The Cyprus Conflict Message to the Congress Reporting on Progress Toward a Negotiated Settlement.

To the Congress of the United States:

As required by Public Law 94-104, this report describes the progress that has been made during the past sixty days towards a negotiated settlement on Cyprus.

On April 13 representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community presented to U.N. Secretary General Waldheim a description of the proposals that they intend to put on the table once the Cyprus intercommunal talks, in recess since April 1977, are reconvened. After examining these proposals, the Secretary General issued a public statement characterizing them as "concrete and substantial" yet cautioning at the same time that he had reached no judgment on their merits. On April 19 the Secretary General travelled to Nicosia, where he explained the new Turkish Cypriot proposals to the Government of Cyprus. Later that day President Kyprianou declared to a press conference that the proposals were "entirely inadmissible" and totally inadequate as a basis for resuming intercommunal negotiations. At the same time, however, he did not completely close the door to a new round of talks.

These new Turkish Cypriot proposals represent a limited advance over the positions that the Turkish Cypriots have assumed in previous negotiating sessions. Reflecting earlier ideas, the new constitutional proposal stresses substantial self-government for each of the two zones and the concept of equality of representation for the two communities in the future central government of Cyprus. Yet it is substantially more developed and detailed than the brief and sketchy paper tabled by the Turkish Cypriot representative at the last round of talks in Vienna in April 1977. Our understanding, moreover, is that the Turkish Cypriots have in fact prepared an entire draft constitution for consideration once negotiations commence. As far as the territorial issue is concerned, the Turkish Cypriots have designated six general areas in the vicinity of the present demarcation line whose transfer to Greek administration they would be prepared to negotiate, and they have not ruled out discussing other areas that the Greek Cypriots may wish to raise. The Turkish Cypriots refrained from specifying the percentage of territory that they would be prepared to transfer to the Greek Cypriot side on the grounds that this would deprive them of the negotiating flexibility they were seeking to preserve. While this territorial proposal is not as concrete as some would have hoped, it does represent an advance in that for the first time the Turkish Cypriots have clearly agreed to sit at the table and discuss territorial concessions. In a separate proposal on Varosha (New Famagusta), the Turkish Cypriots indicated that they would be prepared to permit Greek Cypriot inhabitants to return to their homes and properties in the city, which is now almost totally uninhabited but behind the Turkish line.

The Government of Cyprus has justified its rejection of the Turkish Cypriot proposals on the grounds that they provide not for the creation of a federation, as called for in the Makarios-Denktash understanding of February 1977, but rather for partition of the island into two separate states. Clearly there is a broad conceptual gap between the two sides on the constitutional issue. A second Greek Cypriot contention is that the April 13 proposals envisage the return of only a very small portion of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus to Greek Cypriot control and that Greek Cypriot resettlement of Varosha under Turkish Cypriot administration would be unacceptable.

The Turks and Turkish Cypriots have repeatedly stressed both in public and in private that they are fully prepared to be flexible and to negotiate in earnest once the talks are reconvened. They have underscored that the April 13 proposals represent only a starting-point and should not be construed as the final Turkish Cypriot position. Recently, more substantial indications of Turkish flexibility have Jimmy Carter, 1978 emerged. In a press conference in Bonn on May 11 Prime Minister Ecevit gave assurances that the political framework of Varosha is open to negotiation; the Turks have authoritatively stated that as many as 35,000 Greek Cypriots will be allowed to return to Varosha; and they have specified that this return can commence as soon as the talks are resumed. At the same time, however, the Turkish side has made it clear that no new proposals will be developed in advance of actual negotiations, which they have called upon Secretary Ceneral Waldheim to schedule without further delay.

On May 2 Secretary General Waldheim issued a statement noting that a significant gap continued to exist between the two Cypriot parties and announcing his intention to hold further consultations in order to clarify their positions regarding a resumption of the negotiating process. The Secretary General has recently met with President Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash as well as with Prime Ministers Ecevit and Caramanlis. We understand that Special United Nations Representative on Cyprus Galindo Pohl will be undertaking further consultations in the area.

On May 22 Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash issued a statement which clarified and to a certain extent reformulated the Turkish Cypriot position on resumption of the intercommunal talks. This was in many respects a positive and encouraging statement. First, Mr. Denktash reaffirmed Turkish Cypriot readiness to enter into "sustained, intensive good-faith negotiations" with the Greek Cypriots, and he noted that he had made a commitment to Secretary General Waldheim to enter into these negotiations "with an open mind and in a spirit of conciliation and flexibility." Second, with respect to the territorial issue, Mr. Denktash declared that he was prepared to consider significant geographical readjustments" which would enable "a considerable number of Greek Cypriots to resettle." Third, Mr. Denktash spoke of important concessions on Varosha, including the return of some 35,000 Greek Cypriot inhabitants in the course of negotiations. And fourth, Mr. Denktash stated that the Turkish Cypriots were eager to discuss with the Greek Cypriots other steps for healing the wounds of the past, such as the reopening of Nicosia airport and joint economic projects. It should be possible to build on these ideas, and on the proposals put forward by the two sides, to move towards an early resolution of the Cyprus problem.

In his May 24 address to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, President Kyprianou put forward a proposal for the complete demilitarization of Cyprus and for the creation of a mixed Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot police force, in proportion to population, under the guidance and supervision of the United Nations.

The Administration has fully supported the efforts of the Secretary General to reconvene productive intercommunal negotiations. We will continue to do so. It is our conviction that this is a crucial moment in the history of Cyprus. If talks are not resumed at an early date, opportunities for progress on the issue may well be delayed for some time to come, and as a consequence the unfortunate de facto division of the island could further solidify. It is for this reason that every effort must now be made to bring the parties together for sustained, good-faith, and productive negotiations.

JIMMY CARTER

The White House,

June 23, 1978.