Venice Economic Summit Conference Interview With Reporters Following the Conclusion of the Conference.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think what I'll do is just make a couple of remarks to start with and then spend the time we have answering any questions that you might have.

I've had a chance to meet individually with the leaders of the nations and also with the President of the European Community, as well as to meet collectively with them on several occasions, as you know, to deal with the political and economic problems that our countries face collectively in the 1980's.

Basically, we continued the themes that I expressed in the State of the Union message, that I repeated in my Philadelphia speech on foreign affairs, and that I outlined in the toast in Rome this week, emphasizing the threat to the Western democracies, urging them to stand resolved against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, not to accept it in any way as a move that would be condoned by any nation, demanding absolute and total withdrawal of all Soviet troops, not to treat it as was treated their taking over of Czechoslovakia; calling on the nations to be as harmonious as possible in dealing with the energy question, to emulate what we have already done in passing through our Congress a new energy package based on both conservation and on the development of alternative forms of energy.

I've been very pleased at the strength of the resolutions and the harmony that does exist among us. This has been an opportunity for me to discuss many items of mutual interest, and I think this has probably been the best summit conference that I've attended so far.

I'll be glad to answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Carter, you have now been to three of these, and there have been discussion from Giscard and others about the format and whether it's a good thing and how they work and how it should be changed, if at all—more frequent, different format, political separate from economic. I wonder what your thoughts are and how you rate this one.

THE PRESIDENT. This is my fourth one. It's obvious that as experience has been gained, with Henry Owen as my personal representative, the 6 solid months of preparation for these summit conferences have paid rich dividends. It's let us explore possible differences among us and resolve as best we could prior to the entry of the heads of state the answers to some of the questions.

We all believe that the maximum benefit comes from the frank discussion among the heads of state ourselves, possibly joined by the Foreign Ministers. And my guess is that in the conference to be held in Canada in 1981, there's likely to be a smaller entourage, and we probably will limit the questions to those that relate fairly exclusively to the head-of-state level that can't be resolved by the Finance Ministers or by the Ministers responsible for energy.

We have expanded this session more than ever before to a discussion of political and diplomatic measures, including all seven heads of state. In the past, we have had one breakfast meeting or one luncheon meeting with the four so-called Berlin powers. This time we decided to have the political aspects of Europe and the world discussed among all seven. And I think it worked well.

Q. Mr. President, what has happened here beyond the strong communiqué that we got yesterday that makes it any more likely that the Russians will be willing to either get out or negotiate an exit from Afghanistan? And do you expect them to negotiate an exit from Afghanistan?

THE PRESIDENT. It's hard to predict what the Soviets are doing. My experience has been not to be optimistic in expectations.

Well, we have, since the very beginning, taken unilateral steps and urged as many of our allies and friends in other countries to join us with the prohibition against Soviet fishing in American waters, the grain embargo, and the joint call by 104 nations for the Soviets to withdraw and demands of a similar nature made by the 34 to 36 nations in the Moslem world on two occasions.

We've asked our allies and friends not to replace goods or services that we did not sell to the Soviet Union, and we've asked them not to give special credit terms to the Soviets, as had been the case in the past, for instance, with the British and the Japanese. We've asked them to stand resolute in not recognizing as legitimate the Babrak Karmal, Babrak regime, and demanding total withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan by the Soviets—not a partial withdrawal—as an acceptable fact.

The more the Soviets realize that they do stand isolated in the world, that they are condemned by the world as an aggressive power and as long as we support the national liberation forces in Afghanistan with our words and our encouragement on a collective basis as we have done here, the more likely the Soviets are to decide they've made a serious mistake. I think the Soviets did underestimate the fervor and the courage of the freedom-fighters who are struggling for national liberation. I think they did underestimate the condemnation of the United Nations members and also the constant condemnation of the Moslem countries with whom the Soviets do want good relationships.

I think we have reconfirmed the position of all the nations on the Olympic boycott that had been stated before by them, even after we had the flurry of reports about the Soviet withdrawal.

So, for the Soviets to face a united commitment of all of us plus the other nations in the world of opposition to their extended stay in Afghanistan will be an encouraging factor in the Soviets' decision to withdraw.

Q. Why did your joint statement not go into economic sanctions, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. Pardon?

Q. Why did your joint statement on that not go into economic sanctions on Afghanistan?

THE PRESIDENT. We didn't go into specifics about what the nations would or would not do in withholding credit or the grain embargo or the fishing in waters or other matters relating to economics. Each nation over the last 6 months has decided on its own, working with parliaments and, in my case, working with the Congress, to make a stand on Afghanistan and to initiate sanctions of a varying degree of severity.

I think it's accurate to say that those exerted by the United States were the most severe, and they vary among the nations here. There has been no backing off, no change in the severity of the sanctions already imposed, but to enumerate the degree of the sanctions which do vary among the nations, I think, would have been a fruitless effort.

Q. Mr. President, could I ask about the hostages in Iran?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Q. You've said that you wouldn't forget them, but there was no mention of the 53 Americans in the statement which came out of yesterday's meeting. And you did not refer to those hostages specifically in your closing remarks today. Could you tell us why they weren't mentioned, or were they discussed privately?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, they were discussed privately, and I think some of the leaders did mention them. I think that Mrs. Thatcher, for instance, did.

We all see the international terrorism associated with the capture of the diplomats, of the Americans in Iran, as a pattern to be feared and condemned by the entire world. The essence of the hijacking and the terrorism, the capturing of diplomats, is that it's a phenomenon that's abhorrent to all of us and on which the nations represented here have stood resolutely.

All of them have joined in with us in sanctions against Iran. Those sanctions are being maintained, and there's no doubt about that fact. In my private discussions with the leaders, we covered, in each case, what the countries are doing to help us, either through the United Nations or through diplomatic or other means. Some still have personnel in Iran who are giving assistance to us.

So, that's a matter of great concern to all of us. There's no

Q. But was there a conscious decision not to mention the 53 and Iran in the context of the statement and for your statement?

THE PRESIDENT. No, there was no conscious decision—

Q. What have you determined, Mr. President, about what the Russians actually have done with their troops in-or out of Iran—not so much what the letters say.

THE PRESIDENT. Out of Afghanistan.

Q. Excuse me, out of Afghanistan-but what you know, have determined to be a fact about that?

THE PRESIDENT. We know what forces the Soviets claim are going to be moved out of Afghanistan, and we know that some of those forces are being moved, at least just across the border. The best information I have is that the Soviets have had about 85,000 armed troops in Afghanistan and 30 to 35 thousand on the borders of Afghanistan in Soviet territory.

They have probably ordered the withdrawal of less than 10 percent of those forces. And my own information is that the forces they have withdrawn have not been those that have seen action within the last several weeks or months and they can easily be put into Afghanistan without delay if the Soviets should suffer reverses there.

Q. But then you don't consider this any kind of a real withdrawal, to any extent, that would be a first step?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I helped to word that part of the communiqué yesterday, and we put some very careful "ifs" in there. It will be significant if it is confirmed, if the withdrawal is permanent, and if this is a first step leading to total and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. Under those circumstances, it will be significant.

Q. Then you're not able to judge yet?

THE PRESIDENT. Not yet.

Q. Mr. President, with regard to Chancellor Schmidt's coming visit to Moscow, how do you feel personally about the timing of that visit? Is it helpful, or does it run counter to current interests of keeping the Russians at arm's length until they show better faith about Afghanistan?

THE PRESIDENT. I think it's coming at a good time. After talking with President Giscard d'Estaing, I also believe that his visit with Brezhnev was a fruitful exchange. There was a very firm and forceful presentation by the French President of the position of their nation, as expressed in this communiqué, and I have no doubt that Chancellor Schmidt will make the same forceful presentation to the President of the Soviet Union.

And for the Soviet leaders to hear in an unvarnished fashion directly from European leaders the same kind of message they've been hearing by various means from us, I think, strengthens our own position and also sends a very clear signal to the Soviets that there is no variation among us in our condemnation of the Soviet invasion, and also that it's fruitless for them to try to drive a wedge between us and our European friends and allies.

Q. Mr. President, what merit do you think there is, if any, in Chancellor Schmidt's idea that by pointing out to the Soviets that we have 3 years before we'll be deploying theater nuclear forces in Western Europe—that that may give them an opportunity to pull back on their future weapons? Do you think there's any merit at all in that idea?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't. There is merit to the thought that the Soviets would unilaterally cease deploying the SS-20's. So far, the Soviets have built facilities and have deployed several dozen SS-20's, and they are continuing with that building and that deployment. If the Soviets would unilaterally stop that, it would be beneficial, and that's what Chancellor Schmidt expressed to me as his hope. However, for us to offer a quid pro quo, a quid for that quo, we would not be gaining anything at all.

We will start this summer locating sites, and we'll be going through the construction phase in 1981, 1982, and '83 of the deployment of theater nuclear forces just to meet an overwhelming threat that the Soviets have built up already. And for us to accept the proposition that there is any sort of equity or equality in the present arrangement is a mistake, and for us to agree not to deploy if they will just maintain their heavy existing deployment is not a fair exchange.

So, I do not agree with any freeze nor any prohibition against American and European continuation of our uninterrupted plans.

Q. On the Middle East—

Q. You seem to be holding out hope for something that I gather you don't agree is.—

THE PRESIDENT. If the Chancellor's hopes are realized and if the Soviets unilaterally stop their present heavy construction and deployment plans, I would be pleased and I would also be surprised.

Q. On the Middle East, Mr. President—

Q. Mr. President, one of the subjects on which there was no statement in the summit was on the Middle East with regard to peace efforts.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Q. Today there seems to be a new complicating circumstance in reports that Prime Minister Begin is supposed to be moving some office to East Jerusalem. Were there discussions here on the Middle East, and how did they come out?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes. We did not discuss that report, and I'm not prepared to discuss it, because I've not been briefed on it. But I explained to the European leaders very clearly what our position is. We are committed to the Camp David process, as long as the Egyptians and the Israelis agree with us that there is an ongoing chance of progress toward a comprehensive peace.

Obviously we have had some times of rapid movement and some times of dormancy in progress, and I cannot predict firmly what the future might hold. But at this time there is no alternative procedure that I can envision that could adequately replace the Camp David document, the basis provided for it in U.N. 242, nor the process of negotiating between Israel and Egypt and us with the invitation open to the Jordanians and Palestinians that might be acceptable to all sides. For us to terminate this process simply because we're not making rapid progress would be a mistake.

I have pointed out to the European leaders—and I don't think any have privately disagreed with me—that there is absolutely nothing in the Camp David accords that contradicts what the Palestinians and/or the Jordanians and other Arab leaders desire to see accomplished. Those difficult issues that presently divide the Israeli position from the Arab position are yet to be resolved through negotiation, and I pointed out to them the unpredicted progress that was made between Israel and Egypt, when Egypt was willing to sit down with the Israelis and negotiate in good faith under the most difficult of circumstances.

I had a long discussion earlier this week with King Hussein of Jordan about this.

It would please me—but I don't expect this to happen—if Jordan would join the peace talks. It has become difficult now for the Jordanians and other Arab leaders to acknowledge that the Camp David accords are the best approach. I don't have any doubt that they are.

If, in the future, the Egyptians become convinced or the Israelis become convinced or we become convinced that there is a better way to move toward a comprehensive peace in the Mideast, resolving the Palestinian question in all its aspects, giving the Palestinians a voice in the determination of their own future, guaranteeing mutual security, then of course we would explore that alternative route. But so far I do not see any alternative to what we are doing.

Q. Has the European resolution helped or hindered?

Q. What was that question?

THE PRESIDENT. "Has the European resolution helped or hindered."

It's hard to say. I did not encourage the passing of that resolution. It could have been worse in its wording. It was worded very cautiously, and I don't believe that it did any harm. But we will continue in an uninterrupted fashion along the course laid out by the Camp David agreement and the Camp David process.

Q. Do you think you've convinced anybody, Mr. President, on the Camp David argument here in Venice?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think so. I would rather let them speak for themselves.

What they want to do is to express their belief that the Palestinian people should be represented as a final decision is made about the Middle East. We agree with that. This is included within the Camp David accord signed by Prime Minister Begin. So far, we've not been able to get the Jordanians, for instance, to join with Palestinian members of its delegation, and we've not yet been able to get a representative group of, say, the West Bank and Gaza mayors to say, "This is what we want to do in going toward full autonomy." I don't know if we'll be successful in that effort.

But I think the European leaders understand very well that there is no present alternative to the Camp David effort • and we don't disagree with the fact that the Palestinian question must be resolved and that the Palestinian rights must be honored and that the Palestinians must have a voice in this decision.

Q. Prime Minister Trudeau said that while there was great unity on economic issues that you hadn't quite come to that sense of unity on the political front. Could you explain to us what some of the political differences were and where you see the major problems are?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, obviously the other leaders have different views about how rapidly to move on the resolution of the Mideast differences.

I think the French, for instance, would demand immediate and total withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the occupied territories of the West Bank. President Giscard d'Estaing has made this clear, that that is his option. That's easy to say, but how to go about inducing the Israelis to withdraw from the West Bank, which they've agreed to do, in U.N. 242, how far to withdraw, how to negotiate a final determination of the status of the West Bank, how to guarantee Israeli security in the meantime, those are the difficult aspects of it—how to accommodate the questions of water and land and the authority given to the interim self-governing body. So, I think there are differences about how and how rapidly to move, and there are differences about how to assess the ultimate status of the West Bank.

But those things are inevitable. They've been very clearly expressed to the public. There are no private disagreements among us that haven't been clearly discerned through the press and through the public.

Q. Mr. President, do you anticipate any repercussions at home about the conference's very unequivocal statement about the importance of expanding nuclear power?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't—well, I say I don't. Do I anticipate any differences? There are going to be some differences.

Our position on nuclear power is clear. We believe that nuclear power is going to have to play a viable part in the energy production in the United States. We consider nuclear power to be a source of last resort, in that to the extent that we can conserve energy in our country and provide alternative forms of energy, the dependence on nuclear power can be minimized. But there are many States and communities that have a heavy dependence on nuclear power, and we believe that there's a viable demand for nuclear powerplants that will be honored in the future in our country.

We are working toward safer plants, better operation, better maintenance, better design, more standardization of construction.

Other countries that don't have the benefit of massive coal deposits and oil and gas and shale, like, for instance, France or Germany or Japan, have to depend much more heavily on nuclear power. So, the communiqué was worded very carefully to accommodate the special needs of seven nations who differ radically one from another in the natural resources with which they've been blessed.

We don't have any apology to make for the language. Our position has not changed on how nuclear power should be handled.

Q. Mr. President, following upon that, nuclear power is one aspect, but you all stressed the breaking of the link between oil consumption and economic growth. And one of you—or the communiqué spoke of this as a binding commitment. Now, some of the means to that end-doubling the use of coal and the use of synthetics from shale and so forth—also pose potential problems for the environment. My question is, do you foresee that our current environmental laws will have to be relaxed in some degree in order to meet that commitment?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I do not. There are two aspects of the energy thing. One is the ratio between the additional energy used in its totality, on the one hand, and the growth in our economy on the other hand. I think Valery Giscard d'Estaing explained this better than anyone else, because he went into it in more depth.

At the present time, assuming 1980 as a base, if economic growth goes up 100 percent, then the amount of energy used will go up 100 percent, total energy. We set as a goal for ourselves that by the end of this decade, if economic growth goes up 100 percent in a certain year, as a base, then the amount of energy required to gain that growth would only go up 60 percent. That's the total amount of energy, regardless of where it comes from.

We can meet that goal. We've done a fairly good analysis of it, and we've made great progress already in our country reducing that energy level by about 30 or 40 percent since 1973, primarily in the commercial area where the profit and loss figures are so important in designing plants and in utilizing wasted energy.

The other aspect of it is how much oil to replace by other forms of energy, and we set as a goal for ourselves between 15 and 20 million barrels of oil per day by these seven nations in totality, that we will replace with coal, nuclear power, synthetic fuels, solar energy, and so forth. I believe that we can meet those goals.

I might say that we set some targets or goals a year ago in Tokyo that many people thought were too radically severe and that no one could meet. We have more than met our goals, and all the nations reported today that they will meet those goals in 1980.

Q. Sir, the progress that you cite that's been made in the United States, as I would understand it, has been largely through more efficiency.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Q. And now, as you reach the end of the road on that and have to substitute other fuel than oil, do you still believe that this can be done without, one, damaging the environment or, two, having to relax environmental laws.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, my answer to that question is still the same.

Obviously, you help the environment when you have a certain amount of economic growth or transport people so far with less energy, because you have less exhaust. And as you burn fuels cleaner, you have less air pollution, for instance, and less waste put into the water. And in addition to that, even though we have a very ambitious coal program, we will not lower our air pollution standards at all. In my approach to the coal people from the very first meeting I ever had with them was that they would be committing a very serious mistake if, in promoting the use of coal, they advocated the lowering of air pollution standards. And they have not done so at this point and do not anticipate doing so.

All of the changes, for instance, that would be made in the so-called Rockefeller report to convert existing utility companies from oil or gas to coal were approved ahead of time by the Environmental Protection Agency to make sure that they could make this change without lowering the air pollution standards.

Q. Mr. President, you say you haven't been briefed on the Begin report, but in general, do you not have a position on anything that Israel might do absent negotiations to make more permanent her presence in East Jerusalem?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't want to refer to East Jerusalem specifically, but we have issued a statement about a month ago through a speech that Ed Muskie made calling on both nations not to take any action of a permanent nature that would be incompatible with the Camp David process.

Q. Would it not be incompatible to do something that would make more permanent a presence in East Jerusalem, say?

THE PRESIDENT. I'll let you make the judgment of that. Let me not go into East Jerusalem.

Q. Mr. President, you're going to Yugoslavia, I guess it's tomorrow. Did you have any regrets-

THE PRESIDENT. Let me get the question in the back.

Q.—about not going to the funeral?

Q. On the timing of Brezhnev's announcement of troop withdrawals, what do you think he expected, if anything, from this meeting here, announcing as you all gathered here in Venice?

THE PRESIDENT. It's hard to judge a reason for Brezhnev's announcement that, as you know, was made to the President of France through TASS News Agency, and then, I think, in general throughout the world.

The Soviets authorized President Giscard d'Estaing to notify us. We had already had this information before we were informed by President Giscard d'Estaing.

Q. You already had the information before Giscard told you?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Q. How?

Q. CIA. [Laughter]

THE PRESIDENT. Well—

Q. Wiretaps.

THE PRESIDENT. It's hard—I think one thing is obviously a propaganda effort on the part of the Soviets to repair some of the damage that has been done to their reputation, because they claim to be a .peace-loving nation, and they are occupying, by military force, a freedom-loving people and perpetrating very severe punishment on those people who are fighting to liberate their own country. And to give the impression in the world that they are withdrawing those forces—whether it's an accurate impression or not remains to be seen—would be a propaganda effort for them.

I believe another reason—and this was discussed among the leaders—is to induce some independent athletes to attend the Olympics. The Soviets have put out the word among their embassies throughout the world that they will pay all the expenses, for instance, of athletes who are willing to go to the Olympics. So, they are having a major recruitment effort to induce additional people to go to the Olympics.

What other reasons they might have I don't know. There may be some special consequences of their invasion in the Soviet Union with casualty figures. That could be a factor, but I have no way to know. It's just all this is surmise on my part.

Q. Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. Maybe a couple more questions.

Q. Why did they tell President Giscard before they told you?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't know.

Q. Or anybody?

THE PRESIDENT. Why? I have my own guess.

Q. Which is what?

THE PRESIDENT. But I don't know why.

Q. Mr. President, on Afghanistan again, there was some mention, too, about the courage of the Afghan rebels and the support for their movement. Is there going to be any efforts on the parts of the countries here to support those rebels with arms or any financial aid?

THE PRESIDENT. That's a question I would rather not answer.

Q. Could I ask you about the Tito funeral? You're going to Yugoslavia tomorrow. In hindsight, do you have any regrets about not going to the Tito funeral, and why did you choose not to go at the time when everybody else but Giscard went?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't have any regrets in hindsight. I might point out that the President of Mexico didn't go. The Prime Minister of Canada didn't go. The President of France didn't go. I didn't go.

I think there are 150 some nations on Earth. Forty-two of them went; some, heads of state, and some not. But there was certainly no absence of respect or reverence that I wanted to express to the people of Yugoslavia, and I believe that this trip to Yugoslavia will be much more beneficial a result than would have a visit by me to the country in the aftermath of President Tito's death.

I had an opportunity for television interviews and news interviews with Yugoslav press this past week and again expressed to the Yugoslavian people my admiration for President Tito, his reputation as a fighter for freedom, his leadership in the nonaligned movement, and my regrets to them over his death.

So, I don't have any apology to make, but I think I made the right decision.

Q. Mr. President, you said in your toast in Rome that there had to be a concrete demonstration of Western opposition to the Afghanistan invasion. Do you consider the statement that the leaders issued yesterday sufficient to meet that test, or would you hope and expect that some of the allies will take steps beyond what they've already done to let the Soviets know they do not approve of their behavior?

THE PRESIDENT. I think a communiqué alone would not be enough, and we certainly don't consider it to be enough in our own case, just to issue a communiqué. There are restraints presently and to be continued in the future on the transfer of technology to the Soviet Union, for instance. There has been an interruption of former trade credits, beneficial terms and lower interest rates than ordinarily that have been granted to the Soviets that are no longer granted. These kinds of things will be maintained. And there'll also be the pressure of world opinion on the Soviet Union—an acknowledgment by us and other nations of the occupation.

So, this is just part of a broad gamut of actions that we and others are taking in a peaceful way to induce the Soviets to withdraw their forces.

Q. [Inaudible]—additional concrete steps in the nature of our own grain embargo by other nations?

THE PRESIDENT. I can't answer that question.

Q. When you say this wouldn't be enough in our own case, do you mean that we are going to take some other specific steps?

THE PRESIDENT. I meant we are already taking other steps in addition to the communiqué.

Q. Is it true that you and Schmidt crossed swords? According to a German official, he really—that said he lectured you for a half hour. Or was it all sweetness and light?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it was sweeter and lighter at the end of the conversation than it was at the beginning. [Laughter]

Q. Are you going to the Ohira memorial service?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't know.

I think I made an appropriate statement after Helmut and I had our conversation. One was that the letter that I sent—which I consider to be a private letter and which he considers to be private-was sent with the best of intentions and consists of two basic parts. One was an acknowledgment that erroneous press reports concerning Schmidt's statement on the theater nuclear force agreement were causing problems. I personally put in the phrase "erroneous press reports," because they were erroneous.

Secondly, I wanted to explain to Chancellor Schmidt very clearly what the United States position is on any sort of moratorium or freeze concerning theater nuclear forces.

So, he understands me, and I understand him very well. And I think the meeting was fruitful, and we just never have to refrain from speaking frankly.

Q. What was astonishing about the letter?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think the letter should have been astonishing, but I'd rather let Chancellor Schmidt tell you about that.

Q. What did you say about an Ohira memorial service? Are you going? I didn't hear you.

THE PRESIDENT. I don't—want to say anything on that— [laughter] —

Q. Did you have any fun in Venice, or was it all work?

THE PRESIDENT. I 'had a good time, yes. It's just an unbelievably beautiful city. And Rosalynn and Amy have been having a good time.

Q. Did you really have bread and cheese and water for breakfast

THE PRESIDENT. Milk.

Q. Oh, milk. [Laughter]

Q. Did you have any trouble getting a word in?

THE PRESIDENT. This morning? [Laughter]

Well, I really enjoyed it. They have eight monks over there. This is an order that was founded in the year 982, and they formerly had 215 monks there, and now they only have 12. But they take care of St. Marks, as you know, which is filled with treasures, and they minister to the congregation who comes there, primarily tourists and others who come. And then they also have duties out among the little islands, among the poor people.

They do scholarly work. One of them is a very noted scholar on Gregorian chants and has issued several publications that are used in recording the ancient Gregorian chants. It was a very delightful occasion for me.

The priest who's the head of the order formerly lived in Arkansas and Missouri and Wisconsin. He taught school there in the colleges. He's a musician, a pianist and an organist. And another one of the monks is from Brooklyn—

Q. A Jewish monk. [Laughter]

THE PRESIDENT. I asked him—he said he'd be there the rest of his life. When the monks join the order, they come prepared to stay forever.

Q. Are you going to retire there, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. It sounds like a great idea.

They've also got some people who just come and live with the monks and who go out every day and do their work at the university, keeping books.

Q. Could the press learn something from those monks? [Laughter]

THE PRESIDENT. I have to admit that I looked on them with great envy.

Q. Did they try to convert you? They're Catholic.

THE PRESIDENT. I've already converted. [Laughter]

Q. Mr. President, do you really think that—I don't mean to get serious again—

THE PRESIDENT. That's all right.

Q.—but do you really think it's a healthy trend that the Russians are now dealing with the French and the Germans and so forth?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Q. And not just primarily with the United States?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think they've ever dealt primarily with us. There's always been, I think, a legitimate effort on the part of the Soviet Union to work with and to discuss issues with and also to negotiate with the Europeans directly. But we've always had a custom since the Second World War to share the results of those exchanges.

As soon as Chancellor Schmidt completes his visit to Moscow, then Mr. Genscher, who's the Foreign Minister, will come to Washington to give Secretary Vance and myself a complete report—

Q. Who, who?

Q. Who, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Genscher.

Q. Secretary who?

Q. Vance? You said Vance.

THE PRESIDENT. I'm sorry. My fault. Secretary Muskie. Secretary Muskie. [Laughter]

PRESS SECRETARY POWELL. Donaldson's [Sam Donaldson, ABC News] been drunk for 3 days. [Laughter]

Q. He's a better man for it.

Q. You don't think this looks like business as usual to the American public?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it may.

Q. When we are blessing Schmidt going and you saying that there were fruitful results from Giscard going and that to the public it looks like

THE PRESIDENT. But the fruitful part, I think I pointed out, was that Giscard told Brezhnev, in effect, the same things that were in this communiqué that was issued yesterday, and I don't have any way to know what reports President Brezhnev might get from his ambassadors in other countries, whether he knows that the allies are this firm in condemning the occupation. So, in my judgment, it's both beneficial and also inevitable. We could not prevent it even if we wanted to, which I don't.

And when I have met with Brezhnev or when Secretary Muskie met with Gromyko recently, he immediately gave a report, a private report, to the Foreign Ministers of the other nations who were assembled there. This is a customary thing, and I think it's very good for us to keep having these communications open with the Soviet Union.

Q. But the only thing the Soviets see or hear that would increase their likelihood to want to withdraw is simply unity, right? I mean there aren't any new concrete steps that you're anticipating or any of them is anticipating—if I understood you correctly.

THE PRESIDENT. None that I could surmise.

Q. It's simply the impression that we are—

THE PRESIDENT. But that's important.

Q. —all together, and it won't be, as you said, another Czechoslovakia-

THE PRESIDENT. I think that all of us—

Q.—that it's supposed to make them take the idea of negotiating more seriously.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I think that all of us refuse to accept the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a permanent, accomplished fact, that we demand the Soviets' total withdrawal from Afghanistan, and that we are so closely united that the Soviet effort, if mounted, to divide us one from another and to deal individually with us on a separate basis would be fruitless. I think that's a very good and beneficial signal to send to the Soviets.

Q. Is there a problem, Mr. President, that the French, the German President have somewhat different home constituencies than you have—

THE PRESIDENT. I'm sure they do.

Q.—that they have to sometimes speak to. You're going to be running against, probably, Governor Reagan. Schmidt has a problem on the left wing of his party and so on, so that you may agree in purpose, but when you express it sometimes, you've got to think of whom you are talking to at home.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think everything you said is true. And I try to make a point, within limited bounds, of studying the German and the French and the British and the Japanese and other political party coalitions and the makeup of the individual party factions. This is important for me, when I have a bilateral meeting, to understand what they face.

We observed very closely this morning, for instance, the results of the Japanese election—the drastic reduction in the Communists' strength, a very unexpected victory for the conservative party, which has been the ruling party for a long time. So, I try to understand these things and also ask them questions in our private, more informal talks about politics in their country. They are quite interested in our Nation, knowing the general results of the primary season, what the issues were, how those might carry over into the general election. We're all politicians, and we all exchange experiences.

Q. Can you see any prospect that the Soviets could be seriously interested in negotiating withdrawal before November—I mean, that you could be engaged in serious discussions about it by the fall?

THE PRESIDENT. I really don't envision the Soviets negotiating a withdrawal. We don't know what the Soviets might do, but I can't imagine our being involved in a negotiation.

We have sent to the Soviets a very clear message that was known by our friends and allies here, telling them in effect that with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in their entirety, that we would support an independent, nonaligned, neutral government of Afghanistan if it was acceptable in form to the Afghan people. And how that goal might be accomplished is something that the Soviets can assess, and whether they will attempt it, I can't predict.

Q. [Inaudible]—do you think more informal, where there's some real prospect that they would be talking about withdrawing by fall?

THE PRESIDENT. I think it's a possibility. As you know—

Q. But that's not your expectation, is that correct?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't predict it, but I would be pleased to see it happen.

The Moslem nations, as you know, have formed a three-person committee to explore those possibilities. And it may be, if the Soviets are very discouraged about their lack of success in subjugating the Afghan people, that they might be looking for some way to resolve this issue, and they might attach themselves to this Moslem country effort. But I don't have any way to know.

Q. Who are the Moslem countries?

THE PRESIDENT. Iran, Syria, and-anybody know?

MR. FRIENDLY. ¹ Iran, Pakistan, and the secretary general of the Islamic Conference.

¹ Alfred Friendly, National Security Council Press Officer.

THE PRESIDENT. I know Ghotzbadeh is one of them.

Q. But you don't see our participating short of a total withdrawal—I mean, if they were to begin—participating in neutralization.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, that's too conjectural—

Q. Well, a senior American official said yesterday

THE PRESIDENT.—because a commitment to a total withdrawal at a certain specified early time—you know, if it can be monitored—would be a major factor. I wouldn't say that we'll sit back and-

Q. Have you noticed, Mr. President, as some of us have, that as Reagan emerges more clearly as the Republican candidate that your stock in Europe goes up?

THE PRESIDENT. I hope it's not just in Europe. [Laughter]

REPORTER. Thank you.