"A Conversation With the President," Interview With Howard K. Smith of the American Broadcasting Company

QUESTIONS

THE PRESIDENT'S MOOD

[1.] MR. SMITH. Mr. President, it was about this month, in this year of his tenure, that President Kennedy said: This is the winter of my discontent.

And President Johnson didn't put it the same way, but he felt the same way about the same time in his tenure. How are you feeling these days?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't feel it is "the winter of my discontent." I suppose I keep it somewhat in perspective because I have had many winters in the past which perhaps have been more difficult than this one. There are grave problems confronting America, at home and abroad, but I am rather confident about the solution of those problems. And as long as one is confident about the programs and plans that he is working on, the problems do not loom nearly as big or as difficult.

CREDIBILITY GAP

[2.] MR. SMITH. Mr. President, let me ask you a question to which I shall first append a preface. I promise you the rest of the questions won't be this long.

To me, the key formative fact about the Nixon Presidency is the fact that you were elected to lead the Nation, but due to our system of separate elections you were not given the usual means of leadership. You got a popular mandate which was small; you are the first President in this century to be elected with both Houses of Congress in opposition; you said, I think, last week in an interview that in your situation, television, getting to the public by television, gave you the leverage you needed. Well, now, that channel is menaced by what the columnists call the credibility gap, and the Gallup Poll said, too, that 7 out of 10 Americans don't believe what the Administration is saying. How did this diminution of belief come about, and what do you intend to do about it?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think first, Mr. Smith, with regard to what you call the credibility gap, that many observers--in fact, I think I even recall something you said at one time--have pointed out that Presidents, particularly when they have difficult problems in foreign affairs, inevitably are going to acquire some credibility gap. This was true of Woodrow Wilson. I remember my mother voted for him because it was thought that if that was the case, if he became President, that he kept us out of war.

And you remember Franklin D. Roosevelt once made the statement in a speech before World War II: I will not send your sons to fight on foreign shores. I think both Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt meant exactly what they said. They were not lying to the American people.

On the other hand, the great events made it necessary for them each to take the Nation into war.

Now, in my case, I found the Nation in war. I found it with 550,000 Americans abroad, with our casualties running at over 300 a week, with no plans to bring them home, with no plans to end the war or end America's involvement in it in a way that would allow South Vietnam to survive as an independent entity.

And I have taken the Nation quite a way since then. When I say I have, I shouldn't use that in such an, shall we say, arrogant fashion. I mean we have done that. We have done it with the assistance of many Democrats, as well as Republicans, in the House and Senate and, of course, of our fighting men abroad.

Now we are reaching the key point-the key point when we see that we are ending America's involvement in a war that has been the longest, the most bitter, the most difficult war in our Nation's history.

And once we go over that hump, once the American people are convinced that the plans that have taken so long to implement have come into effect, then I think the credibility gap will rapidly disappear.

It is the events that cause the credibility gap, not the fact that a President deliberately lies or misleads the people. That is my opinion.

[3.] MR. SMITH. May I cite some cases to you that are cited in the press of credibility gap and ask for your comments on them?

First of all, in a speech you made on television after the Cambodian affair, you said American air power would not be used in support of combat operations in Cambodia henceforth, and, in fact, they were, in the battle for Highway 4 to Kompong Som.

THE PRESIDENT. I also said, however, at that time, that I would use American air power anyplace in North Vietnam, or in the Southeast Asian area, where I found that it would be necessary for the purpose of protecting American forces in South Vietnam.

Now, my decision with regard to the use of American air power, whether it is against North Vietnam--there was a strike there yesterday, as you know, against some SAM sites which had been shooting at some of our reconnaissance planes--whether that air power is used, as it has been used, in Laos, for the purpose of supporting the South Vietnamese in their efforts to blunt the North Vietnamese attack, which would be, thereby, launched against the South, and against Americans eventually, or whether it was used in Cambodia, the primary, purpose was not for the assistance, for the purpose of assisting the South Vietnamese, not for the purpose of assisting the Cambodians, but the purpose was and the justification was, and must always be, the defense of American forces in South Vietnam.

And as Commander in Chief, I had that responsibility. I had met it, and I believe this is correct.

[4.] MR. SMITH. Sir, another case, the other day, I think, in your press conference you said that Communist traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail had been cut by 55 percent. Now the same day, the UPI quoted the military command in Saigon as saying it had been cut only 20 percent, which was quite a drastic difference. Can you match those----

THE PRESIDENT. Oh, yes. The military commander in Saigon was actually completely correct and so was I. We were talking about two different things. You see, there is traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail north of the area around Tchepone, where the operation of the South Vietnamese was taking place. There is traffic south of the area of Tchepone.

Now, as far as the traffic coming down the trail to Tchepone, where the battle was taking place between the South Vietnamese forces and the North Vietnamese forces, that traffic actually was very greatly increased. But as far as the traffic south of Tchepone was concerned, that traffic was substantially reduced.

As a matter of fact, I have since found that 55 percent, my estimate, was too low--that actually the traffic had been cut more than that. I would say that perhaps

75 percent of the traffic has been cut south, at that time, south of the area of the fighting.

And it, of course, stands to good reason why. Because the units fighting--the North Vietnamese fighting in that area against the South Vietnamese--they needed those supplies, they needed the trucks, they needed all the other things that normally would go south. And they chewed them up.

[5.] MR. SMITH. Now, you also said that the Laos operation showed the South Vietnamese could hack it by themselves. Now, that seems partly so, but it has to be added that they do that to that degree only with tremendous U.S. air support, 40,000 helicopter sorties, against an adversary that has no air power at all. And that is cited as a case of overstatement.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, let's look at two different areas, Mr. Smith. First, let's look at the area of Cambodia. As you know--as a matter of fact, as you and some other commentators have pointed out--at the time when all eyes have been on Laos, a very significant operation has been going on in Cambodia.

Perhaps it is not as well known that at that time, in that operation where over 4,000 North Vietnamese who have already been casualties--in that operation, it has been entirely conducted by the South Vietnamese, and 75 percent of all the air sorties in that operation are South Vietnamese. South Vietnam has a very good air force. It isn't yet big enough, however, to handle the kind of operation that they have in Cambodia as well as the one in Laos.

Now, when we look at the situation in Laos what do we find there? We found that the South Vietnamese went in with forces that numerically were very inferior to the forces that they found. As a matter of fact, the North Vietnamese had twice as many ground forces in the area of Laos, of southern Laos, as South Vietnam had.

South Vietnam had, of course, to have support, firepower support, through our air power, which would equalize that difference. And without that firepower support, it would have, of course, been very foolish to have the South Vietnamese go in on the ground against the superior North Vietnamese forces.

But the point that I wish to make is this: That when I use the term "hack it," when General Abrams said that the South Vietnamese, after 6 weeks in Laos, are coming out, the great majority of them with higher confidence, with greater morale, despite the fact that they have taken some very severe losses, they know that they have given much more losses to the enemy, that we now have concluded, and this is General Abrams' assessment, that the South Vietnamese have now passed a milestone in their development.

We didn't know at the time of Cambodia whether they could conduct an operation last year by themselves, and, consequently, we went in with advisers.

This year, they went in without any American advisers, with only American air support, against very, very heavy odds numerically on the ground. They fought extremely well. Now they are withdrawing. They are having all the problems of an army withdrawing. Some of their units have not done so well. But 18 out of the 22 battalions, as General Abrams has pointed out, are doing extremely well and, he says, will come out with greater confidence and greater morale than before.

What this all means, of course, is that South Vietnam, man for man, when there is not a numerical superiority on the part of the enemy, will be able to--to use the parochial term--"hack it," in my opinion and in General Abrams' opinion.

And I should also point out this: That in Laos they were fighting on the enemy's terrain, on his turf, against overwhelming numbers. When they fight in South Vietnam, they are going to be fighting on their terrain with their having the numerical advantage and the enemy having the long supply line.

[6.] MR. SMITH. Well, now, sir, they give the impression of retreating from Laos now, and there is still a whole month of dry season before the rains come. If they retreat now, won't the Communists have plenty of time to repair their trails and repair their pipelines before the rains come?

THE PRESIDENT. They can never gain back the time, Mr. Smith. Six weeks is a period in which the Communists not only have found, as we pointed out earlier, that the supplies to the South have been drastically cut--during that 6-week period they have had chewed up great amounts of ammunition, great amounts of materiel that otherwise would have gone South and would have been used, incidentally, against many Americans fighting in South Vietnam--and also in that 6-week period the South Vietnamese have developed a considerable capability on their own and considerable confidence on their own. They are better units to handle the situation as we withdraw.

Now, insofar as what they are going to be able to do for the balance of this dry season is concerned, I can only suggest that I cannot predict what will happen today, tomorrow, or the next day. There is going to be some more severe fighting as the South Vietnamese continue to withdraw from Laos. That we expected.

But let me try to put it in perspective. I have noted a considerable amount of discussion on the networks and in the newspapers and so forth, and it is altogether, let me say, understandable and justifiable discussion, as to whether this is a victory or a defeat. And I know that that is a question, perhaps, that you would raise; certainly, our viewers would raise it.

Let me hit it very directly. This is not the kind of an operation that you can really describe in the traditional terms of victory or defeat, because its purpose was not to conquer territory. Its purpose was not to destroy an army. Its purpose was simply to disrupt supply lines. Its purpose, in other words, was not to conquer or occupy a part of Laos; its purpose was to defend South Vietnam.

Now, let's measure this operation in terms of accomplishing that purpose. For 6 weeks the South Vietnamese have disrupted the enemy's supply lines. For 6 weeks they have tied down some of the enemy's best divisions. For 6 weeks we have seen, too, that the South Vietnamese have been able to handle themselves quite well under very, very difficult circumstances.

Now, what does this mean for the future? Well, I think when we judge whether this operation is going to be labeled a success or a failure, we cannot judge it before it is concluded, and we cannot judge it even after it is concluded. We can only see it in perspective because its goals were long range--long range being, first, to insure the continuation of the American withdrawal; second, to reduce the risk to the remaining Americans as we withdraw; and, third, to insure the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves after we have left. Those were the three goals of this operation.

How do we know whether or not those goals will be achieved? Well, I will say this, my interim assessment based on General Abrams' advice and the advice that I get from all people in the field is this: As far as our withdrawal is concerned, it is assured. The next withdrawal announcement will be made in April. It will be at least at the number that I have been withdrawing over the past few months; and, second, as far as the danger to the American forces remaining, particularly in the northern part of South Vietnam-there are 100,000 there, as you know-that danger has been substantially reduced. That operation has already accomplished that much.

Third, as far as the ARVN is concerned, and here I come back to an expert, General Abrams, who tells it like it is and says it like it is, says that some of their units did not do so well but 18 out of 22 battalions conducted themselves with high morale, with great confidence, and they are able to defend themselves man for man against the North Vietnamese.

And so that I would say insofar as achieving our goals of assuring American withdrawal, reducing the threat to the remainder of our forces, and, finally, our goal of seeing to it that the ARVN develops the capability to defend itself, that the operation in Laos at this interim period has made considerable progress in achieving those goals.

Now, having said that, Mr. Smith, I don't want to leave the impression that the pictures we have been seeing on television tell basically an inaccurate story. You know, a picture doesn't lie. I know that and you know that. That is why television is such an enormously effective medium. But while a picture doesn't lie, a picture may not tell all the truth.

You have been a war correspondent. You know the man who sees just part of the war doesn't know what is going on in other segments. What have the pictures shown? They have shown only those men in the four ARVN battalions of 22 that were in trouble. They haven't shown people in the other 18 battalions. That is not because it has been deliberate. It is because those make news.

Finally, the pictures have not shown at all what has happened to the enemy, and their losses by conservative estimates are five times as large as the losses of the ARVN. So, under the circumstances I am not saying here that what we are looking at is an operation which at this time can be judged a great success or, by the same token, I say we cannot say that this is an operation that should be judged a failure. I do say that based on the progress that has been made to date, the two things that the American people can judge it on mean a great deal to them: One, that the American withdrawal will continue; two, that the danger to America's remaining forces has been reduced. Of those two things I am sure, and for that reason the operation was worthwhile as far as we are concerned.

[7.] MR. SMITH. I think one of the problems of you and your critics is you are looking at the same set of facts from a different angle. You say the war is winding down, and you can prove it by the troop withdrawals and by the drastic decrease in casualties. They say the war is expanding, and they can prove it geographically by pointing to new nations where our side was not fighting before.

How do you compose these conflicting viewpoints?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Smith, I know you were stationed in Europe for a while and when you were there you probably did what I did when I was there from time to time. I sometimes picked up one of the British or European papers. The London Economist, for example, is a pretty good objective paper. I don't think it could be called a pro-Nixon Administration paper necessarily. But they had a very interesting piece the other day in which they pointed out that when the United States was criticized for expanding the war by reason of our destroying the sanctuaries in Cambodia and supporting the South Vietnamese effort to blunt the North Vietnamese attack in Laos, it said that kind of reasoning would have said that, in effect, when Eisenhower ordered the landings on D-Day, or the landings in Italy in World War II, that the purpose of that was to expand the war into Europe.

Well, the purpose of that was not to expand the war into Europe. The purpose was to get the Germans out. The purpose was to avoid what would otherwise be a shattering defeat.

Let's understand. Let's look at Cambodia for just a moment. I just saw a summary of the 2 weeks' coverage by the television networks and by the newspapers, and I do not claim that this was deliberate or distorted or anything. Let's understand that. I am not here to bait the press and you are not here to bait me. We are just trying to get the facts. But for 2 weeks, and there were some notable exceptions that we don't need to go into-but for 2 weeks the overwhelming majority of the Nation's press and television, after Cambodia, carried three themes: One, the Chinese might intervene; second, American casualties would soar, the war would be expanded; and, third, there was a danger that the American withdrawal would therefore be jeopardized.

Now, none of those things happened. The Chinese did not intervene. American casualties were cut in half. They are one-half as great after Cambodia as before. And the withdrawal rate, as a matter of fact, slightly increased after Cambodia because of its success.

Now, what does this prove? It doesn't prove that the press was trying deliberately to make America look bad. That wasn't the point. But, naturally, they were seeing it from one vantage point. I had to see it from another.

Now, let me say this: Everything that I have done since I have been President has had, as far as South Vietnam is concerned, and North Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos, one purpose, and that is to end America's involvement, but to end it in a way that South Vietnam will continue to survive as an independent country, have a chance to survive. We can't guarantee their survival.

Now, let me say why the second part of that equation is important. Anybody could end the war in Vietnam by just withdrawing, "bugging out" as it has been called, and there are those now in the House and Senate who say, well, let's end it by the end of this year without regard to the consequences.

But, Mr. Smith, the reason I can't do that, even though politically there is great temptation to do it, is that I think I know what would happen. I have been to Asia a number of times, and I think what would happen is that if after all of this sacrifice and all of this effort the United States, right at the time that we are winding doom the war and bringing our men home, at a time when the South Vietnamese are achieving the capability of hacking it, of taking care of their own defense--if the United States now were to throw in the towel and come home, and the Communists took over South Vietnam, then all over Southeast Asia, all over the Pacific, in the Mideast, in Europe, in the world, the United States would suffer a blow, and peace, because we are the great peace-keeping nation in the world today because of our power, would suffer a blow from which it might not recover. That is why I am doing this.

I am doing these things, everything I am doing, not for the purpose of expanding a war but ending it, and ending a war in a way that we can win a peace. That is something we haven't done for a long time in this country.

TROOP WITHDRAWALS

[8.] MR. SMITH. Sir, some of your critics do say the way to get out is to get out immediately. But most of those in Congress, most of your critics say you should set a definite deadline in order to give the American people the view of the light at the end of the tunnel.

What is the objection to setting a definite deadline for withdrawal in order to do that and also to deprive your critics of a complaint?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, you know, you have really given me a nice way to get at the question.

Since it is so easy to do, why don't I do it? And the reason is, it wouldn't be in the interest of the United States. It wouldn't be in the interest of the kind of a peace we are trying to get.

First, it would torpedo any chances for a negotiated settlement which might-there is still some chance; I agree not much, but still some--the moment that we tell the enemy that we are going to get out as of a date certain, then any negotiating stroke we have with regard to accelerating or some way getting our prisoners back a little sooner is completely thrown in.

It also has the effect, once we set the deadline, of completely continuing this operation out there on the enemy's terms.

They know exactly what we are going to do, and then they can proceed to make their plans on that assumption.

Now, what are we doing--let me say I know when we are going to get out. We have a plan. It is being implemented. I will make another announcement on that plan in April. I won't go into it tonight, because it would not be proper to do so until we have all the facts and figures. But it will be at least at the level that we have been going through withdrawals up to this point.

But as far as a deadline is concerned, while the next announcement, I am sure, will give some indication as to the end of the tunnel, we are not going to tell the enemy now that there is no need for them to negotiate, that there is nothing to be gained by their coming to the conference table and negotiating with regard to an exchange of prisoners, possibly with regard to an all-Indochina peace conference.

You see, these are high stakes. And as long as there is a chance on those stakes for us to have a negotiation, we have got to continue to play the game out.

POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE CONFLICTS

[9.] MR. SMITH. Mr. President, let me ask you about something in connection with Vietnam you said to Mr. Sulzberger.¹

¹C. L. Sulzberger, foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times, who interviewed the President on March 8, 1971.

You said you expected that this would probably be our last war.

Now, in this century, I don't think we have started a single war. Wars have been started by second powers. They have involved our vital interests, and then we have had to respond.

Now, what has changed to prevent second powers from starting future conflicts that might involve our national interests?

THE PRESIDENT. You are absolutely right with regard to how wars have come ers have started them. The United States was drawn into World War I. It was drawn into World War II. We were drawn into World War II. We were drawn into Korea because the North Koreans attacked, and then we came in to help save South Korea, and so it was in Vietnam. North Vietnam attacked South Vietnam; no South Vietnamese attacked North Vietnam, as you are aware.

However, when I make the Statement with regard to this possibly being the last war, I also, as you will note in my interview with Mr. Sulzberger, very strongly indicated the necessity for the United States to play its destined role because of our power, economically and otherwise, as the peacekeeping nation, the major peacekeeping nation in the free world.

Now, if the United States doesn't play that role, there will be another war. I mean by that, for example, for one thing, that how we end the war in Vietnam will have a great effect on whether there will be another war like that.

If the war in Vietnam is ended in a way that it is considered to be an American defeat or a reward for those who engage in aggression, or an encouragement to the hard-liners in the Communist world, then they will do it again.

And, if they hit somebody that is an ally of the United States, like the Philippines or Thailand, we will be drawn in.

That is why ending the war in Vietnam in a way that does not reward Communist aggression, that is something that is essential if we are going to avoid another war.

Now, putting it in the larger context of world war, the reason that I feel strongly that we may well have seen our last war is that when we look at the awesome power of nuclear weapons, when we look at the nuclear standoff that the United States and the Soviet Union now find themselves in, neither of those great powers, in my opinion, is going to have a leader who will make the decision to attack the other power and, at that same time, kill 70 million of his own people. That is the great deterrent.

So, I think as far as a big war is concerned, the enormous deterrent of nuclear power is going to deter it. And as far as smaller wars are concerned, the fact that the United States handles the situation in Vietnam the way it does, and the fact that we will continue to maintain our commitments, maintain our commitments around the world, but applying the Nixon Doctrine, strengthen other nations so that they can defend themselves, it will mean that as far as the United States is concerned, we may not have to have another war.

The last point is very important. You see, the difficulty in Vietnam, the difficulty in Korea, is that the United States had to go in and do the fighting for them. The Nixon Doctrine provides that we will help other nations help themselves.

And for that to work, however, it is necessary that we help them help themselves, because there will be, as I pointed out in this interview with Mr. Sulzberger, brushfire wars throughout, probably, in times to come.

The main thing is for us to not get involved in them. And if those with whom we have treaty commitments have adequate power to defend themselves, then we will not have to go in to defend them. That is the way to avoid American involvement.

COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC

[10.] MR. SMITH. Now to go back to my very first question, what is your problem in getting that case across to the American people?

When President Johnson retired from politics, he confessed to an association of broadcasters that he felt he had deficiencies in communication. Well, you are obviously very articulate and clear. Can this be the possibility: Your former aide, Patrick Moynihan, has written an article in Commentary saying that we have entered an era in which it is fashionable and obligatory for the press to disparage Presidents, and he gives a host of reasons for that. Do you believe that to be true?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Smith, you will remember that in 1962 I had my hoedown with the press, and I have avoided one since. I have respect for the press. It is true that of all the Presidents in this century, it is probably true, that I have less, as somebody has said, supporters in the press than any President. I understand that, and I do not complain about it because it is philosophical.

MR. SMITH. Don't you think the press mistreated Lyndon Johnson more, and Harry Truman?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, as a matter of fact, I think President Johnson did get a bad rap from the press and for the wrong reasons--on his style, for example. Now, when you take a man on because of his accent and because he happens to be from Texas or something like that, that is the wrong reason. If you take a man on on his policy, that is something else again.

No, understand, I am not complaining about my treatment from the press. I think it is a philosophical difference. I have many friends in the press, personal friends, as you are quite aware.

I have never taken on a member of the press individually. I have never called a publisher since I have been President. I have never called an editor to complain about anything. I have never called a television station to complain about it, and I never shall, as long as I have the opportunity to talk to the American people on a program like this directly. Then if I fail to communicate, it is my fault.

So, getting back to your major question, what about the problem of Presidents communicating with the American people, getting it across. I don't think we can blame the press, I don't think we can blame the media. I really don't think you can blame the President.

I think what it really gets down to is that the problems are enormous, and that the American people at the present time are frankly just frustrated. They are frustrated by having gone through Korea, and then they are frustrated by having gone through Vietnam.

When I said in an interview that there is a new isolationism growing in the country, I understand it. I know why people feel that way, because they say after all of this sacrifice, after all of this war, for what? Why can't we have some peace? We don't start any wars. We don't want anything from anybody else. Why can't they just leave us alone?

And so for that reason, any President who tries to see to it, to take the long view, to see to it that we do not take that very, very inviting but dangerous road of peace at any price, sort of an instant peace so to speak, any President who insists on giving that kind of leadership is going to have problems in communicating.

But I can also say this: Any President who didn't do it wouldn't be able to go to bed at night and sleep very well, knowing what he knows. You see, I know that if we fail, if we fail to meet America's commitment in the world, to be as strong as we need to be to deter any major aggressor and as strong as we need to be to help our friends with whom we have treaty alliances, and to have the will just at the time we are nearing the end to finish our involvement in Vietnam in a way that South Vietnam will be able to survive-that is what is on the line.

I think we can do it. I think we will. And I think that the American people will support it. Maybe the polls will go down, but I am not going to live or die by the polls. If I did, I wouldn't be here now.

FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION

[11.] MR. SMITH. Don't you think your job would be a lot easier if you carried Congress with you? Now, Senator Fulbright has complained that Congress has absolutely no control over foreign affairs. Two major actions, Cambodia and Laos, were undertaken with little information to and without the advice of Congress. Doesn't he have a point?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Senator Fulbright has a point with regard to himself, yes. But I should point out that if a majority of the Congress, Mr. Smith, disapproved of what the President was doing in Cambodia or in Laos, the majority of the Congress can act, and it can act by cutting off the funds. The majority of the Congress has not done that.

You may recall that the supplemental appropriation bill of $I billion at the end of last year was passed by both Houses of Congress. Those votes will be close. There is great debate in the Congress. I respect the Congress. I would like to be able to carry the Congress perhaps better than we have. I would like better understanding in the Congress.

But, on the other hand, it is the responsibility of the President of the United States, particularly when as Commander in Chief he has responsibility for the lives of American men, to make those decisions that are going to save those lives. And Cambodia saved the lives of American men.

And may I say, too, that the thousands of North Vietnamese who were casualties in North Vietnam [Cambodia and Laos], the hundreds, the millions of rounds of ammunition that were destroyed there, the time that was bought there, all of these things--that means that the risk to American lives is substantially reduced, and that is why the support of that operation was worthwhile, in my opinion.

MR. SMITH. Now, Members of Congress obviously feel left out, feel they don't have much control, and a subsidiary complaint made by Senator Fulbright is that Congress has no access to White House aides who have played an ever larger role in advising on foreign affairs. The New York Times said the other day a coup d'etat could hardly deprive the people's elected representatives more completely of their constitutional powers than this gradual process of the White House, without accounting, taking over foreign affairs. Is there something to that?

THE PRESIDENT. It is an old argument, Mr. Smith. As you know, from having studied many Presidents before this one, it has been raised with regard to virtually every Presidential adviser, and there is nothing to it.

I have Presidential advisers--Dr. Kissinger; I have my prime foreign policy adviser, the Secretary of State, with whom I just talked before coming on this program, and the Secretary of Defense on national security policy, with whom I just talked before coming on this program. Both of them, incidentally, have been testifying this past week before the Congress; some in public and some in private session.

And as far as a Presidential adviser is concerned, however, he cannot be hauled down before the Congress. Then you are going to have two Secretaries of State. You cannot have that; there can only be one.

MR. SMITH. Aside from the fact that you have the responsibility, wouldn't it be simply politically prudent if you invited the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee here every month and had a talk with them and listened to their suggestions and explained your point of view to them informally and gave them a sense of participation?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would have to go really further than that. I would have to take the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committees, all of which, of course, have some significant control over these policies.

At the time of Cambodia, as Senator Fulbright will recall, I did have the whole group down, and we discussed some of these matters, and I answered questions.

The possibility of having meetings on an informal basis with committee members is something that I can consider. I see many of them individually.

For example, Senator Aiken, Senator Mansfield--I see him virtually every 2 to 3 weeks for breakfast as the majority leader. Any Senator who asks to see me usually gets in to see me. It is a question of time.

ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT

[12.] MR. SMITH. The story keeps recurring that access to you is difficult. Newsweek carries a story this week that Secretary Volpe is having a hard time seeing you, as Mr. Hickel² complained he did. In the case of Senators, I will use names. A year ago Senator Javits, Republican, New York, the best vote-getter in the State of your party--

THE PRESIDENT. That is right.

MR. SMITH.-- said he had not been consulted by you on anything.

² Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the Interior, 1969-70.

And Senator Dole, who is increasingly your spokesman, was heard to complain recently that he had been "shunted off" to lesser White House aides. Is that true?

THE PRESIDENT. I think there is no substitute, Mr. Smith, for seeing the man in the Oval Office, and yet while my schedule, as you probably are aware, due to a rather disciplined schedule in which I, unless I have a guest, eat breakfast alone in 5 minutes, never have guests for lunch--I do that in 5 minutes, too. I perhaps put more time in, in a day, than any President could put in, and it is because it is my way--I am not bragging about it.

But in terms of the number of people I see, the number of Senators, the number of Cabinet officers, the number of appointments, I would say that it is probably a record. But the more you see naturally the more others who don't get in as often want to see you. It is not possible to meet this adequately, but the only way I can figure it out is to cut another hour off of my sleep, but then I wouldn't be as sharp on this program.

EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL POWERS

[13.] MR. SMITH Well, the kind of thing I am concerned about is, I see-this is a prediction--I see the next 2 years being dominated by this political theme: The age-old conflict between the Executive and Congress, but in sharper form than ever. Resolutions are being prepared in the Senate to try and require your aides to testify, resolutions limiting your powers as Commander in Chief.

And there is another assault coming from another quarter, and I don't know whether you are aware of it. But tomorrow morning Senator Ervin begins hearings on the impounding of funds by you which had been appropriated by Congress. It is said that several billions of dollars that Congress has appropriated for things like dams and so on you have refused to spend, that this violates the Constitution and deprives Congress of its main power, the power of the purse.

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Smith, when I was a Senator and a Congressman, particularly when I was a Senator and a Congressman with a President in the other party in the White House, I played all those games, too, with very little success.

Now, these games are going to be played. The efforts will be made, it is true, by Members of the Senate, Members of the House, and some of them with the very best of intentions, to hamstring the Executive, the President. When it is the proper thing to do, it will be done.

But I think, generally speaking, you will find that in these great battles that have occurred through the years, between the President and the Congress, that sometimes the Congress wins, sometimes the President wins. But where the President's responsibility as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is concerned, and where the lives of American men are involved, usually the President wins and for good reason. You can have only one Commander in Chief.

We get back to this business of why not pass a resolution saying that we will get out of Vietnam by Christmas of this year. It is very easy to pass a resolution. It would be very popular for me, as a matter of fact, to sponsor it.

On the other hand, it is my judgment, as I have already indicated, that such a resolution would not be in the interest of the security of our own forces, not be in the interest of the negotiations, the possibility of negotiating release of our prisoners, and not in the interest of the United States long run in terms of ending this war in a way that might discourage another war coming.

That is my judgment. I have to fight for that judgment. If the Congress determines to move in another direction, so be it. I don't think it will, though, and I don't think the American people will support the Congress whenever it fights the President in his honest effort to serve as Commander in Chief and, in that service, to protect the lives of American men and to, in addition, conduct policy in a way that will avoid those lives being lost, we hope, at some future time.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

[14.] MR. SMITH. Mr. President, let me ask you some political questions now, because we are approaching a political year.

As you have acknowledged, the Republican Party is the Nation's minority party. No matter how often we reporters pronounce the old FDR coalition dead--the blacks, the poor, labor, and so on--every election it seems to pull together enough to keep the Democrats the majority party.

What plans have you got, what strategies do you intend to pursue to try to put the Republican Party back where it was before 1932, the permanent majority party?

THE PRESIDENT. That probably will not happen, Mr. Smith, to either the Republican or the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is not a majority party either, as you know, because approximately--if you take the pollsters--approximately 42 to 43 percent of the people consider themselves to be Democrats. And then approximately 30 percent consider themselves Republicans and the other 30 percent consider themselves to be Independents.

So, we will never have a time again, in my opinion, in this country when you are going to have a polarization of Democrats versus Republicans. I think you are going to have the Independents controlling basically the balance of power.

Also, when you look at the Democratic Party, you must remember that 43 percent is somewhat overblown because it has particular weight because of the South. And many southern Democrats, and I can say this looking back at our policies in the field of foreign policy and defense policy, many southern Democrats in the House and the Senate are our best supporters---best supporters of this President, not because he is a Republican, but because they think it is in the best interests of the country.

So, in my view, I do not believe that either the Republican or the Democratic Party will have a decisive majority such as the Republican Party had before 1932, such as the Democratic Party had in the period of the Roosevelt years.

What I think will happen is that both parties will vie for building the new coalition, starting with their hard core of hearty supporters and then moving into that group of Independents trying to get a field of the Independent voters and also moving over into the other party and picking up a considerable number of them.

THE 1972 CAMPAIGN

[15.] MR. SMITH. Talking about forming a coalition, the first Republican President in our history, he wanted to unite the Nation, when he ran for reelection he decided the best thing he could do was to choose a Democrat as a running mate. Now, I know you admire Abraham Lincoln. Do you think there are ever circumstances in which you will want to imitate him in this respect?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Smith, when I went on this program, you remember I told you you could ask me anything, but I would have to determine what I answered.

As you may recall, I said after the election of 1970 that 1970 was a political year, and I, therefore, did my job working for the candidates of my party; 1971 is a nonpolitical year, and that I would not engage in political activities in 1971.

I recognize that is an intriguing question. I have probably a very good answer. But I think that I will defer giving any answers at this time. Maybe ask me next year at this time, and I will give you an answer.

MR. SMITH. Mr. President, I will tell you a secret: I didn't expect an answer.

In one of your speeches you said you would rather be a one-term President than settle in Vietnam dishonorably. And a columnist recently has said that you have told a private person that you might voluntarily become a one-term President if your plans do not succeed by 1972.

Have you given serious thought to voluntarily becoming a one-term President?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Smith, let me say, first, I have made no decisions with regard to what I will do in 1972, either for myself or for whoever may be the man who runs for Vice President.

On the other hand, I could say categorically that I have certainly made no decisions indicating that I will not be a candidate in '72, not that I will be or I will not be.

The idea of what you call voluntary retirement, I would suggest, is quite premature where I am concerned, and I would say that anybody who reads my life would perhaps take that kind of a story with a grain of salt.

CAMPAIGN SPENDING

[16.] MR. SMITH. Let me ask you a question you can give an answer to, sir. Regarding elections, to me the greatest danger to our democracy is soaring election costs. The costs are getting ridiculous. A candidate has to resort to rich vested interests to pay those costs. He is bound to be in great degree beholden to them once he is elected. And I fear our democracy could turn into a plutocracy very easily. Now, I know many people on Capitol Hill are laying plans for legislation, but some of the Republicans have told me they first want to know what the White House position is and they haven't found out.

What is your view about those election costs?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, first, election costs are soaring, and I know from just comparisons. I recall when I ran for the House of Representatives the campaign cost $25,000. That was in 1946. Right now I don't think you can run a House campaign for less than $100,000 in any district except, perhaps, a rather safe district for an incumbent. That is just an indication of the costs.

So the problem is not the control of the cost, the problem is how. First, it must be comprehensive. There was a bill last year that simply would have controlled the cost as far as television is concerned. That would just be shutting one door and opening another one, because you give me an opportunity to do that and I can go out and buy newspaper ads and billboards and direct mail and the rest, and I will beat anybody who is limited simply on the television side.

So it must be comprehensive. It must cover television. It must cover all campaign expenses. As far as the specifics of a bill are concerned, Senator Scott has made some proposals; others have made others. We have not developed a position on it, but we will develop a position once we get further evidence as to what would be the best comprehensive bill to support.

MR. SMITH. When do you think that will be?

THE PRESIDENT. I would imagine it would come further on in the Senate session. They are, it seems to me, rather full in their calendar right at the present time. But whenever it comes up in the Senate session, because Senator Scott's is the major bill that has been proposed here, then, of course, we would have to develop our position by that time. But we are working on it. We are considering the various proposals that have been made.

We do favor a limitation on expenses. There is no question about that. The point is how can we have one which will do two things: One, it must be comprehensive, and the other point that I should make, it must not give an advantage to incumbents over challengers. That is another thing.

The last bill was very properly called the "incumbent's preservation bill." It gave a tremendous advantage to an incumbent over a challenger. Now, that may seem like arguing against myself, but, remember, I haven't made a decision with regard to '72, yet.

GOVERNMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS

[17.] MR. SMITH. We haven't talked about domestic affairs, and let me ask you a general domestic question. This is a cliche but a very vital cliche. I would like to hear you explain how it is that we can master the impossible, achieve perfection in 10,000 actions it takes to send the men to the moon, land them, and bring them back safely, and we can't make New York City a clean, pleasant place to live. Now, it is not size. I lived in Greater London, which is bigger, for 11 years, and everything works: Mass transit works, the police work, air pollution is declining. What are we doing wrong?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, this is the challenge of our time, Mr. Smith. That is why environment has been one of the six great goals that I have set out for the American people. We can clean up the air; we can clean up the water; we can also clean up the congestion; we can work on the problems of mass transit. But in order to do it we need what I have called a new American revolution.

The trouble with government today in this country--and I think I can summarize it in a word--is this, that to the average person out there in New York, in California, in Florida, wherever he may live, to that average person he looks at government, all government, and he is fed up with it, and the reason he is fed up with it is that it costs too much, it doesn't work, and he can't do anything about it.

That is why our new revenue sharing proposals, I think, have very, very great meaning, because they will reduce the cost of government, it will make it work better, but, more important, it is going to give people in New York and other places a chance to do something about it. As far as these programs are concerned, the other point that we have to bear in mind is that whether it is education, whether it is welfare, whether it is health, what we need is reform, not simply pouring billions of more dollars into these old programs--we can't do that but what we need to do is to reform all of these programs, and that is why this Administration--and due to the fact that the problems of our foreign policy have not only in this Administration but in the previous Administration have been so predominant, people have failed to recognize it--that this Administration has the most progressive proposals in the area of reform of any administration in this century. And it is needed, it is desperately needed.

We are either going to have to reform the machinery of government in the United States or it is going to break down completely.

MR. SMITH. Well, now, sir, that is often cited as the great objection to revenue sharing--giving money without strings to States whose governments are not very good. And I would beg you to consult your Vice President who used to be the Governor of Maryland and tried to reform the constitution and couldn't get it done. They can't handle these modern problems with money. In the case of the cities, the last town fathers of Newark are mostly under indictment or in jail for misuse of funds. Don't you have to attach strings to them to make them reform before you give them money?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Smith, I don't believe in that doctrine. I think it is repugnant to the American system that only a bureaucratic elite at the top of the heap in Washington knows what is best for the people out in the sticks. Sure, there are people--there are dishonest people in government, but there are dishonest people in National Government, too. There are dishonest people in State government.

But the way to make people more responsible, the way to get better people in the government, is to give them, it seems to me, more responsibility.

What I mean by that is that if your people who are mayors, county officials, and Governors are simply errand boys for the purpose of disbursing the money that is handed out with strings, all the decisions made by someone else, you are not going to get competent people to do the job. But if, on the other hand, they have some responsibility to make their own decisions about how to clean up New York City, how to revise State government, you are going to get better Governors, you are going to get better mayors, you are going to get better county officials.

And incidentally, on that point let me say that I have just met with the Nation's Governors. They are a pretty first-rate group of people--I mean, we are getting some fine Governors in this country, and we can get better Governors, better mayors, better county officials, by giving them more responsibility, not by taking responsibility away from them.

SUBURBAN INTEGRATION

[18.] MR. SMITH. Let me ask you just one question on civil fights.

It is clear after a generation of trial that the greatest block to integration of any form is segregated suburbs. Now, I have asked you about that before, and your answer has been that you oppose forced integration.

But does that not mean, in effect, the perpetuation of discrimination in housing, and is that not against the law?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Smith, when you have basically a situation that is caused by economic considerations rather than by racial decisions, I do not believe that you can say that that is a violation of the law, or certainly not of the law or of the Constitution, either in spirit or in letter.

Let's understand that as far as any suburb is concerned they all must be open. Any individual must have a right, a constitutional right, to buy a house, rent a house or a home or an apartment, anyplace in this country, without regard to what his race or religion may be. That constitutional right now is guaranteed, and we will see that it is enforced.

On the other hand, if you have a situation where people are living in a certain area, people, say, who have purchased their homes--let us say they are $20,000 to $25,000 homes--then for the Federal Government to come in and say, we are going to insist that we will, in effect, break up this community, break it up from an economic standpoint, because those homes are too expensive for some people to move into--it may happen that some of those people may be black people, they may be other minority people, they may be white people, but because they are too expensive we are going to put lower--a low-cost Federal Government project in there--I do not believe that that kind of forced integration is either constitutional, and it certainly is not required by the law. Until it is required by the law, we are not going to do it.

CHANGES IN THE PRESIDENT

[19.] MR. SMITH. Mr. President, we have got just a short time left. This is a very unfair question to put to you in a short time. But I have noticed so many of your opinions have changed lately-in favor of deficit spending. When somebody attacked Mr. Yost for allegedly having a relationship with Alger Hiss,³ you defended him.

³Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations 1969-71, and Alger Hiss, former State Department official who was convicted of perjury following investigations into Communist activities by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Do you think you have changed greatly? Whatever happened to the jut-jawed, aggressive young man who would fight at the drop of a hat over those things?

THE PRESIDENT. The jaw is still there. As my wife has often said, there is not much I can do about my image. I was born with it.

But as far as the problems that we confront in this country are concerned, it is the responsibility of whoever reaches what Disraeli once referred to as the top of the greasy pole when he became Prime Minister, or whoever is in that Oval Office over there, he must see the problems of the world and the problems of his country in a very different perspective.

What is most important for the man who is President--I have often thought about it--what would you look for? Well, of course, you want a man who is intelligent. You hope he is reasonably intelligent, a man with courage, and a man who can give some political leadership, maybe make a speech, and that sort of thing.

But the most important single factor is that he must be one who has perspective and poise, what the Quakers call peace at the center, one who isn't knocked off balance by the stories, the crises of the moment, one who having that peace at the center then will make decisions, decisions with regard to our foreign policy, decisions with regard to the lives of men that you have referred to, in a way that will be in the best interests of the country.

MR. SMITH. There is one tyrant over all of us, and that is time. They tell me we are out of time. I thank you very much for this evening.

Good night.