Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China Interview With Walter Cronkite of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

TAIWAN

MR. CRONKITE. We have no commitment from Peking that it will not use force to take Taiwan. Secretary of State Vance has said only that we have the expectation that it will not. But if the present Peking Government or some future Peking Government tried to reunify Taiwan by force, would we feel free to use force to help Taiwan resist?

THE PRESIDENT. In the first place, the People's Republic of China does not have the capability of launching a 120-mile attack across the ocean against Taiwan, who are heavily fortified and also heavily armed. And we have made it clear to the People's Republic that after this year, when the treaty does expire, this coming year, that we will sell to Taiwan defensive weapons.

I think it is accurate to say also, Walter, that the major interest that the People's Republic of China has in the Western Pacific is peace and good relationships with us. They know our firm expectations, clearly expressed to them, that the differences between China and Taiwan will be settled peacefully. And I think to violate that understanding with us would be to wipe out all the benefits to them and to Asia of peace and their new relationship with us.

We have, obviously, a desire and a commitment to maintain peace in the Western Pacific. And as would be the case with an altercation between any two peoples, we would certainly be deeply concerned. But I don't want to speculate on under what circumstances we might take military action because I think it's an absolutely unnecessary speculation, because the people of China want peace, they want good relationships with us, and because Taiwan is so strong and will stay strong.

MR. CRONKITE. Well, clearly, if the situation changed drastically in our relations with any of these two other units, the Chinese Government and Taiwan, we can take a new look at the situation, I suppose.

THE PRESIDENT. That's always an option. And I think, as you know, political circumstances change around the world constantly, and we would have to reassess them as they do occur. But I don't have any doubt that we made the right decision. We have made our intentions and our expectations clear to the people of China and to Taiwan.

My reports from Taiwan, in the last clay or few hours, has been that they studied the agreements with the People's Republic, that their original concerns have been substantially alleviated, and I don't think that the people of Taiwan are any more concerned about future peace than they were before. In addition, we will maintain trade relationships, cultural relationships with the people of Taiwan, as has been the case in the past.

SOVIET REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT

MR. CRONKITE. Have you had any recent conversations with any Soviet officials or have you heard from Moscow as to what their reaction is in the last few hours, bringing us up to date?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I've had a personal message delivered to me this afternoon from President Brezhnev expressing his understanding that our commitment is to peace in the entire world, acknowledging the fact that the American position is that our new relationship with the People's Republic of China will contribute to world peace, and acknowledging the fact that the proper relationship between major sovereign nations is to have full diplomatic relations.

So, I would characterize his personal message to me as being very positive in tone. And I can say without any doubt that our new relationship with China will not put any additional obstacles in the way of a successful SALT agreement and also will not endanger our good relationships with the Soviet Union.

VISITS BY CHINESE AND SOVIET LEADERS

MR. CRONKITE. What about the slight protocol problem of timing visits from Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the Vice Chairman, who's due here from Peking on January. 29, and a possible visit from Chairman Brezhnev to sign a SALT agreement? Can Chairman Brezhnev come after Teng has been here?

THE PRESIDENT. I can't set the schedule for him. My hope is that President Brezhnev would come before Mr. Teng comes to Washington.

As you know, Secretary Vance will be meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko day after tomorrow, the 21st, and at that time we'll see if the SALT agreements are coming to a successful conclusion. If so, we will extend immediately again an invitation to President Brezhnev to come here during the middle part of January.

The two visits would, obviously, not overlap or conflict, and I think I'll be well prepared, in studying the prospective agenda, to meet with both of them in the same month.

MR. CRONKITE. What about return visits from you, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have not made any plans for that. And I would presume that both leaders might invite me to come to their countries sometime in the future. And I would look with favor on those invitations, but not anytime soon.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

MR. CRONKITE. Do you feel that this agreement with China puts any pressure on the Soviet Union to come to any early conclusion with the SALT talks?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I really can't assess any interrelationship between the two. The agreement with China was not designed to put any sort of pressure on the Soviet Union. I think the outcome of the new relationship between ourselves and the billion people of China and their government is constructive and positive and contributes toward the lessening of tension rather than the building up of additional tension. And that applies to our relationship with the Soviet Union as well as to other countries.

CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, some Members of Congress, including Democrats and some liberal Republicans, are claiming that you failed to live up to an administration pledge to consult with Congress before taking any such action as you have toward Taiwan and Peking. And now, there's a threat of a court challenge to the constitutionality of your cancelling the treaty without congressional approval. How seriously do you view this? Do you feel that either Congress or the courts could block this arrangement with both Taiwan and Peking?

THE PRESIDENT. No. My constitutional responsibility in establishing relationships with foreign countries is clear and cannot be successfully challenged in court.

We have had constant consultations with the Congress over the past 2 years. And our goal in establishing normal relations with China has been made clear on numerous occasions by me personally. When Secretary Vance went to China and came back, he gave the Congress leaders and Members a thorough briefing. Dr. Brzezinski did the same thing after his visit to China. I have met with all the Members of the Congress who would come to sessions here at the White House.

One of the deliberate items on my own agenda in explaining to them and answering their questions was about the terms under which we would normalize relationships with China. I might add that when numerous delegations of congressional leaders have gone to the People's Republic and come back, they have also given me and Secretary of State Vance their views on what ought to be done. Almost invariably their recommendation was to proceed expeditiously with normalization of relations with China.

So, there's been a clear understanding, really ever since 1972, of the policy of our Government toward China, a desire to normalize relations, and also a clear expression of my views both publicly and privately to the Members of Congress about our goals and the plans for accomplishing this goal.

I might say in complete candor that in the last 2 or 3 weeks, when the negotiations were building up to a climax in an unanticipated degree of rapidity of movement, we did not consult with anyone outside of a very tiny group within the executive branch of Government about the prospective success. But what did happen should not be a surprise to anyone. The congressional views were well known to me. My, views were well known to the Members of Congress.

U.S.-CHINESE NEGOTIATIONS

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, what was the need for such haste? Why could you not have consulted with the congressional leaders first, before making the final commitment?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Walter, my experience in negotiating sensitive and complicated agreements with foreign leaders, including the experience at Camp David and otherwise, is that to negotiate through the news media, through public pronouncements and with wide divergencies of views expressed by different leaders in a country, is not conducive to success. And I'm authorized and directed by the Constitution and my responsibility is to conduct negotiations of this kind.

We did not depart from the established policy of our country that's been extant since President Nixon went to China in 1972. And I think had we caused a public debate in our country about all the ramifications of the negotiations at the very time we were trying to conclude these discussions with the Chinese, it would have resulted in failure. And our country would have lost a wonderful opportunity to a great stride forward and all the benefits that will be derived from this agreement.

So, I don't have any doubt that what I did was right and correct. I don't have any doubts that had we made a public issue of it, it would have complicated the issue unnecessarily.

U.S.-TAIWAN DEFENSE TREATY

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, on the matter of the court challenge, the challenge is not your right to recognize or to withdraw recognition of a government, but of your right to cancel a treaty. Does that change your view any of the validity of that challenge?

THE PRESIDENT. NO. The treaty is being terminated in exact conformance with the terms of the treaty itself. Had I canceled the treaty or abrogated the treaty peremptorily as of the first day of January-which was the Chinese request to us, or demand from us originally—there may have been some justification for that court challenge. But the treaty provides that either side can terminate the effectiveness of the treaty by giving a 1-year notice. And that's exactly what we are doing with the people of Taiwan, telling them that after a year the treaty will no longer be in effect. It's completely in accordance with the terms of the treaty itself, Walter.

MR. CRONKITE. Since the Constitution requires the Senate to approve by a twothirds vote the making of a treaty, you don't feel that there might be an implication in the Constitution that the same two-thirds would apply to canceling a treaty.

THE PRESIDENT. No. I think this gets into a complicated legal discussion, and I'm not qualified for it. But as of the 1st of January, we will have relations with and acknowledge the nationhood of China. And Taiwan will no longer be a nation in the view of our own country. And whether or not a treaty can exist with an entity which is no longer a nation is a legal question in itself. But we have gone a second mile to protect the integrity of our own country by extending the terms of the peace treaty for a full year, even after we recognize the China Mainland Government as the Government.

So, I think that we have more than honored the terms of the treaty, and I see no basis for a successful court challenge. I think what we've done is right. It's better for our country. It's better for the people of China. It does not hurt the people of Taiwan. It's good for world peace. I think we've benefited greatly, and I'm very proud of it.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

MR. CRONKITE. Can I ask you just one more real quick one now on the Senate of the United States?

THE PRESIDENT. Okay.

MR. CRONKITE. Do you think that putting the Chinese question on the agenda of the next session of Congress might complicate the confirmation of a SALT treaty?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I think not. What we will ask the Congress to do next session is to pass special legislation to permit us to continue our cultural relations with Taiwan, our trade relations with Taiwan, the application of the Eximbank, and the support of loans to China—to the people of Taiwan, rather, and also to authorize us to sell weapons to Taiwan after the defense treaty expires.

So, I think that even those who oppose the normalization of relations with China will favor the continued relationships with Taiwan, which this legislation will have to authorize. So, I don't think this will complicate the other issues in Congress. They're almost as complicated as they can get anyhow. I don't think this will hurt at all.

MR. CRONKITE. Thank you very much, Mr. President, for taking the time to be with us. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT. It's a pleasure, Walter. Thank you.