Excerpts from the Press Conference

Q. Mr. President, Prime Minister Churchill said in a somewhat recent speech to Commons, that he praised America's lavish aid to China, and yesterday a Chinese military spokesman in Chungking said that it was not true, that our aid to China, to use his words, was "pitifully inadequate." Anything you can say about that?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose it all depends on how you define, large, medium, or small. I can give you some figures—I see no particular reason why I shouldn't—I never have given them out before. As you know, we can't get goods, munitions, anything else, into China by ship since their coast is under the occupation of the Japanese. And, therefore, there have been, ever since we have been in the war, two methods of getting materials into China. One was the overland route, as they call it, which starts from way back near the Caspian Sea, the top end nearer India, and then across the desert—a terrific trip—through the top part of Tibet and then down to the region of Chungking.

What you have to do is look it up on the map- we have been getting a number of goods of different kinds through that route. You have to provide the trucks. You have actually to carry the gasoline from one stop to another. That route has taken a certain tonnage into China, but it is a terribly difficult proposition, and a very long trip from the point of time, and from the point of wear and tear on the truck. It is a feasible route, but well, it's the route of Kublai Khan-some of the old conquerors, and so forth, nearly all desert and awfully difficult.

We have all used what we could- still using it- going to keep on doing it.

The other route was, roughly, the route of what we call the Burma Road, that general direction from Northeast India, over the end of the Himalaya Mountains. And just about the time we came into the war the Burma route, as it was used for vehicles with wheels at that time, was practically destroyed by the Japanese, up on the sides of the mountains, and they pulled the route down.

And then about that time, when the Burma route became impassable, after the Japanese got in there through Burma, we started the air route over the mountains; and the tonnage over that route was very, very small in the beginning. We have built it up constantly.

Just to give you an idea of how we have built it up, there were times only a year and a half ago, when we were taking a very few thousand tons over it a month. You have to have transport planes that will go to a great height over the tops of the Himalaya Mountains. And a year and a half ago, we were taking only two or three thousand tons a month over it.

Way back about that time, in conference with the Chinese, we felt that by really heroic efforts we could increase the planes that we could get over there. At that time, in going over with munitions and goods, the planes were subject to attack by Japanese fighter planes as they went over. However, we kept at it, and about a year ago we actually got up to an increase, which we looked forward to for some time, of ten thousand tons a month over that route, which is a very excellent performance, because we were able to take gasoline for Chennault's forces there—the American air command and we could take medicine. Of course, preferably, we took over things that had as small a bulk as possible, principally gasoline and a few munitions- bombs, and things like that, and medical supplies.

Well, we weren't satisfied with it, and we kept on going; and the story of how that air route over the mountains has grown in the past year is going to be written some day, and it will be an epic.

All I can tell you now- I can't give you- I could, but I won't give you exact figures—we are taking over twenty thousand tons a month over the hills from upper Burma right into southeastern China. So we are very well satisfied with this performance, because it is an amazing performance ....

Q. The Chinese military spokesman said we had so few planes that if the figures were revealed our strength would be inconsiderable.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the easiest thing to do on that would be to dig out, of course I couldn't give it to you, the destruction which Chennault's forces have caused to the Japanese in the number of ships that they have sunk, even on the coast of China and up the rivers, and the Japanese detachments and concentrations which they have broken up. So, considering the size of the force, considering that it has to be supplied from over the mountains, there again, that is one of the epics that is going to be written up—the destruction that they have wrought.

Q. Sir, could you tell us roughly what part of this twenty thousand tons a month of materials goes into Chinese hands?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will put it this way. Of course, a large part of the tonnage going over is gasoline for the Chennault forces and the B-29's that are operating out of China, but if you take out that one item of gasoline, I would say that the overwhelming majority of all the others that go over is for the Chinese forces. The gasoline is shipped primarily for Chennault's forces and the B-29's.

Q. Mr. President, what is the reason for the sudden complaints by the Chinese on the inadequacies of the aid we have given them?

THE PRESIDENT: They would like to have more. (Laughter) . . .