Excerpts from the Press Conference

Q. Have you anything to say about Chairman Ed Flynn's recent speech that has attracted a good deal of attention?

THE PRESIDENT: I have no idea what Flynn said.

Q. He spoke something like this: that the election of a Congress hostile to the Administration would be equal to a major military disaster, or words to that effect.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will tell you, I suppose the easiest way of putting it is this: that when a country is at war we want Congressmen, regardless of party—get that—to back up the Government of the United States, and who have a record of backing up the Government of the United States in an emergency, regardless of party.

Q. That's it.

THE PRESIDENT: Put that down again, twice. I think that covers it all right. . . .

Q. Mr. President, did you confer again this week with Dr. Van Kleffens, the Dutch Foreign Minister?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I am seeing him today. . . .

Q. It seems to be the impression, sir, which Dr. Van Kleffens has in turn added to, that the Pacific councils to which Mr. Churchill referred are now beginning to shape up. Could you throw any light on that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think they are.

Q. Are those councils to be military, or are they to be political and military, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I would put it this way, that down in the Abda area, as you know, there is the military command under the supreme command of Wavell. Now that is a slipshod way of putting it, but the operations could be called "tactical." I refer to the certain long-range strategic questions which would be referred here, and London. Well, London of course includes the British Empire people—Australia and New Zealand—and it also includes the Dutch Government in London. Now those strategic questions would be referred—it isn't a very good differentiation to make—as tactical and strategic. It isn't a clear line always, but it is the best terminology that I can think of at this time.

Now on the strategical things that would be referred here, or London- long-range again- you would have to divide them into two parts. One would be the military and naval, purely, and they would go to the joint staffs, on which there would be consultations, of course, with Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch officers. Another group of questions that would be referred would be more of a political or government character and they would be referred to the American Government, the British Government, the Dutch Government, and the Colonials' Governments represented in London. Now, of course, there again you run up against the distinct possibility that you will have something that is partly political and partly strategic. I am thinking in very broad terms, nothing specific at all. Where they have both characteristics they probably would be referred both to the governmental agencies- the political agencies- and then the military and naval.

Q. Would these so-called councils, sir, sit in Washington, or would they sit both in Washington and London?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, they are—they are sitting both in Washington and London.

Q. They are sitting?

THE PRESIDENT: They are.

Q. They are in being now?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, they have been for a month.

Q. For a month?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: And I think there is no reason why we shouldn't point out that on the decision end of these things there is very close cooperation between Washington and London.

I suppose the easiest way of putting it is this: that when a question is raised down in that area that has to be referred, there are two copies made. One copy is marked for action, and that comes to Washington. The other copy goes to London, and that is marked for recommendation to Washington. And, in the event of disagreement, it comes to the higher authorities in both places. There haven't been any disagreements to date, and probably won't be. But the "action" copy comes to Washington. . . .

Q. Mr. President, do you expect any early results from the 500 million-dollar loan to China?

THE PRESIDENT: I think so. Quite aside from what might be called the psychological point of view, assuring China through the loan that we are solidly behind them and are helping in every way that is physically possible in the military sense, as fast as we can- this will be a very definite relief to the whole financial problem of China itself, through stabilization of their currency, and the ability to get more things that they very greatly need for their armies. . . .