Excerpts from the Press Conference

THE PRESIDENT: I still hope to get off this afternoon at three o'clock. I was asked in the front row when I would come back. I can't answer the question because I don't know. I hope to stay until Tuesday, but I am not sure that I can.

If somebody will ask me what the reason is, the reason is the Japanese situation.

I have here a release, which you will get when you go out, in regard to merchant vessels. This is after consultation between State, War, Navy, and Maritime Commission. (Reading):

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes between the United States ports and ports of Spain, Portugal, and their adjacent island possessions will not be armed at this time.

"American merchant vessels sailing in the inter-American trade between ports of the United States and ports of Central and South America will not be armed, at this stage.

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes in the Pacific Ocean will not be armed under existing circumstances.

"Public announcement will be made of any change in policy affecting any of these routes."And that is all.

Q. Mr. President, could you say how long you think the "existing circumstances" may prevail?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I would ask that question in Tokyo and not in Washington.

Q. Is there anything you can tell us, sir, about these Japanese negotiations?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I'd better not.

Q. If you have read newspapers carefully, I think you would come to the conclusion that we have been getting news based on Tokyo, to a large extent, in that respect. I just simply throw that out.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that probably is true, and it has been based on an American policy of infinite patience.

Q. Well, Mr. President, could you say, sir, whether these negotiations have broken down temporarily?

THE PRESIDENT: No. They have not.

Q. Mr. President, did the Japanese yesterday bring any response to the document presented by Mr. Hull?

THE PRESIDENT: NO, no.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell when the next meeting will be held with the Japanese?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know.

Q. Can you tell us, sir, if there were any new developments in your talks with the Japanese different from those that they have had from Mr. Hull?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I would say just exactly the same.

I think I could tell you, for background- but only for background—that the situation seems serious, because our one desire has been peace in the Pacific, and the taking of no steps to alter the prospects of peace, which of course has meant non-aggression. It really boils down to that.

And also—as background—I was, last spring, talking along the line of general peace for the Pacific, based on a settlement of the war between China and Japan- the restoration of peace there, plus a permanent arrangement for non-aggression in the Pacific, and the restoration of normal economic relations, access to raw materials.

And as you know, the Secretary of State, with even more patience than I have—which is saying a whole lot—had been holding conversations from, I think it was, April. And in the middle of them came the Japanese expedition to Indo-China, which is very far afield, and caused us very great concern, because it seemed to show a reasonable parallel with the Hitler methods in Europe. As, for example, the infiltration, over a period of several months, of the German armies into Rumania and Hungary, placing themselves in the position where strategically they were all set to attack Yugoslavia and Greece.

And of course the drawing of the parallel made peacefully inclined people over here wonder whether this occupation, with a limited number of troops in Indo-China, was the beginning of a similar action in the Far East, placing obvious American interests in great jeopardy if the drawing of such a parallel was justified.

The American flag, of course, does fly from the Philippines. And even before the Japanese went into Indo-China, one might almost say that the Philippines were located in a horseshoe, with Japanese military control over the coasts of China, all the way down to the southern border of China, and Japanese military control on the opposite side- the east- over the mandated islands, so called.

You look at a map closely, that is a sort of a horseshoe, open at the southern end, and the Philippines in the middle of it. I think a study of the map would be advisable for all of us, because the Hitler method has always been aimed at a little move here and a little move there, by which complete encirclement, or the obtaining of essential military points, was merely a prelude to the extension of aggression to other places. It's a perfectly obvious historical fact today. And we are of course thinking not only about the American flag in the Philippines, not only about certain vital defense needs which come from that open end of the horseshoe, but we are thinking about something even more important, and that is the possible extension of control by aggression into the whole of the Pacific area. And we are thinking about what it would mean to this country if that policy were to be used against us in the whole Pacific area. I don't think that anything more can be said at this time. We are waiting ....

Q. Mr. President, would this mean that we are working for the status quo?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We have been for a long time.

Q. Mr. President—

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Wait a minute. I wouldn't say working for the status quo, because we —

Q. (interposing) Temporary status quo?

THE PRESIDENT: You have got to leave China out of the status quo. We are certainly not working for the status quo in China.

Q. (interjecting) That's right.

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) Or Indo-China, for that matter.

Q. Against further aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: Against further aggression. We are working to remove the present aggression. . . .

Q. That Chinese situation is absolutely solid and set, is it not?

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely.

Q. No chance of compromise?

THE PRESIDENT: No. . . .