Further Statement by the President on the Decision To Withdraw U.S. Forces from Korea, 1947-1949.
IN RECENT DAYS, the position taken by the various departments of this Government in 1947, 1948, and 1949 with respect to the withdrawal of United States troops from Korea has been made the subject of partisan political debate. Many untrue accusations are being made with reference to the decision of this Government to withdraw our troops from Korea. In order that the public may have access to the facts, I have determined that a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, dated September 26, 1947, and its enclosure, which have heretofore been classified as top secret, Should be declassified. Copies of these documents accordingly are attached to this statement.
The significance of this memorandum of September 26, 1947, and its importance to the subsequent developments of our policy concerning Korea have been made clear in my statement of October 27, 1952. Following the military appraisal expressed in this memorandum, this Government proposed to the United Nations in 1947 that elections be held in Korea looking toward the establishment of a united Korea and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. A resolution to this effect was adopted at the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 14, 1947. This memorandum of September 26, 1947, was relied upon in the formulation of United States policy with respect to Korea in the National Security Council both in 1948 and in 1949, when the entire situation was reviewed in the light of then existing conditions, and the decision to complete the withdrawal of United States troops was confirmed. At that time, as I pointed out in my statement of October 27th, the advice of our military establishment was that, in spite of the obvious risks, the withdrawal of United States troops was justified.
I would not have released this document nor brought these facts before the public if the Republican candidate for President, who was Chief of Staff of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, had not in his campaign misrepresented the contents of this memorandum and made intemperate and unjustified attacks upon the civilian agencies participating in our decisions with respect to Korea. Beginning in his speech of September 22d in Cincinnati, and on various occasions thereafter, culminating in his speech in Detroit on October 24th, the Republican candidate sought to create the false impression that our civilian officials were solely responsible for our decisions with respect to Korea and that they were guilty of blundering, if not of something worse. As I pointed out in my remarks in Cincinnati on October 31st, our decisions with respect to Korea, like many other decisions in our struggle for peace, involved both military and diplomatic factors and were reached through the honest cooperation of both military and civilian officials. False and malicious attacks upon the loyalty and judgment of either the military or civilian officials who were involved in these crucial decisions are inexcusable and are extremely damaging to the proper conduct of the Government. As President, I feel it my duty to protect the men who are engaged in this crucial work from such attacks.
In releasing these documents, I wish it understood that there is no intention to criticize the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the work of the military establishment in these critical matters. Indeed, I believe that releasing these documents will indicate the justification for their views.
I hope that the release of these documents will set this controversy at rest, and will in some measure protect those who have not been able to protect themselves in this debate because of their official positions, and because of the secrecy classification which must necessarily cover a great deal of their work.
Note: The text of the memorandum and its enclosure, released with the President's statement, follows:
Memorandum for the Secretary of State:
Subject: The interest of the United States in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States.
Pursuant to the request in SWN-5694 (copy attached), initiated by the State Member of the Committee, the following views have been received:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea for the reasons hereafter stated.
In the event of hostilities in the far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.
If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to establish and maintain strong air and naval bases in the Korean peninsula, he might be able to interfere with United States communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and adjacent islands. Such interference would require an enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area where they would be subject to neutralization by air action. Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less costly than large scale ground operations.
In light of the present severe shortage of military manpower, the corps of two divisions, totaling some 45,000 men now maintained in South Korea, could well be used elsewhere, the withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair the military position of the far East Command unless in consequence, the Soviets establish military strength in South Korea capable of mounting an assault in Japan.
At the present time, the occupation of Korea is requiring very large expenditures for the primary purpose of preventing disease and disorder which might endanger our occupation forces with little, if any, lasting benefit to the security of the United States.
Authoritative reports from Korea indicate that continued lack of progress toward a free and independent Korea, unless offset by an elaborate program of economic, political and cultural rehabilitation, in all probability will result in such conditions, including violent disorder, as to make the position of United States occupation forces untenable. A precipitate withdrawal of our forces under such circumstances would lower the military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States.
JAMES FORRESTAL
ENCLOSURE
Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S. Policy in Korea:
SWN-5694
15 September 1947
The following has been received from the State Member, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
"In view of the continuing stalemate in the Joint Commission in Korea and in view of the recent Soviet refusal to participate in four Power Consultations in Washington on proposals for the early achievement of the aims of the Moscow Agreement, the State Department is currently considering what further steps should be taken to implement U.S. Policy in Korea. In order that such consideration may include the basic elements, the State Department requests, as a matter of urgency, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the interest of the U.S. in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States."
It is requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above be obtained as a matter of urgency and forwarded to the Secretary, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
See also Items 295 [8], 310.
Harry S Truman, Further Statement by the President on the Decision To Withdraw U.S. Forces from Korea, 1947-1949. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/231069