Interview With the President Question-and-Answer Session at a Breakfast With Members of the White House Correspondents Association.

PRESS SECRETARY POWELL. Ladies and gentlemen, let me take a moment to make sure we understand the ground rules, which are few, and just a word about what's involved here.

We thought it might be helpful to you—and of course we always do things that we think will be helpful to us—to provide an opportunity to talk with the President in a somewhat less formal situation than the regular news conference.

We plan to have two of these breakfasts. About half of the people who cover the White House regularly are here today. The other half will be invited to another breakfast within a week or so. The proceedings will be on the record. We will provide a transcript as soon as possible, and there is no embargo on whatever news you are able to glean from this gathering.

Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't know who wants to recognize the interrogator. But, Frank [Frank Cormier, Associated Press], I think I'll start with you and Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International] first.

ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM

Q. All right. Mr. President, I'm a little curious—I've been away a month and missed a lot—but I wonder if you would place the goals of defending the dollar and fighting inflation above what might be the contradictory goal of political survival.

THE PRESIDENT. Okay. I'll try to answer. I don't think they are contradictory. There's no doubt that the primary domestic concern of the American people, as revealed by every poll that I've seen lately, is inflation. I think part of the reason is that we have made substantial progress on alleviating the previous number one concern, which was unemployment. The latest figures show 5.8 unemployment, which is a substantial reduction from roughly 8 percent, when I came into office.

Also, I think the Congress and I together have had some very 'constructive legislation passed concerning transportation, education, aid to the cities, including the employment question, and so forth.

But I think that to deal now successfully with a stable dollar and to level off the rate of inflation, hopefully to reduce it in the future, is not only necessary from a nonpolitical basis but also good politics.

Q. How about when the constituencies start hollering at you?

THE PRESIDENT. That's difficult, but it's already a very serious problem. What I'm trying to do, basically, is to build up within the consciousness of the Congress and my own administration a realization of what Americans demand, and that is a very sound, fiscally responsible approach to these special interest demands.

It's much easier for me to have a partner in Congress as legislation and budget decisions are evolving, rather than for me to assume the unfortunate posture of having to veto legislation once it's passed. And I believe that this would make it easier for me next year than it has been the last few days of this year, when I had to veto several bills that had expectations built up because the Congress passed them, which I couldn't accept.

Q. Mr. President, what do you think of all the scare talk—and I mean scare talk—about not only a recession but a depression, and some of which comes from your own people? And a lot of it comes from economists and experts.

THE PRESIDENT. I checked with Charlie Schultze recently, and Schultze's projections are still a growth rate next year, if the inflation package is successful as we anticipate, of about 3 percent. Some have said lower, of course, but if there's one group that has an extreme diversity in analysis, it is economists. And I think that this is something that we do not anticipate, a recession or a depression. If we have a complete and abject failure in our anti-inflation program, then I think a recession or even a depression is a possibility—I won't say a likelihood. But I think we'll be successful.

Q. But how about controls? Is that a last resort? In case of a recession or a depression, would you go for them?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, mandatory wage and price controls, I think, would be counterproductive. And one of the main reasons that I've discounted them is that I don't think they would work. If our Nation was in such a serious state, approaching a national emergency or danger to our own security, there might be aroused in the public consciousness and in the Congress such a commitment to controlling inflation that mandatory wage and price controls would be necessary, as in the case of war, or something of that kind.

One of the differences that exists now with the experiment that Nixon pursued with wage and price controls that were mandatory is that I don't have the legal authority to do it. There would be no way to have a surprise announcement that wage and price controls were being imposed on the economy by the Government now. If that should become necessary in the case of a serious crisis, and the Congress began the long and, I'm sure, disputed debates, then following that a legal right to impose wage and price controls would come. But we don't have that option now.

Q. Well, wouldn't you want it on a standby basis?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I'm not going to request it, even on a standby basis.

Q. Mr. President, just to follow up on that, the argument of it not being practical to talk about wage and price controls now, because, after all, you don't have the authority to impose it, how does that gibe with the fact that you can always have wage and price controls imposed retroactively, so that if companies rushed to raise their prices when talk first started about it, they still wouldn't be affected when you imposed a retroactive date on it?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't mind answering the question, Marty [Martin J. Schram, Newsday], but this is kind of idle talk, because I don't have any intention of asking the Congress for wage and price authority. I don't think the Congress would grant it if I asked. And I have no intention to do it.

Obviously, if you ever should make that decision in case of a crisis, the decision would have to be retroactive. You can't do it prospectively, because that opens up the possibility of massive price increases just in anticipation of controls and also to lay a basis for higher prices in the future. But I don't anticipate that happening under any foreseeable circumstances, as I say, unless our Nation is in a crisis stage and actually our security is in danger. I don't anticipate it.

Q. I just want to follow up on the same subject. A lot of economists think that there will be a recession next year, perhaps not a deep one. And Alfred Kahn said yesterday—he was talking, as Helen said, scare talk—that if your program doesn't work and we just went along as we have been, there would be a deep depression. Is it fair to assume that you'd rather take the chance of a mild recession than what your people seem to think would be the certainty of a deep depression in your program?

THE PRESIDENT. Sam [Sam Donaldson, ABC News], the reason that Alfred Kahn and I get in the posture of having a tiny phrase extracted from an answer is that the questions are extremely hypothetical and all the caveats that are built very carefully around the answer are sometimes ignored. And then on TV and so forth or in the news media a little tiny phrase is used concerning an extreme depression.

I watched on "Issues and Answers" two or three Sundays ago when you asked Alfred Kahn repeatedly, "If you had to choose between the two, which would you go with?" And he said over and over, "I do not anticipate this happening. I'm reluctant to answer your question." You said, "Well, if you answered the question, how would it be?" He finally said it. And it's really kind of an idle thing. And I'm reluctant to say all my caveats and then add two or three "ifs" and then ever answer the question.

I just don't think we're going to have a substantial economic setback next year. I anticipate success with the anti-inflation program. I can't anticipate perfect success, complete success.

I think if we had a complete failure and inflation ran rampant, then the prospect for a recession and maybe a depression would be there. The definition of recession, the way I understand it, is zero growth for two quarters. We anticipate still a growth rate that's fairly substantial next year. Charlie Schultze's projections still, on which we base our budget preparations, is that if our inflation package is moderately successful, then the growth rate next year would average about 3 percent.

Q. Could I just follow up just one more time? The reason I ask is not to trap you into saying, "Aha! Deep depression possibilities."

THE PRESIDENT. Sure.

Q. But I think one of the reasons most people think that your dollar-strengthening program is successful, people around the world said, "Well, he means business." Do you really mean business?

THE PRESIDENT. I meant and do mean business.

Q. All right. And looking ahead—and I'm not predicting, I don't know anything about it, a recession—but if there should come a mild recession, people are going to think, well, will he then, "Oh my goodness, it's mild recession, and I'm going to start pumping the money in." In other words, now, do we reverse policy again, or do you just kind of hold to your course?

THE PRESIDENT. I intend to hold to my course.

Q. Come what may from the standpoint of—

THE PRESIDENT. With any foreseeable circumstance, based on our current projections, I am going to hold my course. Temporary aberrations or pressures from interest groups will have very little effect.

And I think that the Congress has gotten the message on the desire of the American people just as strongly or maybe even more strongly than I have. I'm not going to be taking a fiscally responsible position opposed by a spendthrift Congress. I think we're going to be working in concert to bring about a responsible but very strict fiscal policy.

I might point out to you that we've made good progress already. In 1975, for instance, the Federal deficit was 4 1/2 percent of our GNP—I think 4.6 percent, to be accurate. Our projections for the 1980 fiscal year budget—no, these are calendar years; I'm sorry—1980 calendar year is I percent of our GNP, a substantial reduction in the deficit. And I think this is necessary to give people confidence in the future.

And we tend to forget often that controlling inflation is much more beneficial to those who have marginal incomes, those who are retired and live on fixed incomes, than it is to the wealthy or affluent or well-educated, or those who have a flexible opportunity to seek additional means for income and support. The ones who are tightly bound because of illiteracy or because of immobility or because they don't have options on new jobs, or because they have already finished their life's work and are living on a fixed retirement basis, these are the ones that suffer most from inflation.

And when you take a strong stand against inflation, it doesn't mean that you're abandoning your commitment to the well-being of people who need government assistance and government protection most, I think it's a contributing factor to government caring for, caring about and caring for, these who are most vulnerable.

Q. Mr. President, if you're going to reach that goal of 30 billion or less on the deficit—

THE PRESIDENT. I am.

Q.— we are told that you'll have to find somehow, to cut 15 billion or more off just the cost of current programs scheduled for next year. If you're going to increase defense spending, what on Earth are you going to find in the other parts of the budget to squeeze that much out of?

THE PRESIDENT. We'll find it. We've got overall projections now, of course. Before I made that commitment, which was a very serious commitment and one about which we had a fairly substantial debate, we had excellent projections that showed that it was both feasible and that it would be accomplished. It's not going to be easy. And there are going to be many disappointed heads of Federal agencies and many disappointed interest groups in our country. But it's going to be fair, equitable, a sharing of some moderate sacrifice. But the benefits to be derived from this policy will be, I think, well recognized and supported. We'll meet that goal.

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, sir, do you think a time might come when another summit might be necessary to untangle all the apparently serious problems that are cropping up?

THE PRESIDENT. I really hope not. And this is not something that we are contemplating.

There are two serious problems that we have now that we did not have at Camp David. One is the lack of authority, final authority, granted to the negotiators. Three weeks ago—I think it was 3 weeks ago, 3 1/2 weeks ago—I spent almost all weekend, including late at night, early in the morning, meeting with the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators. We arrived at an agreement on a treaty text. This text was then submitted back to the national leaders and cabinets and others, and was rejected because of what I consider to be minor differences. They were important to the negotiating nations: And at Camp David, on the contrary, I could walk 50 yards or in 2 minutes have a private conversation in my own cabin with either Begin or Sadat; sometimes, if necessary, both together.

That's been one of the most frustrating things. We've had to negotiate a treaty or a settlement several times already; each time someone has rejected the final conclusion.

I would say equally as serious, perhaps even more serious, is that the negotiations have been conducted and are being conducted through the news media. At Camp David, the imposition of a news embargo, where no statements were made unless all three nations—ourselves and the two negotiating nations—agreed, was a very constructive thing. And I think even the press analysis has agreed with that in retrospect—even at the time, even, perhaps. Now that's one of my most serious concerns.

When a text is presented to the Israelis, there is a series of statements made by them that such and such a portion of the text is unacceptable and that we will never change our position on this. And then the same thing happens in a mirror image in Egypt, where public demands are made by different voices there. And it hardens positions, and it makes it almost impossible to present to both nations an accomplished document which they have to either accept or reject in its totality.

You can find in any piece of legislation the Congress passes one paragraph or one phrase or one section to which I, as President, would strenuously object. But still when I look at the totality of the document, I quite often, most often, can sign it. And these two problems are very, very serious.

I will be meeting in a few minutes, right after this meeting, with the Vice President of Egypt. And I met early this week with Defense Minister Weizman. We're trying now to find some resolution of existing differences. But I don't have any intention at this point of going to another summit meeting. And I hope and pray and expect that it will not be necessary.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that, through these long weeks and months of the negotiations where you had such a role yourself, how can we expect that if there is agreement between Egypt and Israel—if it was engineered so much by an outside party, yourself, without a continuing commitment and initiative by the principals, how can we expect that to stand?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I want to make clear that we've not imposed our will on the other leaders as reluctant negotiators. Everything that has been agreed to at Camp David was not only accepted but-I think you could see during the ceremonies here—accepted with enthusiasm, even with celebration. There was, I think, a justified euphoria there of appreciation to one another for having reached an agreement.

It wasn't something that we demanded that the others accept. We don't have any authority to do that and don't want any. We've tried to serve as an avenue of communication and add our good will when we can. This would continue in the future. I think the issues that were established at Camp David and resolved are the basis for a 'historical breakthrough. And to use King Hassan's language, "You can't make the stream flow backwards." We've made progress that's irreversible, in my opinion.

Now, the differences, compared to what was agreed, are minor, but important, politically and symbolically. Neither side completely trusts the other. This is based on ancient animosities, frequent wars, losses that quite often bubble up to the surface when you are in private talks with either leader. And I think that their mutual trust of me and our country is an important ingredient. If the Egyptians distrust the Israelis' commitment to move forward with self-government and autonomous authority in the West Bank, Gaza, we say, "We trust the Israelis to move, President Sadat. You and we together can use our influence in the future to ensure compliance with the agreement." If the Israelis distrust President Sadat's peaceful intentions, then I can tell Prime Minister Begin, "To the extent that you trust us, you and I will work together to alleviate your concerns about Sadat in the future."

I think these kinds of problems can be partially alleviated by our presence. But there's got to be some building of mutual trust between the two.

It is disappointing to me. I anticipated after Camp David that in just a few days the agreement could be reached. But those ancient distrusts and disputes continually arise. And I think now, next year, maybe years in the future, a moderating, constructive influence by the United States might be necessary, as mutually requested by both parties. I think both the Israelis and Egyptians see that without our presence now, future progress will be much more difficult. Even with our presence, progress is difficult.

Q. May I follow on that?

THE PRESIDENT. You can, yes.

Q. If we do get the agreement and dare look over the horizon, how much do you think that will do to defuse the potential for continued violence by other causes in the Middle East and continued threats against American oil supplies? Would it be—take us a great leap forward away from that?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think it would be a tremendous leap forward, even as it affects nations who presently are adamantly opposed to the peace agreements between Egypt and Israel. Yes, it would alleviate tension. It would help to let the moderate Arab countries, ourselves, and Israel act in concert to engender peace, open ways for economic development that still have not been adequately analyzed. I think that is the key factor in having a stable and a prosperous Middle East.

Q. Mr. President, when you outlined those problems, I've never heard you speak of why you think that those problems have developed. Is it in your view that these things are happening in spite of the good intentions of both sides? Or is there a suggestion there that maybe one side or the other or both have decided that maybe they just can't go along with what was agreed to at Camp David-maybe that Sadat thinks he can't get along with the rest of the Arab world on this, or the Israelis think that somehow they could get a treaty with Egypt and wind up keeping the land on the West Bank?

THE PRESIDENT. I think both sides are acting in good faith. They obviously want to interpret the agreements as much as proper to their own advantage. We have an inevitable problem in that Camp David, even though it was quite substantive—the texts were quite substantive-had to be embellished or elaborated with specific time schedules, exact drawing of lines between Israel and Egypt, interim withdrawal terms, the make-up of the Egyptian forces on the east bank of the Suez, the time to commence negotiations on the establishment of self-government in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. These kinds of things had to be negotiated in the final peace treaty.

In a few cases it might be necessary to modify the Camp David accords if both sides agree. If both sides don't agree, then our adamant position will be the Camp David accords cannot be abrogated, because this is just as solemn an agreement between those two nations as a future peace treaty will be. And unless both sides agree to modify the Camp David accords, we will insist that those accords be honored meticulously.

In addition to that, though, the progress from Camp David brings up hundreds of detailed decisions. We've put forward our own compromise proposals and our own documents as the original bargaining position. I spread out in my study upstairs, immediately above us, an enormous map of the Sinai—it was probably 10 or 12 feet long and 6 or 8 feet wide—and personally approved the drawing of the interim withdrawal lines and the final borders, even before the Israeli and Egyptian negotiators came here. And that was put forward to the military negotiators, who in effect have adopted what we proposed.

But I think that both sides are acting in good faith. They have political pressures at home. President Sadat legitimately wants to retain his good ties as a political and military leader of the Arab world. The Israelis have to be sure that their security is certain in years ahead. They want to retain an option of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. This is all included in the Camp David accords.

But I think that it would certainly be obvious that both sides want peace, and I think that's the main hope that we have in spite of these differences.

When you balance the enormous benefits with peace, compared to the horrible consequences of failure, and then look at the tiny differences that exist between them now—on wording and language, linkage, schedules, hilltops, valleys, security outposts—these things are really minuscule in comparison with the advantages of peace. And their common desire for peace is the hope of all three of us, that we'll be successful.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Q. Mr. President, let me ask you a general, all-purpose question about our relations with the Soviet Union. We're coming up now, I hope, to a SALT agreement. Brezhnev is getting older and visibly more feeble with each passing year. And the time is coming when he won't be the leader of the Soviet Union.

How do you see our relations with the Soviet Union developing over the rest of this term of office and on into the 1980's?

THE PRESIDENT. I'm determined that our relationships with the Soviet Union will improve as we go into the next 2 years. With every passing week, we have resolved part of the differences concerning SALT. In spite of a couple of illadvised statements by me that we would be having a SALT agreement within the next few weeks— [laughter] —we have made steady progress. And I think that when I do meet with Brezhnev—and I think "when" is a proper word instead of "if;" we don't know exactly when it will be—then the agenda to be discussed would be quite broad.

The centerpiece of it would be to culminate the SALT negotiations with a SALT II agreement. But I think at that time we would be prepared to discuss, I hope without any excessive time pressure and with very good preparation, the broadest range of differences that exist between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

I think that in recent weeks there has been an alleviation of tension between us. And I would like to see that progress continue.

Q. Why is that? Why in the last few weeks?

THE PRESIDENT. I can't say why. I think at the time of the Shcharanskiy trial, there was a combination of differences that probably made us reach a low point, at least in my own administration. And I think since then we've moved forward on better relations, a better understanding, more harmony, and less disputes with the public media.

Q. When you say you'd be prepared to discuss the broadest range of differences that exist between us, could you be more specific about some of the differences you'd like to discuss?

THE PRESIDENT. NO, I don't think so, because we've not prepared an agenda yet. But it certainly would not be exclusively limited to SALT. And I think that any differences we have with the Soviets, we ought to put them on the table and discuss them. But the agenda would have to be worked out jointly with them before any announcement of it was made.

HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT LEGISLATION

Q. Mr. President, how are you going to get hospital cost containment?

THE PRESIDENT. With a very determined and concerted effort. We were successful last session in finally getting it through the Senate, a fairly good version of it that would accomplish about 60 percent of what we originally wanted. We didn't have an adequate interest among the public in hospital cost containment. I think we'll have more interest next session than we had before. It's obvious that the hospital industry and the medical industry will exert their utmost effort to prevent hospital cost containment being passed.

I've seen recent news stories about the very large financial contributions made to interested Members of Congress. I think just the revelation of these completely legal contributions will induce the entire Congress to say, "Are we responsive to the general public, or are we excessively concerned with the intense lobbying pressure on this legislation?"

I think an open and objective debate with a full focusing of public attention on it will enhance our chances of success.

SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

Q. Mr. President, may I follow up somewhat on that? You talked about special interests here this morning. There is concern among some political scientists and observers that one-issue politics and special-interest politics are sort of taking over the two-party system, factionalizing it. Do you share this concern? And do you feel that some of the Senators who lost last week perhaps were victims, at least in part, of one-issue interest groups?

THE PRESIDENT. I'm concerned about it, and I think some of them who lost were victims of single-interest groups, or at least a small combination of interest groups. The only way to avoid that is to have the public more deeply involved in the electoral process, the financing of elections, and the debate precedent to a congressional decision.

The best single thing that could be done in a generic sense is to have public financing of congressional elections. I think it worked very well in the Presidential election. Certainly the result was obviously beneficial to our Nation. [Laughter] I think that everybody who participated in that Presidential election of 1976—myself and also the losers—agreed that the public financing system worked very well. It put a limit on a nationwide basis, I think, of $21 million. And, as you know, in one unfortunate election in North Carolina, a third that much was spent in one Senatorial election by one candidate. This is excessive. And so, I think that is a major step forward.

One of the problems with my first 2 years is that the multiplicity of simultaneous issues being addressed often prevented public focusing of attention on a particular issue. I think that we've learned in the process. I think we'll be much more careful in the future of things that are very important, to have more focusing of public attention on those important items.

The Congress, in my opinion, has been very responsible, and one of the pleasant surprises of my own Presidency has been the high level of honesty and competence and detailed knowledge by Members of the Congress and their staffs. When they get any degree of seniority, they have focused on a particular issue in subcommittee work, and I've been very favorably impressed with the quality of the Congress.

I think the results of the 95th Congress corroborate what I've just said. They've made some difficult decisions, and quite often they've done this courageously.

So, although the lobbying effort also exceeds my expectations, unfortunately, I think that those efforts can be met by some factors, certainly the two that I've just described to you.

ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Q. Mr. President, despite the international arms embargo, South Africa is reported to have received, and may still be receiving, weapons shipments through a complex scheme involving the Spanish Government—or allegedly involving the Spanish Government, the British Government, and the Island of Antigua. I'd like to know, sir, if you know whether these allegations are true, and if so, what degree of international cooperation it may have had, and what, if anything, you will do about the Pentagon's apparent failure to police its contractors.

THE PRESIDENT. I've never heard this before. If it should be true, it would be in direct violation of the pledged word of honor of the nations involved, certainly including all those who voted for the arms embargo against South Africa through the United Nations. But I've never heard of that allegation. If it should prove true, and if the Pentagon has any role to play in it, directly or indirectly, I would use my full influence to comply with the U.N. resolution.

Q. Would you support an investigation to determine the accuracy of this allegation?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, of course I would.

ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM

Q. Sir, could I return to this question, for a moment, of the domestic economy?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

Q. Without questioning for a moment your resolve to get on top of the inflation problem, are you absolutely convinced in your mind that these very high interest rates which are coming along are a good way to do it? I say that, because some businessmen view high interest rates as costs. They do, of course, add to the deficit-

THE PRESIDENT. I know.

Q. —-and they seem to run against the grain of your own political thinking, as far as I can tell.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I prefer low interest rates. You know, it would be much better for our economy to have lower interest rates. But I think the best way for me to address that hope successfully is to get inflation under control.

The Federal Reserve is properly independent. There's a good combination, I think, of responsibility between myself, the Federal Reserve, and the Congress. I have basic input in the level of budget requests, the size of the budget deficit, the allocation of funds in different ways that the Federal Government allots directly or through local and State governments. And, of course, I have veto power over tax legislation and the right to propose tax legislation. The Congress, on the other hand, can modify my budget. They can propose and do propose, as you know, tax policy. And the Federal Reserve is primarily concerned with the level of money available in the economy at a particular time.

Consumers have a major input, also, in their buying patterns and particularly in the percentage of their income spent versus income retained in savings accounts. I think that the system is balanced as best I can envision it.

The Federal Reserve will obviously modify its interest policy compatible with the amount of money on hand which is related to the inflation rate.

So, I prefer lower interest rates. I'll do everything I can to encourage lower interest rates within the bounds of the law by controlling Federal policy to get inflation under control.

Q. Mr. President, in that connection, would you, fitting in increases in oil and gas prices along the same lines as interest rates—how do increases in oil and gas prices fit into that, into the anti-inflation program?

THE PRESIDENT. As is the case in almost every answer I've given you this morning, there are two sides of the issue in domestic and international affairs-our relations with the Soviets, our relations with Egypt and Israel, our relations with the Congress, controlling inflation versus meeting the needs of our people. Tell me exactly what you asked.

Q. I was wondering how allowing increases in gas and oil prices perhaps would fit in with fighting inflation.

THE PRESIDENT. There again, one of the problems with our economy is excessive imports of oil, in particular, which increase our trade deficit, which lowers the value of the dollar, which increases inflation. It's estimated that every 10-percent drop in the price of the dollar causes a 1 to 1 1/2 percent increase in the inflation rate here at home. Since we imposed the monetary requirements which stabilized the dollar, the dollar's appreciated about 10 percent, which is a major contributing factor to holding down inflation.

Increasing the price of oil and gas, although it costs the consumers more in this country, decreases consumption, causes the consumers to shift to other forms of energy—which doesn't work any particular hardship on them in the long run—cuts down our imports, helps to balance our trade, strengthens the dollar, and controls inflation. So, it's a very complicated process, obviously.

What I proposed to the Congress in April of 1977 was to increase the price of oil to the world market price and refund that increased cost directly back to the consumers as rapidly and as equitably as possible. That would have had minimal inflationary results. It would raise the price of oil, collect the increased price, reduce consumption of oil, give the money right back to the consumers through some mechanism that we proposed. Ours was a reduction in income tax which would be mirrored immediately in income deductions from biweekly paychecks. So, this is the kind of interrelationships that make the economic situation difficult to understand and results uncertain.

I haven't found any easy questions to answer since I've been in this office. They are all difficult. I don't object to the responsibility, and I've enjoyed the job. And I believe that we will be successful because of the basic strength of our country. I think the world looks for us to be responsible, and in addition to solving our own domestic economic problems, we have a responsibility to the world.

The stability of the dollar is important to every nation on Earth. How well we control inflation, how well we stabilize the value of the dollar will determine to a substantial degree the price set for oil by the OPEC nations, for instance. And how much trust other people have in our country on domestic affairs has a direct influence on me, as an able leader, even in political affairs and military affairs that are not directly related to economics. So, the complexity of it is certainly appreciated by me.

But the basic strength of our country, militarily and economically and politically, is the great resource that I have that gives me confidence that, in spite of my own limitations and the complexity of issues, that I might do a good job in the Congress.

Let me say that I'm thankful to you all for coming to meet with me. I've enjoyed it.

Q. Why don't we do it every 2 weeks? [Laughter]

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have a press conference every couple of weeks. REPORTER. Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you very much.