Situation in Iran and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Remarks at a White House Briefing for Members of Congress.

Well, first of all, let me say that I'm very glad to have such an extraordinary turnout tonight. When I was talking to the Speaker a few minutes ago, somebody said that this may be the Members of Congress who couldn't go home to their district— [laughter] —because of unpopularity or either the Defense Department has run out of airplanes—one or the other. [Laughter]

Tonight I'd like to take a few minutes to explain to you two basic and serious problems that we've now been addressing, one of them since the 4th of November, the other one, just Christmas Eve.

I don't recall in history a time, at least in modern history, when our Nation was at peace that it was so deeply concerned as it has been the last 2 months since American hostages were kidnaped in our own Embassy in Tehran on November 4. I need not go into the details on that incident, because you're thoroughly familiar with it. But I will outline very quickly the basic principles that have guided me the last 2 months, and then at the end of my brief comments, I'll be glad to have questions from any of you.

This has not been a good 2 months. It's been a time of strain and trial. It's been a time of intimate negotiations with many foreign leaders, trying to accomplish the basic goals that we have followed since the beginning of this confrontation with the terrorists or kidnapers in Tehran.

Our first commitment has been to protect the interests of our Nation, the longrun, long-range interests; secondly, to do what we can to ensure the lives and the safety of the American hostages, our 50 fellow countrymen; third, to secure through diplomatic means, using every possible channel, their release—unharmed, if God be willing; fourth, to avoid bloodshed, which would very likely lead to the death of our hostages; and fifth and most difficult, to maintain support for the American position by the vast majority of nations on Earth. This has not been an easy last task, because historically in the United Nations and other international fora, our country has not been a favorite, because we are powerful and a super power and because there is jealousy and animosity at times and distrust toward us.

We've now had four votes in the Security Council, as you know. We've not yet experienced a negative vote. On the last vote to set a deadline for the imposition of sanctions and to call for the Secretary-General's trip to Iran, there were four abstentions—the Soviet Union and their puppet, Czechoslovakia, and two small Moslem nations, Bangladesh and Kuwait. The other 11 nations voted to send the Secretary-General to Iran for a last effort to negotiate the release of the hostages, at the end of which time the Security Council would come back and take action on possible economic sanctions.

In the International Court of Justice, the vote was 15 to 0, unanimous vote.

So far then, we have accomplished all the goals that we set for ourselves except the release of the hostages, and we are still exploring every possible avenue for that release.

The most difficult part of the Iranian question is that there's no government entity with whom we can communicate or negotiate or register a complaint or a request. When the Secretary-General went over to Iran, he came back and reported the same thing that we had already known, and that is that the most powerful single political entity in Iran consists of the international terrorists or 'the kidnapers who are holding our hostages. Whenever there has been a showdown concerning the hostages between Khomeini or the .Revolutionary Council versus the terrorists, the terrorists have always prevailed.

We don't know what will happen in the future, but I think you possibly recognize that this small group of people—who may originally have comprised some students, but who are not students and should not be referred to as students—have achieved, with the holding of American hostages, a great and significant political influence in Iran. They don't necessarily have as one of their prime interests the integrity of Iran as a nation or the well-being of the Iranian people or even the security of the country within which they live. And so there is no legitimate political bargaining leverage that can be exerted on them, and there is no entity there with whom one can negotiate.

They know that the consequences to Iran will be quite severe if our hostages are injured or killed, and I think only the presence of a very strong military force in the Arabian Sea has deterred them so far from taking action that would have been even more abhorrent to the rest of the world. That problem persists. It's an everpresent consideration of mine and yours. And I'm determined that this country will not forget for a moment those hostages. And the last hostage there is just as important to me as the first one.

Our country is remarkably unified. I've had strong support, which I deeply appreciate, and the American people have been surprisingly patient, which, as you know, is not a characteristic of Americans. But I think most people who've studied the situation, who've looked at the map, who've seen where the Embassy is located within Tehran, can see that a strike force or a military action that might be oriented toward the release of the hostages would almost certainly end in failure and almost certainly end in the death of the hostages.

They are being held in small groups, two or perhaps three in a group, with heavily armed militants constantly guarding them and the hostages constantly being tied, with their hands bound at all times.

We'll continue to persist. Our next step will be in the United Nations to have sanctions imposed against Iran. I cannot predict to you that the imposition of those sanctions, if we get the nine requisite votes, will cause an early release of the hostages. We pray that something will happen and that eventually Iran will recognize that the threat to them is not from the United States, but even more vividly from the Soviet Union, who have, on Christmas Eve, invaded Afghanistan.

In my own opinion, shared by many of the world's leaders with whom I have discussed this matter, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War. It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, we all were shocked and deplored publicly and officially the Soviet action in Hungary and then later, in 1968, in Czechoslovakia. Those were two countries which, since the Second World War, were basically subservient to the Soviet Union; they were not independent nations in control of their own affairs. There was an uprising, as you know, and the Soviets brutally stamped the uprising out within those two countries.

This, however, was a sovereign nation, a nonaligned nation, a deeply religious nation, and the Soviets invaded it brutally.

We were informed, other leaders throughout the world were informed, by Soviet Ambassadors and direct messages from Moscow, that the Soviets went into the nation to protect it from some third force that might be threatening Afghanistan. When questioned about where was the third threatening force from, the Soviets have never been able to give a reasonable answer. They claim that they were invited in by the Government to protect Afghanistan. As you know, the leader of Afghanistan, President Amin, who was supposed to have invited them in, was immediately assassinated as soon as the Soviets obtained control over Kabul, the capital city, and several of the members of the President's family were also killed.

We are the other super power on Earth, and it became my responsibility, representing our great Nation, to take action that would prevent the Soviets from this invasion with impunity. The Soviets had to suffer the consequences. In my judgment our own Nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviets' move into Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies.

I talked to the President of Pakistan immediately after this Afghanistan invasion and also talked to many other of the world's leaders and sent them direct messages. The action that we could take was confined to three opportunities. One is to take military action, which I did not consider appropriate. Our country has no desire, nor could we have effectively implemented military action, to drive the Soviet forces from Afghanistan—which left me with two other options, which I chose to exercise. One is political action, and the other one is economic action.

Politically, we joined with 50 other nations to take to the Security Council two propositions: one, to condemn the Soviet Union for the invasion and therefore the threat to world peace; and secondly, to call upon the Soviets to withdraw their troops. The vote was cast after the debates were concluded. The only nations voting against these two propositions were East Germany—again, a Soviet puppet nation-and the Soviets themselves. The permanent members, as you know, have a veto right. And now a move is underway, which I think will be realized, to take this case to the General Assembly for further condemnation of the Soviet Union.

It's difficult to understand why the Soviets took this action. I think they probably underestimated the adverse reaction from around the world. I've talked to many other leaders, our allies and those representing nations that might be further threatened, and they all believe that we took the right action. It was not done for political reasons; it was not done to implement some foreign policy. It was done in the interest of our national security.

We did take economic action, which I think was properly balanced. It was carefully considered. We will try to impose this action on the Soviet Union in a way that will have a minimal adverse effect on our own country, where the sacrifices will be shared as equitably as you and I together can possibly devise, and at the same time let the Soviets realize the consequences of their invasion.

We will not permit the Soviets to fish in American waters within 200 miles of our land area. They have a very large fishing fleet, involving hundreds of thousands of tons of fish harvested. They will not have those permits renewed.

We will not send high technology equipment to the Soviet Union or any equipment that might have a security benefit to the Soviet Union. This will include drilling equipment, for instance, used for the exploration and production of oil and natural gas.

We will restrict severely normal commerce with the Soviet Union, which is highly advantageous to them. And of course, I have interrupted the delivery of grain, which the Soviets had ordered, above and beyond the 8 million tons which our Nation is bound by a 5-year agreement to have delivered to the Soviet Union.

We have taken steps to make sure that the farmers are protected from the adverse consequences of this interruption of grain shipments to a maximum degree possible. It will be a costly proposition. I understood this when I took the action. And my estimate is, based on a fairly thorough, but somewhat rapid analysis, that this year the extra cost to purchase this grain and to change the price levels of corn and wheat and to pay the extra storage charges will amount to about $2 billion. That's in fiscal year 1980. In fiscal year 1981 there will be an additional cost of about $800 million.

It may be that as the season progresses and we have more experience in substituting for the Soviet Union as the purchaser of this grain, that there will be an additional 2 or 3 hundred million dollars spent in 1980. If this should take place, then that would reduce by the same amount, roughly, expenditures in 1981 fiscal year. So, the total cost will be in the neighborhood of $2.8 billion. This cost will not fall on the farmers except to the extent that they are taxpayers like every other American. This will be shared by all those in this country who pay taxes to the Federal Government.

This grain will not be permitted to go back on the market in such a way as to depress agricultural prices. And in a few minutes I'll let one of the representatives here of the Agriculture Department, Jim Williams, outline to you the details. And I have a sheet prepared, for handing out to all of you—the exact loan prices for wheat and corn and the other prices for the redemption of corn and wheat from storage.

The last point I want to make is this: It's very important that we understand that our allies are working very closely with us. I talked to several of them before we took this action. All of them agreed that it should be taken. We've got the maximum practical assurance from them that they will not substitute their sale of goods, including grain, for our own. There are three major nations that ordinarily have grain to export—Argentina, Canada, and Australia. Argentina does not have adequate grain to make any significant difference.

I talked to President Giscard d'Estaing today, who represents West Europe. They do have substantial quantities of grain ordinarily on hand, particularly barley. They will not substitute their grain for ours that's being withheld from the Soviet Union.

We anticipate that this withholding of grain to the Soviet Union will not force them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. We understood this from the beginning. We don't think that economic pressure or even condemnation by the United Nations of the Soviet Union will cause them to withdraw their troops. But we hope that we have laid down a marker and let them know that they will indeed suffer, now and in the future, from this unwarranted invasion of a formerly independent, nonaligned country.

I need the support of the American people. I believe that it's a matter of patriotism, and I believe that it's a matter of protecting our Nation's security. I anticipate that we'll get good response from the Congress in the minimal legislation that might be required to carry out these programs. Almost all of it can be done by administrative action under the rights given by the Congress, through legislation, to the Secretary of Agriculture and to me.

There are just a couple of other things that perhaps should be mentioned, but I think I'll wait on them till a little later.

We want to pursue a long-range analysis and a schedule of actions to strengthen American interests and presence and influence in this troubled area of the world, in Southwest Asia. You know about some of these from news reports that have already been issued.

And we will take action, with the Congress help, to strengthen Pakistan. Our desire is to do this through a consortium of nations; that's also the desire of Pakistan. I talked since lunch with President Zia of that country. I've talked to him before about this matter.

And other nations in the region who might be threatened by the Soviets, from Afghanistan, will also know that we and many other nations on Earth are committed to their adequate defense capability, so that the Soviets will be discouraged from further expansionism in the area.

Because of the Iranian. question, we have greatly built up our naval forces in the northern China Sea or in the Arabian Sea. Those will be maintained at a higher level than they have been in the past. And as you know, there has been a marshaling of worldwide public opinion, not only in the condemnation of the Iranian terrorists who hold our hostages but also against the Soviet Union for their unprecedented invasion of Afghanistan in this recent few weeks.

I don't have a written text, but those are some of the things that I wanted to describe to you. And I think it might be good to have questions from this group now. Perhaps some of the—a few members of the press have been in. Perhaps we could discuss the matter more thoroughly and we could get into some sensitive areas after the press has departed.