Message to the Senate Transmitting Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu and the Daito Islands.

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, signed at Washington and Tokyo on June 17, 1971. The Agreement was negotiated in accordance with the understandings I reached with Prime Minister Sato during' my meetings with him in November 1969.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the following related documents:

Agreed Minutes,

Memorandum of Understanding concerning Article III,

Exchange of notes concerning the Voice of America facility in Okinawa,

Exchange of notes concerning submerged lands,

Letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Aichi to Ambassador Meyer concerning treatment of foreign nationals and firms,

Memorandum of Understanding on air services to and through Okinawa; and

The Arrangement concerning Assumption by Japan of the Responsibility for the Immediate Defense of Okinawa.

The enclosed report from the Secretary of State describes the Agreement and the related documents.

When Prime Minister Sato arrived in Washington on November 19, 1969, I observed that "whether peace survives in the last third of the century will depend more on what happens in the Pacific than in any other area of the world." I took that particular occasion to emphasize this fact to the American people and to the world because of my strong feeling then, as now, that Japan, as one of the major powers in the Pacific area, will play a central role in determining what happens in that vital region.

Japan's phenomenal economic growth represents a most significant development for us and for the other nations of the Pacific. Japan is now the third largest producer in the world and has developed with us the greatest transoceanic commerce in the history of mankind. The potential for cooperation between our two economies, the world's most productive and the world's most dynamic, is clearly immense. For this among other reasons, Japan and the United States have a strong mutual interest in the peace and security of the Pacific area. This interest is recognized in our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which both our countries recognize as a keystone of our security relationships in that part of the world. I think all Americans also realize that a close and friendly relationship between Japan and the United States is vital to building the peaceful and progressive world both of us want for all mankind. The problems involved in strengthening the fabric of peace in Asia and the Pacific will undoubtedly be challenging. But if Japan and the United States go separate ways, then this task would be incomparably more difficult. Whatever differences may arise between our nations on specific policy questions, it is essential that the basic nature of our relationship remain close and cordial.

When Prime Minister Sato came to Washington in 1969, there was still one great unsettled issue between the United States and Japan arising out of World War II: the Okinawan question. Almost one million Japanese on Okinawa were still living under foreign administration nearly 25 years after the end of the Second World War. This situation subjected the entire relationship with our major Asian ally to strain. It was clear that our continued administration of Okinawa was incompatible with the mature relationship which both we and Japan recognized as the only possible basis for lasting cooperation between nations, especially between two great world powers such as the United States and Japan.

The Prime Minister and I therefore agreed that our two Governments would immediately enter into consultations concerning specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa to Japan. We determined that it was essential for this to be done without detriment to the security of the Far East, including Japan. We further agreed that the consultations should be concluded as quickly as possible with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972, provided that agreement could be reached on the terms and conditions of the reversion and that the necessary legislative support in both countries could be secured.

In undertaking these negotiations, the United States recognized, as a matter of basic principle, that it was consistent with neither our national character nor our national interest to continue to administer a territory which has been historically connected with Japan and whose people desire to rejoin their mother country. Japan recognized that the presence of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area, and that the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. More specifically, Japan recognized that United States forces in Okinawa played a vital role in the present situation in the Far East and agreed that the United States would retain, under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

After intensive negotiations, agreement was reached on the terms and conditions for reversion and the Agreement which I now commend to the Senate was signed on June 17, 1971.

This Agreement is founded upon the common security interests which are reflected in the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed in 1960 and in the Communiqué which Prime Minister Sato and I jointly issued on November 21, 1969. The Agreement stipulates that, even after reversion, the Mutual Security Treaty and related arrangements, such as the Status of Forces Agreement of 1960, will apply to Okinawa without modification. The same will be true of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, signed in 1953.

The new Agreement provides that after reversion Japan will grant the United States the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyus in accordance with the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 and its related arrangements, such as the Status of Forces Agreement. This means that the United States will continue to have the use of bases in Okinawa necessary for carrying out our mutual security commitments to Japan and for maintaining peace in the Far East. Under this Agreement, these facilities will be provided to us on the same terms as those now available to us in Japan. After reversion, a sovereign friendly government will give us permission to maintain these facilities in the Ryukyus, as in Japan, in recognition of mutual security interests. This is the only sound basis for long-term cooperation and I am convinced that it will enable us effectively to protect our own security interests.

The Agreement and related arrangements also deal with other important matters. They provide for appropriate payment to the United States for assets to be transferred to the Government of Japan and for certain costs which will be involved in connection with reversion. They provide protection for United States business and professional interests in Okinawa after reversion. They transfer to Japan responsibility for the immediate defense of the Ryukyus, which will result in substantial savings for the United States, in terms of both budget and foreign exchange.

In summary, then, I am strongly convinced that this Agreement is in the best interests of both countries. It meets United States security needs and it places our relationship with our major Asian ally on a more sound and enduring basis. It fulfills long-held aspirations of the Japanese people, including the people of Okinawa, for the reunification of these islands with Japan.

I believe the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration will be one of the most important accomplishments of our postwar policy in the Far East. It should enhance the prospects for peace and stability in that area, and it is essential to the continuation of friendly and productive relations between the United States and Japan. I therefore urge that the Senate give its early and favorable consideration to this Agreement so that reversion can take place during 1972.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House

September 21, 1971