European Broadcast Journalists Question-and-Answer Session.

FOREIGN POLICY

DAVID DIMBLEBY [British Broadcasting Corporation]. Mr. President, when you came into office, people in the West were looking to you, on the basis of the campaign you had run, for quite a big boost to the economies of the world. And I wonder whether you think that they may understandably feel a little bit let down at the caution and conservatism you have shown, and you've cut back even on what you've done, and perhaps feel that America hasn't yet begun really to pull her weight to get everybody back to work in the rest of the world.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we will wind up with an economic stimulus package for this year or next year in excess of $20 billion, which we consider to be adequate. In addition to that, we have had very encouraging news about our own rate of economic growth in the first 3 months. The unemployment rate has dropped and the gross national product has increased well above what we had anticipated, almost doubling what it was the fourth quarter of 1976.

At the same time, we've addressed some long-range questions that would help our economy in the future to channel our resources where it's needed most. A comprehensive energy policy with an emphasis on conservation will help us to cut down our very serious payments deficit, which this year is likely to be $12 billion.

As you know, some of the other western governments have a payments surplus. We think we are doing our share to absorb the built-in deficit that's caused by the OPEC oil sales.

MR. DIMBLEBY. But will you be under pressure 'in London, do you think, from other governments to do more than you have done, or do you think they are quite happy to accept what you have now decided on?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I can't anticipate what other governments will think, but my judgment is that they will agree that our effort is adequate.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

CARI, WEISS [ZDF German Television]. It has been suggested frequently, Mr. President, that your administration expects somewhat higher gross rates, higher stimulating efforts, particularly from countries like Germany and Japan. Now since you have cut yourself back a bit in your stimulating measures, do you still think that the Federal Republic isn't doing enough?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, that's a judgment for each country to make, of course. Japan and we have tried to stimulate the economy, about I percent of our gross national product, which I think is a reasonable level. We have a much higher unemployment rate than does either Japan or Germany. Our inflation rate is already higher than it is in Germany. Our' basic inflation rate is about 6 percent. I think that of the Federal Republic is about 4 percent.

These questions are answered best by showing the great difference that exists among nations. Each nation is an individual, but we share common problems on overconsumption of energy, a lack of attention to the future, a lack of concern in dealing with one another and close consultation before we make basic decisions, a lack of attention that has been given in the past to the developing or undeveloped nations of the world.

So, I think the purpose of the summit is not to make every nation exactly the same as others or to criticize one another, but to search out common ground to get to know one another, to set long-range goals on the control of energy consumption, the proliferation of atomic weapon capability, cutting down on the sale of military weapons, and increasing economic growth in the less developed countries. These kind of things are: what we hope to address.

EMMANUEL, DE LA TAILLE [TFI French Television]. Mr. President, we are very conscious that we are speaking with you from many countries in Europe. I would like to go to the political impact of the crisis. Because of the economic situation, most of the governments in Europe are in a very weak position. They are almost everywhere looking for confidence and sometimes for money.

Don't you think there is a danger to see the economic crisis leading to political crisis in Europe, and what could be really clone during the London summit in order to restore some confidence in the governments?

THE PRESIDENT. I think one of the things that we need to keep in mind is not to expect dramatic solutions to all of the economic problems of the world. Another thing that we need to keep in mind is that the crisis atmosphere that existed a couple of years ago has been alleviated to some degree. I think that most of the nations now are much better off than they were 2 years ago.

A reassuring thought, in addition to that, is that among all our people, particularly those in this country, there's a sense of assurance and confidence that's derived from the fact that I will be cooperating with the leaders of France and the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy and Great Britain and Japan and Canada and others in making plans for the future.

So, I don't think the crisis is something that needs to be a matter of intense concentration or the search for magic answers. The problems that we have had in the past among our own nations are much better resolved than those that exist among nations who are destitute, who have no economic base, who don't have a high standard of living, and who don't have any energy reserves of their own.

We are much better off than most countries, and I think that the strength that we can show among the developed, free, industrial nations in harmonizing our efforts together and dealing with the more unfortunate nations is a great step forward in itself.

MR. WEISS. Speaking of North-South, Mr. President, how far do your views differ from the views of the European Community as far as establishing of a common commodity fund is concerned?

THE PRESIDENT. It's hard for me to answer that question without knowing what all the other nations feel. We think that on an individual commodity basis, after negotiations have been completed, that a common fund is the best approach.

I think that in my own exchange of letters in several instances with Chancellor Schmidt we've arrived at a fairly compatible approach to this basic question.

We strongly favor, my own administration does, strengthening of the European Community itself. And I think that as we deal with individual commodities that are either in short supply or those which have a history of wildly fluctuating prices, then I think we can more fairly treat our own consumers and also more fairly treat the producers of those raw materials where quite often a very poor country is heavily dependent upon stable prices for a particular commodity.

So, we favor the stabilization of prices with a commodity fund, but we prefer to deal with it on an individual commodity basis.

NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN

MR. DIMBLEBY. Can we turn to your energy policies, which you say you are going to discuss at London? You talked about-the energy program being "the moral equivalent of war," but to some people it has given the impression of being rather strong on rhetoric and preaching and rather light when it actually comes to the measures.

I mean I saw an American humorist actually took the four letters m-e-o-w and said the policy amounted to "meow," that in other words it's all talk and there isn't very much there compared with what happens in Europe on controlling energy.

THE PRESIDENT. The goals that we have set for our own energy consumption between now and 1985 are very stringent and the legislative proposals that I have submitted to the Congress are adequate to meet those goals.

MR. DIMBLEBY. If you get them through Congress?

THE PRESIDENT. It we get them through Congress.

MR. DIMBLEBY. Do you think you will get them through Congress?

THE PRESIDENT. I think so. One of the goals, for instance, is to reduce substantially the amount of oil that we anticipate importing in 1985. Our present projections, with no actions, show that we will import about 16 million barrels of oil per day. With the program implemented, we'll cut that 16 million down to less than 6 million barrels per day.

We actually anticipate lowering our gasoline consumption in this country 10 percent below the present level of consumption, and to build up this benefit primarily by conservation induced by tax incentives and also without very serious damage to our own economy.

For instance, we feel that the inflation rate will be affected less than one-half of 1 percent over the period between now and 1985, and in addition, we feel that there is practically a nondetectable adverse impact on the rate of economic growth.

We have a much better opportunity to do this than most of the countries with whom we'll be meeting in London because we waste so much more.

MR. DIMBLEBY. But isn't there a sense in which it's fair to say that some of these things don't appear to have been thought right through? I mean two things we have talked about now, both the economy, where you drop back a third of the growth you were going to give, and then the energy policy, where already the 5 cents, which seems quite a small figure, that you are trying to raise, we heard yesterday--they .are saying it's not going to get through Congress. Do you think you, yourself, as President, are moving too fast on too many fronts and haven't actually worked out the mechanics of how you are going to get the things done?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it's difficult to move too fast on too many fronts and also to have a program that's not adequate because it's so timid. Those to me seem to be inherently incompatible.

MR. DIMBLEBY. Well, too fast in language, I meant, and not clear enough in policy.

THE PRESIDENT. Our goal, for instance, in automobile economy--we now have an average gasoline consumption in our country, in all our automobiles put together, of only 14 miles per gallon, be-cause the American economy has been built around very large, very heavy automobiles. By 1982 we project that the average gasoline economy of new automobiles will 'be 27 1/2 miles per gallon, almost twice the present fleet level.

This is a dramatic change in purchasing habits of the American people concerning automobiles. So, the changes are quite profound. We consider them to be adequate, and we consider them to be capable of phasing in so that they don't disrupt our economy as we make these basic changes. And those factors are very difficult to accommodate, but I think that we have put together a package that will do that.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

MR. WEISS. Can we turn to nuclear matters and proliferation, nonproliferation, Mr. President?

MR. DE LA TAILLE. Yes, Mr. President, I would like to ask you some questions about that. Your new nuclear program can be seen in Europe as an American pressure in order to prevent the European people from getting more independence in terms of energy, in terms of nuclear fuel or exports. What's your answer to this reaction that you have in Europe, especially in France and in Germany?

THE PRESIDENT. The sharp distinction that needs to 'be drawn, which hasn't been adequately understood yet, is that we favor the supply of adequate nuclear fuel to nations for power production and we will rapidly increase our own capability in this country to manufacture and to distribute enriched uranium. That is compatible, I think, among all nations.

We also are heavily committed to the prevention of the capability of nonnuclear nations from developing explosives, atomic weapons. We think the key to that is whether or not these nonnuclear countries sign the nonproliferation treaty on the one hand and forgo the opportunity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel or used nuclear fuel into explosives, as was done by India just a few years ago.

This creates a disharmony among us, but I think the basic principle is compatible between us and the Federal Republic of Germany, 'between us and France.

MR. DIMBLEBY. You have been condemned today by the 59-nation energy conference in Salzburg by the chairman, who is saying that at a time when atomic energy is needed, what you have done is made it harder than ever to get it.

THE PRESIDENT. I think that is an incorrect statement on his part, because as I pointed out, we will substantially increase our production of nuclear fuels. We are very eager to sell our own nuclear power plants. We are very eager to see other nations do the same.

What we don't want to do is to give these nonnuclear countries the capability of making weapons. And I don't think these two thrusts of our policy are incompatible.

MR. WEISS. Could you perhaps, Mr. President, explain in some more detail the conditions and criteria under which the United States will in the future reliably supply nuclear fuel? Could nuclear fuel elements originally supplied by the United States be reprocessed in third countries?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes. They are now. And they would be permitted to be reprocessed in the future.

MR. WEISS. Now, the German Federal Government has said it is in no position to retreat from the nuclear exports. Do you consider this still as a deal concluded with Brazil---

MR. DE LA TAILLE. Or France with Pakistan.

THE PRESIDENT. I understand.

MR. WEISS. as a major impediment to your desire to curb proliferation?

THE PRESIDENT. We have expressed ourselves publicly in this administration-and my predecessor, President Ford, and Secretary Kissinger did the same--in deploring the sale of the reprocessing plants both to Pakistan and to Brazil. This is a decision, though, for France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, and Pakistan to make themselves. We hope that our objection to this sale, which has been openly expressed, will curb or prevent future sales of this kind being consummated regardless of the action of the nations on these two particular sales.

I don't know what's going to happen in Brazil or Pakistan about these purchases. My understanding is that the Brazilians are quite determined to go through with their reprocessing capability. But we did object to it. We do object to it. We are not going to try to impose our will on other countries. And we believe that our opposition will prevent similar sales in the future.

CONCORDE SST

MR. DE LA TAILLE. Mr. President, before we go farther, I feel obliged to ask you a question about Concorde. You know that it has been largely misinterpreted in Europe and the problem of Concorde is spreading anti-American feelings in Europe, especially in France, as you know. What's your position on the "political noise" of Concorde and the way it could be solved? [Laughter]

THE PRESIDENT. My position is very clear. I support the decision made by President Ford and his administration in authorizing a 16-month trial period for the Concorde, both at Dulles Airport, which the Federal Government controls, and also at the John F. Kennedy Airport, which is controlled by local authorities in New York.

As you know, where the Federal Government has had that authority, the test flights are now being conducted by Concorde at Dulles, near Washington. I have no authority at all over the New York Port officials.---

MR. DE LA TAILLE. People in Europe don't know that--are not familiar with that.

THE PRESIDENT. I know. That is the crux of the misunderstanding, because in our own Nation, the Executive leaders-even the President has absolutely no authority over the judicial system or the courts, and to try to exert that authority would be a very serious breach of our constitutional processes.

We also have a similar constitutional division of authority between local governments, that is, the State and the city on the one hand compared to the President. I have no authority at all to tell the Governor of New York State or the mayor of New York City nor the New York Port Authority what to do about the Concorde. We have made our Federal position clear, that we prefer to see John F. Kennedy Airport open to the Concorde for the 16-month period.

HUMAN RIGHTS

MR. DIMBLEBY. Mr. President, can we turn to one area of foreign relations which perhaps made the greatest impact in the last 3 months, which is your stand on human rights and its effect on American foreign policy. I think people may be a bit puzzled now about quite where this is leading and wonder also why you've concentrated so very much on Russia and human rights there, where you are not actually able to do very much, and haven't apparently done anything, for instance, in Iran, a country which you have very close links with and where you could presumably very much influence what in fact went on?

THE PRESIDENT. My stand on human rights is compatible with the strong and proven position taken by almost all Americans. We feel that the right of a human being to be treated fairly in the courts, to be removed from the threat of prison, imprisonment without a trial, to have a life to live that's free is very precious. In the past this deep commitment of the free democracies has quite often not been widely known or accepted or demonstrated.

Our policy is very clear. It doesn't relate just to the Soviet Union. I've always made it clear that it doesn't. It relates to our own country as well. It relates to all those with whom we trade or with whom we communicate.

It's an undeviating commitment that I intend to maintain until the last day I'm in office. And through various means, either public statements or through private 'negotiations, through sales policies, we are trying to implement a renewed awareness of the need for human rights in our dealing with all countries.

MR. DIMBLEBY. But has anything been done, for instance, about human rights in Iran since you came into office?

THE PRESIDENT. We feel that it has. But that's something for the Iranian Government to announce and to decide.

MR. DIMBLEBY. But privately you are putting pressure on them?

THE PRESIDENT. Both privately and publicly. I think there are very few leaders in the world now who don't realize that their attitude toward the basic question of human rights is a crucial element in our future relationships with them. This applies not only in the Communist countries. It also applies in totalitarian governments in South America and otherwise. It also applies among our closest friends.

MR. DIMBLEBY. But just lastly on that one point, if, for instance, with Russia you say that your stand on human rights shouldn't affect the SALT talks---

THE PRESIDENT. That's correct.

MR. DIMBLEBY.---may not other countries in the world say, well, when it actually comes down to practical matters of negotiation, of foreign policy, of aid, America doesn't mean it, it's simply what the President wishes America to be saying all the time rather than doing?

THE PRESIDENT. I think that's not accurate. As you may or may not have noticed, I have a very hard time preventing the American Congress from inserting into the laws of our Nation a direct prohibition against loans or foreign aid programs to countries that violate human rights.

My own best approach has been to treat these countries' violations in a negotiating way so that I can talk to a president of a country or to the leader of a country and say this is a very serious problem between us, we don't want to put public pressure on you which would make it embarrassing for you to release political prisoners, for instance.

MR. DIMBLEBY. But you did with Russia, very public.

THE PRESIDENT. I have never predicated our stand on SALT or our trade policies with Russia on the basis of the attitude toward human rights. But I think that in many countries around the world there has been initiated a new awareness of the importance of human rights, at least in dealing with our own country.

DETENTE

MR. WEISS. Quite generally, Mr. President, what basic rules for the future state of detente would you like to see established between East and West?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, of course, I would like to see the Soviet Union join with us in a demonstrable commitment to put a limit on new atomic weapons, to reduce the number of weapons we presently have authorized and also in place, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. I would like to see a comprehensive test ban where no testing of nuclear weapons, either peaceful or for military purposes, is carried out.

I would like to see a prior notice of all test firings to alleviate tensions that exist between our two countries. Also I would like to see us both withdraw any unwarranted influence in the private or internal affairs of African countries where on occasion disputes have been nourished by outside influence.

I would like to see the Indian Ocean demilitarized, and I would like to have the Soviets agree with us to do this, working very closely with India, Australia, and others. I would like to see increased trade between our countries. I would like to see the Soviet Union and us, when we get to the Belgrade conference, to assess the progress made under the Helsinki agreement, demonstrate along with us that we have moved very strongly toward correcting human rights violations within our own countries--and we have been guilty on occasion. These are the kinds of things that would be very helpful.

MR. WEISS. But you are not--obviously not going to draw--to engage the Soviet Union into a much stronger ideological, global dispute?

THE PRESIDENT. You know, I have no objection to that. We have our own democratic form of government which we think is best. In everything that I do concerning domestic or foreign policy, I like to try to make other people realize that our system works, that freedom of elections, freedom from persecution, that basic human rights being preserved, that a move toward peace, reduction in weapons, prohibition against suffering from inadequate health care and so forth, are part of our national consciousness and that we can demonstrate that it works in this country and serve as an example to others.

I am sure the Soviet Union has always maintained that an ideological struggle was legitimate and they have never refrained from doing so. I don't feel any inclination to refrain from doing it, either.

EUROCOMMUNISM

MR. DE LA TAILLE. Mr. President, I would like to ask you a question which is not related directly to the East-West relations, but maybe could be. What's going to be your attitude if there are someday Communist leaders participating in governments as cabinet members, I mean, in Italy or in France in the case of a victory of the leftist coalition? And how do you see the impact of this question of Communists participating in governments in Europe--in Western Europe, I mean?

THE PRESIDENT. That's a question that is hard for me to answer, and I have got a lot to learn from other leaders of the nations with whom I'll be meeting in London. President Giscard can help me a lot to understand that question. So can Mr. Andreotti.

We have taken the basic position that it's not up to us to tell other people how to vote or how to choose their leaders or who those leaders should be.

Secondly, we strongly favor the election of leaders who are committed to freedom and democracy and who are free from Communist philosophy, which quite often has been dominated from the Soviet Union or other nations.

Third, we believe that the best way to prevent a shift toward communism in Italy or France or other countries is to make sure that the democratic government that's presently in existence works, that it's open to change when necessary, that it's sensitive to the needs of people, that its economic structure is sound, and that the administration of government is both competent and honest.

It's important for us to do this in our own Nation. It's important for other free societies to do that in their countries. And to the extent that there is a demonstrable incapability of governing either because of incompetence or lack of sensitivity or honesty, that opens the door for increased Communist intrusion into the governmental process.

I think that's the best way to approach it, not for us to tell other nations what to do.

BERLIN

MR. WEISS. Sir, do you foresee any changes in the United States attitudes or policies or priorities concerning Berlin?

THE PRESIDENT. No. We will be consulting with the other nations involved, as you know--the Federal Republic, Great Britain, and France to reemphasize our commitment to the quadripartite agreement with the Soviet Union on East and West Berlin.

I don't anticipate any change in our policy. What I do anticipate is that we reconfirm our commitment to the policy that has been in effect for the last 25 or more years.

FOREIGN POLICY

MR. DIMBLEBY. When you came to office, Mr. President, you talked a great deal--and during the campaign--about the new openness that you were going to bring to diplomacy. And I wonder now, 3 months in, and after the Moscow talks which collapsed, if you feel that you were too open, that you pitched your bid too publicly and also too high, and that you have in fact set back the cause of disarmament by 3 months?

THE PRESIDENT. No. In the first place, the Moscow talks did not collapse. They are continuing. The Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, will continue their talks in Geneva in the middle of this month.

Also, we've established 8 or 10 subcommittees to work on some of the matters that I discussed earlier. I need not repeat those.

My administration, including myself, have been criticized because we have brought into the open some basic foreign policy discussions that in the past took place in secret. I feel that I'll make a better judgment on foreign matters if the Congress and the American people know what my options are, debate these options freely and openly, and that my conclusions are drawn after those debates are completed.

In addition to that, when I do make a decision as President, I think other nations will pay much more attention to my decision if other nations' leaders know that the Congress and the American people support me.

In the Mideast, for instance, we hope to make some progress this fall. And a description of some of the options that we have available to us, a description as best I can without violating confidence of the different opinions expressed by the Arab countries and Israel, I think, is a very healthy development. We have been 29 years now with no agreement among those nations, and I think it's time to bring out some of the disputes into the open.

MR. DIMBLEBY. But can you yet point to any benefit that's been gained by your openness?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think so. I believe we have a much better chance now of reaching an actual reduction in commitments to atomic weapons than we did before, working with the Soviet Union.

I think we have a much better chance this year than we have had in a long number of years to have some substantive move toward peace in the Middle East. I think that we have a much clearer concept around the world of the importance of human rights than we did a few years ago, a few months ago.

I think we have raised the question in a vivid fashion of the dangers to be derived from a continued proliferation of atomic weapon capability, and other points that we have tried to express is a need for conservation in the consumption of energy and for the sale of conventional weapons to the developing nations of the world.

I am not trying to say that our country has taken the only initiative in this. I think other leaders with whom I'll meet in London have done these things long before I did.

THE MIDDLE EAST

MR. DIMBLEBY. Do you believe you were talking about the Middle East do you believe that American influence is sufficient just holding the ring and getting things together, or do you think actually in the end a Middle East solution will only be possible when America decides to use every kind of pressure both on Israel and on the Arab countries to come to a conference?

THE PRESIDENT. It is hard to anticipate what is going to happen in the Middle East. What we are trying to do is to consult extensively and privately with the leaders of the nations involved directly. By the end of May, I will have had long and extended conversations with every one of those nations' leaders.

This has been preceded by visits to those countries by our own Secretary of State. After these meetings are concluded, we will decide, based on the conversations we have had, what are the possible common ground for agreement and what are the remaining disharmonies among the nations concerned.

Then we'll go back to those countries, Secretary of State Vance will make that trip, and we'll put together what we think is a consensus among the nations involved. And I think we'll either go public with it or that we'll try to put together that as a basic agenda for a meeting in Geneva, if it takes place.

I would not hesitate if I saw clearly a fair and equitable solution to use the full strength of our own country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement. I recognize, though, that we cannot impose our will on others, and unless the countries involved agree, there is no way for us to make progress.

The last point I would like to make is this: Not because of any special quality of our own has this occurred, but I believe it is accurate to say that at this point we have a group of moderate leaders in the Middle East, all of whom have an inclination to trust our Government to be fair. And if I should ever do anything as President to cause the Arab leaders to think that I was unfair to them and their interests, then the hope for peace would be reduced substantially. And the same thing applies to Israel.

So, we are in effect in the position of a communicator between the parties involved or among them, and also we are in the position of one who can influence countries to modify their positions slightly to accommodate other nations' interests. I think it's a very important position in which I find myself. I take the responsibility very, very heavily.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION

MR. WEISS. Mr. President, I would like to ask you quite generally, how do you assess the mood of the American Nation to intervene abroad, if necessary? I think there is little doubt that the American people would not hesitate to support military action if one of its major allies would be in danger. The public reaction was very cool when the Ford administration considered, for a moment, action in Angola. How do you assess the mood?

THE PRESIDENT. We have deep commitments to Japan, to the NATO countries as an equal partner for mutual defense. These commitments are supported overwhelmingly by the American people. There is no doubt that those commitments would be honored.

The intrusion of American military forces into the internal affairs of other nations is highly unlikely and would not be supported by the American people or by inc. The only exception would be if I felt that our own Nation's security was directly threatened.

We could not have supported an American military offensive in Angola. The people of the country nor the Congress would have supported it even if President Ford had decided to go ahead with it.

I think that the unfortunate experience that we had in Vietnam has impressed on the American people deeply, and I hope permanently, the danger of our country resorting to military means in a distant place on Earth when our own security is not being threatened, except under those conditions as it relates to approved treaties that have in effect been ratified by the American people, as is the case with, say, Japan and NATO.

FOREIGN POLICY

MR. DIMBLEBY. Mr. President, our time is coming towards a close. Can I just ask you lastly, you came into this office in January very confident about how you would handle it, not particularly impressed by people who had done it before you, thinking you would be able to do it perfectly well with your own achievements.

Are you chastened in any way by the difference between what you found since you came into office and what you expected when you first walked into the White House?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I have been almost permanently chastened in my own political career. I have had victories and defeats. I have had high expectations and some of those haven't been realized. But on the whole I have been very pleased, and I see the future of my own administration of the Nation which I serve and of the world community in which we play a part as being one that provides me with a great deal of hope and expectation for improvement.

I do feel chastened, to use your word, to the extent that I know I have got a lot to learn. I see that there is now way for us to make progress without the closest possible harmony, consultation with our allies and our friends, who share with us the blessings of strong and viable economy and free people. That's why the summit is so important to me and to the people of the United States. I hope that I can contribute something as we meet with other leaders, but I am going to learn as well.

I am not an expert on finance. I know that the Chancellor of Germany, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Prime Minister of Japan 'have all been finance ministers. I expect to learn a lot from them.

MR. DE LA TAILLE. The French President.

THE PRESIDENT. And the French President, 'too.

I think to the extent that we can understand each other and see our common problems and derive strength from one another, I think to that extent we can approach the future with confidence and hope and the expectation of progress.I feel very good about the future.

MR. DIMBLEBY. Mr. President, thank you very much.