Interview With the President Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Editors and News Directors.

THE PRESIDENT. I'm very pleased to have all of you here. I see some old friends around the table from Georgia, and I'm very pleased.

I think this is one of the best things that we have done since I've been President, is to have in, on frequent occasions, distinguished leaders of the news media throughout the country. It gives me an opportunity to answer your questions, to learn about the interests around the Nation, and also to express in each case, at the beginning of the session, some particular point that illustrates the kind of difficulties or responsibilities that a President has to meet.

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Yesterday, there was a very disappointing vote in the House of Representatives on obtaining a rule for Panama Treaty implementation legislation. We only won the vote by two votes, which is very disturbing to me and, I'm sure, to the Nation. The fact is that the Panama treaties have already been implemented. The President and three other Presidents before me negotiated the treaties. The Senate has now ratified the Panama treaties. They are the law of the land. They became effective the first day of April.

The Panama Canal Zone will become Panama territory on the first day of October 1979, no matter what the Congress does this year on implementation. The reason for the implementation legislation is to permit the United States to operate the Panama Canal between now and the year 2000 and also to defend the Canal Zone between now and the year 2000 with U.S. forces.

If the implementation legislation is not passed in a timely fashion and in compliance with the treaty, we would be faced with a very serious consequence.

We could not handle the problems or needs or obligations for and to American workers there. We could not transfer workers from one place to another. We couldn't deal effectively with the Panamanian workers who have been employed there for many years.

The citizenship status and basic rights of Americans in the Panama Canal Zone would be in doubt. We could not provide for the facilities and equipment to defend the canal. In fact, the operation of the canal itself might very well be interrupted.

I don't believe the Congress will put us, as a nation, in that posture. But there's a great deal of misinformation about this subject. Even some Members of the Congress feel that if they don't pass implementation legislation, they could somehow abrogate the treaties themselves.

As you know, the canal is very important to us. A substantial portion of oil, for instance, for the east coast is derived from wells in Alaska—comes down through the Panama Canal and up to this coast.

The gulf ports are dependent upon the Panama Canal in a very large way. About 6 or 7 percent of our total trade traffic goes through the Panama Canal with overseas destinations. Consumers would be adversely affected. Farm supplies, farm goods, grain, and other items use the Panama Canal in a very large and important fashion.

This is the kind of problem that a President does face in dealing with the Congress: to implement basic policy after that policy has been established.

ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

We will be facing the question in the future of how to deal with the SALT treaty, which will have been negotiated, I hope—if everything goes well—by the end of next month. And, of course, how to deal with the Rhodesian question, how to implement the Mideast peace treaty in an effective fashion—those are some of the foreign affairs problems that I have to face. Inflation, energy, and many other items on the domestic scene are of comparable importance and, I might say, of comparable difficulty.

I'd be glad to answer any questions that you all might have.

QUESTIONS

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV

Q. Mr. President, when you meet with Secretary Brezhnev next month, what will be the priority items of discussion?-SALT, obviously, but there must be others. Can you talk about those a bit?

THE PRESIDENT. We've not yet agreed on an agenda, and it's a little bit difficult for me to answer your question definitively until we and the Soviets have concluded that discussion.

The conclusion of the SALT negotiations, which will be practically concluded then, and the signing of the documents would obviously be a major step. In arms control, we are dealing with the question of antisatellite capabilities, trying to restrain that. We'll proceed with further discussions of a comprehensive test ban on nuclear testing. The British are party to that, but we keep the British thoroughly informed. We will proceed also with discussions on the control of the transfer of conventional weapons to the developing countries and to others, as major arms suppliers. We've had several meetings on that subject.

We'll proceed with discussion of the mutual and balanced force reduction talks that have now been going on without much progress for the last 5 years in Vienna. We hope to make some progress there.

Prior to the time that I meet with President Brezhnev, I'll be meeting with Chancellor Schmidt in this room, I think the first week in June. And we are constantly consulting with our European allies on some of these subjects that affect them. Secretary Harold Brown, who's in Europe right now, has been involved with those subjects.

We'll also lay the groundwork, at least describe the parameters or a general outline of the SALT III discussions if everything goes well.

We'll have some discussion about trade, I'm sure, about refugee problem% about some potential improved ways for us to communicate with one another if regional altercations or disagreements should arise, so that we can have a stable and a more secure, more peaceful interrelationship with the Soviet Union; at the same time, meeting with the Soviets on a peacefully competitive basis and prevailing in those competitions as often as possible.

I'd say arms control, trade, better communications in the future would be the general outline. All of those items that I described to you, certainly with the exception of SALT, still have to be approved by the Soviets.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

Q. Morris Wilkes from KRLB in Lubbock, Texas. What happens if the United States Senate does not ratify the SALT treaties? I was talking to some Senators on the Hill yesterday, and they said the votes are not there and they don't see them coming around. What happens if they do not ratify the treaty, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. That's a terrible possibility to have to contemplate.

The SALT negotiations are a continuing process that were initiated as far back as President Eisenhower. And we've made steady, incremental progress—sometimes very slow, very tedious, very careful-with a limited test ban to protect the atmosphere, with SALT I, with Vladivostok, and now with SALT II. SALT II has been under negotiation for going on 7 years. I'm the third President who has participated in this process. It's a carefully balanced treaty. It's in our best interest. It protects our own Nation's security and will contribute to world peace and, I think, also is in the best interests of the Soviet Union.

Substantial amendments to the treaty-which would be an easy way out for a Senator, to say, "Well, we don't like what you've done, do it again"—would be, I think, unacceptable to the Soviet Union and to us, if there was any substantial change in the treaty terms. It would put me in a very difficult position.

And I think that a rejection of the treaty would interrupt—I wouldn't predict "terminate," but at least interrupt, with serious consequences, the process of controlling nuclear weapons over many years' time.

There would be no way to move to SALT III. It would be very difficult to reopen SALT II, because why should a President of the Soviet Union want to negotiate with the President of the United States if ultimate approval by the Senate of a carefully balanced treaty was extremely doubtful?

It would be a terrible blow to our own allies in Europe. I think it would shake the strength of NATO itself, because many of our allies in Europe feel that they are in the forefront of some possible confrontation between the two super powers, and they might be the first to suffer in case a nuclear war should take place. And for us to prove that we are not able to get along with the Soviet Union and control nuclear weapons, when we have thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides already, I think would cause many of our allies to look with doubt on the advisability of their having unilateral agreements with us.

I think they would start searching for some alternative to the NATO Alliance exclusively. I don't think they would abandon NATO, but they'd just have to start feelers to the East to see if they could have some insurance here to avoid a confrontation, when we ourselves have proven unable to lay the groundwork for nuclear arms control.

We would have a very serious problem, too, in trying to restrain other potential nuclear powers from coming into being. There are at least a dozen or more nations right now who have the technological capability of developing nuclear explosives. We have exerted a tremendous amount of effort, I and the Congress, in trying to restrain those nations and keep them from becoming nuclear explosive powers.

India, Pakistan, Iraq, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, and so forth, and others that I could name if I wanted to, have been restraining themselves, with a large part of their restraint predicated upon the anticipated voluntary control by the Soviet Union and the United States. If we should fail in this, it would be almost impossible for me to go to the President of Brazil or the Prime Minister of India and say, "Please do not develop a nuclear explosion." It would make me look ridiculous to try to continue that effort that I've been pursuing.

And the last thing that concerns me is—that I'll mention this afternoon because of the press of time—it would give the Soviets an enormous propaganda weapon to use against us. They would be identified, at least in their own mind and maybe in the minds of many nonaligned countries around the world as a peace-loving nation. They would certainly hammer this point—"We ourselves believe in nuclear arms control, but look what the United States has done."

In the peaceful competition that I described earlier with the Soviet Union, we would be at a decided disadvantage if we should reject this major move toward increased peace throughout the world, toward increased security for the United States, toward increased control of the world's most destructive weapon.

SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY

Q. Mr. President, Herbert Kamm of the Cleveland Press, sir. Mr. President, I'd like to turn to a political question. As you no doubt are aware, the chairman of the Democratic Party in Cuyahoga County is leading an effort to encourage Senator Kennedy to run for President.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I've heard of that. [Laughter]

Q. Would you mind commenting, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, what the local political organization does is something that I can't control. I've not talked to him about it. I would be glad to, if he has some particular concerns.

I think that this is the case in several instances around the country. It's certainly not an unprecedented political circumstance in the year prior to a Presidential election year. I'm not a candidate; I'm a President. I don't have any intention of announcing my own plans until late this year.

But Senator Kennedy is a very popular and attractive man. If he became a candidate, he would be a formidable opponent for anyone else who ran. If I decided to run, I wouldn't have any fear of meeting that kind of competition. It was there for me to face when I was an unknown Governor planning my campaign when Senator Kennedy was the prime potential opponent.

Senator Kennedy has announced repeatedly that he's not a candidate; he intends to support me; thinks I'll get the nomination. I think he's pleased with that. I take him at his word. But it doesn't cause me any deep concern. I would like to have the full and enthusiastic support of the Democratic leaders in the Cleveland area, Cuyahoga County, and also throughout Ohio, indeed, the entire Nation.

But I have to make difficult decisions. I'm responsible for them. I have no aversion to them. But people naturally get concerned about particular issues or ideas. And I don't know what the motivations of the county chairmen are, but I have confidence that eventually the Democrats will make the right decision—and the American people. [Laughter]

COAL

Q. Mr. President, Richard Grimes from West Virginia. There's a feeling in the State that your strong commitment in 1977 for coal has eased up somewhat, I think a lot of it having to do with the EPA regulations that are slowing our sale of coal. Is that true?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I doubt that any other administration has ever done as much to encourage the present and future production of coal as we have. It's been a top priority for us. We want to increase the production and use of coal tremendously in this country.

We've passed, by law, restraints on major stationary powerplants against the future, continued use of oil and natural gas and substitutes for coal. We've tried to encourage the use of coal in this respect. I think the new settlement between the United Mine Workers and the operators has provided a degree of stability and an absence of wildcat strikes and so forth that's encouraging.

I think that in the long run, the sure supply of coal, without unexpected interruption, is going to be helpful. Under the chairmanship of Governor Jay Rockefeller, a commission made up of all elements of the coal industry is now preparing a report for me that would give advice to me and the Nation on how we can increase the use and production of coal.

I've asked all the agencies who are interested-in the Federal Government, who have a responsibility in the Federal Government—to prepare advice for me on how we can increase the consumption of coal in our Nation. We are running out of oil and gas. Our basic energy proposal to the Congress in April of 1977 contemplated an enormous increase in the production and the use of coal.

We have tried to deal with the transportation problems that affect the coal industry, not only in West Virginia but throughout the Nation. And my guess is that when the environmental protection standards are promulgated, as is now required by Federal court order, that the need of our Nation for the use of coal will be a major factor in their decision.

I have met around this table within the last 2 weeks with the United States Senators, I think from 12 different coal-producing States, to get all of their ideas on the consequences of this decision. It's made by EPA, an independent agency, and the EPA Administrator was here. He's a sound person, and he's working with people who have a balanced view of the quality of our environment and the need to meet our energy requirements.

So, I don't think the people of West Virginia need to fear any deviation of my administration in enhancing the production and the use of coal.

The last thing is that we, if we get-if and when we get the windfall profits tax and the energy security fund, we'll have substantial, increased moneys for pilot plants for the liquefaction and gasification of coal and research and development on new ways to use coal that would be of tremendous benefit to West Virginia and to other States in the country.

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Q. Mr. President, I'm Ed Belkin, news director of KYW News Radio, Philadelphia. Citizens in the Northeast are increasingly disturbed with military facilities being closed or shifted to the so-called Sunbelt States from what is already an economically depressed area. I'm sure you know all too well the case of Frankford Arsenal. The battle of the aircraft carrier Saratoga is underway yet between Philadelphia and Newport News. And now, of course, there's the issue of basic training at Fort Dix. What are you doing to ensure that this apparent imbalance is corrected, so that all these facilities are not shifted out of the Northeast and that the thousands of jobs and millions and billions of dollars that would go with these facilities are not shifted elsewhere?

THE PRESIDENT. Economic factors and balance of military placement in the country are both factors in the ultimate decision. The primary factor, however, is how to enhance our Nation's security to an optimum degree within budgetary and personnel constraints.

I have never interfered in a very carefully evolved decision by the Department of Defense in deciding how to modify the base structure. I think that we have proven, since I've been in office, to have the best interests of Philadelphia at heart.

We recognize the adverse economic impact of the Frankford Arsenal decision. It was reassessed after I got into office, and again, after considering all the factors, the Defense Department felt that this change was advisable. I did not dispute that final decision. We assessed all the economic factors as well as the military factors.

On the Saratoga, we could save some money by having the repairs or the overhaul of Saratoga performed at Newport News. But I feel that it's very important for the shipyard not only at Newport News but also in Philadelphia—the Navy shipyards—to be kept available for future use in case of a national emergency.

And my administration, with the full knowledge of the Newport News people, went all out to assure that the major overhaul of the Saratoga would be carried out in Philadelphia. It was done on the basis of merit, and although it cost a little bit more to do the actual overhaul, it preserves the entity itself and the strength of the Philadelphia shipyard for future use in a balanced fashion.

These are very complicated decisions, and they have in the past been fraught with political interference. I don't believe that anybody could accuse me or my administration or the Defense Department, Charlie Duncan, the Deputy that makes the basic recommendation, of ever making one of these decisions on the basis of politics—not to get votes or anything else.

And sometimes we aggravate some extremely interested and dedicated and competent Members of Congress when those changes are made. But in balance, I can tell you that every decision has been made to the best of my ability, in the best interests of our Nation's security, within the budgetary and personnel limits.

On some occasions we make a decision, like in the Philadelphia shipyard overhaul case with the Saratoga, to preserve the ability of a defense establishment for future use in a case of emergency. That's the best answer I can give you.

UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS

Q. Mr. President, Raul Parra from the Spanish Television Network, Albuquerque. Are there any definite plans on how to deal with the illegal aliens influx from Mexico and the possibility of implementing the bracero program again?

THE PRESIDENT. We have no plans to use the bracero program again. As you know, I presented to the Congress my first year in office, after a great deal of study, a proposal on how to deal with the undocumented workers. There are many names for the same people—some, illegal aliens; some, undocumented aliens. I've lately been calling them undocumented workers. The other day someone suggested that we call them undocumented taxpayers. [Laughter]

But the Congress has not been willing to act on my recommendations. The Hispanic American community is sharply divided on the issue because the undocumented workers coming into our country compete in some areas for scarce jobs, as you know. In other cases, those very same American citizens who have Mexican heritage would like for their relatives to come here, and the pressures from economics in Mexico are quite severe now. But Mexico, with a large prospective improvement in their economy in the future because of the gas and oil discoveries, I think will help to assuage this problem.

I have met with Lopez Portillo, President of Mexico, on this subject at length. I've sent Reubin Askew, former Governor of Florida and the chairman of my commission on immigration, down to meet several days with the President of Mexico, the Secretary of State—or the Foreign Minister, and others. We are trying to evolve a program that would be fair. And I think for the first time, at least in my historical memory, Mexico and the United States Governments are now working in harmony to try to hammer out a reasonable and fair approach to the problem. I don't say that we'll be together at the end, but we're working together.

The last thing is that I have pledged to all the minority groups in our country, and to the people of Mexico, that undocumented workers who are in our Nation and who do not have a legal right to be here, will be treated fairly. They will not be abused, and their constitutional—or human rights will be preserved.

I'm sworn on my oath to uphold the law and the Constitution of my country, and there's no way that I can condone the illegal crossing of our border. But we're working the best we can to deal with the question that's been long in existence and to do it humanely and fairly and legally. Some modification of the law will be required.

The commission that has now been established will make those recommendations. I and the Congress are waiting for their recommendations to be made.

MS. BARIO. Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you. I might take one other question.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Q. Hal Rosen of Chicago. Earlier this week, on Monday, Joseph Sisco,¹ speaking before the Chicago Foreign Relations Council, said that while it's official U.S. policy that we don't recognize—or make contact, rather, with the PLO unless they recognize 242, that he sees modification in this in the future. While he's not an official Government spokesman, obviously, does his view reflect any change in our policy?

¹ Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

THE PRESIDENT. NO, there's been no change. I don't contemplate any change. Our Nation is pledged, again, on its word of honor, which I have corroborated since I've been in office, that we will not deal with the PLO until they accept U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations, which all the other Arab entities have done, and until they recognize the right of Israel to exist.

And I think that any such meeting as that, on any kind of an official basis, would be counterproductive. And we're not doing it surreptitiously. We're not cheating on our commitment. Obviously, as is well known by Israel, there are members* of the PLO, individual members* who are mayors of major cities, for instance, on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, and both we and the Israelis deal with them as Palestinians, not, however, in their capacity as members* of the PLO. So, there has been and will 'be no change in this policy.

*The President intended to say "supporters" of the PLO. [Printed in the transcript.]

I've got time, I think, if you would let me, to have either one more question or get an individual photograph with everybody here. And my preference would be to get a photograph. [Laughter]

We only have 3 or 4 minutes, so if you'd just come by, I'd like to just shake hands, and we'll have a photographer standing here. And then we'll send the photographs to you.