Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1635 - Defend America Act of 1996

(Senate)
(Sen. Dole (R) KS and 23 cosponsors)

If S. 1635 were presented to the President in its current form, the President would veto the bill.

S. 1635 would commit the United States now to deployment by 2003 of a costly system for national missile defense (NMD) to defend the United States, inter alia, from a long-range missile threat from countries other than the major declared nuclear powers. For the reasons explained below, committing the United States now to such a deployment is not only unnecessary, but could be harmful to our broader national defense interests.

The costly deployments required by S. 1635 would divert vital defense funds from other more pressing defense needs. The bill encourages deployment of space-based laser satellites that would cost billions and would violate the ABM treaty. The CBO has estimated that such an NMD would cost $31-$60 billion through 2010. These amounts do not even include the costs of operating and supporting such a system. Such unnecessary NMD spending - within the defense budget levels proposed by the Administration through 2002 -- would jeopardize modernization efforts for other, more pressing defense missions. Moreover, the budget resolutions passed by the House and Senate would provide $10 to $16 billion less in 2001 and 2002 for defense than the Administration's budget plan. Proceeding with the NMD program envisioned by this bill, undo these defense budget levels, would cripple modernization.

The immediate commitment to a specific system to defend against a threat that does not now exist is both imprudent and dangerous. By mandating an NMD deployment decision now, the bill would force the Department of Defense (DOD) to commit prematurely to a technological option that may be outdated when the threat emerges. The bill embraces much of the failed "Star Wars" scheme, which depends on advances in technology that are at least a decade away.

The Administration's Deployment Readiness Program will continue to develop national missile defense technology for three years — the minimum time needed to develop a workable defense — after which time the United States can make an informed decision to deploy a system by 2003 if so warranted by the threat. The Intelligence Community has estimated that there will be sufficient warning time to make this timetable possible. This "3+3" approach to national missile defense ensures that a system will be fielded with the best technology available if and when the threat emerges. The Administration approach also preserves the correct priority in the Ballistic Missile Defense program. This program fully funds Theater Missile Defenses to defeat a threat

Finally, by setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, S. 1635 would put at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II. These two treaties together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.