


# ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT




Transmitted to the Congress


January 1962

Together With  
THE ANNUAL REPORT  
of the  
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

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# Economic Report of the President



Transmitted to the Congress  
January 1962

TOGETHER WITH  
THE ANNUAL REPORT  
OF THE  
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington, D.C., January 20, 1962


The Honorable the PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,  
The Honorable the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SIRS: I am presenting herewith my Economic Report to the Congress, as required under the Employment Act of 1946.

In preparing this Report, I have had the advice and assistance of the Council of Economic Advisers, who, in turn, have had the assistance of members of the Cabinet and heads of independent agencies.

Together with this Report, I am transmitting the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, which was prepared in accordance with Section 4(c) (2) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Kennedy", written in a cursive style.



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**ECONOMIC REPORT  
OF THE PRESIDENT**



*To the Congress of the United States:*

I report to you under the provisions of the Employment Act of 1946 at a time when

- the economy has regained its momentum;
- the economy is responding to the Federal Government's efforts, under the Act, "to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power;"
- the economy is again moving toward the central objective of the Act—to afford "useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work."

My first Economic Report is an appropriate occasion to re-emphasize my dedication to the principles of the Employment Act. As a declaration of national purpose and as a recognition of Federal responsibility, the Act has few parallels in the Nation's history. In passing the Act by heavy bipartisan majorities, the Congress registered the consensus of the American people that this Nation will not countenance the suffering, frustration, and injustice of unemployment, or let the vast potential of the world's leading economy run to waste in idle manpower, silent machinery, and empty plants.

The framers of the Employment Act were wise to choose the promotion of "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" as the keystone of national economic policy. They were confident that these objectives can be effectively promoted "in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare." They knew that our pursuit of maximum employment and production would be tempered with compassion, with justice, and with a concern for the future. But they knew also that the other standards we set for our economy are easier to meet when it is operating at capacity. A full employment economy provides opportunities for useful and satisfying work. It rewards enterprise with profit. It generates saving for the future and transforms it into productive investment. It opens doors for the unskilled and underprivileged and closes them against want and frustration. The conquest of unemployment is not the sole end of economic policy, but it is surely an indispensable beginning.

The record of the economy since 1946 is a vast improvement over the prolonged mass unemployment of the 1930's. The Employment Act itself deserves no small part of the credit. Under the mandate and

procedures of the Act, both Congress and the Executive have kept the health of the national economy and the economic policies of the Government under constant review. And the national commitment to high employment has enabled business firms and consumers to act and to plan without fear of another great depression.

Though the postwar record is free of major depression, it is marred by four recessions. In the past fifteen years, the economy has spent a total of seven years regaining previous peaks of industrial production. In two months out of three, 4 percent or more of those able, willing, and seeking to work have been unable to find jobs. We must do better in the 1960's.

To combat future recessions—to keep them short and shallow if they occur—I urge adoption of a three-part program for sustained prosperity, which will (1) provide stand-by power, subject to congressional veto, for temporary income tax reductions, (2) set up a stand-by program of public capital improvements, and (3) strengthen the unemployment insurance system.

These three measures will enable the Government to counter swings in business activity more promptly and more powerfully than ever before. They will give new and concrete meaning to the declaration of policy made in the Employment Act. They will constitute the greatest step forward in public policy for economic stability since the Act itself.

As the Employment Act prescribes, I shall in this Report review “economic conditions” in the United States in 1961 and “current and foreseeable economic trends in the levels of employment, production, and purchasing power;” set forth “the levels of employment, production, and purchasing power obtaining in the United States and such levels needed to carry out the policy” of the Act; and present my economic program and legislative recommendations for 1962.

## PROGRESS IN 1961

Last January the economy was in the grip of recession. Nearly 7 percent of the labor force was unemployed. Almost one-fifth of manufacturing capacity lay idle. Actual output was running \$50 billion (annual rate) short of the economy's great potential. These figures reflected not only the setback of 1960-61 but the incomplete recovery from the recession of 1957-58. The task before us was to recover not from one but from two recessions.

At the same time, gold was leaving the country at a rate of more than \$300 million a month. In the three previous years, the Nation had run a total deficit of \$10 billion in its basic international accounts. These large and persistent deficits had weakened confidence in the dollar.

In my message to the Congress on February 2, I stated that this Administration's "realistic aims for 1961 are to reverse the downtrend in our economy, to narrow the gap of unused potential, to abate the waste and misery of unemployment, and at the same time to maintain reasonable stability of the price level." In a message on the balance of payments on February 6, I added a fifth aim, to restore confidence in the dollar and to reduce the deficit in international payments.

These five aims for 1961 have been achieved:

(1) The downtrend was reversed. Gross national product (GNP) grew from \$501 billion (annual rate) in the first quarter to a record rate of \$542 billion in the last quarter. In July, industrial production regained its previous peak, and by the end of the year it showed a total rise of 13 percent.

(2) These gains brought into productive use nearly half the plant capacity which was idle at the beginning of the year. The growth of GNP narrowed the over-all gap of unused potential from an estimated 10 percent to 5 percent.

(3) Unemployment dropped from 6.8 to 6.1 percent of the labor force. The number of areas of substantial labor surplus declined from 101 in March to 60 in December.

(4) Price stability has been maintained during the recovery. Since February, wholesale prices have fallen slightly, and consumer prices have risen only one-half of 1 percent.

(5) Confidence in the dollar has been restored. Our gold losses were cut from \$1.7 billion in 1960 to less than \$0.9 billion in 1961. The deficit in 1961 in our basic international transactions was about one-third as large as in 1960.

The "Program To Restore Momentum to the American Economy" which I proposed to the Congress on February 2 resulted in prompt legislation to

- extend unemployment insurance benefits on a temporary basis;
- make Federal aid available, through the States, to dependent children of the unemployed;
- liberalize social security benefits;
- promote homebuilding under the Housing Act of 1961;
- raise the minimum wage and extend it to more workers;

--provide Federal aid under the Area Redevelopment Act, to revitalize the economies of areas with large and persistent unemployment.

Prompt executive action was taken to accelerate Federal purchases and procurement, highway fund distributions, tax refunds, and veterans' life insurance dividends. The Administration raised farm price supports, expanded the food distribution program, and established eight pilot food stamp programs.

Monetary and credit policies responded to the dual demands of economic recovery and the balance of payments. On the one hand, the Federal Reserve System maintained general monetary ease; Federal Reserve open market operations, complemented by Treasury management of the public debt and of government investment accounts, assured an ample supply of credit which served to counter upward pressures on long-term interest rates; reduction of FHA ceiling rates, supported by FNMA mortgage purchases, eased mortgage credit and stimulated homebuilding; and the Small Business Administration made its credit more widely available at lower cost. On the other hand, both monetary and debt management policies countered downward pressures on short-term rates, with a view to checking the outflow of funds to money markets abroad.

The Federal Budget played its proper role as a powerful instrument for promoting economic recovery. The measures to relieve distress and restore economic momentum expanded purchasing power early in the year. Subsequently, major increases in expenditure for national security and space programs became necessary. In a fully employed economy, these increases would have required new tax revenues to match. But I did not recommend tax increases at this point because they would have cut into private purchasing power and retarded recovery.

The increase of GNP—\$41 billion (annual rate) from the first to the fourth quarter—reflected increased purchases of goods and services by consumers, business, and governments:

- Consumers accounted for nearly half. As household incomes rose, consumer expenditure expanded by \$18 billion.
- Residential construction and business expenditures for fixed investment responded promptly to the recovery and to favorable credit conditions. By the end of the year, they had risen by \$8 billion.
- Business stopped liquidating inventories and started rebuilding them. This shift, which occurred early in the year and helped get recovery off to a flying start, added \$8 billion to the demand for goods and services by the fourth quarter.

- Federal, State, and local government purchases rose by \$8 billion.
- Although exports were somewhat higher in the fourth quarter than in the first, the rise in imports in response to recovery lowered net exports by \$1 billion.

Labor, business, and farm incomes rose as the economy recovered. Wages and salaries increased by \$19 billion (annual rate) from the first quarter to the fourth. Corporate profits after taxes recovered sharply, receiving about 15 percent of the gains in GNP. With the help of new programs, farm operators' net income from farming increased from \$12 billion in 1960 to \$13 billion in 1961, and net income per farm rose by \$350. The after-tax incomes of American consumers increased by \$21 billion, or \$92 per capita, during the year. Since consumer prices rose by only one-half of 1 percent, these gains in income were almost entirely gains in real purchasing power.

One million jobs were added by nonagricultural establishments during the expansion. But employment did not keep pace with production and income. Productivity rose rapidly as capacity was more fully and efficiently utilized. And more workers on part-time jobs were able to work full time.

The record of 1961 demonstrated again the resiliency of the U.S. economy with well-timed support from government policy. Business responded to the expansion of purchasing power by producing more goods and services, not by raising prices. Indeed, the record of price stability in three quarters of expansion was better than in the three preceding quarters of recession. The rates of advance of production and income compared favorably with the two preceding periods of expansion. Production grew rapidly without straining capacity or encountering bottlenecks.

As 1961 ended, actual output was still \$25 to \$30 billion short of potential, and unemployment was far too high. But much of the industrial manpower, machinery, and plant that lay idle a year ago had been drawn back into productive use. And the momentum of the 1961 recovery should carry the economy further toward full employment and full production in 1962.

## GOALS OF ECONOMIC POLICY

Though we may take satisfaction with our progress to date, we dare not rest content. The unfinished business of economic policy includes (1) the achievement of full employment and sustained prosperity without inflation, (2) the acceleration of economic growth, (3) the extension of equality of opportunity, and (4) the restoration of balance of pay-

ments equilibrium. Economic policy thus confronts a demanding assignment, but one which can and will be met within the framework of a free economy.

### *Our Goal of Full and Sustained Prosperity Without Inflation*

Recovery has carried the economy only part of the way to the goal of “maximum production, employment, and purchasing power.” The standing challenge of the Employment Act is not merely to do better, but to do our best—the “maximum.” Attainment of that maximum in 1963 would mean a GNP of approximately \$600 billion, wages and salaries of over \$320 billion, and corporate profits of as much as \$60 billion, all in 1961 prices. The material gains are themselves staggering, but they are less important than the new sense of purpose and the new opportunities for improvement of American life that could be realized by “maximum” use of the productive capacity now lying idle and the capacity yet to be created.

Involuntary unemployment is the most dramatic sign and disheartening consequence of underutilization of productive capacity. It translates into human terms what may otherwise seem merely an abstract statistic. We cannot afford to settle for any prescribed level of unemployment. But for working purposes we view a 4 percent unemployment rate as a temporary target. It can be achieved in 1963, if appropriate fiscal, monetary, and other policies are used. The achievable rate can be lowered still further by effective policies to help the labor force acquire the skills and mobility appropriate to a changing economy. We must also continue the cooperative effort, begun with the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, to bring industry to depressed areas and jobs to displaced workers. Ultimately, we must reduce unemployment to the minimum compatible with the functioning of a free economy.

We must seek full recovery without endangering the price stability of the last 4 years. The experience of the past year has shown that expansion without inflation is possible. With cooperation from labor and management, I am confident that we can go on to write a record of full employment without inflation.

The task of economic stabilization does not end with the achievement of full recovery. There remains the problem of keeping the economy from straying too far above or below the path of steady high employment. One way lies inflation, and the other way lies recession. Flexible and vigilant fiscal and monetary policies will allow us to hold the narrow middle course.



### *Our Goal of Economic Growth*

While we move toward full and sustained use of today's productive capacity, we must expand our potential for tomorrow. Our postwar economic growth—though a step ahead of our record for the last half-century—has been slowing down. We have not in recent years maintained the 4 to 4½ percent growth rate which characterized the early postwar period. We should not settle for less than the achievement of a long-term growth rate matching the early postwar record. Increasing our growth rate to 4½ percent a year lies within the range of our capabilities during the 1960's. It will lay the groundwork for meeting both our domestic needs and our world responsibilities.

In November of last year we joined with our 19 fellow members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in setting a common target for economic growth. Together we pledged ourselves to adopt national and international policies aimed at increasing the combined output of the Atlantic Community by 50 percent between 1960 and 1970. The nations of the West are encouraged and enlivened by America's determination to make its full contribution to this joint effort.

We can do our share. In the mid-1960's, the children born in 1943 and after will be arriving at working age. The resulting rapid growth in our labor force offers us an opportunity, not a burden—provided that we deliver not only the jobs but also the research, the training, and the capital investment to endow our new workers with high and rising productivity as they enter economic life.

### *Our Goal of Equal Opportunity*

Increasingly in our lifetime, American prosperity has been widely shared and it must continue so. The spread of primary, secondary, and higher education, the wider availability of medical services, and the improved postwar performance of our economy have bettered the economic status of the poorest families and individuals.

But prosperity has not wiped out poverty. In 1960, 7 million families and individuals had personal incomes lower than \$2,000. In part, our failure to overcome poverty is a consequence of our failure to operate the economy at potential. The incidence of unemployment is always uneven, and increases in unemployment tend to inflict the greatest income loss on those least able to afford it. But there is a claim on our conscience from others, whose poverty is barely touched by cyclical improvements in general economic activity. To an increasing extent,

the poorest families in America are those headed by women, the elderly, nonwhites, migratory workers, and the physically or mentally handicapped—people who are shortchanged even in time of prosperity.

Last year's increase in the minimum wage is evidence of our concern for the welfare of our low-income fellow citizens. Other legislative proposals now pending will be particularly effective in improving the lot of the least fortunate. These include (1) health insurance for the aged, financed through the social security system, (2) Federal aid for training and retraining our unemployed and underemployed workers, (3) the permanent strengthening of our unemployment compensation system, and (4) substantial revision in our public welfare and assistance program, stressing rehabilitation services which help to restore families to independence.

Public education has been the great bulwark of equality of opportunity in our democracy for more than a century. Our schools have been a major means of preventing early handicaps from hardening into permanent ignorance and poverty. There can be no better investment in equity and democracy—and no better instrument for economic growth. For this reason, I urge action by the Congress to provide Federal aid for more adequate public school facilities, higher teachers' salaries, and better quality in education. I urge early completion of congressional action on the bill to authorize loans for construction of college academic facilities and to provide scholarships for able students who need help. The talent of our youth is a resource which must not be wasted.

Finally, I shall soon propose to the Congress an intensive program to reduce adult illiteracy, a handicap which too many of our fellow citizens suffer because of inadequate educational opportunities in the past.

#### *Our Goal of Basic Balance in International Payments*

Persistent international payments deficits and gold outflows have made the balance of payments a critical problem of economic policy. We must attain a balance in our international transactions which permits us to meet heavy obligations abroad for the security and development of the free world, without continued depletion of our gold reserves or excessive accumulation of short-term dollar liabilities to foreigners. Simultaneously, we must continue to reduce barriers to international trade and to increase the flow of resources from developed to developing countries. To increase our exports is a task of highest priority, and one which gives heightened significance to the maintenance of price stability and the rapid increase of productivity at home.

## POLICIES FOR 1962

### *Prospects for 1962*

The Nation will make further economic progress in 1962. Broad advances are in prospect for the private economy. The gains already achieved have set the stage for further new records in output, employment, personal income, and profits. Rising household incomes brighten the outlook for further increases in consumer buying, particularly of durable goods. Business firms will need larger inventories to support higher sales, and improved profits and expanded markets will lead to rising capital outlays. The outlays of Federal, State, and local governments will continue to increase as we work for peace and progress.

In the first half of 1962, we may therefore expect vigorous expansion in production and incomes, with GNP increasing to a range of \$565–570 billion in the second quarter, employment continuing to rise, and the unemployment rate falling further.

In the second half of 1962, business investment in plant and equipment should pick up speed and help maintain the momentum of progress toward full employment—and toward future economic growth. Rising output should push factory operating rates closer to capacity and raise profits still further above previous records. To these incentives for capital expenditures will be added Treasury liberalization of depreciation guidelines and, if the Congress acts favorably, the 8 percent tax credit for machinery and equipment outlays.

For 1962 as a whole, GNP is expected to rise approximately \$50 billion above the \$521 billion level of 1961. This would be another giant stride toward a fully employed economy. The record of past recoveries and of the U.S. economy's enormous and growing potential indicates that this is a gain we can achieve. In the perspective of our commitments both to our own expanding population and to the world, it is a gain we need to achieve.

### *Budgetary Policy*

Prosperity shrinks budgetary deficits, as recessions create them. Budget revenues are expected to rise 13 percent between the fiscal years 1962 and 1963; revenues rose 14½ percent between 1959 and 1960 in the previous upswing. Such sensitivity of budget revenues to business activity is desirable because it moderates swings in private purchasing power.

I have submitted to the Congress a Budget which will balance in fiscal 1963 as prosperity generates sharply rising tax revenues. The Budget

is appropriately paced to the expected rate of economic expansion. It will give less stimulus to business activity as private demand for goods and services grows stronger and shoulders more of the responsibility for continued gains. But the shift will be moderate and gradual. We have learned from the disappointing 1959–60 experience that an abrupt and excessively large swing in the Budget can drain the vigor from the private economy and halt its progress, especially if a restrictive monetary policy is followed simultaneously. This will not be repeated. Budget outlays will rise by \$3½ billion from fiscal 1962 to fiscal 1963, whereas they fell by more than that amount from fiscal 1959 to fiscal 1960. The 1963 Budget starts from a much smaller deficit and will move to a moderate surplus as the recovery strengthens.

With support from increased government expenditures and other government policies, the momentum of the recovery is expected to raise GNP to \$570 billion for 1962 as a whole. Prompt enactment of the proposed tax credit for investment would give the economy further strength. Economic expansion at the expected pace will yield \$93.0 billion in Budget revenues in fiscal 1963 to cover \$92.5 billion in Budget expenditures. If private demands for goods and services should prove to be weaker in 1962 than now anticipated, less private purchasing power will flow into taxes, and Budget revenues will fall short of the \$93.0 billion figure. If private demands are stronger, tax receipts will rise further and Budget revenues will exceed expectations.

A surplus of \$4.4 billion in fiscal 1963 is expected in the national income accounts budget—a budget constructed to measure the direct impact of Federal expenditures and receipts on the flow of total spending. The surplus would be several billion dollars higher if the economy were operating steadily at a level high enough to hold unemployment to 4 percent.

Either surplus—prospective or potential—is both a challenge and an opportunity. A government surplus is a form of saving—an excess of income over expenditure. Like any other form of saving, it releases labor and other productive resources which can be used to create new investment goods—plant, equipment, or houses. If investment demand is not strong enough to use the resources and labor, they will be wasted in unemployment and idle capacity, and the surplus itself will not be realized. But if the necessary investment demand is present, the surplus will make possible the acceleration of economic growth by enlarging the future productive power of the economy. The Government is seeking to help American industry to meet this challenge and seize this opportunity, through such measures as the 8 percent investment tax credit and revisions of depreciation guidelines.

We face 1962 with optimism but not complacency. If private demand shows unexpected strength, public policy must and will act to avert the dangers of rising prices. If demand falls short of current expectations, more expansionary policies will be pursued. In 1962, vigilance and flexibility must be the guardians of economic optimism.

### *Monetary and Credit Policies*

Monetary, credit, and debt management policies can also help to assure that productive outlets exist for the funds that the American people save from prosperity incomes. The balance foreseen in the Budget for fiscal year 1963, and the surplus which would arise at full employment, both indicate that fiscal policy is assuming a large share of the burden of forestalling inflationary excesses of demand. With monetary and related policies relieved of a substantial part of this burden, they can more effectively be used to assure a flow of investment funds which will transform the economy's present capacity to save into future capacity to produce.

At the same time, monetary and debt management policies must continue to protect the balance of international payments against outflows of short-term capital. As in 1961, domestic expansion and the balance of payments confront these policies with a dual task, requiring continued ingenuity in technique and flexibility in emphasis.

### *Balance of Payments*

The program launched last year to reduce our payments deficit and maintain confidence in the dollar will, I am sure, show further results in 1962. I am hopeful that the target of reasonable equilibrium in our international payments can be achieved within the next two years; but this will require a determined effort on the part of all of us—government, business and labor. This effort must proceed on a number of fronts.

*Export expansion.* An increase in the U.S. trade surplus is of the first importance. If we are to meet our international responsibilities, we must increase exports more rapidly than the increase in imports which accompanies our economic growth.

Our efforts to raise exports urgently require that we negotiate a reduction in the tariff of the European Common Market. I shall shortly transmit to the Congress a special message elaborating the details of the proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and explaining why I believe that a new trade policy initiative is imperative this year.

To encourage American businessmen to become more export-minded, we have inaugurated a new export insurance program under the leadership of the Export-Import Bank, and we have stepped up our export promotion drive by improving the commercial services abroad of the U.S. Government, establishing trade centers abroad, planning trade fairs, improving the trade mission program, and working with business firms on export opportunities through field offices of the Department of Commerce and the Small Business Administration. Foreign travel to the United States, which returns dollars to our shores, is now being promoted through the first Federal agency ever created for this purpose.

*Prices and productivity.* Our export drive will founder if we cannot keep our prices competitive in world markets. Though our recent price performance has been excellent, the improving economic climate of 1962 will test anew the statesmanship of our business and labor leaders. I believe that they will pass the test; our Nation today possesses a new understanding of the vital link between our level of prices and our balance of payments.

In the long run, the competitive position of U.S. industry depends on a sustained and rapid advance in productivity. In this, the interests of economic recovery, long-run growth, and the strength of the dollar coincide. Modernization and expansion of our industrial plant will accelerate the advance of productivity.

*Foreign investment.* To place controls over the flow of private American capital abroad would be contrary to our traditions and our economic interests. But neither is there justification for special tax incentives which stimulate the flow of U.S. investment to countries now strong and economically developed, and I again urge the elimination of these special incentives.

The new foreign trade program which I am proposing to the Congress will help to reduce another artificial incentive to U.S. firms to invest abroad. The European Common Market has attracted American capital, partly because American businessmen fear that they will be unable to compete in the growing European market unless they build plants behind the common tariff wall. We must negotiate down the barriers to trade between the two great continental markets, so that the exports of our industry and agriculture can have full opportunity to compete in Europe.

*Governmental expenditures abroad.* Military expenditures form by far the greater part of our governmental outlays abroad. We are discussing with certain of our European allies the extent to which they can increase their own military procurement from the United States to offset our dollar expenditures there. As a result, the net cost to our

balance of payments is expected to be reduced during the coming year, in spite of increased deployment of forces abroad because of the Berlin situation.

To curtail our foreign aid programs in order to strengthen our balance of payments would be to sacrifice more than we gain. But we can cut back on the foreign currency costs of our aid programs, and thus reduce the burden on our balance of payments. A large percentage of our foreign aid is already spent for procurement in the United States; this proportion will rise as our tightened procurement procedures become increasingly effective.

We have sought to induce other advanced countries to undertake a larger share of the foreign aid effort. We will continue our efforts through the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to obtain a higher level of economic assistance by other industrial nations to the less developed countries.

*Short-term capital movements.* Outflows of volatile short-term funds added to the pressures on the dollar in 1960. Our policies in 1961 have diminished the dangers of disruptive movements of short-term capital. For the first time in a generation, the Treasury is helping to stabilize the dollar by operations in the international exchange markets. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, in administering their monetary policy and debt management responsibilities, have sought to meet the needs of domestic recovery in ways which would not lead to outflows of short-term capital.

During the past year, we have consulted periodically with our principal financial partners, both bilaterally and within the framework of the OECD. These consultations have led to close cooperation among fiscal and monetary authorities in a common effort to prevent disruptive currency movements.

*Strengthening the international monetary system.* The International Monetary Fund is playing an increasingly important role in preserving international monetary stability. The reserve strength behind the dollar includes our drawing rights on the Fund, of which \$1.7 billion is automatically available under current practices of the Fund. An additional \$4.1 billion could become available under Fund policies, insofar as the Fund has available resources in gold and usable foreign currencies. Recently, the Fund has diversified its use of currencies in meeting drawings by member countries, relying less heavily on dollars and more heavily on the currencies of countries with payments surpluses. However, the Fund's regular holdings of the currencies of some important

industrial countries are not adequate to meet potential demands for them.

In a message to the Congress last February, I said: "We must now, in cooperation with other lending countries, begin to consider ways in which international monetary institutions—especially the International Monetary Fund—can be strengthened and more effectively utilized, both in furnishing needed increases in reserves, and in providing the flexibility required to support a healthy and growing world economy."

We have now taken an important step in this direction. Agreement has been reached among ten of the major industrial countries to lend to the Fund specified amounts of their currencies when necessary to cope with or forestall pressures which may impair the international monetary system. These stand-by facilities of \$6 billion will be a major defense against international monetary speculation and will powerfully reinforce the effectiveness of the Fund. They will provide resources to make our drawing rights in the Fund effective, should we need to use them. Moreover, the U.S. stand-by commitment of \$2 billion will augment the resources potentially available through the Fund to other participants in the agreement, when our balance of payments and reserve positions are strong. I shall shortly submit a request to Congress for appropriate enabling legislation.

### *Prices and Wages*

Prices and production need not travel together. A number of foreign countries have experienced both rapid growth and stable prices in recent years. We ourselves, in 1961, enjoyed a stable price level during a brisk economic recovery.

While rising prices will not necessarily accompany the expansion we expect in 1962, neither can we rely on chance to keep our price level stable. Creeping inflation in the years 1955-57 weakened our international competitive position. We cannot afford to allow a repetition of that experience.

We do not foresee in 1962 a level of demand for goods and services which will strain the economy's capacity to produce. Neither is it likely that many industries will find themselves pressing against their capacity ceilings. Inflationary pressures from these sources should not be a problem.

But in those sectors where both companies and unions possess substantial market power, the interplay of price and wage decisions could set off a movement toward a higher price level. If this were to occur, the whole Nation would be the victim.



I do not believe that American business or labor will allow this to happen. All of us have learned a great deal from the economic events of the past 15 years. Among both businessmen and workers, there is growing recognition that the road to higher real profits and higher real wages is the road of increased productivity. When better plant and equipment enable the labor force to produce more in the same number of hours, there is more to share among all the contributors to the productive process—and this can happen with no increase in prices. Gains achieved in this manner endure, while gains achieved in one turn of the price-wage spiral vanish on the next.

The Nation must rely on the good sense and public spirit of our business and labor leaders to hold the line on the price level in 1962. If labor leaders in our major industries will accept the productivity benchmark as a guide to wage objectives, and if management in these industries will practice equivalent restraint in their price decisions, the year ahead will be a brilliant chapter in the record of the responsible exercise of freedom.

#### MEASURES FOR A STRONGER ECONOMY

The final section of my Report is a summary of my recommendations for legislative action (1) to strengthen our defenses against recession, (2) to strengthen our financial system, (3) to strengthen our manpower base, and (4) to strengthen our tax system.

##### *A Program for Sustained Prosperity*

Recurrent recessions have thrown the postwar American economy off stride at a time when the economies of other major industrial countries have moved steadily ahead. To improve our future performance I urge the Congress to join with me in erecting a defense-in-depth against future recessions. The basic elements of this defense are (1) Presidential stand-by authority for prompt, temporary income tax reductions, (2) Presidential stand-by authority for capital improvements expenditures, and (3) a permanent strengthening of the unemployment compensation system. These three measures parallel important proposals of the Commission on Money and Credit, whose further recommendations are treated under the next heading.

In our free enterprise economy, fluctuations in business and consumer spending will, of course, always occur. But this need not doom us to an alternation of lean years and fat. The business cycle does not have the inevitability of the calendar. The Government can time its fiscal transactions to offset and to dampen fluctuations in the private economy.

Our fiscal system and budget policy already contribute to economic stability, to a much greater degree than before the war. But the time is ripe, and the need apparent, to equip the Government to act more promptly, more flexibly, and more forcefully to stabilize the economy—to carry out more effectively its charge under the Employment Act.

*Stand-by tax reduction authority.* First, I recommend the enactment of stand-by authority under which the President, subject to veto by the Congress, could make prompt temporary reductions in the rates of the individual income tax to combat recessions, as follows:

(1) Before proposing a temporary tax reduction, the President must make a finding that such action is required to meet the objectives of the Employment Act.

(2) Upon such finding, the President would submit to Congress a proposed temporary uniform reduction in all individual income tax rates. The proposed temporary rates may not be more than 5 percentage points lower than the rates permanently established by the Congress.

(3) This change would take effect 30 days after submission, unless rejected by a joint resolution of the Congress.

(4) It would remain in effect for 6 months, subject to revision or renewal by the same process or extension by a joint resolution of the Congress.

(5) If the Congress were not in session, a Presidentially proposed tax adjustment would automatically take effect but would terminate 30 days after the Congress reconvened. Extension would require a new proposal by the President, which would be subject to congressional veto.

A temporary reduction of individual income tax rates across the board can be a powerful safeguard against recession. It would reduce the annual rate of tax collections by \$2 billion per percentage point, or a maximum of \$10 billion—\$1 billion per point, or a \$5-billion maximum, for six months—at present levels of income. These figures should be measured against the costs they are designed to forestall:

- the tens of billions of potential output that run to waste in recession;
- the pain and frustration of the millions whom recessions throw out of work;
- the Budget deficits of \$12.4 billion in fiscal 1959 or \$7.0 billion this year.

The proposed partial tax suspension would launch a prompt counterattack on the cumulative forces of recession. It would be reflected

immediately in lower withholding deductions and higher take-home pay for millions of Americans. Markets for consumer goods and services would promptly feel the stimulative influence of the tax suspension.

It would offer strong support to the economy for a timely interval, while preserving the revenue-raising powers of our tax system in prosperity and the wise traditional procedures of the Congress for making permanent revisions and reforms in the system. I am not asking the Congress to delegate its power to levy taxes, but to authorize a temporary and emergency suspension of taxes by the President—subject to the checkrein of Congressional veto—in situations where time is of the essence.

*Stand-by capital improvements authority.* Second, I recommend that the Congress provide stand-by authority to the President to accelerate and initiate up to \$2 billion of appropriately timed capital improvements when unemployment is rising, as follows:

(1) The President would be authorized to initiate the program within two months after the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate

(a) had risen in at least three out of four months (or in four out of six months) and

(b) had risen to a level at least one percentage point higher than its level four months (or six months) earlier.

(2) Before invoking this authority, the President must make a finding that current and prospective economic developments require such action to achieve the objectives of the Employment Act.

(3) Upon such finding, the President would be authorized to commit

(a) up to \$750 million in the acceleration of direct Federal expenditures previously authorized by the Congress,

(b) up to \$750 million for grants-in-aid to State and local governments,

(c) up to \$250 million in loans to States and localities which would otherwise be unable to meet their share of project costs, and

(d) up to \$250 million additional to be distributed among the above three categories as he might deem appropriate.

(4) The authority to initiate new projects under the capital improvements program would terminate automatically within 12 months unless extended by the Congress—but the program could be terminated at any time by the President.

(5) Grants-in-aid would be made under rules prescribed by the President to assure that assisted projects (a) were of high priority, (b) represented a net addition to existing State and local expenditures, and (c) could be started and completed quickly.

(6) Expenditures on Federal projects previously authorized by the Congress would include resource conservation and various Federal public works, including construction, repair, and modernization of public buildings.

(7) After the program had terminated, the authority would not again be available to the President for six months.

The above criteria would have permitted Presidential authority to be invoked in the early stages of each of the four postwar recessions—within four months after the decline had begun. Furthermore, no false signals would have been given. Were a false signal to occur—for example, because of a strike—the authority, which is discretionary, need not be invoked.

The first impact of the accelerated orders, contracts, and outlays under the program would be felt within one to two months after the authority was invoked. The major force of the program would be spent well before private demand again pressed hard on the economy's capacity to produce. With the indicated safeguards, this program would make a major contribution to business activity, consumer purchasing power, and employment in a recession by utilizing for sound public investment resources that would otherwise have gone to waste.

*Unemployment compensation.* Third, I again urge the Congress to strengthen permanently our Federal-State system of unemployment insurance. My specific recommendations include

(1) Extension of the benefit period by as much as 13 weeks for workers with at least three years of experience in covered employment;

(2) Similar extension of the benefit period when unemployment is widespread for workers with less than three years of experience in covered employment. This provision could be put into effect by Presidential proclamation when insured unemployment reaches 5 percent, and the number of benefit exhaustions over a three-month period reaches 1 percent of covered employment;

(3) Incentives for the States to provide increased benefits, so that the great majority of covered workers will be eligible for weekly benefits equal to at least half of their average weekly wage;

(4) Extension of coverage to more than three million additional workers;

- (5) Improved financing of the program by an increase in the wage base for the payroll tax from \$3,000 to \$4,800;
- (6) Reinsurance grants to States experiencing high unemployment insurance costs;
- (7) Provisions which permit claimants to attend approved training or retraining courses without adverse effect on eligibility for benefits.

Wider coverage, extended benefit periods, and increased benefit amounts will help society discharge its obligation to individual unemployed workers. And by maintaining more adequately their incomes and purchasing power, these measures will also buttress the economy's built-in defenses against recession. Temporary extensions of unemployment compensation benefits have been voted by the Congress during the last two recessions. It is time now for permanent legislation to bring this well-tested stabilizer more smoothly into operation when economic activity declines.

In combination, these three measures will enable Federal fiscal policy to respond firmly, flexibly, and swiftly to oncoming recessions. Working together on this bold program, the Congress and the Executive can make an unprecedented contribution to economic stability, one that will richly reward us in fuller employment and more sustained growth, and thus, in greater human well-being and greater national strength.

### *Strengthening the Financial System*

*Proposals of the Commission on Money and Credit.* The Report of the Commission on Money and Credit, published last year, raises important issues of public policy relating to (1) the objectives and machinery of Government for economic stabilization and growth, (2) Federal direct lending and credit guarantee programs, and (3) the structure and regulation of private financial institutions and markets. The Commission's Report represents the results of thorough analysis and deliberation by a private group of leading citizens representative of business, labor, finance, agriculture, and the professions. The Commission's findings and recommendations deserve careful consideration by the Congress, the Executive, and the public—consideration which should result in legislative and executive actions to strengthen government policy under the Employment Act and to improve the financial system of the United States. The subjects covered by the Commission can—for the purposes of discussion and action in the Government—usefully be divided into four categories.

(1) To strengthen the instruments of policy for economic stabilization, the Commission recommends permanent improvement of unemployment compensation, flexibility in government capital expenditures, and flexibility in adjusting the basic Federal individual income tax rate. These key proposals are reflected in the three-part anti-recession program just described.

(2) In its comprehensive new look at existing financial legislation, the Commission concludes that the following financial restrictions no longer serve the purposes originally intended and unnecessarily complicate or obstruct other government policies: the ceiling on the public debt, the ceiling on permissible interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds, and the required gold reserve against Federal Reserve notes and deposits. I am sure that the Congress will wish to examine carefully the Commission's recommendations on these points.

(3) The Commission re-examines the structure of the Federal Reserve System and its relationship to other arms of the Federal Government. The desirability of proposed changes in the structure which has evolved over the years can be determined only after extensive consideration by the Congress and by the public.

There are two reforms of clear merit on which there appears to be sufficiently general agreement to proceed at once, and which are of direct concern to the President in the exercise of his responsibility to appoint the members and officers of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

The first is to give adequate recognition in the simple matter of salaries to the important responsibilities of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The United States is behind other countries in the status accorded, by this concrete symbol, to the leadership of its "central bank," and I urge that the Congress take corrective action.

The second is to revise the terms of the officers and members of the Board so that a new President will be able to nominate a Chairman of his choice for a term of four years coterminous with his own. This change has the concurrence of the present Chairman of the Board of Governors. The current situation—under which the four-year term of the Chairman is not synchronized with the Presidential term—appears to be accidental and inadvertent.

Provision should be made now for smooth transition to new arrangements to take effect in 1965. I suggest that, on the expiration of the present term of the Chairman in April 1963, the next term expire on January 31, 1965. In order that, starting in 1965, the President may have a free choice when he begins his own term, it is also

necessary to provide that the terms of members of the Board—which now begin and end on January 31 of even years—begin and end in odd years. This change can be accomplished very easily by extending the terms of present members by one year.

(4) Several of the Commission's recommendations require careful appraisal by the affected agencies in the Executive Branch as a basis for future legislative recommendations:

(a) *Banks and other private financial institutions:* The Commission proposes significant changes in the scope and nature of government regulations concerning reserves, portfolios, interest rates, and competition. I shall ask an interagency working group in the Executive Branch to examine the complex issues raised by these proposals. This interagency group will keep in close touch with the relevant committees of the Congress, which will no doubt wish to study these issues simultaneously.

(b) *Federal lending and loan guarantee programs:* It is clearly time for a thorough review of both their general impact on the economy and their effectiveness for the special purposes for which they were established. Again the Commission's Report has performed a valuable service in illuminating basic problems. One important question is the appropriate role—with account taken of both effectiveness and budgetary cost—of direct Federal lending, loan guarantees, and interest sharing. I shall ask a second interagency group in the Executive Branch to examine these programs.

(c) *Corporate pension funds and other private retirement programs:* It is time for a reappraisal of legislation governing these programs. They have become, in recent years, a major custodian of individual savings and an important source of funds for capital markets. The amendment to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act which I recommend below will be an important step toward insuring fidelity in the administration of these Plans. But there is also need for a review of rules governing the investment policies of these funds and the effects on equity and efficiency of the tax privileges accorded them. I shall ask a third working group of relevant Departments and agencies to recommend needed actions in this field, taking into account the findings of the Commission as well as other studies and proposals.

*A revision of silver policy.* Silver—a sick metal in the 1930's—is today an important raw material for which industrial demand is expanding steadily. It is uneconomic for the U.S. Government to lock up large quantities of useful silver in the sterile form of currency reserves.

Neither is any constructive purpose served by requiring that the Treasury maintain a floor under the price of silver. Silver should eventually be demonetized, except for its use in coins.

(1) As a first step in freeing silver from government control, the Secretary of the Treasury at my direction suspended sales of silver on November 29. This order amounted to the withdrawal of a price ceiling on silver which had been maintained by Treasury sales at a fixed price.

(2) The next step should be the withdrawal of the Treasury's price floor under domestically produced silver. Accordingly, I recommend repeal of the Acts relating to silver of June 19, 1934, July 6, 1939, and July 31, 1946; this step will free the Treasury from any future obligation to support the price of silver.

(3) I also recommend the repeal of the special 50 percent tax on transfers of interest in silver; this step will foster orderly price movements by encouraging the development of a futures market in silver.

(4) Finally, I recommend that the Federal Reserve System be authorized to issue Federal Reserve notes in denominations of \$1; this will make possible the gradual withdrawal from circulation of \$1 and \$2 silver certificates, and the use of the silver thus released for coinage purposes.

### *Strengthening Our Manpower Base*

The labor force of the United States is its most valuable productive resource. Measures which enhance the skills and adaptability of the working population contribute to the over-all productivity of the economy. Several legislative proposals to serve these ends have already been put before the Congress.

(1) I urge speedy passage of the proposed Manpower Development and Training Act. A growing and changing economy demands a labor force whose skills adapt readily to the requirements of new technology. When adaptation is slow and occupational lines rigid, individuals and society alike are the losers. Individuals take their loss in the form of prolonged unemployment or sharply reduced earning power. Society's loss is measured in foregone output. These are losses we need not suffer. A few hundred dollars invested in training or retraining an unemployed or underemployed worker can increase his productivity to society by a multiple of that investment—quite apart from the immeasurable return to the worker in regaining a sense of purpose and hope. Both compassion and dollars-and-cents reasoning speak for this legislation.



(2) For the same reasons, I urge enactment of the Youth Employment Opportunities Act. This bill provides three types of pilot programs to give young people employment opportunities which would enable them to acquire much-needed skills. These programs include training, employment in public service jobs with public and private nonprofit agencies, and the establishment of Youth Corps Conservation Camps. In the current decade, young men and women will be entering the labor force in rapidly growing numbers. They will expect, and they deserve, opportunities to acquire skills and to do useful work. The price of failure is frustration and disillusion among our youth. This price we are resolved not to pay.

(3) I have already made my recommendations for improvement of the Federal-State unemployment compensation system.

(4) I am asking the Congress for more funds to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. Employment Service. This important agency has already strengthened its operations, improving its staff and placement services particularly in the largest urban centers, and concentrating on labor market problems of nationwide significance—especially those connected with technological displacement of adult workers and the employment of youth. But the matching of jobs and workers is especially difficult and especially important in a rapidly changing economy, and more can be done. When unfilled jobs and qualified unemployed workers coexist—but do not make contact because the flow of job information is not sufficiently free—the employer, the worker, and the country lose. I urge the Congress to reduce that loss in the most effective way—by revitalizing further the agency charged with disseminating information about job opportunities and willing workers.

(5) I ask for enactment of the pending proposal to amend the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act so as (a) to provide adequate penalties for embezzlement and (b) to vest authority in a responsible Federal agency to enforce the statute by issuing binding regulations, prescribing uniform reporting forms, and investigating violations. Almost 90 million people rely on some welfare and pension plan for part or all of present or future income. These plans are a major support of the economic security of the American people. We are derelict if we do not provide adequate administrative and enforcement provisions to protect the tremendous financial interest of participants in these funds.

### *Strengthening Our Tax System*

The tax system of the United States has consequences far beyond the simple raising of revenue. The tax laws are a vital part of the economic

environment; their effects may be equitable or inequitable; they create incentives which may help or handicap the national interest. We cannot safely ignore these important effects in the comforting illusion that what already exists is perfect. We must scrutinize our tax system carefully to insure that its provisions contribute to the broad goals of full employment, growth, and equity.

My legislative proposals in the tax field are directly related to these goals and the corollary need for improvement in the balance of payments. In particular, I urge the earliest possible enactment of the tax proposals now before the House Committee on Ways and Means. The centerpiece of these proposals is the 8 percent tax credit against tax for gross investment in depreciable machinery and equipment. The credit should be retroactive to January 1, 1962. The tax credit increases the profitability of productive investment by reducing the net cost of acquiring new equipment. It will stimulate investment in capacity expansion and modernization, contribute to the growth of our productivity and output, and increase the competitiveness of American exports in world markets.

The tax credit for investment is in part self-financing. The stimulus it provides to new investment will have favorable effects on the level of economic activity during the year, and this will in turn add to Federal revenues. My other proposals for tax reform are designed to improve the equity and efficiency of the tax system and will offset the remaining net revenue loss:

- (1) Extension of the withholding principle to dividend and interest income;
- (2) Repeal of the \$50 dividend exclusion and the 4 percent dividend credit;
- (3) Revision of the tax treatment of business deductions for entertainment, gifts, and other expenses, to stop abuses of "expense-account living";
- (4) Elimination of the special tax preference for capital gains from the sale of depreciable property, real and personal;
- (5) Removal of unwarranted preferences (a) to cooperatives, (b) to mutual fire and casualty insurance companies, and (c) to mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations; and
- (6) Revision of the tax treatment of foreign income, to remove defects and inequities in the law. Removal of the unwarranted incentive to the export of capital will be consistent with the efficient distribution of capital resources in the world


and will aid our balance of payments position. Tax deferral privileges should be limited to profits earned in less developed countries, and opportunities for "tax haven" operations should be eliminated.

In addition, I recommend that the corporate income tax and certain excise taxes again be extended at present levels for another year beyond June 30, 1962, except that the structure of taxes and user charges in the transportation field be altered as proposed in my Budget Message.

In considering tax revision in the United States, we must not limit ourselves simply to Federal taxation. Our States, counties, and municipalities collect nearly half as much tax revenue as the Federal Government. There is great potential for equity or inequity, for incentive or disincentive, in their highly diverse tax systems. In addition, the effectiveness of Federal tax policies can be enhanced by harmonious coordination with State and local fiscal systems. There is wide latitude for improvements in the coordination of tax systems and in operations with intergovernmental implications. In this effort, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations is performing a valuable service. I urge careful study of its recommendations at all levels of government.

Later this year, I shall present to the Congress a major program of tax reform. This broad program will re-examine tax rates and the definition of the income tax base. It will be aimed at the simplification of our tax structure, the equal treatment of equally situated persons, and the strengthening of incentives for individual effort and for productive investment.

The momentum of our economy has been restored. This momentum must be maintained, if the full potential of our free economy is to be released in the service of the Nation and the world. In this Report I have proposed a program to sustain our prosperity and accelerate our growth—in short, to realize our economic potential. In this undertaking, I ask the support of the Congress and the American people.





**THE ANNUAL REPORT  
OF THE  
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS**




LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,  
*Washington, D.C., January 12, 1962.*

THE PRESIDENT:

SIR: The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its Annual Report, January 1962, in accordance with Section 4(c) (2) of the Employment Act of 1946.


Respectfully,



WALTER W. HELLER,  
*Chairman.*



KERMIT GORDON



JAMES TOBIN





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## INTRODUCTION

The Report of the Council of Economic Advisers is a document directed toward economic problems and national economic policy. It is written in keen awareness that the ultimate goals of the Nation are human goals, and that economics is merely instrumental to the making of a better life for all Americans. Involuntary unemployment is a sign of economic waste, but the fundamental evil of unemployment is that it is an affront to human dignity. Expenditures on better education and better health are investments in future capacity to produce; but even if they were not, they would be intrinsically desirable because ignorance and illness bar the way to happiness and security for many of our citizens. Social security and welfare benefits help to limit the depth of recessions, but their more important function is to protect human beings from hunger and despair. Statistical tables are to the economist what test tube and microscope are to the scientist—the tools of the trade; but for the one as for the other, the ultimate dedication is to the quality of human life.

The Employment Act of 1946 is a historic affirmation of the responsibility of the Federal Government “to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.” The Act commits the Federal Government to seek to create and to maintain an economic environment in which “there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work.” These goals, as the Act recognizes, must be sought within the broad framework of U.S. political and economic institutions—free competitive enterprise and the Federal system of government. And they must be sought by means consistent with other national needs, obligations, and objectives.

The people of this Nation—aided by an immense and fertile land, by rich stores of minerals and other gifts of nature, and by technologies and tools which lighten the work of man and multiply its fruits—can produce vast quantities of the goods and services human beings want. The Employment Act’s broad goal of maximum employment, production, and purchasing power implies, first of all, that the vast productive capacity of the Nation should be used and not permitted to lie idle or run to waste. And, second, it implies that this capacity itself should be raised to enable each new generation to advance to higher standards of well-being.

The first of these objectives—maximum use of our existing productive resources—is the topic of Chapter 1. One requirement is to maintain aggregate demand for goods and services at, but not above, levels sufficient to buy the goods and services the economy is capable of producing. Since inadequate demand has in recent years been a major cause of unemploy-

ment and excess capacity, expansion of demand has been and remains a principal task of government policy. But expansion of demand is not the whole answer. The functioning of markets for labor and for its products can be improved in ways which will bring into effective use a greater proportion of the Nation's productive resources. Government policy can play a role here too. These two aspects of the current economic situation, and the relevance of current and proposed policies, are discussed in Chapter 1.

The second objective—to accelerate the growth of the productive powers of the United States—is the subject of Chapter 2. The United States has joined its partners in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in setting “as a collective target the attainment during the decade from 1960 to 1970 of a growth in real gross national product of 50 percent for the 20 Member countries taken together.” This growth in production in Europe and North America is intended to lead both to an increase in standards of living in the industrial countries and to “a significant increase in aid to less developed countries.”

The OECD declaration underscores the fact that free nations must pursue their economic objectives in concert. U.S. policy under the Employment Act must take full account of our international economic transactions. Chapter 3, therefore, examines the U.S. balance of payments and the external position of the dollar, particularly as they are related to domestic economic developments and policies.

The necessity of moving toward balance in U.S. international accounts has given price stability new and compelling importance as a requirement of economic policy for recovery and growth. An appropriate and responsive structure of relative prices is equally important, to bring resources into full and efficient use and to guide the growing productive capacity of the economy to serve the Nation's changing needs. Competition and mobility of resources, by contributing to the efficiency and flexibility of the price structure, will at the same time weaken upward pressures on the price level which sometimes accompany and endanger high employment. Chapter 4 is a discussion of recent, current, and prospective developments and policies affecting the course of prices in the United States.

Full utilization of manpower and other productive resources, faster growth in capacity to produce, balance of payments equilibrium, and price stability—these are necessarily the tasks of U.S. economic policy today. Significant progress has been made toward achieving all of them in 1961. In many important respects they are complementary; especially in the long run, measures which advance one task advance the others. But in other respects they are difficult to reconcile; measures useful for one purpose may be harmful for another. As perhaps never before, the complexity and the importance of the tasks facing the U.S. economy in this decade challenge the wisdom and vision of Government and of all sectors of the private economy.

## Chapter 1

# Toward Full Recovery

### PART I: OBJECTIVES, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

**T**HE U.S. ECONOMY made substantial advances in 1961 toward the goals of the Employment Act: "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power." Total production rose to a record rate of \$542 billion a year in the fourth quarter, \$41 billion above the level at the beginning of the year. Unemployment, which had been close to 7 percent of the labor force ever since December 1960, fell sharply toward the end of 1961; the rate was 6.1 percent in December. The annual rate of income, after taxes, of the American people rose from \$1,940 per capita in the first quarter to \$2,032 per capita in the last quarter of 1961. These gains in disposable income were almost entirely real gains in purchasing power. Prices were virtually stable during the year; the consumer index rose only 0.6 percent between December 1960 and November 1961. As the year ended, the economy was advancing vigorously.

Government fiscal and monetary policies contributed strongly to the favorable economic developments of the past year. Although the downswing probably would have ended early in 1961 in any case, the impressive pace of the economic expansion must be attributed in large measure to government actions. A summary of the Administration's program in 1961 to promote economic recovery is given in the Appendix to this chapter.

In spite of the significant gains of 1961, the economy at the turn of the year still fell short of the standards set forth in the Employment Act. Too many persons "able, willing, and seeking to work" were unable to find "useful employment opportunities." Even at record levels, national production had not yet reached its potential at full employment; and the purchasing power of the American people—the command over goods and services represented by their incomes—was still too low.

The prospect for 1962 is a continuation of the favorable trend of 1961. Whether the current expansion is sufficiently strong and durable to carry the economy to "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power", no one can now foretell with certainty. Current and proposed government actions will continue to give strong support to economic expansion. If these are coupled with continued strength in the private economy, the current expansion would reduce unemployment to 4 percent of the labor force by mid-1963. But, given the inevitable uncertainties, government policy must be alert and flexible, ready to promote the achieve-

ment of full recovery within the coming fiscal year and to counteract developments which might threaten its attainment. The President has made important proposals to increase the effectiveness and flexibility of government fiscal policy; these are discussed at length in Part II of this chapter.

Part I of this chapter discusses, first, the current implications of the objectives of the Employment Act: "maximum employment" as a guide to the fiscal and monetary policies of Government and to other public and private policies of equal ultimate importance; and the potential production and purchasing power of the American economy at levels of employment which full recovery can achieve. Next, it describes the progress of the economy in 1961 toward these objectives and the outlook for continued advance in 1962. Part II of the chapter discusses government policies for full recovery and maximum employment, with special emphasis on the Administration's policies in 1961 and its programs under way or proposed for the coming year.

## THE OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT

### *Reasons for Concern over Unemployment*

The great depression led this Nation, and most other nations of the free world, to assume national responsibility for the human tragedy and economic waste of involuntary unemployment. Unemployment had previously been regarded as almost solely the personal responsibility of the individual; now it came to be acknowledged as a charge on the conscience of the Nation. The mass unemployment of the 1930's led to new understanding: that to be unemployed is not to be unemployable; that job opportunities for individual workers depend on national economic circumstances beyond their control.

There are three principal reasons why involuntary unemployment is a national concern: (1) the human obligation to prevent and to relieve economic distress, (2) the basic principle of a free economy that an individual should be able to choose freely how to use his time, whether to work for pay or not, and (3) the economic waste of leaving productive resources idle.

*Preventing economic distress.* First, a wealthy nation cannot in good conscience permit its citizens to be inadequately nourished, clothed, or housed; its sick to be denied medical care; or its young to be deprived of schooling. Unemployment insurance and public assistance are recognitions of this social obligation. But they are not substitutes for the opportunity to earn income from useful employment. For the breadwinner and his family, unemployment means a reduction in living standards. Only about three-fifths of the unemployed in 1961 were receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Even those who were insured generally found weekly benefits a pale shadow of their lost wages. When the unemployment insurance program was inaugurated in the late 1930's, the goal was to provide benefits equal to about half of previous earnings. As Table 1 indicates,



benefits now do not meet this standard. The Administration has proposed permanent legislation to strengthen the unemployment insurance system in this and other respects.

TABLE 1.—*Weekly earnings in selected industries, and unemployment insurance benefits, 1961*

Item	Weekly average, 1961
Unemployment insurance benefits, all industries <sup>1</sup> .....	\$33.80
Weekly earnings, selected industries: <sup>2</sup>	
Retail trade.....	64.01
Manufacturing.....	92.34
Telephone communication.....	92.75
Wholesale trade.....	93.32
Bituminous coal mining.....	112.10
Class I railroads.....	112.41
Contract construction.....	117.66

<sup>1</sup> For State programs only; see Table B-23.

<sup>2</sup> Gross earnings for production workers or nonsupervisory employees; see Table B-27.

Source: Department of Labor.

For all too many, unemployment has not been simply an uncomfortable interlude between jobs but a catastrophe of long duration; almost one-third of those unemployed in December 1961 had been out of work for 15 or more weeks and one-sixth had been unemployed for at least 27 weeks. Family savings vanish when unemployment is prolonged.

Unemployment is not a perfect measure of the incidence of economic distress. Failure to find work does not entail poverty for some unemployed persons: women whose husbands have good jobs, young people who can fall back on well-to-do parents, older people who have assured livelihoods from property incomes or annuities, people who earn an adequate annual income from work at a seasonal occupation during part of a year. On the other hand, there are many causes of economic distress other than unemployment. Some persons, though employed, suffer from reduced and inadequate incomes resulting from failure to obtain more than part-time or occasional work, or to earn decent returns from long hours of self-employment on the farm or in the shop. Other individuals are not regarded as unemployed simply because, discouraged by a lack of suitable opportunities, they have abandoned the search for jobs. Included in this group are individuals with personal disabilities who can find jobs only when labor markets are tight.

Nevertheless, changes in unemployment are indicative of changes in the over-all magnitude of economic distress. The same conditions of general prosperity which lead to lower unemployment figures also lead to lower rates of involuntary part-time idleness, to better rewards from self-employment, and to more job opportunities for persons on the fringes of the labor force. While effective measures to provide adequate job opportunities will not solve all problems of economic distress, they will solve a substantial share of them. And without successful policy against general

unemployment, other attacks on poverty and insecurity stand little chance of success.

*Assuring free choice.* The second reason for national concern over unemployment is the basic principle of a free economy, embodied in the Employment Act, that "useful employment opportunities" be afforded "for those able, willing, and seeking to work." A free society abhors forced idleness as well as forced labor. This principle does not apply a means or needs test for job-seekers. It acknowledges that mature individuals should be able to choose for themselves how they spend their time, as between gainful employment, housework, leisure, and education. Involuntary unemployment can destroy morale and freedom of choice whether or not the individual is in economic need. Americans want to work. Neither welfare programs nor personal means can erase the frustration of the individual who is forced to conclude that society does not need or want his contribution. The general preference for gainful work over unemployment, however well compensated, is demonstrated by the low levels of unemployment in areas with buoyant labor markets, in occupations with ample job opportunities, and in the population at large during years of prosperity.

*Avoiding economic waste.* Finally, excessive unemployment is a waste of productive resources. When these resources are left idle, the useful goods and services they could have produced are forever lost to the Nation. These losses would be enormously wasteful at any time. They are dangerous in a decade when the economy must not only meet compelling domestic needs but underwrite the defense of freedom throughout the world. In coupling maximum production and purchasing power with maximum employment, the Employment Act recognizes the losses of national output and real income associated with unemployment. An estimate of these losses in present circumstances is attempted below. Changes in the unemployment rate are roughly indicative of changes in the "gap" between realized and potential production. The same measures of policy which will lower unemployment will also raise national output closer to capacity to produce. The national economic losses associated with unemployment are, of course, quite independent of the individual circumstances of the unemployed. If housewives, elderly persons, and teen-agers on vacation from school are eager and able to produce useful goods and services, it is foolish and wasteful for the Nation to forego their contributions.


*Measures of unemployment.* The global measure of unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labor force, provided monthly by the Current Population Survey and published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is the best single measure of the economic distress, the frustration of free choice, and the economic waste associated with unemployment. But there are other measures of independent interest. Four of these measures, along with the global rate, are shown in Chart 1:

(1) The unemployment rate among *experienced wage and salary workers*—those who have already held at least one job. This measure

excludes the self-employed and new entrants to the labor force. (2) The unemployment rate among *married men living with their wives*. This measure relates to individuals whose commitment to the labor force is permanent and necessary to the support of their families. It does not cover all individuals with such a commitment, and conceptually it is inappropriate both as a measure of economic waste and as an indicator of involuntary unemployment among persons "able, willing, and seeking to work." (3) A *full-time equivalent* measure which (a) adds to the wholly unemployed the full-time equivalent of work lost by involuntary part-time employment and (b) subtracts the self-employed from both the labor force and civilian employment on the grounds that they are not subject to the risk of unemployment. This concept has merit as a measure of economic waste and of imbalance in markets for hired labor. (4) The number of

CHART 1

## Measures of Unemployment



1/ UNEMPLOYED PLUS FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT OF PART-TIME EMPLOYED AS PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE. EXCLUDES SELF-EMPLOYED AND UNPAID FAMILY WORKERS.

2/ PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE IN GROUP.

3/ MARRIED MEN LIVING WITH THEIR WIVES.

4/ PERSONS UNEMPLOYED 15 WEEKS OR MORE AS PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

*long-term unemployed*, those who have been jobless for more than 15 weeks, as a percentage of the labor force. This rate is an important measure of the financial and social distress caused by the concentration of prolonged unemployment on a small fraction of the labor force.

The differences among these measures reveal more clearly than any single measure the anatomy of unemployment. But they show no systematic tendency to widen or narrow. If due allowance is made for volatility in month-to-month movements all five measures tell the same story about changes in economic conditions.

### *Full Employment as the Objective of Stabilization Policy*

The goal of the Employment Act is “maximum employment,” or—to put it the other way round—minimum unemployment. Ideally, all persons able, willing, and seeking to work should be continuously employed. Involuntary unemployment is an individual and social evil. No one would prefer for its own sake a higher rate of unemployment to a lower one. But zero unemployment is unattainable. A more meaningful figure is needed to give content to the realistic and forceful declaration of policy in the Employment Act. A feasible interim goal must reflect a balancing of employment and production objectives with other considerations of national policy, within the limits set by the existing characteristics of the economy. Such a goal is set forth in the discussion which follows. We must not forget, however, that any practical unemployment goal is only a temporary compromise, and its attainment must never be an occasion for relaxation, but rather an incentive to search out ways to achieve a still lower rate.

The partial conflict which exists between minimum unemployment and certain other national objectives—and which imposes the necessity of striking a balance between them—results mainly from the fact that these other objectives are served by stability of the general price level. Given the existing structure of the economy and the nature of the processes by which prices and wages are determined, a serious attempt to push unemployment close to zero would produce a high rate of price inflation. The result would be a weakening of the competitive position of U.S. products in world markets, an arbitrary redistribution of real income and wealth, and a threat of even more serious consequences if expectations of further inflation should become dominant.

Happily, however, the conflict between the goals served by price stability and the goal of minimum unemployment is only partial. Stabilization policy—policy to influence the level of aggregate demand—can strike a balance between them which largely avoids the consequences of a failure in either direction. Furthermore, the degree of conflict can be diminished by private and public policies which improve the functioning of labor and product markets.

There are various possible causes of unemployment, on the one hand, and of inflationary pressure, on the other. These causes may be grouped

into (1) those related to aggregate demand and (2) those related to the structure and functioning of markets. It is necessary to distinguish carefully between these two groups of causes in setting an appropriate target for stabilization policy.

The relation of aggregate demand and of structural causes to unemployment may be briefly described as follows:

(1) The total effective demand for goods and services—by consumers, businesses, and governments—may be insufficient to employ all the persons seeking work at existing wage rates.

(2) Workers may be idle while vacancies are unfilled. This may arise because the workers live too far away from the available jobs, are not qualified for them, or simply are unaware of their existence. In a dynamic economy, there will always be workers between jobs, some seeking new positions out of preference, some displaced by economic and technological change. New entrants to the labor force will similarly be unemployed while locating jobs suitable to their qualifications and preferences. The length of “frictional” unemployment for any one worker, and the size of the pool of frictionally unemployed, depend on how smoothly the labor market functions, how well the skills, experience, and qualifications of workers match the specifications of available jobs, how ready workers are to change residence and occupation, how adequate are facilities for training and retraining, and how rapidly displacements resulting from economic change are occurring. Structural unemployment may be regarded as an extreme form of frictional unemployment. It occurs when inability or failure to make the necessary adjustments concentrates unemployment of long duration on displaced workers in particular areas and occupations, while elsewhere jobs are seeking workers of quite different qualifications.

Similarly, aggregate demand and the structure of markets are related to the price level, as follows:

(1) Inflation may result from excessive aggregate demand. Demands for goods and services by consumers, businesses, and governments may add to a total which exceeds the amount that the economy can supply. Prices will be bid up in all markets, and, as business firms try to expand output in order to seize the profit opportunities presented, increases in wages and in costs of materials will follow. The resulting rise in incomes will reinforce and renew the process. In less extreme circumstances, aggregate demand may press hard upon, but not exceed, the economy’s productive capacity. Increases in prices and wages may occur nevertheless, reflecting the need to obtain additional output by using labor and capital more intensively—by making greater use of overtime labor, by attracting workers from great distances, by making employment attractive to persons formerly not in the labor force, and by making use of obsolescent capacity and inefficient production techniques.

(2) Upward pressure on prices may originate in those sectors of the economy where competitive forces are weak and large corporations and

unions have a considerable degree of discretion in setting prices and wages. (This discretion, and the public interest in its responsible exercise, are discussed in Chapter 4.) There are two ways in which wage and price decisions in these sectors may put upward pressure on the general price level. First, prices may be increased when demand is not strong in the aggregate or even in the specific industries involved. Because the prices of these industries affect costs elsewhere, increases in their prices tend to spread throughout the economy. Second, prices in these sectors may remain constant in the face of declining demand, although they rise in times of increasing demand. The result in the long run is an upward drift in prices in these industries, which again tends to be transmitted to the whole economy.

Expansion of aggregate demand is clearly the specific remedy for unemployment caused by a deficiency of aggregate demand. Excessive aggregate demand, however, is a source of inflationary pressure. Consequently, the target for stabilization policy is to eliminate the unemployment which results from inadequate aggregate demand without creating a demand-induced inflation. A situation in which this is achieved can appropriately be described as one of "full employment," in the sense that further expansion of expenditure for goods and services, and for labor to produce them, would be met by only minor increases in employment and output, and by major increases in prices and wages. Correspondingly, expansion of demand beyond full employment levels would involve a major sacrifice of the objectives served by price stability, and only a minor gain with respect to the goal of maximum employment.

The selection of a particular target for stabilization policy does not commit policy to an unchangeable definition of the rate of unemployment corresponding to full employment. Circumstances may alter the responsiveness of the unemployment rate and the price level to the volume of aggregate demand. Current experience must therefore be the guide.

In the existing economic circumstances, an unemployment rate of about 4 percent is a reasonable and prudent full employment target for stabilization policy. If we move firmly to reduce the impact of structural unemployment, we will be able to move the unemployment target steadily from 4 percent to successively lower rates.

The recent history of the U.S. economy contains no evidence that labor and commodity markets are in general excessively "tight" at 4 percent unemployment. Neither does it suggest that stabilization policy alone could press unemployment significantly below 4 percent without creating substantial upward pressure on prices.

When unemployment was about 5 percent, as in 1959 before the steel strike and in the first half of 1960, the economy showed many independent symptoms of slack, notably the substantial underutilization of plant and equipment capacity. The wholesale price index fell at a rate of 0.2 percent

a year in the 15 months April 1959–July 1960; and at the consumer level, prices of commodities other than food rose at a rate of only 0.6 percent.

The economy last experienced 4 percent unemployment in the period May 1955–August 1957, when the unemployment rate fluctuated between 3.9 percent and 4.4 percent (seasonally adjusted). During this period, prices and wages rose at a rate which impaired the competitiveness of some U.S. products in world markets. However, there is good reason to believe that upward pressures of this magnitude are not a permanent and systematic feature of our economy when it is operating in the neighborhood of 4 percent unemployment. The 1955–57 boom was concentrated in durable manufactured goods—notably automobiles (in 1955), machinery and equipment, and primary metals. The uneven nature of the expansion undoubtedly accentuated the wage and price pressures of those years. Moreover, the review of the present price outlook in Chapter 4 points to a recent strengthening in the forces making for price stability. The experience of 1955–57 is nevertheless sobering, and experience at higher levels of activity will be needed to indicate whether stabilization policy can now undertake a more ambitious assignment than 4 percent unemployment.

There is no precise unemployment rate at which expansion of aggregate demand suddenly ceases to affect employment and begins to affect solely the general price level. The distinction between aggregate demand effects and structural effects is a matter of degree, both for employment and for the general price level. Sufficiently high levels of aggregate demand can, and have in the past, cut deeply into frictional and structural unemployment. When vacancies are numerous, the time required to find an attractive job is reduced. When there are vacancies everywhere, no one needs to travel far to find a job. And when no applicant for a job meets its exact specifications, the specifications may well be adjusted. Similarly, the degree of inflationary pressure arising from discretionary price and wage setting is not independent of the general strength of demand. Presumably, this pressure could be entirely eliminated by sufficient weakness in aggregate demand if that were the sole objective of stabilization policy.

But while stabilization policy would not be an ineffective cure for either one or the other of these economic ailments, it would be an extremely expensive cure. On the one hand, attempting to reduce frictional and structural unemployment by a highly inflationary expansion of demand would court disaster in our balance of payments position. On the other hand, an attempt to restrict aggregate demand so severely as to eliminate all risk of an increase in the general price level might well involve keeping the economy far below full employment. This would mean sacrifice rather than achievement of both of the major goals that price stability serves: Equity would be sacrificed because the economy as a whole, and the unemployed in particular, would suffer as a result of the manner in which a few individuals

and groups exercise their economic power. Eventually, the balance of payments would also be weakened: under conditions of prolonged unemployment and excess capacity, the investment needed to keep our exports competitive in quality and cost would be unlikely to occur.

The 4 percent interim goal refers to the global measure of unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labor force. An objective stated in terms of any of the other measures of unemployment discussed above would have the same implications for stabilization policy, for the various measures tell the same story with respect to the degree of over-all tightness in the economy. The particular numerical statement of the goal must, of course, change with the unemployment concept used. For example, 4 percent in terms of the global measure is roughly equivalent to a rate of  $2\frac{1}{4}$  percent among married men living with their wives; the latter figure, though lower, is at least as serious as the former in its implications for the human consequences of unemployment. Corresponding figures for the other measures of unemployment are  $4\frac{1}{4}$  percent among experienced wage and salary workers,  $6\frac{1}{4}$  percent for the full-time equivalent concept, and, if the 4 percent global rate is long sustained, a two-thirds of one percent rate of long-term unemployment.

Unemployment of 4 percent is a modest goal, but it must be emphasized that it is a goal which should be achievable by stabilization policy alone. Other policy measures, referred to in the next section and discussed in detail in Part II of this chapter, will help to reduce the goal attainable in the future below the 4 percent figure. Meanwhile, the policies of business and labor, no less than those of Government, will in large measure determine whether the 4 percent figure can be achieved and perhaps bettered in the current recovery, without unacceptable inflationary pressures.

### *Full Employment and Structural Unemployment*

One way to raise the attainable level of full employment is to reduce frictional and structural unemployment by improving the mobility of labor and the efficiency of labor markets. The amount of frictional and structural unemployment varies from country to country and from time to time within any one country. It has sometimes been suggested that, though a 4-percent unemployment rate was once achievable in the United States with adequate levels of demand, it is no longer a feasible goal because of increasing technological displacement of workers, rapid obsolescence of skills, intractable pockets of depression, and greater numbers of young people swelling the labor force. Careful analyses at the Council and elsewhere—notably in a recent report by the staff of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress—lend no support to the view that frictional and structural unemployment is a rising proportion of the labor force. It would be wholly wrong, however, to conclude that improvement in the structure of the labor market is not both possible and of high importance.



The displacement of labor through changes in technology, consumer tastes, and the geographic distribution of industry is an inevitable part of the growth of a free and progressive economy. But the level of unemployment corresponding to any given pace of progress depends on the smoothness with which markets function. The size of the pool of unemployed workers, like the size of a pool of water, is determined jointly by the flow into it and the flow out of it. The flow into it depends on the rate at which workers leave jobs or are displaced and on the rate at which new workers enter the labor force without jobs. The flow out depends on the speed with which the unemployed can transfer to jobs vacated by retirement, and to other skills, other industries, and other areas where jobs are available in expanding sectors of the economy.

Economic policy can reduce the size of the pool by providing opportunities for vocational training and retraining, by improving the flow of information about job opportunities, by facilitating the relocation of displaced workers, by acting to reduce and eliminate discriminatory hiring practices, and by assisting in the rehabilitation of depressed areas through the renovation of public facilities and the attraction of viable industry. Administration policies and proposals to attain these ends are discussed in Part II of the present chapter.

The benefits to the United States from the pursuit of such policies are great. In their absence, many of our citizens become, in a real sense, victims of progress; they are condemned to prolonged periods of unemployment which benefit no one and inflict an unjust penalty on an arbitrarily selected few. In their absence, we can expect resistance to technological progress from those who would be harmed by it without prospect of reward.

The returns from such policies do not come instantaneously. For that reason, we should undertake them now, even while unemployment and excess capacity are widespread. There is still time to reap the benefits of the reduction of structural unemployment during the current recovery. But these policies are no substitute for an adequate level of demand. Experience tells us that the pull of expanding job opportunities is a vitally necessary condition for the success of policies to assure a better functioning labor market.

#### FULL PRODUCTION

##### *Productive Potential*

The Economic Report is required by the Employment Act to set forth "the levels of employment, production, and purchasing power obtaining in the United States and such levels needed to carry out the policy" of the Act. In accordance with the obligation to set forth the levels of production needed to carry out the objectives of the Act, the Council has made the following estimates: (1) In the first quarter of 1961, a gap of \$51 billion (1961 prices, annual rate) existed between actual gross national product (GNP) and the output obtainable at full employment. (2) By the last quarter of the year, recovery had narrowed this gap to about \$28 billion.

- (3) For 1961 as a whole, production averaged \$40 billion below potential.  
 (4) The production potential for the year 1962 is estimated at \$580 billion (in 1961 prices).

Estimates of this kind cannot, of course, be precise. But they are essential in order to specify, within reasonable margins of error, a current measure of "maximum production" linked to "maximum employment." They indicate clearly that this Nation can achieve a huge bonus of output and income by making full use of its resources.

The level of unemployment is a barometer of economic waste. Each percentage point of progress toward 4 percent in the unemployment rate has meant a gain of roughly 3 percent in total output in postwar periods of expansion.

The sources of potential gains in output accompanying full employment are given in Table 2, which shows the gain in output that each source could

TABLE 2.—Allocation of estimated \$40 billion gap between potential and actual gross national product, 1961

[Billions of dollars]

Source	Associated increment of output
Total.....	40
Lower unemployment.....	15
Larger labor force in response to greater demand.....	4
Longer hours of work per man associated with higher utilization.....	5
Greater productivity per man-hour associated with higher utilization.....	16

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

have contributed if aggregate demand in 1961 had been sufficient to reduce unemployment to 4 percent of the labor force. The figures incorporate evidence from postwar relationships among labor input, productivity, and output. An unemployment rate of 4.0 percent instead of 6.7 percent for 1961 would in itself have increased the number of jobs by 3 percent of actual employment. But it would have raised production by much more, about 8 percent. The reason that improved employment conditions yield magnified gains in output is that, in addition to putting the jobless back to work, they have a number of other favorable effects on output.

Higher output would have accompanied lower unemployment in the following manner:

(1) Actual unemployment in 1961 was 4.8 million persons. Given the actual 1961 labor force of 71.6 million persons, 2 million of the unemployed would have been at work at an unemployment rate of 4 percent.

(2) At full employment, the labor force would probably have been considerably higher in 1961 and production would have been correspondingly increased. Participation in the labor force is encouraged by greater availability of job opportunities. In recent years of slack activity, the actual

labor force has been abnormally low relative to the number of persons of working age.

(3) Furthermore, a brisker pace of economic activity is accompanied by a higher average number of hours a week worked by those employed. Part-time jobs are converted into full-time employment, and overtime work increases in private nonfarm industry.

(4) Because of these three factors—less unemployment, larger labor force, and longer hours of work—labor input at full employment in 1961 would have exceeded actual labor input by more than  $4\frac{1}{2}$  percent, the equivalent of 7 billion man-hours. The added man-hours could have increased production by \$24 billion, at existing rates of productivity.

(5) The higher productivity that accompanies fuller use of resources would have meant still more output. In recessions, business firms cannot cut back their labor force as fast as their output falls. Clerical help and sales and supervisory personnel are essentially “overhead.” Moreover, while firms can and do lay off production workers, they do so only with reluctance, preferring both to maintain morale and to avoid the expense of hiring and training new labor when business activity recovers. Recessions thus produce on-the-job underemployment, which is reflected in depressed levels of productivity. In movements toward full employment, recession losses in productivity are regained. At full employment, productivity in 1961 would, according to past evidence, have been 2 to 4 percent higher than it actually was. This gain is equivalent to a \$10 to \$20 billion increment of GNP. The table shows a \$16 billion figure, near the middle of the range, bringing the total estimated gain from all sources to \$40 billion.


These calculations receive further support from an alternative approach. Evidence on the relationship between output and unemployment suggests that actual GNP in mid-1955, when the unemployment rate was close to 4 percent, was equal to potential output. The trend rate of growth of GNP, adjusted for changes in unemployment levels, has averaged about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  percent in the post-Korean period. Thus the path of potential GNP can be represented by a  $3\frac{1}{2}$  percent trend from actual GNP in mid-1955 (Chart 2). The 1961 value of the trend exceeds actual output by \$40 billion, which is equal to the sum of the components described above.

The distance between potential and actual GNP was narrowed by \$23 billion from the first to last quarter of 1961, as output increased by \$37 billion (1961 prices). Among the four factors listed above, the first two, reduction in unemployment and increase in the labor force, contributed less to the gain in production than past experience would have suggested. Of the other two factors, hours of work in nonfarm industries expanded roughly in accord with past behavior; but man-hour productivity achieved an exceptional gain, probably above 6 percent in the three quarters of expansion. As a result, the  $7\frac{1}{2}$  percent increase in total production was achieved with a very small increase in employment: nonfarm employment increased by about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  percent, but this rise was partially offset by a decline

CHART 2


## Gross National Product, Actual and Potential, and Unemployment Rate

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS\* (Ratio scale)



PERCENT

PERCENT



\* SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATES.

1/ 3% TREND LINE THROUGH MIDDLE OF 1955.

2/ UNEMPLOYMENT AS PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE; SEASONALLY ADJUSTED.

NOTE: A, B, AND C REPRESENT GNP IN MIDDLE OF 1963 ASSUMING UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF 4%, 5%, AND 6%, RESPECTIVELY.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

in agricultural employment. It is primarily because latent productivity was exploited so effectively that unemployment remained high.

The estimated gap of \$28 billion, or 5 percent, between potential and actual output in the fourth quarter of 1961 reflected principally a shortfall in persons employed. At the end of the year, there was room for a slight further rise in average weekly hours worked. The impressive gains in productivity during the year brought output per man-hour at the year-end close to the full employment level indicated by past experience. Nevertheless, further gains in productivity as a result of fuller utilization of existing capacity may still be ahead. In any case, further additions to output during the coming year are expected to require larger increases in employment than in 1961.

The unemployment rate will fall in the coming year if, and only if, production continues to rise in relation to the economy's potential. The prospects for 1962 are discussed later in this chapter.

A full-utilization economy in 1963 would provide nearly 72 million civilian jobs and generate an estimated \$600 billion GNP (1961 prices). These figures—5 million more jobs and nearly \$80 billion more output than 1961 levels—suggest the magnitude of the opportunity and challenge we face. To help visualize this challenge more concretely, Table 3 presents an illustrative pattern of employment, productivity, and output for the full year 1963 consistent with 4 percent unemployment.

TABLE 3.—*Employment, output, and productivity, 1961 actual and 1963 illustrative*

Sector	Employment (millions of persons)		Output (billions of dollars, 1961 prices)		Output per employed person (dollars)	
	1961 actual	1963 illustrative <sup>1</sup>	1961 actual <sup>2</sup>	1963 illustrative <sup>1</sup>	1961 actual <sup>2</sup>	1963 illustrative <sup>1</sup>
Total economy <sup>3</sup> .....	69.4	74.3	521.2	600	7,500	8,100
Agricultural.....	5.5	5.2	21.0	21	3,800	4,000
Private nonagricultural.....	54.2	58.8	449.4	525	8,300	8,900
General government <sup>3</sup> .....	9.7	10.3	50.8	54	-----	-----
Addendum:						
Civilian employment.....	66.8	71.6	-----	-----	-----	-----
Unemployment.....	4.8	3.0	-----	-----	-----	-----

<sup>1</sup> Illustrative pattern projected at 4 percent unemployment; by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>2</sup> Estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>3</sup> Includes military.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Department of Labor (except as noted).

### *Plant and Equipment Capacity*

Periods of slack and recession in economic activity lead to idle machines as well as idle men. Only once since 1949, at the trough of the 1958 recession, was there more excess plant and equipment capacity in U.S. industry than at the start of 1961. While increases in output during the past year have led to fuller use of capital facilities, 1962 begins with considerable room for expanded output from existing plant and equipment,

enough room to permit achievement of the full employment goal. This excess capacity is available to be tapped on demand. It is easier to expand employment at stable prices when tools are already available for new job-holders. Otherwise, capital might act as a bottleneck, obstructing the flow of increased demand for goods into improved employment opportunities for labor.

While unused capital is a reserve source of supply, it dampens the vigor of demand. Although much of investment is undertaken primarily for replacement and modernization, investment for expansion of capacity is important to aggregate demand as well as to economic growth. Inducements to expand plant and equipment are stronger when present facilities are fully utilized. The rate at which existing capacity is utilized also influences the ability of firms to finance investment out of retained earnings. Unused tools are a drag on profits. They yield no return and they impose overhead costs for maintenance and depreciation.

The reliability of measures of productive capacity and capital stock is severely limited by both conceptual and statistical difficulties. But an increasing amount of quantitative evidence is becoming available. Carefully used, it can be very helpful in arriving at the needed qualitative judgments about productive capacity. Two series of data on capital utilization from 1953 to date are presented in Chart 3. One measures the ratio of actual output to capacity output for all manufacturing industry. The other shows the output-capital ratio: the ratio of the value of total output to the value of the stock of plant and equipment, both expressed in 1954 prices, covering all private domestic business except residential housing. Although the two measures are derived by substantially different methods, they move together very closely, offering encouraging evidence of their general validity as measures of capital utilization.

A number of significant points are evident from the chart:


(1) Measures of capital utilization, like unemployment rates, indicate the persistence of slack in the economy over the past five years. Even during the expansion of 1959–60, operating rates and the ratios of output to the stock of capital remained considerably below their 1955–56 levels.

(2) Recessions are clearly marked by excess capacity in plant and equipment. Capital was most underutilized at the 1958 trough; the low point of early 1961 lies about midway between the 1958 rates and those of the 1954 recession. Because capacity grew slowly in 1958–61, excess capacity in early 1961 was smaller than in 1958 even though unemployment was just as large.

(3) Output gains must match the growth of plant and equipment capacity in order to maintain rates of capital utilization. Periods of slow advance in production, like 1956–57 and 1959–60, lead to declining rates of utilization.

CHART 3

## Capacity Utilization and Corporate Profits



SOURCE: COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (BASED ON DATA OF DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM).

(4) Considerable excess capacity remains in the economy despite the rapid rise of utilization rates during 1961. While there is no clear benchmark of full utilization of capital, the operating rates and output-capital ratios attained in late 1955 can serve as a reasonable indication. If GNP had been at its estimated potential level in the last quarter of 1961, capital utilization rates would have been approximately at the levels attained in late 1955. Existing excess capacity in plant and equipment is thus compatible with full employment of the labor force.

(5) Levels of capital utilization have a potent influence on corporate profits. The share of corporate profits in GNP moves closely with the measures of capital utilization, although it swings somewhat earlier. Corporate depreciation allowances have increased rapidly and “gross profits”—net profits and inventory valuation adjustment plus capital consumption allowances—have been maintained during the 1953–61 period. But net profits have declined as a fraction of GNP in recent years; the combination of unrelenting overheads and depressed levels of output can fully account

for this "squeeze." As corporate capacity is put to fuller use, profits benefit from larger margins as well as expanded sales.

## PROGRESS IN 1961

### *The Situation at the Beginning of the Year*

As 1961 began, economic activity was far below its full employment level, and production and income continued to contract through February. By most measures of the decline in economic activity, the 1960-61 recession was the mildest in the postwar period. But the peak reached in May 1960 had followed a year of very slow advance in output and ended the shortest expansion in the postwar period. At the 1960 peak, unemployment and excess capacity were higher than at any prior postwar peak. Unemployment rates were higher during the 1960-61 recession than during the slumps of 1948-49 and 1953-54; in this respect, the recession was almost as severe as that of 1957-58.

The rate of use of existing facilities in late 1959 and early 1960 was not conducive to substantial further increases in business fixed investment, nor were monetary conditions encouraging. Although there was a brief interlude in the first quarter of 1960 when investment demand rose sharply, this buoyancy was to a large extent a temporary aftermath of the steel strike of 1959. As orders, sales, and profits proved disappointing, investment in both fixed capital and inventories was cut back.

During this period, government fiscal programs gave little support to aggregate demand. Total Federal expenditures, on income-and-product account, showed little change between mid-1959 and mid-1960 as Federal purchases of goods and services actually declined. In January 1960, Federal social insurance taxes were increased by about \$2 billion a year. Indeed, the sharp change in the relationship between Federal Government receipts and expenditures was perhaps the most important factor in choking off the recovery.

The recession followed the same pattern as previous postwar downswings. With activity weakening, purchases of goods were cut back throughout the private economy. Inventory investment, as usual, displayed the largest decline among major components of GNP (Table 4). The decline of inventories, as well as of other major categories of expenditure, was concentrated in durable goods. Correspondingly, a decline of 12 percent in durable goods manufacturing accounted for most of the fall in industrial production from May 1960 to February 1961. Unemployment, which had been 5.1 percent (seasonally adjusted) of the civilian labor force in May, rose to 6.8 percent in February.

Once the contraction began, it was certainly moderated, and perhaps shortened, by a rise in outlays at all levels of government. The automatic stabilizers in the Federal fiscal system contributed to the stability of personal consumption expenditure during the recession, as transfer payments rose



TABLE 4.—Changes in output, income, and employment over the three quarters of the 1960–61 recession

[Seasonally adjusted]

Item	Cyclical peak: Second quarter 1960	Cyclical trough: First quarter 1961	Change, peak to trough
Billions of dollars, annual rates			
<i>Output (1961 prices):</i>			
Gross national product.....	514.2	502.9	-11.3
Personal consumption expenditures.....	333.9	331.7	-2.2
Gross private domestic investment:			
Fixed investment.....	69.5	64.2	-5.3
Residential nonfarm construction.....	21.2	19.4	-1.8
Other construction.....	19.9	20.6	.7
Producers' durable equipment.....	28.4	24.2	-4.2
Change in business inventories.....	5.4	-4.0	-9.4
Net exports of goods and services.....	3.0	5.3	2.3
Government purchases of goods and services.....	102.3	105.7	3.4
Federal.....	54.4	54.9	.5
State and local.....	47.9	50.8	2.9
<i>Income (current prices):</i>			
Disposable personal income.....	352.7	354.3	1.6
Corporate profits after taxes.....	23.3	20.0	-3.3
Millions of persons			
<i>Employment:</i>			
Total civilian employment.....	67.0	66.8	-0.2
Employment in nonagricultural establishments.....	54.6	53.5	-1.1
Private.....	46.1	44.9	-1.2

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding. See Tables B-2, B-11, B-15, B-19, and B-24.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Department of Labor.

by \$3.0 billion and personal taxes fell by \$0.7 billion (annual rates) to offset much of the fall in private wages and salaries resulting from lower employment.

### *Recovery During the Year*

By the end of 1961, production and income had improved markedly, and most economic indicators had surpassed their 1960 peaks. In the final quarter of 1961, GNP, measured in constant prices, was 7½ percent higher than in the first quarter, and about 5 percent above the peak attained in the second quarter of 1960 (Tables 4 and 5). The only major category of expenditure that was lower than in the second quarter of 1960 was expenditure for producers' durable equipment. Industrial production in December exceeded its low point of February by 13 percent, and was 4 percent above the previous peak attained in January 1960.

The increase of \$41 billion (current prices, annual rate) in GNP from the first to last quarters of 1961 distributed substantial gains in income widely through the economy. Personal income grew by \$24 billion. Wage and salary disbursements expanded by \$19 billion and accounted for

TABLE 5.—Changes in output, income, and employment over three quarters of expansion, 1961

[Seasonally adjusted]

Item	1961		Change, trough to fourth quarter
	First quarter (cyclical trough)	Fourth quarter <sup>1</sup>	
Billions of dollars, annual rates			
<i>Output (1961 prices):</i>			
Gross national product.....	502.9	540.2	37.3
Personal consumption expenditures.....	331.7	347.8	16.1
Gross private domestic investment:			
Fixed investment.....	64.2	71.4	7.2
Residential nonfarm construction.....	19.4	23.2	3.8
Other construction.....	20.6	20.2	-.4
Producers' durable equipment.....	24.2	28.0	3.8
Change in business inventories.....	-4.0	4.5	8.5
Net exports of goods and services.....	5.3	4.0	-1.3
Government purchases of goods and services.....	105.7	112.5	6.8
Federal.....	54.9	59.9	5.0
State and local.....	50.8	52.7	1.9
<i>Income (current prices):</i>			
Disposable personal income.....	354.3	375.6	21.3
Corporate profits after taxes.....	20.0	<sup>2</sup> 23.8	<sup>2</sup> 3.8
Millions of persons			
<i>Employment:</i>			
Total civilian employment.....	66.8	66.9	0.1
Employment in nonagricultural establishments.....	53.5	54.5	1.0
Private.....	44.9	45.5	.6

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary estimates of output and income by Council of Economic Advisers.<sup>2</sup> Third quarter data and change from first to third quarter.

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Department of Labor (except as noted).

most of the gain in personal income. Incomes from dividends and business ownership also rose. Farm operators' net income from farming increased from \$12.0 billion in 1960 to \$13.1 billion in 1961, and net income per farm rose by nearly \$350. Disposable personal income (after taxes) grew by \$21 billion over the three quarters of expansion, adding \$92 to average per capita spendable income.

The effect of rising output is strikingly shown in the \$3.8 billion increase—nearly 20 percent—in the annual rate of corporate profits after taxes from the first to the third quarter. By all indications, corporate profits rose further in the fourth quarter and probably exceeded \$50 billion before taxes and \$25 billion after taxes.

Higher private incomes meant larger tax liabilities: Federal receipts in the income-and-product budget rose by about \$10 billion (annual rate) in the three quarters of expansion, and the yield of State and local taxes grew by \$3 billion.

The recovery was paced by a prompt and sharp reversal in inventory investment, the volatile inventories of manufacturers of durable goods ac-

counting for a major share of the movement. During recessions, output falls below final sales as some orders are filled out of excessive stocks. The end of inventory liquidation in itself raises production to the level of sales. And rising sales and orders in a period of economic recovery encourage the accumulation of stocks, creating further gains in production. In 1961, this characteristic switch from liquidation to accumulation occurred very promptly, only one month after the trough in over-all activity, and was a major factor in the \$15 billion expansion of GNP in the second quarter. Incentives for restocking did not arise wholly independently; they were provided in large part by evidence of a strengthening in final purchases, i.e., expenditures for GNP other than for inventory accumulation.

A key element in the rise of final demand was the increase in expenditures at all levels of government. The upward trend of State and local government purchases continued unabated. The promotion of economic recovery was a major aim of Federal budget policy in 1961. Scheduled obligations and expenditures were speeded up in the numerous ways listed in Part II and the Appendix to this chapter. Additional outlays came from new Administration programs—some to assist individuals and areas hit by economic recession and others to meet national needs of high priority. Furthermore, in the spring and summer of 1961 when overriding national security requirements led to increased expenditures for defense and space activities, the existence of unutilized manpower and capital ruled against an increase in tax rates. A careful appraisal of the direct and indirect effects of increased Federal activity indicates that it was a major force—probably the principal driving force—of the recovery of 1961.

Investment in nonresidential construction and producers' durable equipment, taken together, rose at an annual rate of \$3.4 billion (1961 prices) from the first to the last quarter of 1961, both responding to and contributing to the expansion (Table 5). With improving rates of utilization of capacity, larger corporate profits, and readily available credit, business fixed investment began to rise in the second quarter of 1961. In contrast, business capital outlays had continued to decline during two quarters of rising total output in both 1954 and 1958.

Residential nonfarm construction, which had fallen since mid-1959, picked up in the early months of 1961 and continued to rise through the year. Although the rate of new family formation has been relatively low, and vacancy rates have continued to rise steadily, increasing disposable incomes and favorable financial and liquidity conditions have stimulated home building. Through much of 1960 and well into 1961, individuals continued to increase their volume of liquid assets. Funds for conventional, FHA, and VA mortgages were readily available; mortgage yields declined moderately throughout the recession and into the summer of 1961 and remained fairly stable the rest of the year.

The favorable financial environment for business investment and residential construction reflected the monetary and credit policies of the

Government. These policies have facilitated the flow of funds into investment and have contributed to a stability of interest rates unusual for a year of recovery.


Exports in the fourth quarter were \$0.8 billion (annual rate) higher than in the first quarter. But outlays on imports, partly to rebuild inventories, rose by \$2.1 billion, reducing net exports by \$1.3 billion. Net exports is the one component of GNP which tends to fall as business activity improves cyclically.

Consumer outlays accounted for somewhat less than half the increase in GNP from the first to the fourth quarter. Until the closing months of the year, consumer spending did not quite keep pace with disposable income. The ratio of personal saving to personal disposable income rose from 6.7 percent in the first quarter to 7.3 percent in the third. In the fourth quarter, however, consumption did keep pace with income and expanded by \$8.0 billion (current prices, annual rate). Demand for new automobiles sparked a rise in the fourth quarter of \$3.2 billion (annual rate) in outlays for consumer durable goods, which finally surpassed the peak that had been reached in the second quarter of 1960.

The gains in production, income, and employment during 1961, in comparison with previous expansions, are shown in Charts 4 and 5. Chart 4 displays the rise of GNP from its lowest quarter in each recession. In

CHART 4

### Real Gross National Product in Four Postwar Recoveries



<sup>1/</sup>BASED ON SEASONALLY ADJUSTED DATA.


<sup>2/</sup>TROUGH QUARTERS FOR GNP WERE 1949 II, 1954 II, 1958 I, AND 1961 I.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.


CHART 5

# Employment, Production, and Income in Four Postwar Recoveries


CYCLICAL TROUGH = 100




PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE



CYCLICAL TROUGH = 100



CYCLICAL TROUGH = 100



NOTE: INDEXES AND RATE BASED ON SEASONALLY ADJUSTED DATA.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

the three previous cycles, the trough quarter for GNP came before the month of the cyclical trough. In 1961 the cyclical trough, in February, was in the middle of the quarter of lowest GNP. In Chart 5 the reference point for all series is the cyclical trough month. These differences in timing must be taken into account in comparisons of recoveries. There are also differences in the composition of output: for example, the 1958-59 upswing was more heavily concentrated in industrial production than the current recovery.

On the whole, increases in production and income during the present expansion of economic activity compare favorably with the two preceding periods of expansion. However, these gains were not matched by equal improvements in employment and unemployment. As noted above, one of the principal reasons was that productivity gains during 1961 exceeded those of earlier expansions. The year ended with unemployment at 6.1 percent of the civilian labor force (seasonally adjusted).

In summary, real output rose during the 1961 recovery at an annual rate of 10 percent. The gap between actual output and estimated potential has been narrowed by \$23 billion in three quarters; labor and capital have been more efficiently utilized; and widespread gains in income have been secured. The Nation has adjusted smoothly and easily to the marked change of pace: no evidence of strain can be found, no bottlenecks have developed, no excessive backlogs of orders have appeared. And prices have been exceptionally stable, as Chapter 4 makes clear. Although the economy at the end of 1961 was still short of full employment, the experience during the year was gratifying and reassuring on many counts. And it demonstrated the ability of the economy to advance efficiently at a rapid pace when the underlying strength of private demand is reinforced by appropriate Federal fiscal and monetary policies.

#### OUTLOOK FOR 1962

The Employment Act of 1946 requires an estimate of "current and foreseeable trends in the levels of employment, production, and purchasing power." Although the difficulties and risks of economic forecasting are well known, neither government nor private enterprise can conduct its affairs, develop its policies, and make its decisions without economic projections—without making the best estimates that economic and statistical tools permit of the economic framework within which it will have to operate in the future. For example, it would be impossible to formulate either Federal or State budgets without projections of future levels of income and business activity and the tax revenues they will produce. In the Budget Message, GNP for 1962 is projected at \$570 billion (current prices), a rise of nearly \$50 billion, or almost 9½ percent, over 1961. A somewhat higher figure is likely if the Congress enacts promptly the Administration's proposed tax credit for investment. This section presents, with full recognition of the

margins of error inherent in economic projections, the appraisal of the economic outlook underlying the budget.

The momentum of the current recovery will carry the economy to new records in production, income, and employment during 1962. In the closing months of 1961, private demand was rising briskly. The resulting gains in consumer incomes, profits, business inventory requirements, and orders for durable goods will generate further increases in spending and business activity in the coming months. Broad advances in the private economy will be reinforced by a continued upward trend in Federal, State and local government outlays.

The favorable prospects for private demand, together with current economic programs and proposals of the Administration, point to a strong and sustained expansion. The percentage gain in GNP (current prices) in 1962 over the 1961 level can realistically be expected to match the increases of 8½–9½ percent in 1955 and 1959. Those two years, like 1962, were the first full years of recovery from recession.

Expansion in GNP in 1962 is expected to be somewhat more moderate than the annual rate of 11 percent (current prices) attained over the past three quarters. But it is anticipated that output will continue to catch up with potential, reducing slack and unemployment. Substantial increases are expected in all major categories of expenditure. The expected total increase is made up, very roughly, of the following parts: one-half, consumer outlays; one-fifth each, government purchases and private fixed investment; and one-tenth, additions to inventories.

#### *Survey of Major Categories of Expenditure*

The rationale for this appraisal of the outlook may be indicated by a brief survey of the key components of GNP.

*Consumption.* The ratio of total consumer expenditure to personal disposable income, 93.0 percent in 1961, is expected to rise slightly in 1962. The proportion of income spent on nondurable goods and services typically declines during expansion and, this year, will probably fall below the 81.3 percent recorded in 1961. In prosperous periods, consumers devote a larger share of their incomes to increasing their wealth. But at the same time they show a preference for accumulating wealth in the form of consumer durable goods. The current strong liquid position of households is likely to moderate their desire for additional liquidity and to reinforce demands for durable goods this year. The brisk sales of automobiles in the fourth quarter of 1961 also point in this direction. An increase in expenditures for durables from 11.6 percent of disposable income in 1961 to some 12½ percent, approaching the proportions recorded in 1959 and 1960, will probably outweigh the slight decline to be expected in the fraction devoted to nondurables and services.

Measured absolutely, rather than as shares of disposable income, all components of consumer expenditure seem headed upward in 1962. Per-

sonal disposable income is likely to grow substantially. It will probably advance at a somewhat slower rate than GNP for the following reasons: (1) Corporate profits rise sharply in cyclical upswings, and dividend payments lag behind. (2) Government transfer payments to individuals are held down when unemployment declines. (3) Collections from progressive personal income taxes rise somewhat faster than personal incomes. But disposable income will still absorb more than half of the dollar gains in GNP, and consumer expenditure will account for about half of the total increment in expenditure. Consumption is now about 65 percent of GNP; no economic expansion can go far without support from consumers, and every expansion provides substantial income gains for households. A rise of \$50 billion in GNP for 1962 would be accompanied by an increase of about \$100 in consumption per capita, permitting significant advances in standards of living.

*Government.* State and local governments can be expected to add about \$1 billion a quarter to their purchases of goods and services, continuing their steady upward trend. Federal purchases of goods and services will rise during 1962 but more slowly than over the past year. The average increase during the course of 1962 seems likely to be \$1 billion a quarter, compared with \$1.7 billion in 1961. New Federal obligations, which have some effect on business activity before the outlays they foreshadow, are expected to rise by \$5 billion in the year starting next July 1—after a rise of \$12½ billion in the current fiscal year.

*Inventories.* Inventory-sales ratios have declined markedly during this expansion, as is usual in the first year of an upswing. The ratio of inventories to GNP fell by about 5 percent over the last three quarters of 1961. More rapid accumulation is to be expected—and welcomed—in the near future. Analysis supported by prior cyclical experience suggests that inventories will soon begin catching up with total output. If they were to rise at a quarterly rate of 2 percent, inventory investment would attain an annual rate of more than \$8 billion some time in 1962.

The threat of a midyear steel strike may produce added stockpiling this spring. In the absence of a prolonged strike, the main effect would be on the pattern of activity during the year, with the second quarter stronger and the third quarter correspondingly weaker. Although the year-end levels and the full year totals might not be seriously affected, this abnormal factor in inventory behavior would increase the difficulties of appraising the real strength of the economy. A long strike, of course, could seriously imperil the prospects for continued vigorous expansion.

Quite apart from the steel situation, inventory investment is likely to reach its peak before the end of 1962 and cannot be expected to be a significant expansionary factor in the latter half of this year.

*Residential construction.* With the aid of continued credit ease and increased household incomes, residential construction ended 1961 with a rate of activity \$2 billion above the average for the year. Further mod-



erate gains are likely, in part from additions and alterations and in part from new housing starts. Industry and government specialists have predicted housing starts of 1.4 million in 1962. Mortgage availability will influence housing demand considerably. If funds remain readily available, gains in household incomes are likely to strengthen the demand for new homes.

*Business fixed investment.* As Chart 3 shows, rates of capital utilization have been more favorable to investment demand in the last year than in 1958. Business outlays for durable equipment and nonresidential construction have risen more promptly and more vigorously to date than in the comparable stage of the preceding expansion. Incentives to invest for modernization and replacement purposes are also favorable. Furthermore, business fixed investment is volatile; in peacetime expansions, it usually rises as a fraction of GNP. Even the weak expansion of 1958-60 produced a 22 percent increase in capital outlays from their low in the third quarter of 1958 to their peak in the second quarter of 1960. The same performance in the current expansion would mean a rise of \$6 billion from the last quarter of 1961 to the last quarter of 1962. And the major determinants of investment—corporate liquidity and profit rates, capacity measures, conditions in financial markets—point to more strength than in the last expansion. It seems probable that capital outlays in 1962 will surpass their 1958-60 performance.

Prospects for plant and equipment investment are difficult to assess quantitatively. Recent surveys suggest that businessmen have not yet planned any major expansion of productive facilities. But improved economic conditions have consistently led to substantial upward revisions of plans. Whether business fixed investment as a share of GNP, 8.9 percent in 1961, will approach the 1956 and 1957 figure of 10.7 percent or even substantially surpass the 1960 figure of 9.3 percent cannot be foretold. Much depends on the extent to which excess capacity declines over the next few quarters and on the willingness of businessmen to count on continued prosperity. Capital outlays will also be significantly influenced by the state of financial markets. The financing of investment will be facilitated by the rising flow of internal funds from retained earnings and depreciation allowances. But corporate investment is almost certain to exceed corporate saving in 1962. Corporations as a whole have strengthened their liquidity position, in part by long-term financing ahead of investment needs in 1961. Nevertheless, they will probably require substantial net external financing this year, involving an increase in the security holdings of households and financial institutions. Monetary policy can facilitate this external financing.

An important stimulus to capital outlays would be provided by enactment of the proposed tax credit of 8 percent on expenditures for new durable equipment. This measure would raise significantly the after-tax return on new investment. Enactment of the tax credit will help assure sufficient strength in this central component of demand at the crucial stage of the recovery.

Another favorable factor for the later stage of recovery is the planned revision by the Treasury of guideline schedules of depreciation on plant and equipment. The revision will incorporate available current information about the economic lives of capital goods and the effects of technological change on obsolescence.

In 1955-57, capital outlays amounting to more than 10 percent of potential and actual GNP led to an annual rate of growth of slightly less than 4 percent in the business capital stock. Because total output did not grow at an equal pace after 1955, excess capacity developed and capital outlays were sharply reduced in the 1957-58 recession. The excess capacity that emerged is more accurately attributed to underbuying than to overbuilding. If purchases by consumers and government had been sufficient to keep the economy fully employed, rates of capital utilization would not have fallen. Business firms would have had sustained incentives to enlarge their productive facilities at the rate of nearly 4 percent a year. Better performance in maintaining full use of resources could justify business fixed investment amounting to 10 percent or more of the Nation's output.

#### *Prospects for Full Employment*

This appraisal of the prospects for production and income implies an unemployment rate of 5 percent or somewhat lower at the end of 1962, but not as low as 4 percent.

The achievement of 4 percent unemployment by mid-1963 requires a gain of about 11 percent in GNP (in constant prices) over the coming year and a half. This pace of advance would permit smooth and efficient adjustments, avoiding bottlenecks that might generate serious upward pressures on prices. It would also allow a gradual transition toward the rates of expansion that must be expected when full utilization is restored and output can no longer rise more rapidly than productive potential. A continued upward movement for more than two years with an over-all gain of 20 percent in real GNP would represent a very strong expansion. But a less ambitious rate of recovery to full employment would prolong the waste of unused resources without gaining appreciably greater assurance of stable prices.

While this rate of expansion seems feasible in the light of the prospects for private demand and Administration policies designed to promote expansion at a desirable pace, any appraisal of the economic outlook must take into account a wide range of possible outcomes. Weakening of consumer demand or lack of investment enthusiasm by business firms could endanger the prospective gains of 1962 and slow down the expansion. Because of the growth in the labor force and productivity, 1962 could achieve new highs in output and even in employment without any reduction in the currently excessive rate of unemployment. Large and continuing gains are needed to

bring output up to the economy's potential and to reduce unemployment to 4 percent of the labor force for the first time since 1957.

An expansion that slows down prematurely is less likely to be lasting. A slowdown, or even an expected slowdown, in the growth of sales can diminish incentives to enlarge productive capacity and inventories. A decline in capital spending and inventory accumulation can convert a slowdown into a downturn. For this reason, prospects for a lasting expansion rest heavily on the vigor of the upswing over the next few quarters.

The buildup of inventories that is expected in the near future will contribute substantially to household incomes and to the strength of consumer demand. But by late 1962, continued advance will depend heavily on the ability of fixed investment outlays to replace inventories as a key expansionary force. If the expansion is vigorous earlier in the year, utilization rates will be favorable to investment demand in late 1962, and, therefore, to the continuation of the expansion itself.

On the other hand, private demand can rise too fast or too far. Too rapid an expansion may strain the adjustment mechanisms of the economy. In a dynamic economy, patterns of output and employment change from one cycle to the next. It takes time to re-employ the jobless and to return efficiently to full utilization of capacity. Hence, a very rapid expansion of demand might involve price increases, bottlenecks, and inefficiencies that could be avoided in a more gradual rise to the same levels. The current expansion has an enviable record to date: with a 10 percent annual rate of increase of real output, it has substantially narrowed the gap between actual and potential output; at the same time, the movements of prices, inventories, and orders show none of the symptoms of strain that would be associated with excessive speed. If demand for consumer durable goods and business capital formation were quickly to attain the same strength relative to incomes as in 1955, reasonable speed limits might be violated. In that event, full employment might be achieved sooner but policy might have to contend with excess demands and inflationary pressures.

Still another challenge to policy might come from unexpected behavior of unemployment relative to output. Given continued growth of potential output along the 3½ percent trend discussed earlier, the achievement of full employment in mid-1963 would be associated with GNP of \$600 billion in 1961 prices. Deviations from historical trends in the size of the labor force, average hours of work, and man-hour productivity can alter the relationship between output and unemployment. Full utilization of resources may correspond to a somewhat higher or somewhat lower GNP. In particular, the effects of measures (discussed in Chapter 2) to increase the rate of growth of productivity, while adding to investment demand during the expansion, may raise the productive potential output of the economy above its current trend as early as 1963.

Stabilization policy has contributed significantly to the gratifying progress of 1961 and to the favorable prospects for 1962. Policy will continue to promote progress toward full employment, remaining alert to unforeseen developments which might throw the economy off course. The flexibility in existing policy instruments can be used to good advantage, as it was in 1961. Furthermore, Administration proposals now before the Congress would greatly enhance the ability of stabilization policy to counter threats of oncoming recession with speed and vigor. The record of stabilization policy in 1961 and its tasks for 1962 are discussed in the remaining part of this chapter.

## PART II: POLICIES FOR MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION

In Part I of this chapter, the progress of the economy in 1961 and the prospect for further progress in 1962 were reviewed in terms of the objectives of maximum employment, production, and purchasing power. Part II describes more fully and specifically how government policy can, does, and will promote progress toward these goals. Two major kinds of government policy are involved: measures for economic stabilization, which influence the total volume of spending; and measures to reduce structural unemployment and underemployment by better mutual adaptation between available jobs and available workers.

### ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

Insufficient demand means unemployment, idle capacity, and lost production. Excessive demand means inflation—general increases in prices and money incomes, bringing forth little or no gains in output and real income. The objective of stabilization policies is to minimize these deviations, i.e., to keep over-all demand in step with the basic production potential of the economy.

Stabilization does not mean a mere leveling off of peaks and troughs in production and employment. It does not mean trying to hold over-all demand for goods and services stable. It means minimizing deviations from a rising trend, not from an unchanging average. In a growing economy, demand must grow in order to maintain full employment of labor and full utilization of capacity at stable prices. The economy is not performing satisfactorily unless it is almost continuously setting new records of production, income, and employment. Indeed, unless production grows as fast as its potential, unemployment and idle capacity will also grow. And when the economy starts from a position well below potential, output must for a time grow even faster than potential to achieve full utilization.

## *The Postwar Record*

Despite the recessions of recent years and the inflationary excesses of the early postwar years, the postwar record of economic stabilization is incomparably better than the prewar. The economy fluctuated violently in 1919–21 and operated disastrously far below potential from 1930 to 1942. The 1929 level of GNP, in constant prices, was not exceeded, except briefly in 1937, until 1939. The difference between the 17 percent unemployment of 1939 and the 3 percent rate 10 years earlier is a dramatic measure of the growth of the labor force and productivity even during depression. Since the war, the economy's detours from the path of full employment growth have been shorter in both time and distance. There have been four recessions, but none of them has gotten out of hand, as did the decline of 1929–33. All of the declines have been reversed within 13 months, before unemployment reached 8 percent of the labor force. For this improved performance there are several reasons.

First, the war and preceding depression left business firms and households starved for goods. Further, wartime earnings coupled with scarcities of civilian goods, rationing, and price control, saturated business firms and consumers with liquid assets. For these legacies of depression and war, the economy paid a price in the inflations of 1946–48 and 1950, with delayed effects throughout the past decade.

Second, the structure of the economy was reformed after 1933 in ways which substantially increased its resistance to economic fluctuations. The manner in which government tax revenues and income maintenance programs serve as automatic or "built-in" economic stabilizers is described below. The New Deal strengthened and reformed the Nation's banking and financial system with the help of new governmental credit institutions, deposit insurance, and loan and guarantee programs. These have virtually eliminated the possibility that economic declines will be aggravated by bank failures, foreclosures, and epidemic illiquidity.

Third, there is a significantly improved understanding of the manner in which government fiscal and monetary tools can be used to promote economic stability. Under the Employment Act and the climate of opinion which it symbolizes, the Government has been expected to assume, and has assumed, greater responsibility for economic stabilization.

Finally, businessmen and consumers no longer regard prolonged and deep depression as a serious possibility. They generally expect recessions to end quickly; they anticipate a long-term upward trend in the economy; and they spend and invest accordingly. This stability of expectations is in part the result of stability achieved in fact, and reflects general understanding of the structural changes which have contributed to it. But expectations of stability are also a cause of stability—nothing succeeds like success.

### *Achieving Greater Stability*

While our postwar performance is a great advance over that of prewar years, it is still far from satisfactory. We have had no great depression, but we have had four recessions. Even the relatively short and mild recessions of the postwar period have been costly. In the last decade, the Nation has lost an estimated \$175 billion of GNP (in 1961 prices) by operating the economy below potential. Industrial production has been below its previous peak nearly half the time since 1946.

There is general agreement that economic fluctuations in the United States are intensified by—if not always caused by—a rhythm in inventory investment, alternating between periods in which stocks are accumulating at an excessively high rate and periods in which they are being liquidated. But it is not beyond hope that stabilization measures, both automatic and discretionary, can be strengthened in force and improved in timing so as to compensate for inventory swings better than has been true in the past. If this is done the swings themselves will be dampened.

The possible gains from improved economic stabilization are impressive. Losses of production, employment, and consumption will be cut. More saving and investment will be realized, contributing steadily to the long-run growth of production potential. Business, consumer, and labor decisions will allocate resources more efficiently when they respond less to cyclical prospects and more to long-run developments. There will be less need and less justification for restrictive practices which are now designed to provide sheltered positions in markets periodically hit by recession.

It is true that an economy operating steadily at a high level of employment, with only limited excess plant capacity, is more subject to the risks of price increases than an economy with heavy unemployment and large unused capacity. However, the dampening of economic fluctuations may itself help to counter this tendency. Cyclical fluctuations have been exerting a “ratchet effect” on prices; costs and prices have been relatively inflexible downward in recessions but have been responsive to increases in demand during recoveries. Cyclical swings in total spending also tend to be accompanied by sharp and transitory shifts in the composition of spending. Because prices and costs respond more readily to upswings than to downswings, these rapid changes in the composition of demand impart an upward bias to the whole price level. These sources of upward price bias will tend to be reduced as a more even pace of advance is achieved.

To capitalize on the potential gains of stabilization requires skillful use of all economic policy, particularly budgetary and monetary policy.

#### THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND ECONOMIC STABILITY

Federal expenditures and taxes affect total employment and production by influencing the total volume of spending for goods and services. Direct Federal purchases of goods and services are themselves part of total demand for national output. In addition, the Federal Government makes “transfer

payments” to individuals, for which no current services are rendered in return. Examples are social security and unemployment insurance benefits, and veterans compensation and pension benefits. Both purchases of goods and services and transfer payments add to private incomes and thereby stimulate consumption and investment. Federal taxes, on the other hand, reduce disposable personal and business incomes, and restrain private spending.

By increasing the flow of spending, additional Federal outlays—with tax rates unchanged—have expansionary effects on the economy. Whether an expansion in spending—government or private—leads mainly to more output or mainly to higher prices depends on the degree of slack in the economy. Under conditions of widespread unemployment and excess capacity, businessmen respond to higher demand by increasing production; under conditions of full employment, prices rise instead. In the slack economy of 1961, for example, additional demand from both private and public sources was readily converted into increased production.

Built into the Federal fiscal system are several automatic defenses against recession and inflation. Given the tax rates, tax revenues move up and down with economic activity, since most taxes are levied on private incomes or sales. Indeed, tax revenues change proportionally more than GNP. Furthermore, certain Federal expenditures, such as unemployment compensation payments, are automatically affected by the state of the economy. Economic fluctuations, therefore, result in substantial changes in Federal expenditures and revenues, even when basic expenditure programs and tax rates remain unchanged. With the present system of tax rates and unemployment compensation payments, a one-dollar reduction in GNP means a reduction in Federal tax receipts and an increase in transfer payments totaling about 30 cents. Therefore, private incomes after Federal taxes fall by only 70 cents for each reduction of one dollar in GNP. For this reason, any initial decline in spending and output is transmitted with diminished force to other sectors of the economy.

These automatic or built-in stabilizers moderate the severity of cyclical swings in the economy. If the forces causing a downturn in economic activity are weak and transient, the automatic stabilizers cushion the severity of the decline and give the basic recuperative powers in the private economy a better opportunity to produce a prompt and full recovery.

But if the forces causing the downturn are strong and persistent, the built-in stabilizers may not suffice to prevent a large and prolonged recession. Furthermore, they are blindly symmetrical in their effects. When economic activity quickens after a slump, the rise in Federal revenues begins immediately and slows the recovery in employment and incomes. For these reasons, the task of economic stabilization cannot be left entirely to built-in stabilizers. Discretionary budget policy, e.g., changes in tax rates or expenditure programs, is indispensable—sometimes to reinforce, sometimes to offset, the effects of the stabilizers.

To be effective, discretionary budget policy should be flexible. In order to promote economic stability, the Government should be able to change quickly tax rates or expenditure programs, and equally able to reverse its actions as circumstances change. Failure to arrest quickly a downturn in income, production, and employment may shake the faith of firms and households in prompt recovery and thereby lead to a cumulative decline. Delay in countering inflationary pressures may permit the development of a self-propelling speculative boom, with disruptive consequences to the domestic economy and the balance of payments. If moderate fiscal action can be taken quickly and can be speedily reversed when circumstances warrant, the dangers of overstimulating or overrestricting the economy are much smaller than if fiscal responses are sluggish and difficult to reverse.

Fiscal policy can be made a more flexible and more powerful tool of economic stabilization by means that do not change the basic structure and level of taxation or the long-run size and composition of Federal expenditure programs. Changes in the basic structure and level of taxation should be made by the Congress with full deliberation in the light of the many relevant considerations, including the long-run revenue needs of the Government, equity among individuals and groups, and the effects of various taxes on economic efficiency and growth. Similarly, changes in the magnitude and content of government expenditures should represent the considered judgment of the people and the Congress on national priorities. For purposes of economic stabilization all that is needed of tax policy is temporary variation in the general level of tax rates within the existing structure, and all that is required of government outlays is timing of certain expenditures so that they bolster employment and purchasing power when the economy needs stimulus and taper off as it approaches full employment. In both cases, the form of action required for purposes of stabilization and the procedure for taking timely action can be agreed upon in advance.

### *The President's Recommendations*

The President has recommended a three-part program for economic stabilization. Its enactment would be the most significant step forward in policy for economic stabilization since the Employment Act itself. These three measures parallel recommendations of the Commission on Money and Credit, a private group of leading citizens representing diverse economic interests and viewpoints.

*Stand-by capital improvements authority.* Under the first measure, the Congress would give the President stand-by authority to initiate at a time of rising unemployment up to \$2 billion of public investments. More specifically, the program of accelerated capital improvements could be initiated by the President within two months after the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate (a) had risen in at least three out of four months (or in four



out of six months) and (b) had risen to a level at least one percentage point higher than its level four months (or six months) earlier. Before invoking this authority, the President would be required to make a finding that current and prospective economic developments require such action to achieve the objectives of the Employment Act.

Under the program, the President would be authorized to commit up to (1) \$750 million for direct Federal expenditures, (2) \$750 million for grants-in-aid to State and local governments, (3) \$250 million in loans to such States and localities as would otherwise be unable to meet their share of project costs, and (4) a further \$250 million to be distributed among the above three categories as he might deem appropriate. Once initiated, the program could be terminated at any time by the President.

The program is designed to permit the timely initiation and execution of capital improvement projects which are desirable in their own right. To insure that the projects are appropriately timed, several important safeguards are incorporated in the proposal. An expanded capital improvements program initiated by the President under this authority would automatically be terminated within 12 months after initiation, unless extended by the Congress. Once a program had been terminated, a new program under this authorization could not be initiated by the President for 6 months. With respect to grant-in-aid expenditures, the President would be required to prescribe rules to assure that assisted projects were of high priority, were a net addition to existing State and local expenditures, and were of the type which could be started quickly and carried speedily to conclusion. Under existing legislation, Federal advances are provided to aid State and local governments to plan projects which would meet these specifications.

To insure that the projects are desirable on their own merits, the proposal would limit direct Federal expenditures to projects and programs previously authorized by the Congress. Appropriate projects would include resource conservation (e.g., reforestation, reseeding of range lands, timber stand improvement) and various Federal public works, including construction, repair, or modernization of Federal buildings. Examples of projects for which State and local governments could receive grants are hospitals, airports, schools, waste treatment facilities, street repairs and improvements, water and sewer systems, and deferred maintenance and improvement of public buildings.

The unemployment criteria for triggering the accelerated capital expenditures program are rigorous enough to prevent untimely or premature activation, but not so restrictive as to delay the effects of the program until late in the recovery period. The criteria for initiation of the program would have been met in the early stages of each of the four postwar recessions. Furthermore, no false signals would have been given. Even if the criteria were to give a false signal in the future—for example

if unemployment were to rise because of a major strike—the President simply need not invoke the authority.

Table 6 shows the dates at which the unemployment criteria would first have been met in each recession of the past decade, the date of the previous peak, the date of the low point of the recession, and the date at which the economy subsequently returned to full employment. In every case, Presidential authority could have been invoked within four months after the previous cyclical peak and well before the trough of the recession. The first impact of orders, contracts, and expenditures under the program would have been felt within one or two months after the authority was invoked.

TABLE 6.—*Hypothetical timing of proposed capital improvements program in four postwar business cycles*

Business cycle peak	Unemployment criteria met <sup>1</sup>	Business cycle trough	Subsequent achievement of full employment <sup>2</sup>
November 1948	March 1949	October 1949	October 1950
July 1953	November 1953	August 1954	July 1955
July 1957	November 1957	April 1958	(3)
May 1960	August 1960	February 1961	(3)

<sup>1</sup> Criteria are met in any month in which the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate (a) had risen in at least three out of four months (or in four out of six months) and (b) had risen to a level at least one percentage point higher than its level four months (or six months) earlier. Program could be initiated within two months after criteria are met.

<sup>2</sup> The date at which the economy returned to the neighborhood of a 4 percent unemployment rate.

<sup>3</sup> Full employment has not been achieved since the beginning of the 1957 recession.

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

The major impact of the program would occur when a stimulus is needed to arrest economic decline or support recovery. It would not be delayed until private demands are already pressing hard on the economy's capacity to produce. Table 6 indicates that a quick-starting, fast-moving capital expenditures program begun in the early stages of recession could have been terminated before the economy returned to full employment.

*Stand-by tax reduction authority.* The second recommendation is to establish a procedure for making quickly a temporary across-the-board reduction in the individual income tax rate. Such a reduction would be a speedy and powerful method of augmenting purchasing power throughout the Nation.

Specifically, the President would be given stand-by authority, subject to congressional veto, to reduce temporarily all individual income tax rates, in accordance with the following procedure:

- (1) Before proposing a temporary tax reduction, the President must make a finding that such action is required to meet the stabilization objectives of the Employment Act.
- (2) Upon such finding, the President would submit to Congress a proposed temporary uniform reduction in all individual income

tax rates. The proposed temporary rates may not be more than 5 percentage points lower than the rates permanently established by the Congress.

- (3) This change would take effect 30 days after submission, unless rejected by a joint resolution of the Congress.
- (4) It would remain in effect for 6 months unless revised or renewed by the same process or extended by a joint resolution of the Congress.
- (5) If the Congress were not in session, a Presidentially proposed tax adjustment would automatically take effect but would terminate 30 days after the Congress reconvened. Extension would require a new proposal to the Congress, which would be subject to congressional veto.

An across-the-board variation in the basic individual income tax rate can be a potent stabilization measure. At the current level of taxable income, a reduction of 1 percentage point in the tax schedule would add about \$2 billion, at annual rates, to disposable personal income, and a full 5 point reduction would increase disposable income by \$10 billion. Since nearly three-quarters of the individual income tax is collected through payroll deductions, the rate reduction would have an immediate effect upon incomes available to consumers. Payments of taxes on estimated declarations would also be reduced, raising still further the current flow of consumer incomes. Higher consumer incomes mean higher consumer spending. The resultant expansion in output and employment by the consumer goods industries and their suppliers would increase the incomes of those already employed and create jobs for many of the unemployed.

Policy to reverse recession or speed recovery often calls for a temporary boost in private purchasing power. Permanent reduction in tax rates could give the economy as strong, or stronger, a stimulus but at the possible sacrifice of tax revenues which would be most desirable after the economy returned to full employment. Private demands are weak in periods of recession and slack, but a large part of their weakness results from recession and slack themselves. Once full employment has been restored, with the help of the temporary tax reduction as well as other measures, private demands will be stronger simply because capacity operation is itself a powerful stimulus. At that time, the private economy no longer needs the fiscal stimulus which is appropriate to reverse a decline or support a recovery. In that case a return to permanent tax rates may be desirable in order to provide room in a non-inflationary full employment economy for defense outlays and other continuing government programs of high priority. Indeed, a Federal surplus, normally to be expected at full employment, will provide saving to finance private investments stimulated by capacity operations and prosperity profits. Under the proposal, a tax adjustment can be speedily invoked to

meet the temporary requirements of economic stabilization, without permanently sacrificing revenues needed at a later date.

*Improvement of the unemployment compensation system.* The third major recommendation is to strengthen the Federal-State unemployment compensation system. The proposed legislation will make the unemployment insurance system more effective in meeting its two objectives. Individual workers will be more secure against the risks of unemployment. The economy will be more secure against the risks of sharp declines in purchasing power.

As pointed out in Part I of this chapter, unemployment benefits are now generally smaller, relative to earnings, than the 50 percent envisaged when the system was first inaugurated a generation ago. Furthermore, it has been necessary during the last two recessions to enact temporary legislation to extend the period of unemployment compensation for the large numbers of workers who had exhausted their benefit rights. To insure that experienced workers who suffer long-term unemployment during periods of prosperity will receive the same benefits as during recessions, the Administration has proposed a permanent Federal program under which the period of unemployment compensation would be extended by as much as 13 weeks for workers who have had at least three years' experience in insured work. The proposal also provides, when unemployment is widespread, a Federal program extending the period of benefits for all insured workers, including those who do not qualify for the permanent program of extended benefits because they have had less than three years of experience in insured work. This extension could be put into effect upon proclamation by the President when insured unemployment has reached 5 percent and the number of benefit exhaustions in a three-month period has reached 1 percent of insured employment. In these periods, regular benefits are exhausted by large numbers of workers and particularly by workers who have only limited experience in insured employment.

To raise the percentage of wages compensated by unemployment insurance and to accomplish other needed reforms, the following recommendations are made: (1) an additional three million workers should be covered; (2) States should be required to meet higher standards with respect to the amount of weekly benefits; (3) States which have experienced heavy insured unemployment should receive reinsurance grants; (4) a State may not deny compensation to claimants undergoing approved training.

Since the unemployment compensation system is an insurance program designed to be self-financing, increased benefits must be matched by increased contributions. The proposal would increase the taxable wage base from \$3,000 a year to \$4,800 and make permanent the temporary increase adopted in 1961, which raised the net Federal unemployment tax from 0.4 percent to 0.8 percent.

These three recommendations together constitute a far-reaching innovation in discretionary fiscal policy. At the same time, they are moderate proposals, carefully defining and limiting the authority which they confer. They will go a long way toward providing the flexibility in fiscal policy which is essential if the Nation is to make prosperity the rule and not the exception in its economic life. In the past 7 years the Nation has undergone three recessions. In the 4½ years since 1957, full employment has not once been attained. While some fluctuations in business and consumer spending will always occur, nothing in our free enterprise economy condemns us to repeat this recent experience. Prudent innovations in the tools of fiscal policy, and careful use of both new and old tools, can greatly improve the stability of our economy in the years ahead.

#### BUDGET POLICY, 1958-63

The Federal budget has influenced economic activity in recent years in two ways: through the workings of the built-in stabilizers, and through discretionary changes in the budget program. It is not easy to separate these two influences. In order to do so, it is necessary, first, to view Federal fiscal transactions in the same accounting framework used to describe the whole economy. The *national income accounts budget* is a way of measuring and classifying Federal transactions which accords with the national income and product accounts for the economy. Second, it is convenient to have a numerical measure of the expansionary or restrictive impact of a budget program on the economy. The *full employment surplus* is such a measure. This section discusses these two somewhat unfamiliar but highly useful tools and then applies them in an analysis of recent and prospective budget policies.

##### *The National Income Accounts Budget*

The effects of Federal receipts and expenditures on the income stream are most accurately represented when the budget is viewed in the framework of the national income accounts. These accounts present a consistent record and classification of the major flows of output and income for the entire economy, including the transactions of the Federal Government. There are three major differences between the Federal budget as it is conventionally presented (the so-called "administrative budget") and the accounts of the Federal sector as they appear in the national income. The major differences between these two budgets, and between both of them and the consolidated cash budget, are schematically summarized in Table 7. There are other, less significant differences among the budgets, such as the treatment of intragovernmental transactions.

First, the national income accounts budget, like the consolidated cash budget, includes the transactions of the trust funds, which amount currently to about \$25 billion per year and have a significant impact on the economy. Highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation payments, and social security benefits are examples of trust fund transactions. Because

TABLE 7.—Major differences among three concepts of the Federal budget

Item	Budget concept		
	Administrative	Consolidated cash	National income accounts
Timing of receipts.....	Collections....	Collections....	Accruals.....
Treatment of net loans and other credit transactions....	Included.....	Included.....	Excluded.....
Treatment of trust fund transactions.....	Excluded.....	Included.....	Included.....

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

the traditional budget—or administrative budget—is primarily an instrument of management and control of those Federal activities which operate through regular congressional appropriations, it excludes the trust funds, which have their own legal sources of revenue.

Second, transactions between government and business are, so far as possible, recorded in the national income accounts budget when liabilities are incurred rather than when cash changes hands. This adjustment in timing affects both government purchases and taxes, shifting them to the point in time at which they are likely to have their principal impact on private spending decisions. The choice of an accrual, rather than a cash, basis for timing is particularly important for the highly volatile corporate income tax. Since these taxes are normally paid more than six months after the liabilities are incurred, payments of corporate income taxes, as recorded in the administrative budget, run substantially below accruals in a period of rising economic activity. For fiscal year 1962, this difference is estimated at about \$3 billion.

Finally, unlike the administrative budget, the national income accounts budget omits government transactions in financial assets and already existing assets. The largest omission is the volume of loans extended by the Federal Government. This volume is estimated at \$4 billion net of repayments in fiscal year 1962. While these loans have important effects on economic activity, they are properly viewed as an aspect, not of fiscal policy, but of monetary and credit policy, and are so discussed later in this chapter. Borrowers from the Federal Government, like borrowers from private financial institutions, acquire cash by incurring debts. They add thereby to their liquidity, but not directly to their incomes.

#### *The Full Employment Surplus*


As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the magnitude of the surplus or deficit in the budget depends both on the budget program and on the state of the economy. The budget program fixes both tax rates and expenditure programs. The revenues actually yielded by most taxes, and the actual expenditures under certain programs like unemployment compensation, vary automatically with economic activity. To interpret the economic significance of a given budget it is, therefore, essential to distinguish the

automatic changes in revenues and expenditures from the *discretionary* changes which occur when the Government varies tax rates or changes expenditure programs. The discussion that follows runs in terms of the national income accounts budget.

In Chart 6 this twofold aspect of fiscal policy is portrayed for the fiscal years 1960 and 1962. Since tax revenues and some expenditures depend on the level of economic activity, there is a whole range of possible surpluses and deficits associated with a given budget program. The particular surplus or deficit in fact realized will depend on the level of economic activity. On the horizontal scale, Chart 6 shows the ratio of actual GNP to the economy's potential, labeled the "utilization rate." On the vertical scale, the chart shows the Federal budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of potential GNP.

CHART 6

### Effect of Level of Economic Activity on Federal Surplus or Deficit



1/ACTUAL GNP AS PERCENT OF POTENTIAL GNP.  
SOURCE: COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

The line labeled "fiscal 1960 program" represents a calculation of the budget surplus or deficit which would have occurred at various levels of economic activity, given the Federal expenditure programs and the tax rates of that year. For the reasons explained earlier, the same budget program may yield a high surplus at full employment and a low surplus or a deficit at low levels of economic activity. The actual budget position in fiscal year 1960, a surplus of \$2.2 billion or 0.4 percent of potential GNP, is shown at point A; this accompanied a level of GNP 5 percent below potential. Had full employment been achieved that year, however, the same basic budget program would have yielded a surplus of about \$10 billion, or nearly 2 percent of gross national product (point F in the chart). The line labeled "1962 program" similarly shows the relationship between economic activity and the surplus or deficit, for the budget program of 1962; the expected deficit is shown at point B, and the full employment surplus at point G.

It is the height of the line in Chart 6 which reflects the basic budget program; the actual surplus or deficit depends both on the height of the program line and the level of economic activity. In other words, discretionary fiscal policy, by changing the level of Government expenditures or tax rates shifts the whole program line up or down. The automatic stabilizing effects of a given budget program are reflected in the chart by movements along a given line, accompanying changes in economic activity. One convenient method of comparing alternative budget programs, which separates automatic from discretionary changes in surplus and deficits, is to calculate the surplus or deficit of each alternative program at a fixed level of economic activity. As a convention, this calculation is made on the assumption of full employment. In Chart 6, the points F and G mark the full employment surplus in the budget programs of fiscal years 1960 and 1962, respectively. The statement, "the fiscal 1960 budget had a larger full employment surplus, as a fraction of potential GNP, than the 1962 budget" is a convenient shorthand summary of the fact that the 1962 budget line was below the 1960 line, yielding smaller surpluses or larger deficits at any comparable level of activity.

The full employment surplus rises through time if tax rates and expenditure programs remain unchanged. Because potential GNP grows, the volume of tax revenues yielded by a fully employed economy rises, when tax rates remain unchanged. Full employment revenues under existing tax laws are growing by about \$6 billion a year. With unchanged discretionary expenditures, a budget line drawn on Chart 6 would shift upward each year by about 1 percent of potential GNP.

The full employment surplus is a measure of the restrictive or expansionary impact of a budget program on over-all demand. Generally speaking, one budget program is more expansionary than another if it has a smaller full employment surplus. One budget program might have the smaller full employment surplus because it embodies greater Federal purchases of goods and services, in relation to potential GNP. By the same



token, it leaves a smaller share of full employment output for private purchase. This means that full employment is easier to maintain under the budget program with the smaller surplus, because less private demand is required. It also means that inflation is more difficult to avoid, because there are fewer goods and services to meet private demand should it prove strong. Alternatively, one budget program might have a smaller full employment surplus than a second because it involves either lower tax rates or larger transfer payment programs. In that event, private after-tax incomes are larger at full employment for the first budget program than for the second. As a result, private demand would be stronger under the first program.

If the full employment surplus is too large, relative to the strength of private demand, economic activity falls short of potential. Correspondingly, the budget surplus actually realized falls short of the full employment surplus; indeed, a deficit may occur. If the full employment surplus is too small, total demand exceeds the capacity of economy and causes inflation.

But whether a given full employment surplus is too large or too small depends on other government policies, as well as on economic circumstances affecting the general strength of private demand. If the full employment surplus is too large, more expansionary monetary and credit policies may strengthen private demand sufficiently to permit full employment to be realized. Changes in tax structure, stimulating demand while leaving the yield of the tax system unchanged, might have the same effect. Similarly, restrictive changes in other government policies can offset the expansionary influence of a low full employment surplus.

A mixture of policies involving (1) a budget program with a relatively high full employment surplus and (2) monetary ease and tax incentives stimulating enough private investment to maintain full employment, has favorable consequences for economic growth, discussed in Chapter 2.


### *The Budget in 1958-60*

The analysis of the budget program in terms of the full employment surplus points to a probable major cause of the incomplete and short-lived nature of the 1958-60 expansion. The most restrictive fiscal program of recent years was the program of 1960. Its full employment surplus exceeded any from 1956 to date. Estimates of the full employment surplus by half years are shown in Chart 7. The full employment surplus declined sharply as a result of higher expenditures during the 1957-58 recession until it reached an estimated \$3 billion in the second half of 1958. Thereafter, it rose gradually through most of 1959 but then increased sharply to about \$12½ billion in 1960. Thus, whereas the Federal budget contributed to stability during the contraction phase of the cycle and during the first year of the expansion, it was altered abruptly in the direction of restraint late in 1959 at a time when high employment had not yet been achieved.

CHART 7

## Federal Surplus or Deficit: Actual and Full Employment Estimate

(National Income Accounts Basis)



\* SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATES; DATA ARE FOR HALF-YEARS.

✓ ESTIMATED BEGINNING SECOND HALF 1961.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

### *Federal Fiscal Activity in 1961-62*

Immediately upon taking office, the new Administration moved vigorously to use the fiscal powers of the Federal Government to help bring about economic recovery. Federal procurement was accelerated by Presidential directive early in February, and tax refunds were also expedited. A listing of Administration stabilization policies during 1961 is provided in the Appendix to this chapter. Changes in transfer programs added about \$2 billion to the combined total of transfer payments for fiscal years 1961 and 1962. The Veterans Administration advanced the payment of \$150 million of veterans' life insurance dividends into the first quarter of calendar year 1961, and then made an extra dividend payment of \$218 million at midyear. The Congress promptly adopted a number of measures requested by the President. A Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act was adopted, providing for extension of exhausted benefits and giving the Administration time to develop a comprehensive program for permanent

improvement in unemployment compensation. Social security benefits were increased effective in August, and aid was extended to children dependent on unemployed persons. Transfer payments represent a major element of flexibility in Federal expenditures. While transfer programs—like any Federal outlays—ought to stand on their merits, the precise timing of worthwhile new programs properly depends on economic conditions. The objectives of economic stabilization in 1961 argued strongly for speeding the introduction of programs like improvements in social security, scheduled to be adopted later.

Other Federal outlays increased in 1961 to meet specific national needs. Federal grants to States and localities for urban renewal, area redevelopment, highways, and public assistance increased. Direct payments to farmers were increased as a result of participation in the feed grains program. The largest increases in expenditures came in the areas of defense and space exploration. These programs were expanded for reasons of national security, not for economic stabilization. However, stabilization objectives ruled against any increases in tax rates to finance these new expenditures.

During 1961, the estimated full employment surplus declined significantly, from an annual rate of \$12½ billion in the second half of 1960 to \$8½ billion in the second half of 1961. As shown in Chart 7, the actual surplus or deficit has been substantially different from its full employment counterpart. Since private incomes declined during late 1960 and into 1961, the actual budget position shifted from a surplus of \$1 billion in the second half of 1960 to a deficit of \$5 billion in the first half of 1961. Then as the economy began to recover, the deficit, in the national income accounts, shrank to \$2 billion in the second half of the year. The rising deficit in the early part of 1961 was due both to a shift downward in its budget program line (as discretionary budget outlays were increased) and to a movement to the left along the new line (as private incomes and Federal tax receipts declined).

The Federal national income accounts budget appropriately showed its largest deficit early in 1961, when the economy was near the trough of recession. Since then, the deficit has been steadily declining in spite of rising expenditures, and a surplus is expected in the first half of 1962. The administrative and cash deficits show a different time pattern, with deficits rising in the 1962 fiscal year, primarily because tax collections lag behind tax liabilities.

The fiscal actions taken during the past year reflect the Administration's philosophy that the budget is a positive instrument for economic stabilization. According to the original January 1961 budget estimates, expenditures on national income-and-product account were expected to reach a level of \$98 billion in fiscal year 1962. Present estimates, which incorporate all of the changes made by executive and legislative action, indicate that these expenditures will amount to more than \$106 billion. This increase in

expenditures is itself responsible for a rise in the gross national product that can be estimated conservatively at \$15 billion.

### *Budget Policy for Fiscal 1963*

The balanced administrative budget proposed for fiscal year 1963 projects an increase over the current fiscal year of nearly \$6 billion in Federal outlays on income-and-product account. Because of the \$2 billion a year increase in social insurance taxes effective January 1, 1963, the full employment surplus rises in the first half of 1963. But it remains considerably below the level of 1960 (Chart 7). Fiscal policy will be less restrictive than it was in the late stages of the last recovery. The budgetary program, yielding a surplus on income-and-product account of \$4.4 billion reflects the reasonable expectation that 4 percent unemployment will be reached by the end of the 1963 fiscal year. The feasibility of this objective and the outlook for the economy have been appraised in detail in Part I above. Obviously, the strength of private demand over the next 18 months cannot now be assessed with precision. Any plans covering the uncertain future are necessarily risky. A less expansionary budget with a larger full employment surplus would provide added assurance of price stability but only at the cost of increased dangers of an incomplete recovery. A more expansionary budget would, on the other hand, improve the outlook for maximum production and employment but increase the risks of rising prices.

The risks of an incomplete recovery, on the one hand, or of rising prices on the other, are fortunately reduced by the automatic stabilizing characteristics of the budget. If private demand proves excessively buoyant, the added revenues can be expected to enlarge the surplus in the budget, thereby moderating inflationary pressures. Conversely, any shortfall in private demand will likewise be partially countered by a shortfall in tax revenues. In addition, discretionary policy will remain flexible. First, monetary policy can be used flexibly. The Federal Reserve can attune its policies to the pattern of output, employment, and prices as it unfolds during the months ahead. Second, as the experience of 1961 demonstrated, the budget itself is a flexible tool which can be adjusted during the course of a fiscal year by varying the timing of outlays and by legislative action. Finally, the President's stabilization proposals described earlier in this chapter, would, if adopted, significantly strengthen the government's ability to act swiftly and energetically in meeting unforeseen economic developments.

### MONETARY AND CREDIT POLICIES AND ECONOMIC STABILITY

The second major instrument of the Government for economic stabilization is monetary and credit policy, interpreted in the broadest sense to encompass all governmental actions affecting the liquidity of the economy and the availability and cost of credit. Here the Federal Government has broad and inescapable responsibilities, stemming basically from the sovereign right of Congress "to coin money, regulate the value thereof. . . ." The

Government's influence is exercised in several ways—principally through Federal Reserve control of the total volume of bank reserves, but also through Treasury management of the public debt and through the administration of a variety of government lending and credit guarantee programs. These powers can significantly affect the flow of funds into business investment, capital expenditures of State and local governments, residential construction, and purchases of consumer durable goods. Monetary and credit policies can be flexible, responding at short notice to changes in economic circumstances and prospects.

In an important sense, the private economy of the United States contains automatic or "built-in" monetary stabilizers. Unless the Government acts to make compensating changes in the monetary base, expansion of general economic activity, accompanied by increased demands for liquid balances and for investment funds, will tend to tighten interest rates and restrict the availability of credit. Similarly, a recession of business activity will normally lead to lower rates, easier terms, and less stringent rationing by lenders. Like fiscal stabilizers, the monetary stabilizers are often useful built-in defenses against recessions or against inflationary excesses of demand. But these defenses may not be strong enough. Being automatic stabilizers, they can only moderate unfavorable developments; they cannot prevent or reverse them. And at other times, unless the monetary authorities offset their effects, they can operate counter to basic policy objectives, braking expansions short of full employment. Discretionary policy is essential, sometimes to reinforce, sometimes to mitigate or overcome, the monetary consequences of short-run fluctuations of economic activity. In addition, discretionary policy must provide the base for expanding liquidity and credit in line with the growing production potential of the economy. For these reasons, the Federal Reserve System is continuously making and executing discretionary monetary policy.

The proper degree of general "tightness" or "easiness" of monetary policy, and the techniques by which the various governmental authorities can appropriately seek to achieve it, depend on the state of the domestic economy, on the fiscal policies of the Government, and on the international economic position. When the economy is in recession or beset by high unemployment and excess capacity, monetary policy should clearly be expansionary. How expansionary it should be depends very much upon the extent of the stimulus that the government budget is, and will be, giving to over-all demand. When demand is threatening to outrun the economy's production potential, monetary policy should be restrictive. How restrictive it should be depends, again, upon how much of the job of containing inflation is assumed by fiscal policy. There is, in principle, a variety of mixtures of fiscal and monetary policies which can accomplish a given stabilization objective. Choice among them depends upon other objectives and constraints. The relation of this choice to economic growth was noted above; the stabilization of demand at full employment levels by a budget

surplus compensated by an expansionary monetary policy is favorable to growth. On the other hand, monetary policy may in some circumstances be constrained by the balance of payments. If low interest rates encourage foreign borrowing in the United States and a large outflow of funds seeking higher yields abroad, monetary policy may have to be more restrictive than domestic economic objectives alone would dictate. The first line of defense is to try to adapt the techniques of monetary control, so that policy can serve both masters at once. Even so, difficult decisions of balance between conflicting objectives may sometimes be unavoidable.

### *Monetary Policy and Debt Management*

At the beginning of 1960, monetary policy was restrictive and interest rates were generally at postwar peaks. Despite bullish expectations about the economy, interest rates soon began a slow decline that lasted seven or eight months, aided by a gradual reversal of Federal Reserve policy (Table 8) beginning in March and furthered by the recession starting in May.

However, the Federal Reserve's anti-recession policy, for the first time since the early 1930's, was constrained by a serious balance of payments situation. Through its choice of expansionary monetary techniques, the Federal Reserve sought to avoid adding to the already large outflow of short-term capital. The 3-month Treasury bill rate did not fall below 2 percent. Long-term interest rates declined from their peaks but remained considerably above their previous cyclical troughs (Chart 8). This was a matter of serious concern because of the importance of long-term interest rates for business capital investment, residential construction, and State and local governmental spending on public facilities. And neither the money supply nor long-term private financing responded as promptly as in previous periods of monetary ease.


The new Administration faced in January 1961 both economic recession and a crisis of confidence in the dollar that threatened to limit sharply the use of expansionary monetary policy for economic recovery and growth. The Administration's forthright attack on the balance of payments problem restored confidence in the dollar. The resulting reduction in the discount on the dollar in the forward markets for foreign exchange eliminated any significant advantage in sending short-term funds abroad and helped to make it possible for monetary policy to support domestic expansion.

The ability of monetary policy to support economic expansion at home without stimulating outflows of short-term funds was simultaneously enhanced by new Federal Reserve open market techniques and by Treasury debt management policies. In his Economic Message of February 2, the President had emphasized the importance of "increasing the flow of credit into the capital markets at declining long-term rates of interest to promote domestic recovery," while "checking declines in the short-term rates that directly affect the balance of payments." The Federal Reserve sold short-

CHART 8

# Interest Rates in Three Business Cycles

PERCENT PER ANNUM



NOTE: DATA ARE PLOTTED FROM CYCLICAL PEAK (P) TO 10 MONTHS AFTER CYCLICAL TROUGH (T).

SOURCES: MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, AND BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.

TABLE 8.—Principal Federal Reserve monetary actions, 1960–61

Date	Action
1960: March.....	Federal Reserve open market operations modified so as to exert moderately less restraint on bank reserve positions than in earlier months. Effect was to allow reduction in net borrowed reserves.
May.....	Open market operations modified to provide reserves for moderate expansion of bank credit and money supply.
June.....	Discount rates reduced from 4 percent to 3½ percent.
July.....	Margin requirements reduced from 90 percent to 70 percent.
August.....	Authorized member banks to count about \$500 million of vault cash as required reserves. Reduced reserve requirements against demand deposits at central reserve city banks from 18 percent to 17½ percent, effective September 1, releasing about \$125 million of reserves.
August–September.....	Discount rates reduced from 3½ percent to 3 percent. Open market operations modified to suggest a positive attitude toward increasing the availability of reserves.
October.....	Purchased short-term U.S. Government securities other than Treasury bills for first time since 1958 to minimize downward pressure on 3-month bill rate, thus keeping bill rate more competitive internationally.
November–December.....	Authorized member banks to count all vault cash in meeting reserve requirements, reduced reserve requirements against demand deposits at central reserve city banks from 17½ percent to 16½ percent, raised requirements for country banks from 11 percent to 12 percent. Net effect of actions was to release about \$1.3 billion of reserves.
1961: January–early February.....	Open market operations aimed at maintaining ease in member bank reserve positions, with seasonal increases in reserve funds about offset by gold outflow and other factors draining reserves.
February–December.....	On February 20, began providing reserves through purchases of longer-term U.S. Government securities, while selling short-term Government securities at times. <sup>1</sup> Expansion in money supply became more rapid later in the year, with monetary ease being maintained throughout the year.
December.....	Board of Governors announced increase in maximum rates payable on savings and other time deposits, effective January 1, 1962. The action was taken to promote competition for savings and to encourage retention of foreign funds by member banks and thus moderate pressures on this country's balance of payments.

<sup>1</sup> Treasury also purchased very long-term U.S. Government securities for Government investment accounts. In his Economic Message of February 2, President Kennedy had announced that the Federal Reserve and Treasury were developing techniques to help keep long-term rates down while holding short-term rates at internationally competitive levels.

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

term securities, while the Treasury further increased the outstanding supply through new cash offerings. On February 20, the Federal Reserve announced a new policy of providing bank reserves through purchases of U.S. Government securities of longer maturities, particularly in the 3- to 6-year range. Its purchases of U.S. Government securities of maturity of more than 1 year amounted to \$2.6 billion in 1961. The Treasury, in administering the investment portfolios of various government investment and trust accounts, made substantial purchases of securities of maturities of more than 10 years. Aided by these actions, long-term bond rates declined until May and rose only moderately thereafter in the face of an economic recovery that had begun in February.

Through substantial net purchases of U.S. Government securities, the Federal Reserve increased member bank reserves in 1961 by about \$1 billion. As a result banks steadily expanded their loans and investments; the



increase during the year was considerably more than in 1960 and about the same as in the peacetime record year, 1958. Persistently expecting an up-trend in market interest rates, banks maintained lending rates in the face of generally weak demands for short-term loans, and added \$6 billion to their holdings of U.S. Government securities. However, the expansion of bank holdings of Government securities made more funds available on the open market. And the high level of bank holdings of short-term government securities, combined with abundant free reserves, put pressure on banks to expand business loans and to lend directly in the capital markets. As monetary ease persisted and expectations of rising interest rates subsided, banks stepped up purchases of State and local securities and expanded mortgage lending. The 7 percent increase in total bank deposits and currency during 1961 fell just short of the peacetime record, although public preference for time deposits held the increase in the money supply (demand deposits and currency) to about 3 percent.

The liquidity of the economy was also increased by changes in the composition and level of the Federal debt held outside the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. Open market and debt management operations added substantially to the supply of U.S. Government securities maturing within 1 year. The volume of less liquid securities, maturing within 1 to 5 years, declined. The volume of outstanding securities greater than 5 years in maturity remained the same. The average maturity of that part of the debt held outside the Federal Reserve and U.S. Government investment accounts declined from 58 months to 56 months. The average maturity of the total marketable public debt changed little in 1961. Two advance refundings, designed to have a minimal impact on over-all liquidity, helped to offset shortening as a result of mere passage of time.

Federal Reserve and Treasury debt operations provided the basic liquidity necessary for economic expansion. Individuals, in addition to increasing their deposits in commercial banks, stepped up their accumulation of claims on such financial intermediaries as savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies, while cutting down their purchases of securities on the open market. This behavior was in part a response to the high level of interest and dividend rates paid by financial intermediaries relative to yields of high-grade open market securities. Liquid assets held by the public—defined to include the money supply, savings deposits and shares, U.S. Savings bonds, and short-term U.S. Government securities—grew by 7 percent in 1961, paralleling the rise in GNP. Financial intermediaries used the funds which flowed into them from the public to extend credit by acquiring mortgages, bonds, and other loans and securities. In this way, their operations both increased the liquidity of individuals and made more long-term credit available.

The total volume of mortgage, corporate, and State and local long-term financing rose sharply to what appears to be a new record (Table 9).

TABLE 9.—Funds raised in money and capital markets, by type of instrument, 1957-67

[Billions of dollars]

Type of instrument	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961 <sup>1</sup>
Total.....	36.6	46.2	61.2	39.5	50.1
Federal obligations <sup>2</sup> .....	1.1	9.0	11.3	-2.2	6.6
Short-term <sup>3</sup> .....	5.5	-1.2	5.5	-5.1	10.5
Long-term <sup>4</sup> .....	-4.4	10.2	5.8	2.9	-3.9
Private.....	35.6	37.3	49.9	41.6	43.5
Short-term.....	7.4	5.3	16.9	13.4	9.8
Business bank loans.....	2.3	1.3	7.5	3.2	2.0
Consumer credit.....	2.8	.3	6.4	3.9	1.1
Other.....	2.3	3.7	3.0	6.3	6.7
Long-term.....	28.2	32.0	33.0	28.1	33.7
State and local securities.....	4.6	5.7	4.9	3.6	5.3
Corporate securities.....	9.8	8.2	6.5	6.9	7.9
Other securities <sup>5</sup> .....	1.7	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.4
Mortgages.....	12.1	15.3	19.2	15.4	18.1

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes consumer-held savings bonds and notes issued to international organizations; includes non-guaranteed securities issued by Federal agencies.

<sup>3</sup> Direct marketable issues maturing in one year or less.

<sup>4</sup> Includes direct Treasury issues maturing after one year and all nonguaranteed securities.

<sup>5</sup> Investment company share issues and foreign security issues.

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

Corporations borrowed unusually heavily in long-term capital markets but added in the aggregate almost as much to their financial assets, of a generally liquid character, as to their financial liabilities. Monetary ease, in facilitating this financing, laid the financial groundwork for expanded corporate capital spending in the future.

Because of the expansion in liquidity and in the supply of credit through financial institutions, interest rates were relatively stable during 1961, in sharp contrast to the previous upswing (Chart 8). The rate of 3-month Treasury bills fluctuated within the narrow range of 2¼ and 2½ percent during most of the year, rising somewhat above this range toward the close. Most long-term rates declined through May and thereafter increased by only a small amount. Rates on home mortgages, which are more sticky than most other rates, continued to fall until midyear, and then remained fairly stable. Thus, 1961 has demonstrated that interest rates do not have to rise sharply in cyclical recoveries. Their movement is not governed by immutable natural law. It depends upon all economic circumstances and governmental policies affecting the supply of funds and the demand for them.

The behavior of interest rates during the year may also have signaled the ending of the upward trend in rates from the low levels at which they were pegged prior to the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951. While this trend was in part an adjustment to the profitability of investment in capital goods, it also reflected the spread of inflationary expectations. Recent stability in industrial and consumer prices may, however, diminish in-

flationary psychology, so that inflation premiums would gradually be shaken out of the interest rate structure.

The climate for equity financing was also favorable during 1961. Common stock prices rose by about 25 percent, anticipating in part a recovery of corporate profits, and the average dividend yield on stocks fell below 3 percent.

### *Federal Credit Programs*

The Administration sought to make credit readily available at liberal terms through programs of Federal lending and Federal insurance and guarantee of private lending. Important steps were taken to stimulate housing construction. Early in the year, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) reduced the maximum permissible rate on insured mortgages in two steps, from 5¾ to 5¼ percent. The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) supported these reductions by its secondary market operations in mortgages, raising both its purchase and selling prices repeatedly. Up to midyear, sales of mortgages by FNMA exceeded purchases, but after midyear its operations added to the supply of funds available for mortgages. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the regional Banks liberalized regulations and reduced interest rates on advances in order to stimulate mortgage lending by savings and loan associations.

For the longer run, the Housing Act of 1961 expanded or liberalized many existing credit programs and initiated new ones. A new FHA insurance program was set up for middle-income housing, with FNMA also prepared to purchase these mortgages under its special assistance programs. Maturities up to 35 years, in some cases up to 40 years, were authorized for FHA-insured mortgages and insurable loan-to-value ratios were increased. A new FHA program for insurance of long-term home improvement loans was instituted. FNMA made the new home improvement loans eligible for purchase under its secondary market operations, and, when used to finance rehabilitation of homes in urban renewal areas, the new loans are eligible for purchase by FNMA under its special assistance program. FNMA also was authorized to make short-term loans secured by federally underwritten mortgages. Funds were provided for loans for public facilities, college housing, farm housing, housing for the elderly, and FNMA special assistance. The capital grant authority for urban renewal was increased by \$2 billion.

Other Federal credit programs contributed to making credit more generally available at liberal terms in 1961. In particular, the Small Business Administration reduced the interest rate on loans made in areas of substantial unemployment and instituted a simplified program to expand bank participation in small business loans.

Federal credit programs will support economic expansion during the coming fiscal year. New commitments are expected to rise to record levels. Direct loans and mortgage purchases (including trust fund purchases) will

approach \$9 billion, \$3 billion more than anticipated collections on outstanding loans. New commitments to guarantee or insure private loans will for the first time reach \$20 billion.

### *Monetary Expansion and Recovery*

As the economy advances toward full employment, it will need more liquidity. Throughout the postwar period, and particularly in the three previous economic recoveries, the growth in liquidity has fallen considerably short of the growth in GNP. The economy had to work off the excess liquidity inherited from the war, interest rates were generally rising, and expectations of higher prices were spreading. These factors worked to reduce the liquidity requirements of the economy relative to GNP. And the growth in nonmonetary liquid assets diminished even more the needed growth in the money supply (bank deposits and currency). Business firms, government units, and individuals learned, to their advantage, how to minimize holdings of cash.

For each 1 percent rise in GNP in the three past economic recoveries, commercial bank deposits and currency increased by only about one-third of 1 percent, while liquid assets, more broadly measured, increased by about two-fifths to three-fifths of 1 percent. If these relationships should hold in the current economic recovery, and if gross national product rises to full employment levels by the middle of 1963—an increase of more than 20 percent from the trough in the first quarter of 1961—commercial bank deposits and currency would grow over the same period by 7–8 percent and liquid assets by 11–12 percent.

In the current recovery, however, the factors that served to limit liquidity requirements in the earlier recoveries may well be less important. In particular, interest rates may appropriately be more stable, for reasons already explained. Thus, these estimates of needed liquidity are probably conservative. The appropriate expansion of liquidity will depend upon the strength of private demands, on the tightness of fiscal policy, and on the balance of payments position.

### IMPROVING THE MOBILITY OF RESOURCES

Maximum employment and production depend not only on the success of stabilization policy in maintaining demand at appropriate levels but also on the mobility of labor and other productive resources in response to changes in demand and cost. If frictional and structural unemployment can be diminished, demand can be pressed further before encountering bottlenecks and price increases. Thus, measures to improve the mobility of resources enable stabilization policy to aim at, and to attain, higher levels of employment and production. Such measures are a basic part of the Administration's economic program.

## *Labor Market Policies*

Changes in technology and tastes are constantly altering the pattern of demand for labor in our economy. New industries appear and expand while old ones decline; job opportunities multiply in one region and disappear in another; new skills are required as old ones become obsolete. The more rapidly an economy grows and changes, the greater the flux in its labor markets.

A high level of over-all demand is a prerequisite for the efficient allocation of labor resources in a dynamic economy. It furnishes the most important single incentive for economically desirable labor mobility—the magnetic attraction of available job openings. However, a high level of demand will not by itself ensure the best possible degree of occupational, industrial, and geographic labor mobility, for it will not eliminate some important impediments to the desirable response of labor to job opportunities. Certain features of seniority, pension, and other benefit rights may serve to hold labor in industries and areas experiencing declining demand. Lack of knowledge of job openings and lack of the skills required to fill them constitute important barriers to labor mobility, and the high cost of moving is an insurmountable obstacle to the migration of many low-income families to areas of expanding employment. It is in the best interest of the economy, as well as of the individuals involved, that these impediments be reduced and that every wage earner be in a position to select the most favorable alternative from the widest possible range of employment opportunities.

*Employment exchange.* Letting employers know about available workers and telling workers about available jobs are difficult administrative and technical problems in a labor market as complex as ours. Yet doing this well can significantly reduce the number and size of labor shortages and help eliminate pockets of unemployment and underemployment.

A major effort has begun to improve the United States Employment Service so that it can do a better job in matching job vacancies with people. The staff has been substantially expanded, particularly in the metropolitan areas where most workers and jobs are concentrated. This staff will need, most importantly, to emphasize improvement in the quality of its counseling and placement work. The flow of information about jobs should be made nationwide through more extensive exchanges of job information among the State agencies. Also, since the performance of the important labor exchange function should not suffer from the tremendous administrative problems of administering unemployment compensation, these two activities should be separated where the volume of work permits.

As the United States Employment Service succeeds in improving its services, more people will use it. The larger the number of employers and workers using the Employment Service, the more complete will be the knowledge of the labor market available to each of them. A greatly

strengthened United States Employment Service will facilitate an expanded rate of economic growth and contribute to the effectiveness of such specific government programs as Area Redevelopment, Rural Redevelopment, and the proposed programs for Trade Assistance and Manpower Development and Training.

*Training.* The economic need for facilitating labor mobility through education and training programs is evidenced by the simultaneous existence of very low unemployment rates in various skilled, technical and professional occupations and relatively high unemployment among the less skilled groups. Programs for education and training should be directed particularly toward new entrants into the labor force and the training of adults for positions of increased productivity and income. Racial discrimination in training, as well as in hiring, must be eliminated. It is wrong—that is reason enough—and it is also an enormous waste of human talent.

The Administration is proposing a program to provide useful employment and training for young people through three pilot programs financed in whole or in part by the Federal Government. These programs provide for on-the-job training, public service employment and training, and employment, training, and educational opportunities through service in a Youth Conservation Corps. Special training programs for young people are contemplated; such programs are urgently needed in urban slum areas. Some of these programs for the training of youth should help, directly and indirectly, to stimulate and guide the flow of migration from the farm; in April 1960, 43.8 percent of the entire farm population and 59.0 percent of the nonwhite farm population were under age 20.

Lack of education certainly does not imply lack of aptitude, and widened educational opportunities enable individuals to improve their employment opportunities as well as the quality of their lives. The Administration's program for aid to States and educational institutions in extending and improving adult literacy programs is an important step toward reducing structural unemployment.

The Administration's key proposal for manpower development and training provides for the establishment of programs for selection, placement, and on-the-job training, and for improvement of State training facilities. Although intended primarily for the unemployed and underemployed, these programs would also be open to other qualified persons desiring to improve their skills or to acquire new skills.

Compensation for workers participating in a training program is essential. At present, many individuals are confronted with the hard choice between compensation without training and training without compensation; the necessity for this choice should be eliminated. Unemployed workers in most States are still disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits if they participate in education and training programs.

Moreover, workers receiving benefits are required to be continuously available for job placement. Compensation for training would make it financially possible for an unemployed individual to complete a full course of training or retraining. Under the proposed program, allowances would be provided for certain trainees not receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Thus a large part of the cost of trainee compensation under the program would be offset by reductions in unemployment compensation payments and various other public assistance expenditures.

A major feature of the proposal is the provision for government studies on a national and local basis to determine the future requirements of the economy for various occupations and skills, to anticipate prospective manpower shortages, and to assure that workers are trained for occupations where opportunities will exist.

### *Resource Use in Agriculture*

The agricultural population has long been a major source of manpower for U.S. industry. Many more children are born and raised on farms than will be needed to produce the Nation's food and fiber. They must be educated, trained, and guided to nonagricultural employment. Many adults now earn substandard incomes in farming. They are not in a technical sense structurally unemployed, but their distress is nevertheless a symptom of structural maladjustment. Programs of the kind just discussed—to facilitate labor mobility and training—can and should help many of these individuals to find new employment.

During the first two decades of this century, there was serious question whether agriculture could, with the closing of the land frontier, continue to meet the food and fiber demands of a growing national economy. The rate of growth in farm output was declining, and food and fiber prices were rising relative to other wholesale prices. The resulting public concern led to (1) increased emphasis on conservation and resource investment and (2) increased allocation of public funds for research and education designed to speed progress in agricultural technology.

By the mid-1920's, agricultural productivity was rising and farm employment declining. The full implications of rapid technological progress in agriculture were, however, obscured by the depression and by the Second World War and the Korean conflict. During the depression, the catastrophic decline in demand for farm products was the compelling problem, and policy was directed to protecting farm prices and incomes from its consequences. During the war and the Korean conflict, government programs were designed to encourage increases in output and to protect farmers from the effects of price reductions when emergency demands disappeared.

During the 1950's, the full effects of the programs set in motion early in the century began to be felt. The demand for farm output rose only slightly

faster than the population. Rapid gains in productivity put farm prices and incomes under increasing downward pressure. Farm programs designed for depression and war were continued, in order to hold at least part of the social gains from increasing agricultural productivity within the agricultural sector. Farmers also responded by leaving agriculture at the most rapid rate in history. Use of labor declined by almost one-third while output increased by more than one-fourth between 1950 and 1961.

By 1960, it was clear that agriculture's relationship to the general economy had undergone a fundamental change in several respects. Agriculture can, without question, meet any foreseeable demands for food and fiber placed upon it. In 1910, it required 13.6 million farm workers to feed a Nation of 92.4 million people. By 1960, the population had increased to 180.7 million and farm employment had fallen to 7.1 million. The effects of fluctuations in national economic activity on the demand for farm output have been damped by built-in floors under consumer spending and by continuation of the emergency farm programs. Nevertheless, the stability and growth of the national economy are still of great importance to the farm population. Failure to maintain full employment limits the ability of industry to absorb farm workers displaced by advancing technology. During periods of peak economic activity, migration has been above 5 percent of the farm population. During recessions in the last decade, the migration rate out of agriculture has fallen considerably. Thus the problem of agricultural labor mobility is very largely a question of the availability of nonagricultural job opportunities. If job opportunities are available, the general manpower policies discussed above can facilitate the necessary migration and ease the human problems of adjustment.

Caught between the pressures of a slowly rising demand for farm products, rising productivity in agriculture, and limitations on nonfarm employment opportunities, total farm income and farm income per capita or per farm family have lagged behind incomes in the rest of the economy. The commodity programs have protected farm incomes from even greater declines, but at considerable budgetary expense and at some cost in delaying adjustment of patterns of resource use in agriculture. In 1961, farm incomes were increased and a significant start was made toward reduction of costs of surplus accumulation, storage, and disposal.

Objectives of agricultural policy as it develops in the future should encompass both (1) continuation of agriculture's historic role as a major contributor to national economic growth and (2) equitable distribution of gains in agricultural productivity between farmers and consumers. Achievement of these two objectives will require continued rapid transfers of labor from the farm to the nonfarm sector and reduction in resources devoted to the production, storage, and disposition of surplus production.



## Appendix

### PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND GROWTH

When the new Administration took office on January 20, 1961, it moved with speed and vigor to deal with the recession that had begun in May 1960. At his press conference of February 1, the President announced a series of administrative actions. He followed this with a comprehensive "Program to Restore Momentum to the American Economy," delivered before the Congress on February 2. Legislative requests, some of them directed toward the immediate situation, others toward future recovery and growth, were laid before the Congress in this speech and in a series of messages during the year.

The following is a list of the actions taken during 1961 to foster economic recovery and growth. Included also are measures (other than defense and foreign aid) which, though primarily directed to other purposes, contributed significantly to growth.

#### A. EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

##### 1. *Accelerated Procurement and Construction*

The President directed Federal agencies to accelerate procurement and construction planned for the rest of fiscal year 1961 under existing funds.

##### 2. *Post Office Construction*

It was announced that post office construction, originally scheduled for implementation over 18 months, would be compressed into 10 months (March to the end of the calendar year). Although changes were made in this directive before the end of the calendar year, there was a substantial acceleration during the first half of 1961 in the provision of new offices. Projects for post offices were concentrated in areas of high unemployment.

##### 3. *Federal-Aid Highways, School and Other Construction*

On February 2, the President made available \$718 million of Federal-aid highway funds scheduled for release in the fourth quarter of fiscal 1961. Quarterly apportionments for the first and second quarters of fiscal 1962 were also released ahead of schedule, in May and August. On February 16, the President urged State Governors to speed the spending of \$1.1 billion in Federal aid for highways, schools, hospitals, and waste treatment facilities.

##### 4. *Accelerated Tax Refunds*

Taxpayers who were eligible for refunds were requested to file returns early to speed refund payments. In the first three months of 1961, individual income tax refunds totaled about \$2.1 billion, 31 percent more than in 1960.

### 5. *Veterans Life Insurance Dividends*

On February 1, the President announced that he had directed the Veterans Administration to advance the payment of veterans life insurance dividends. The total payable, \$258 million, over the entire calendar year was made available in the first quarter. In addition, a special dividend payment of \$218 million was made in late June and in July.

### 6. *Price Supports and Farm Storage Payments*

Price supports were raised on corn, cotton, butterfat and milk, soybeans, and most other price-supported commodities for the 1961 crop year.

On February 8, the President directed the Department of Agriculture to speed payments to farmers for storage of crops under price support loans. The payments, advanced to early March, amounted to about \$25 million.

### 7. *Food Distribution*

In his first executive order, the President, on January 21, directed the Secretary of Agriculture to expand the free food distribution program for needy families in areas of chronic unemployment. On January 24, the Secretary of Agriculture announced that, through additional purchases of protein foods, the Government would increase the variety of surplus foods being distributed. As a result of these actions, the annual rate of distribution was raised from about \$60 million to more than \$200 million.

### 8. *Food Stamp Program*

On February 2, the President announced the establishment of six area projects for operation of a pilot "food stamp" distribution program. This was subsequently expanded to eight areas.

### 9. *Farm Loans*

On February 8, the Department of Agriculture announced that, pursuant to a White House directive, it was making available an additional \$50 million for housing loans to low-income farmers. On February 13, the Department announced that the Farmers Home Administration would release an additional \$35 million for operating loans for farmers. Lending activity of the Farmers Home Administration for rural area development was accelerated.

### 10. *Rural Electrification Administration*

During the year, the Rural Electrification Administration intensified its activity in the field of rural area development.

### 11. *Monetary Policy and Debt Management*

As the President announced in his February 2 message, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department worked "to further the complementary effectiveness of debt management and monetary policy." During the year, their policies were directed toward fostering domestic economic recovery by providing the base for needed bank credit and

monetary expansion and by encouraging the flow of savings and credit into long-term investment channels. The Federal Reserve provided bank reserves through purchases of securities of more than 1 year. The Treasury Department has been buying long-term U.S. Government securities for the trust fund accounts. At the same time, both monetary and debt management policies countered downward pressure on short-term rates, with a view to checking the outflow of funds from this country to money markets abroad.

## 12. *Housing Actions*

On February 1, the President announced a speeding up of the initiation of projects already approved (including the commitment of available college housing funds ahead of schedule).

On February 2, the maximum permissible interest rate on insured home loans of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was reduced from  $5\frac{3}{4}$  percent to  $5\frac{1}{2}$  percent, and on May 29 to  $5\frac{1}{4}$  percent.

The Community Facilities Administration reduced rates on new loans and broadened the program to include certain communities and projects previously excluded.

Purchase and sales prices for federally underwritten mortgages under Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) secondary market operations were raised in a series of steps. After the middle of 1961, purchases of mortgages by FNMA under secondary market operations exceeded sales.

The Federal Home Loan Bank Board liberalized terms under which Federal savings and loan associations can make mortgage loans; broadened the powers of insured associations to engage in participation loans; allowed member associations to borrow an amount up to  $17\frac{1}{2}$  percent of withdrawable accounts from Federal Home Loan Banks, in contrast to the former  $12\frac{1}{2}$  percent (this action was taken in two steps); caused Federal Home Loan Banks to reduce interest rates on advances to members; and instituted a new program of intermediate advances by Federal Home Loan Banks.

On February 2, the Urban Renewal Administration requested local public agencies to accelerate urban renewal activities.

On July 17, FHA eliminated the continuing service charge formerly permitted for home mortgages of \$9,000 or less.

## 13. *Small Business Administration Loans*

On April 5, the Small Business Administration (SBA) announced a decrease from  $5\frac{1}{2}$  percent to 4 percent in the interest rate on loans to small businesses in areas of substantial unemployment, and a liberalization of size standards. The Agency also reduced from  $5-5\frac{1}{2}$  percent to 4 percent the interest rate on loans to State and local development companies in such areas. In August, it instituted a simplified bank loan participation plan

designed to achieve expanded commercial bank participation in small business loans.

#### 14. *Government Procurement in Areas of Substantial Unemployment*

On February 2, the President announced that he was directing the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Labor, and the General Services Administration to take steps to improve the mechanism for channeling Federal contracts to firms both in areas of substantial unemployment and in areas of substantial and persistent unemployment. Accordingly, the Federal Procurement Regulations have been amended (1) to provide procedures for the setting aside of appropriate procurements for award to firms which will perform a substantial proportion of the contracts in areas of substantial unemployment and areas of substantial and persistent unemployment, (2) to assure that concerns in such areas are afforded an equitable opportunity to compete for subcontracts under government prime contracts, and (3) to clarify and strengthen the preference for firms in such areas in procurements where equal low bids are received. Similar instructions have been issued in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation.

#### 15. *United States Employment Service (USES)*

On February 2, the President directed the Secretary of Labor to expand and improve services to jobless applicants registered with the USES. Placement services, especially in metropolitan areas, have been realigned to meet the needs of workers and employers in all occupations. The Bureau of Employment Security and affiliated State agencies have increased program emphasis on job development for the unemployed, and testing, counseling, and placement activities for young people out of school and out of work.

#### 16. *Manpower Retraining*

In anticipation of passage of the proposed manpower development and training act, the Secretary of Labor on November 27 requested all States to develop plans for immediate implementation of the law. In addition, the Department of Labor and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare have coordinated plans for effectively carrying out their responsibilities under the act.

#### 17. *Export-Import Bank*

The Export-Import Bank announced two new programs which make available export credit guarantees, insurance and financing for semifinished and consumer durable goods, and export credit insurance for consumer goods. The first of these makes available export credit insurance, covering both political and credit risks on short-term and medium-term credit sales, which will be issued through a private association of insurance companies. The second program consists of guarantees issued to financial institutions and Bank participation with financial institutions which finance exporters' medium-term credit sales on a nonrecourse basis. Both programs are de-

signed to enable the exporter to apply for assistance directly to his local commercial bank or insurance broker.

## B. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTIONS

### 1. *Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation*

The President requested the Congress to increase temporarily the period during which unemployment insurance benefits might be paid. The Congress enacted this proposal. The legislation establishes, on a self-supporting basis, a temporary program of extended unemployment compensation to persons who have exhausted their benefits under State and Federal laws. It provides for agreements with States to pay temporary extended unemployment benefits, for any worker who exhausts his State benefits between June 30, 1960 and March 31, 1962, equal to 50 percent of the amount received in State unemployment benefits or 13 times his weekly benefit amount. The increases in benefits are being financed by an increase of 0.4 percent in the unemployment tax rate for the calendar years 1962 and 1963.

In addition, the Congress authorized a temporary self-supporting program of extended railroad unemployment insurance to workers who have exhausted normal benefits under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.

### 2. *Unemployment Compensation*

The President, on June 13, proposed major changes in the Federal-State unemployment compensation system. The Administration bill, introduced in the First Session of the 87th Congress, would extend the scope of the system by increasing coverage to include over three million more workers; increase benefits so that a great majority of eligible claimants would receive a weekly benefit equal to at least one-half of their average weekly wage; establish a permanent Federal program of additional compensation for unemployed workers who have exhausted their regular benefits; and improve the financing of the program by increasing the wage base on which the unemployment tax is based from \$3,000 to \$4,800.

In addition, the measure includes equalization grants to States with high unemployment costs, and a provision precluding denial of unemployment compensation to claimants who are attending approved training or retraining courses.

The Congress took no action on the Administration bill in 1961.

### 3. *Aid to Dependent Children*

The Congress was requested to extend the program of aid to dependent children by providing benefits to children who are needy because of the unemployment of their parents. A bill was passed by the Congress and signed by the President on May 8. It is estimated that expenditures of about \$100 million in fiscal 1962 are being made under this program.

#### 4. *Social Security Liberalization*

The President proposed legislation to improve the old age, survivors, and disability insurance and public assistance programs. Such legislation was passed by the Congress and approved by the President on June 30 to provide, among other things, increased minimum social security benefits, an earlier retirement age for men, and increased benefits for widows. To meet the increased benefit costs the Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes were increased, effective January 1, 1962, by one-eighth of 1 percent each on employers and employees.

#### 5. *Manpower Retraining*

The President proposed a manpower development and training program, providing for counseling, training, relocation assistance, and vocational education. The Administration's bill provides for retraining unemployed persons who cannot reasonably be expected to secure full-time employment without retraining and for upgrading the skills of other members of the work force. It also provides for continuing review and assessment of the Nation's manpower requirements, for appropriate methods of testing, counseling, and selecting workers for training, for determining the skills in which they should be trained, for referral of workers for training, for placement services after completion of training, and for financial assistance during the training period for those unemployed workers who cannot undertake a training program without it.

The Senate approved a manpower retraining bill, and a bill was reported out by the House Education and Labor Committee. The House Rules Committee postponed giving a rule for debate on the bill until 1962.

#### 6. *Youth Employment Opportunities*

The President recommended the enactment of a Youth Employment Opportunities bill. The proposal includes on-the-job training programs conducted in cooperation with both private and public groups, public service employment programs established in cooperation with State and local public and nonprofit agencies, and a Youth Conservation Corps which would perform conservation and related work pursuant to agreements with State and Federal conservation agencies.

Both Senate and House Committees reported out bills on the subject in 1961, but no further action was taken.

#### 7. *Minimum Wage*

The President signed the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments on May 5, extending coverage to approximately 3.6 million additional workers and increasing the minimum wage to \$1.25 an hour over a period of time. The amendments represent the first Congressional action on extension of coverage since the Act was passed in 1938.

#### 8. *Area Redevelopment*

The Administration proposal to aid areas with substantial and persistent unemployment was enacted and signed by the President on May 1. The

Area Redevelopment Act provides loans to commercial and industrial enterprises, loans and grants for community facilities and urban renewal, all designed to increase employment opportunities in these areas. In addition, the Act provides for the training and retraining of unemployed and underemployed residents of these areas and for the payment of retraining subsistence benefits while in training.

In 1961, 359 redevelopment areas and 9 Indian Reservations prepared and submitted plans for their over-all economic development. Of these, plans covering 247 redevelopment areas and 9 Indian Reservations had been given provisional approval by the end of the year. Eleven projects involving industrial loans, grants and loans for public facilities, and technical assistance contracts were approved. Sixty-six more were under active consideration at the end of the year.

Occupational training programs for unemployed and underemployed persons were initiated in October 1961, under the provisions of the Area Redevelopment Act. As of January 5, 1962, training projects in 17 redevelopment areas located in 7 different States had been approved. These projects provided for the training of 3,500 workers in 45 courses of instruction. Fifty training proposals from as many areas are under active consideration, and an additional 50 are in various stages of preparation in local communities.

#### 9. *Housing*

A Presidential message sent to the Congress on March 9 included the following proposals: a 4-year commitment of \$2.5 billion for urban renewal; long-term, low-interest loans for nonprofit limited dividend rental and cooperative housing for moderate income families financed by special assistance from FNMA; expanded public housing and housing for the elderly; authority for FHA to insure long-term home improvement loans; additional aid for urban planning, community facilities, and housing research; an extension of the FHA insurance program for middle-income families to permit in certain cases a 40-year maximum mortgage period, to remove the downpayment requirement, and to make other changes to ease housing credit.

The Housing Act of 1961, incorporating the substance of these proposals, was approved on June 30.

The veterans home loan program was extended by legislation approved on July 6.

#### 10. *Feed Grains Program*

The President signed an emergency feed grains bill on March 22. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to make payments to growers on 1961 crops to reduce acreage and output, and to increase support prices for feed grains. Advance payments were begun shortly after the bill was signed.

### 11. *Agriculture*

The President sent to the Congress an omnibus farm bill on March 16. A bill signed into law on August 8 extended and liberalized lending programs of the Farmers Home Administration, extended the emergency feed grains program to 1962 crops, authorized a program of payments to producers for reducing wheat acreage in 1962, extended the special milk program and the National Wool Act for 4 years, extended the program for the sale of surplus commodities for foreign currency for 3 years, and authorized marketing orders for additional commodities.

### 12. *Federal-Aid Highways*

The President, in a message sent to the Congress on February 28, recommended increased taxes and a schedule of authorizations which would permit completion of the Interstate System in 1972 and an expansion of other Federal-aid highway programs. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1961, approved on June 29, provides increased authorization and revenues required to permit completion of the Interstate System by 1972, while maintaining the pay-as-you-build principle.

### 13. *Natural Resources*

A Presidential message sent to the Congress on February 23 included a program calling for increased aid for waste treatment facilities and air pollution, expansion of the saline water program, accelerated forest planting, access roads to public forests, purchase of shoreline areas for park sites, and a 10-year program of grants to the States for planning comprehensive water development projects. On July 20, the President signed a bill almost doubling grants for water pollution control and strengthening federal authority to seek abatement of pollution. On September 22, an extension of the saline water program for 6 years was approved, with an authorization of \$75 million. To carry out the President's forestry program, appropriations for the Forest Service were substantially increased with particular emphasis on the expanded reforestation program, acceleration of recreational facility development, and strengthening protection against forest fires. Authorization for the Cape Cod National Seashore was signed into law on August 7. In the Housing Act of 1961, approved on June 30, partial grants to localities in an aggregate amount of \$50 million were authorized for the acquisition of land for permanent open space in or near urban areas.

### 14. *Airport Aid*

Administration bills authorizing construction grants of \$75 million a year for 5 years were introduced in both the Senate and the House. A bill signed on September 20 authorized the extension of Federal construction grants to airports for 3 years. A 2-year grant of \$150 million was included in the final money bill approved on September 27.



## 15. *Aid to Education*

The President sent a special message on education to the Congress on February 20. It included recommendations concerning elementary and secondary schools and higher education.

Elementary and secondary schools: The President recommended that the Congress authorize a 3-year program for school construction and teachers' salaries. The total cost would be \$2.3 billion. The Senate passed a school aid program, but the House Rules Committee tabled the proposal.

Higher education: Legislation was proposed to provide more than \$3 billion in assistance to higher education. The proposals included the extension and expansion of the low-interest loan program for college housing facilities; authorization of a new 5-year program under which \$300 million would be loaned each year for the construction of academic facilities; authorization of a program of 4-year undergraduate scholarships; expanded student loans and fellowships through the National Defense Education Act.

The Administration supported legislation to provide matching grants for establishment of educational television stations and for State surveys of the need for such stations. The Senate passed a bill to authorize aid for establishment of such stations and the House reported a bill out of Committee which was substantially the same as the program submitted.

As part of the Housing Bill signed on June 30, the college housing fund was increased from \$1.7 billion to \$2.9 billion in four steps by July 1, 1964.

The National Defense Education Act was extended for two years on October 5, continuing the previous \$90 million annual authorization for student loans.

## 16. *Health Programs*

A Presidential message sent to the Congress on February 9 included the following proposals:

(1) Increased grants for the construction of nursing homes; grants to States for community health programs, and project grants to develop new methods of out-of-hospital care; increased project grants for research into uses of medical facilities, including grants for the construction of experimental and demonstration facilities;

(2) A 10-year program of matching grants for the construction, expansion, and restoration of medical and dental schools with an authorization of \$75 million a year and an anticipated first-year appropriation of \$25 million;

(3) Authorization of Federal grants to schools for scholarships for medical and dental students;

(4) Increased appropriations for existing maternal and child welfare programs;

(5) Increased vocational rehabilitation grants;

(6) An extended and expanded program of matching grants for the construction of research facilities and increased appropriations for the

medical research and training programs of the National Institutes of Health.

The community health services and facilities bill, approved on September 20, increased from \$30 million to \$50 million the annual authorization for grants to States for public health services (with particular attention to community health service programs); authorized an additional \$10 million a year for project grants to develop new methods of out-of-hospital care; raised from \$10 million to \$20 million the annual authorization for grants to build public or nonprofit nursing homes; and increased from \$1.2 million to \$10 million the authorization for research into uses of medical facilities (including construction of experimental facilities).

#### 17. *Medical Care for the Aged*

The President recommended a health insurance program for those of age 65 or over who are eligible for Social Security benefits. The insurance would be financed by an increase in Social Security payroll taxes. Hospital and home health service benefits would begin October 1, 1962. Nursing home service benefits would begin July 1, 1963. Action by the Congress was postponed.

#### 18. *Tax Recommendations*

Among his tax recommendations, the President asked for the enactment of an investment tax credit as an incentive for the modernization and expansion of private plant and equipment. He also recommended withholding taxes on interest and dividends and a series of measures to eliminate defects and inequities. This tax program would involve no net loss in revenue. On August 23, the House Ways and Means Committee announced that it was postponing further action until 1962.

#### 19. *Special Insurance Dividend for Korean Conflict Veterans*

On September 13, the President approved a measure authorizing a one-time special dividend on the otherwise nonparticipating insurance issued to veterans of the Korean conflict. The dividend declaration amounted to \$56 million of which approximately \$30 million was disbursed to eligible policyholders by the end of calendar year 1961.

#### 20. *Small Business Administration (SBA)*

Legislative action during 1961 liberalized the Small Business Investment Program and expanded and strengthened the activities of the Small Business Administration. Additional private capital was attracted into small business investment corporations by amendment of the Small Business Investment Act, which increased the maximum amount of Government participation in a single corporation from the previous limit of \$150,000 to \$400,000. The ability of the SBA to lend to State and local

development corporations was also increased. Amendment of the Small Business Act provided for the development of a program to assure small business participation in subcontracts relating to government procurement, and broadened the authority for research and counseling services for small business.

## Chapter 2

# Economic Growth

**F**ASTER ECONOMIC GROWTH in the United States requires, above all, an expansion of demand, to take up existing slack and to match future increases in capacity. Unless demand is adequate to buy potential output, accelerating the growth of potential is neither an urgent problem nor a promising possibility. Full utilization will itself contribute to growth of capacity. Saving and investment to increase capacity and improve productivity flourish in prosperity and wane when the economy is slack. Reduction of economic fluctuations lessens the risks associated with innovation and investment and diminishes the resistance to technological change. A full employment economy can achieve more rapid growth than an economy alternating between boom and recession; for that reason, effective stabilization policy is the first step toward a policy for economic growth. But stabilization policy is not enough. A sustained improvement in the growth rate requires also a concerted effort, private and public, to speed the increase of potential output. Chapter 1 has analyzed the current problem of underutilization. In this chapter the emphasis is on the growth of potential output.

The growth of the U.S. economy results primarily from decisions taken by individuals, families, and firms. However, all levels of government—Federal, State and local—have a role in the promotion of economic growth. It is no part of that role to force on unwilling households and business firms any particular rate of growth in their own individual activities. But if, as a Nation, we desire a higher rate of growth, there are two consequences for government policy. First, in those areas of economic activity traditionally allotted to some level of government, public expenditures must provide services which contribute to the growth of potential output and which satisfy the needs that accompany increasing income and wealth. Second, public policy—notably in the fields of taxation, education, training, welfare, and the control of money and credit—inevitably stimulates or retards the growth potential of the private economy, even if no such result is consciously intended. Accelerated economic growth requires coordinated policy at all levels of government to facilitate the increase of productivity and the expansion of capacity. No change is implied in the historic division of responsibility between public bodies and private citizens.

## GROWTH: PROBLEM OR OPPORTUNITY

The sources of growth of potential output often present themselves as "problems." A rapidly expanding labor force provides new workers to man factories and perform services, and opens new opportunities for investment to equip them. But it accentuates simultaneously the "problem" of assuring useful jobs at satisfactory wages for an ever-growing number of job seekers. Rapid technological progress increases productivity, releasing labor and other resources for new uses. But it creates simultaneously the "problem" of displaced workers, declining industries, and depressed areas. The problems and the opportunities are opposite sides of the same coin. A commitment to accelerated growth is at the same time a commitment to solve even more such problems. The challenge is to find solutions which do not limit the economy's capacity to grow.

This is what is meant by saying that there are "growing pains" associated with economic progress. They are not new. Nor are they insoluble if the expansion of demand creates new opportunities for labor and capital as old ones disappear. An adequate level of demand, though not itself the solution to structural problems, is a necessary precondition to the solution.

The most pressing of the social problems resulting from rapid industrial progress is the creation of islands of obsolete capacity and unwanted skills. It is inequitable to inflict the costs of progress on an arbitrarily selected few, when the benefits are widely shared. It is more than inequitable—it is self-defeating—to invite resistance to progress, pools of idleness, low productivity, and poverty. The need for specific policies to restore the earning power of displaced workers and the vitality of depressed regions has already been emphasized in connection with the objectives of the Employment Act itself. That need is intensified with the acceptance of accelerated economic growth as a goal of national policy.

Faster economic growth incurs costs and imposes responsibilities. It must—if it is worth undertaking—confer even larger benefits. Potential output has been growing, on the average, at 2.9 percent annually since the turn of the century and at about 4 percent since the end of the second World War, though since 1954 the rate has slowed to 3.5 percent. Yet there are sound reasons for wanting even faster growth in the future—(1) unsatisfied needs at home and (2) threats to freedom abroad.

(1) Per capita disposable personal income, measured in 1961 dollars, has been increasing since 1947 at about 2 percent a year; it surpassed \$2,000 a year in the last quarter of 1961. Nevertheless, about 30 percent of all families and unrelated persons have less than \$1,000 of money income per person, and are now below the level that the average American achieved a quarter-century ago.

A high rate of economic growth today will enable increasing millions to enjoy better lives tomorrow. Only a limited imagination can fail to see opportunities for providing more fully both such basic needs as food,

clothing and shelter and the amenities of civilized life—education, medical care, travel and recreation.

In many, though not all, contexts growth in per capita production will reduce the number of persons with low incomes. Poverty in the United States is disproportionately concentrated among the aged, the nonwhite, the poorly educated, marginal farmers, and families without a male breadwinner. The disadvantaged fare better in a buoyantly growing economy. But for some, the remedy lies in welfare or insurance payments coupled with substantially improved services and retraining to restore them to self-sufficiency. In the longer run, the provision of good education and adequate health services for the children of these families is essential to break the degrading cycle of dependency.

Other unfilled needs lie in the field of public or mixed public and private expenditures. The renewal of cities, the reconstruction of transportation facilities, the improvement of education at all levels, the provision of new facilities for the arts, the expansion of medical care facilities, the conservation and expansion of our national parks and forests, all these things need more resources than we now devote to them. Economic growth will help create those resources.

(2) The leadership of the free world imposes heavy economic burdens on the United States. The primary responsibility for maintaining the military security of the free world falls on us. Although we hope that world tensions will slacken, we must be prepared if they do not. If the threat rises in intensity, we must increase our defense capabilities to meet that threat. The future needs of defense are uncertain but imperative; the larger and more efficient our economy, the more readily will we be able to shoulder larger military burdens, if we must.

Our responsibility is no less in the global battle against poverty, ignorance, and disease. The less developed nations need our capital and technique. They also need a further demonstration of the ability of a free economy to grow, to prosper, and to use its enhanced resources wisely.

The foreign trade policy of the United States should be formulated with regard for the obvious fact that a more satisfactory rate of economic growth can be achieved here and abroad if producers are stimulated to efficiency by active participation in international trade. A liberal trade policy works to this end by providing increased market opportunities abroad for U.S. products while promoting the efficient utilization of resources through the invigorating effects of foreign competition, whether encountered in our home markets or in the markets of other countries.

#### GOALS FOR THE CURRENT DECADE

Goals, if they are to be useful, should be neither too easy nor too difficult. To set a goal that would have been achieved anyway serves no useful purpose. To set a goal that is obviously impossible of achievement invites a

loss of confidence and perhaps failure to achieve what is possible. A good target is one that can be met, but not without effort.

This general limitation sets only a range of growth targets for the United States in the 1960's. It is no easy matter to say exactly how fast an economy can grow, or to obtain consensus on how fast it should grow. Some of the benefits of growth have already been discussed. The costs of growth are the diversion of resources from the satisfaction of current needs to those uses which will yield increased output in the future, and the strain on our institutions and social fabric which this diversion might entail. Ultimately, a democratic society achieves one rate of growth rather than another through the freely made economic and political decisions of its citizens. The task of economic analysis is to show what the choices are, what alternative choices will cost, and what benefits they may yield.

The basic determinants of a society's productive capacity in any year are as follows:

(1) The number of people available for employment, the number of hours they wish to work, their incentives and motivations, and their health, general education, occupational desires, and vocational skills;

(2) The stock of new and old plant and equipment, and its composition by age, type, and location;

(3) The terms on which the economy has access to natural resources, whether through domestic production or imports;

(4) The level of technology, covering the range from managerial and organizational competence to scientific, engineering, and mechanical understanding;

(5) The efficiency with which resources, domestic and foreign, are allocated to different economic ends, and the extent of monopolistic or other barriers to the movement of labor and capital from low-productivity to high-productivity uses.

These basic determinants interact in complex ways. For example, advanced machinery is of little use without skilled labor to operate it; advanced technology often requires capital equipment to embody it.


Next year's productive capacity will exceed this year's to the extent that the basic determinants can be expanded and improved. Success in achieving a higher rate of growth in the future depends on our willingness to spend current resources to expand our production potential and by our skill and luck in spending them effectively.

The record of economic growth in the United States does not suggest that the average growth rate realized in the past is an immutable natural constant, leaving no scope for growth-stimulating policies. The rate of growth of output has varied from one span of years to another, depending on specific economic circumstances (Chart 9). There was one prolonged period of stagnation—the decade of the 1930's—when potential output grew at less than the average long-term rate, and realized output grew more slowly still. Again, there have been periods when poten-


CHART 9

# Output, Employment, and Productivity


BILLIONS OF DOLLARS (Ratio scale)



MILLIONS OF PERSONS (Ratio scale)



DOLLARS (Ratio scale)



<sup>1/</sup>CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT PLUS ARMED FORCES.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.



tial output expanded more rapidly than the past average. The postwar years have been such a period of accelerated growth. Even including the years since 1954, during which growth was sluggish, real gross national product (GNP) in this postwar period has increased at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent. Had potential output been realized in 1960, as it was in 1947, the realized growth rate would have been 4.0 percent a year.

Table 10 shows, for the 1947-60 period, the increases in realized and potential GNP, population, labor force, employment, man-hours, GNP per person, and productivity. Approximately four-fifths of the annual increase in potential GNP during the period is explained by increases in output per man-hour and one-fifth by increases in total man-hours worked. The increase in output per man-hour is, of course, the resultant of improvements in the quality of the labor force, the quantity and quality of capital, the level of technology, and still other factors.

TABLE 10.—*Output, population, labor input, and productivity, 1947-60*

Item	Unit	1947	1954	1960 <sup>1</sup>	Percentage change per year		
					1947 to 1954	1954 to 1960	1947 to 1960
<i>Output:</i>							
Gross national product.....	Billions of dollars, 1961 prices.....	324.9	422.0	511.1	3.8	3.2	3.5
Potential gross national product <sup>2</sup> .....	.....do.....	324.9	440.5	541.8	4.4	3.5	4.0
<i>Population</i> .....	Millions of persons.....	144.1	162.4	180.7	1.7	1.8	1.8
<i>Labor input:</i>							
Labor force <sup>3</sup> .....	Millions of persons.....	61.8	67.8	73.1	1.3	1.3	1.3
Employment <sup>3</sup> .....	.....do.....	59.4	64.2	69.2	1.1	1.3	1.2
Potential employment <sup>4</sup> .....	.....do.....	59.4	65.1	70.2	1.3	1.3	1.3
Man-hours.....	Billions of man-hours.....	129.6	132.9	139.7	.4	.8	.6
Potential man-hours <sup>5</sup> .....	.....do.....	129.6	135.4	143.1	.6	.9	.8
<i>GNP per capita</i> .....	Dollars, 1961 prices.....	2,255	2,599	2,828	2.0	1.4	1.8
<i>Productivity:</i>							
GNP per worker.....	Dollars, 1961 prices.....	5,470	6,573	7,386	2.7	2.0	2.3
Potential GNP per worker.....	.....do.....	5,470	6,768	7,718	3.1	2.2	2.7
GNP per man-hour.....	.....do.....	2.51	3.18	3.66	3.4	2.4	2.9
Potential GNP per man-hour.....	.....do.....	2.51	3.25	3.79	3.8	2.6	3.2

<sup>1</sup> Data include Alaska and Hawaii.

<sup>2</sup> Same as actual in 1947; in 1954 and 1960, calculated from 3.5 percent trend line through mid-1955.

<sup>3</sup> Includes armed forces.

<sup>4</sup> Assumes 4 percent unemployment rate for all periods, with no adjustment for cyclical movement of the labor force.

<sup>5</sup> Same as actual in 1947; in 1954 and 1960, assumes 4 percent unemployment rate and corrects for decline in hours induced by recession.

Sources: Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, and Council of Economic Advisers.

But consideration of the years 1947-60 as a unit masks significant differences within the period. There was a substantial slowing down in the growth of potential output between the first and the second part of this period. From 1947 to 1954, potential GNP grew at a rate of 4.4 percent a year, and from 1954 to 1960 at a rate of 3.5 percent. Since the labor

force grew at a rate of 1.3 percent a year in both periods and average hours worked fell somewhat more slowly after 1954 than before, the slower rate of growth that has taken place since 1954 is explained by a decline in the rate of increase of productivity. This decline resulted in part from a more slowly rising trend of productivity within nonmanufacturing industry, and in part from a shift—usual in slack periods—from manufacturing to nonmanufacturing in the composition of economic activity.

Further evidence that modern industrial economies are not helpless prisoners of past long-term trends is to be found in Table 11, which shows that the major countries of Western Europe, and Japan as well, have recently exceeded their own long-term performances.

TABLE 11.—*Growth of gross national product per man-year, selected countries, 1913-59*

[Percent per year]

Country	1913-59	1950-59
Japan .....	2.6	6.1
Italy .....	1.7	4.7
Germany .....	1.4	4.5
France .....	1.5	3.6
Netherlands .....	1.3	3.4
Norway .....	1.9	3.1
Sweden .....	1.7	2.8
United States .....	1.8	2.2
Canada .....	1.5	2.0
Denmark .....	1.2	1.8
United Kingdom .....	.8	1.7

NOTE.—Gross national product at constant prices was used wherever available. See *National Institute Economic Review*, No. 16, July 1961, pp. 36 and 46-47, for data and description of sources of materials used.

Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research.

On June 28, President Kennedy stated that a growth rate of 4.5 percent yearly is “well within our capability.” On November 17, the United States joined with the other 19 member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in setting as a target the attainment of a 50 percent (4.1 percent a year) increase in their combined national product during the decade from 1960 to 1970. The ability of the United States to meet, and even to exceed, this target is the best guarantee of success for the OECD. A high rate of growth of potential output will not be reached immediately. The policies to achieve it, even if adopted now, will not bear fruit at once, and it will not be achieved without effort. But in the second half of the decade, with the help of a rapidly growing labor force, it should be possible to exceed a growth rate of 4.5 percent annually and to achieve an average rate of growth of potential output of 4.3 percent between 1960 and 1970.

If this growth is achieved and if, in addition, 1970 is a year of 4 percent unemployment, actual GNP will grow at an average annual rate of 4.9 percent (Table 12). The difference between this figure and 4.3 percent reflects the current shortfall of actual output from potential output. Such a rate of growth of total GNP would mean an annual increase of GNP per person in the population of 3.2 percent, nearly double the rate achieved during

TABLE 12.—Output, population, labor input, and productivity, 1960 actual and 1970 illustrative

Item	Unit	1960 <sup>1</sup>	1970 illustrative <sup>2</sup>	Percentage change per year 1960-70
<i>Output:</i>				
Gross national product.....	Billions of dollars, 1961 prices.....	511.1	825	4.9
Potential gross national product.....	do.....	541.8	825	4.3
<i>Population</i> .....	Millions of persons.....	180.7	213.8	1.7
<i>Labor input:</i>				
Labor force <sup>3</sup> .....	do.....	73.1	87.1	1.8
Employment <sup>3</sup> .....	do.....	69.2	83.7	1.9
Potential employment.....	do.....	70.2	83.7	1.8
Man-hours.....	Billions of man-hours.....	139.7	162	1.5
Potential man-hours.....	do.....	143.1	162	1.2
<i>GNP per capita</i> .....	Dollars, 1961 prices.....	2,828	3,858	3.2
<i>Productivity:</i>				
GNP per worker.....	do.....	7,386	9,868	2.9
Potential GNP per worker.....	do.....	7,718	9,868	2.5
GNP per man-hour.....	do.....	3.66	5.09	3.4
Potential GNP per man-hour.....	do.....	3.79	5.09	3.0

<sup>1</sup> Potential series for 1960 based on the following assumptions: *GNP*, calculated from 3.5 percent trend line through mid-1955; *employment*, 4 percent unemployment rate; *man-hours*, 4 percent unemployment rate and correction for decline in hours induced by recession.

<sup>2</sup> Illustrative figures for 1970 based on the following assumptions: *Potential GNP growth* rate of 4.3 percent per year from 1960 to 1970, with actual and potential being the same in 1970; *population*, 1955-57 fertility levels continue to 1980; *labor force*, participation rate of 57.8 percent of noninstitutional population 14 years of age and over; *employment*, 4 percent unemployment rate; *man-hours*, continuation of previous trend.

<sup>3</sup> Includes armed forces.

NOTE.—Data includes Alaska and Hawaii.

Sources: Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, and Council of Economic Advisers.

the 1947-60 period. It is this figure which most nearly measures the gain to society from accelerated economic growth. If, by 1970, we succeed in achieving an unemployment rate below 4 percent, even further increases in output will become possible. To a first approximation, each 1 point decline in the 1970 unemployment rate would add about \$8 billion to 1970 GNP and about 0.1 to the annual rate of growth.

Table 12 is in no sense a prediction of what will actually occur. It shows what would be required to move up to and beyond a 4.5 percent growth rate, giving us a rate of growth of potential for the full decade averaging 4.3 percent a year. Demographic factors lay the foundation for a significant acceleration of potential output. If labor force projections are realized and if past trends in hours worked per man year continue, available labor input will increase during the 1960's at more than one and one-half times its rate of growth during the 1947-60 period. With this increase in labor input, it is a matter of arithmetic that a 3 percent yearly increase in man-hour productivity would be needed if the annual rate of growth of potential GNP is to average 4.3 percent over the decade.

The required growth of output per man-hour was surpassed in the 1947-54 period, but since 1954 performance has fallen below what is required. The vigorous growth of the early postwar period benefited from the possi-

bility of renewing a capital stock which had aged during the depression and war years of low investment. Making good this backlog of investment demand brought with it the quick realization of latent technological progress. Simple continuation of recent trends will not be sufficient to repeat that performance. The rest of this chapter suggests the kind of effort in education, technological development, capital formation, and other areas that may be required to do so. In particular, unless technical progress brings an unexpected increase in the productivity of capital, a major rise in capital investment will be needed.

The population upsurge which began in the 1940's, together with the expected decline in death rates, will give us a rapid increase in the population of working age. Adult women are expected to enter the labor force in increasing proportions; but because a larger fraction of our youth will remain in school and because the trend toward earlier retirement among male workers is likely to continue, over-all labor force participation rates are expected to remain steady. The resultant of these factors should be a labor force in 1970 of a little more than 87 million, an annual rate of increase of 1.8 percent in this decade, compared with the distinctly lower rate of 1.3 percent from 1947 to 1960. If 4 percent of the labor force is unemployed in 1970, total employment will come to 83.7 million. A reduction in the unemployment rate to 3 percent would add over 800,000 to employment.

The calculations of Table 12 assume that the average number of hours worked a year will continue to decline at the same rate as in the past. This reduction in the intensity of work has been going on for a long time. It will continue, both because our citizens choose to enjoy some part of their increased productivity in the form of longer vacations and perhaps a shorter workweek, and because much of the increase in the labor force will consist of part-time workers by preference, notably young people still in school and women with family responsibilities. Full employment will, however, eliminate one possible cause of a decline in average hours; when unemployment rates are high, as they are at present, pressure builds up for a reduction in the workweek. This pressure, motivated by a desire to share the limited volume of employment, is to be sharply distinguished from the desire for increased leisure reflected in the long-run decline in average annual hours. The second of these is to be honored; the first should be met by expanded employment opportunities. Variations in the number of hours worked, like variations in participation rates, also respond to economic forces in other ways. The lure of job opportunities in a growing and prospering economy may attract even more than the expected number of people into the labor force, and may induce some to abandon part-time for full-time work. On the other hand, it is also possible that full employment at the rising wage and salary levels permitted by rising productivity will lead some secondary wage earners to withdraw from the labor force, and others to retire at an earlier age.

The beneficial effects of labor force growth do not occur automatically. Productivity is preserved and increased primarily through acts of investment: investment in the improvement of human resources, in the creation of new technical and managerial knowledge, in the development of natural resources, and in the formation of physical capital. In the case of investment in human capital and in research and development, the link between expenditure and yield is difficult to measure, but there can be little doubt that the return is substantial. In regard to investment in plant and equipment and the development of natural resources, there is more statistical evidence available. No one of these investments can make its full contribution to the objective of accelerated growth without the others. Each of them is necessary; there is good reason to believe that together they can be sufficient, if vigorously pursued.

### INVESTMENT IN HUMAN RESOURCES

Increased production is not an end in itself but only a means of providing increased real income for all to share. As indicated earlier, this is one of the reasons that more rapid growth is a desirable social goal. High levels of education and health, equality of opportunity—these are among the valid measures of a society's performance. They are desirable in their own right. In addition, they have an economic dimension. They are among the foundations of growth as well as among its benefits.

Americans have long spoken of foregoing consumption today in order to invest in their children's education and thus in a better tomorrow. For an economy, just as for an individual, the use of the word *invest* in this connection is clearly justified, since it is precisely the sacrifice of consumption in the present to make possible a more abundant future that constitutes the common characteristic of all forms of investment. That devoting resources to education and health is, in part, an act of investment in human capital explains why programs in the area of education and health are economic growth programs. This kind of investment has a long and remarkable history. Rough estimates, which take into account differences in the length of the school year and in school attendance, suggest that the stock of equivalent school years in the labor force rose more than sixfold between 1900 and 1957. The annual rate of growth of the stock of education was more than 3 percent, or about twice the rate of growth of the labor force itself.

Failure to pursue vigorous educational and health policies and programs leads to smaller increases in output in the long run; it is also associated with higher expenditures in the short run. If we fail to invest sufficiently in medical research, we lose not only what stricken individuals might have produced had they been well, but also the use of the resources and funds currently devoted to their care. Failure to invest sufficiently in education means that we will lose the additional output that would be possible with a better educated labor force; it may also mean the perpetuation of social

problems necessitating public expenditures. Recognition of the costs of inadequate investment in social welfare is one of the reasons for the Administration's concern to strengthen family services in the public welfare field.

It is a waste of resources to restrict health and education to those who can afford them. Moreover, in addition to each person's interest in his own health and education, there is a public interest in everybody's health and education. The well-being of each citizen contributes to the well-being of others. As a result, we have organized programs to help the population to obtain a quality education, to require attendance in schools, to help ourselves and others to obtain needed medical care, to require that certain medical precautions, such as vaccinations, be taken by everyone.

### *Education*

Estimates made by private scholars suggest that about one-half of the growth in output in the United States in the last 50 years has resulted from factors other than increases in physical capital and man-hours worked. Education is one of the "other factors." Even without allowance for the impact of education on invention and innovation, its contribution appears to account for between one-fourth and one-half of that part of the increase of output between 1929 and 1956 not accounted for by the increased inputs of capital and labor. Education is of vital importance in preparing the skilled labor force demanded by new investment and new technology.

Education's contribution to output is reflected by the well-documented fact that income—a measure of each individual's contribution to production—tends to rise with educational attainment. Of course, not all differences in money income are the result of education. Differences in native ability as well as parental economic and social status are also reflected. Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of the increase in income at increasing levels of education may be attributed to that education.

In 1930, \$3.2 billion (3.3 percent of GNP in current prices) was spent for all schools at all levels of education. In 1960, expenditures had risen to about \$24.6 billion (5.0 percent of GNP). In turn, in 1930, 29.0 percent of the population 17 years old graduated from high school. By 1958 this was true for 64.8 percent. Similarly, in higher education the number of earned degrees conferred rose from 140,000 in 1930 to 490,000 in 1960.

Though significant progress has been made, substantial opportunities and needs for investment in education still exist. There is a pressing need to improve curricula and teaching methods, make education more readily available to students of merit by reduction of financial barriers, expand facilities and staff to meet rising enrollments, improve the quality and productivity of our teaching staffs and increase their salaries, and narrow the gap in opportunities available to students in different parts of our country. These problems must be met—and met quickly—at all levels of government and at all levels of education if our standards of education are to keep abreast of our needs.

The program of the Administration includes specific proposals designed to meet urgent needs in the field of education: increased funds for scholarships; assistance to institutions of higher education for the construction of facilities; aid to the States for assistance to public elementary and secondary schools; and a program to improve the quality of elementary and secondary education through curriculum research, demonstration projects, teacher training institutes, and special project grants.

Work of this last kind has been begun, with the support of the National Science Foundation, in supplementary training of teachers of science and mathematics, especially in high schools, and in the development of new courses in physics, mathematics, chemistry, and biology. Similar support has been given by the U.S. Office of Education for improvement in courses in English and modern foreign languages; it should be extended to the other major academic fields.

*Student opportunities.* Of each 1,000 pupils who entered the fifth grade in 1952, 900 entered high school in 1956, 600 graduated from high school in 1960, and 300 entered college in the fall of 1960. Thus 40 percent of the original 1,000 students did not graduate from high school and half of those graduating from high school did not enter college. Many of these withdrawals are by children of better than average intelligence. It is generally agreed that improvement of teaching and expansion of guidance and counseling services will help to reduce the drop-out rate. Efforts to eliminate this waste of human resources have already begun, but more are needed.

Financial barriers to secondary education come chiefly from a pressing need for immediate income for the family. At the college level, the financial problem arises both from the direct costs of attending college and the income foregone. The Office of Education estimates that in the 1961-62 school year the average direct costs of attending public colleges are about \$1,700 a year, and of attending private colleges, \$2,300. These costs have risen rapidly in recent years, and they are expected to continue to rise. They are significant obstacles for large parts of our population. The Administration proposal for assistance to higher education would authorize 4-year scholarship aid for 212,500 capable students in need of financial assistance.

*Personnel and facilities.* Enrollments in elementary and secondary schools rose from 28.2 million pupils in 1950 to 42.5 million in 1960. Enrollment in 1970 is expected to be 53.0 million. In 1950, 2.3 million students were enrolled in institutions of higher education, and by 1960 the figure had risen to 3.6 million. The projected 1970 enrollment is 7.0 million. Rising enrollments have necessitated substantial expansion of personnel and facilities. Further expansion is required if quality is not to deteriorate.

Our educational system thus confronts unprecedented challenges. To accommodate doubled enrollments by 1970, outlays for college facilities must be more than doubled; total expenditures must rise two-to-threefold.

Needs at the below-college level, about the same in dollar terms, must also be met, lest the foundations of the educational system be eroded. The price of failure will be the irrevocable loss of valuable talent.

However urgent the need for additional facilities and for the rehabilitation and replacement of existing facilities, the personnel problem is especially acute, because of the time required to train teachers. Among beginning teachers in public elementary and secondary schools in 1956–57, 27 percent lacked a standard certificate, a bachelor's degree, or both. Demand for new teachers and for replacement of those leaving the profession will be very high. It can be met only by the training of new teachers, accompanied by programs to increase the productivity and quality of experienced teachers. Teachers' salaries at all levels must continue their recent rise if good teachers are to be attracted into and retained in the profession of educating the Nation's youth. Other programs for expansion of the educational system cannot succeed unless the rewards to teaching are increased.

*State differences.* In a highly mobile and interdependent society, the lack of educational opportunities is not simply a matter of concern to some States; it is of concern to the Nation. The support that the different States (and different areas within States) give to education varies substantially. Such support depends not only on the commitment that the population has to education, but also on the resources of the State and the number of children seeking a public education. As a consequence, some States with low per student expenditures for education have educational budgets that, as a percentage of personal income, are far above the national average. Increased Federal support for education, as outlined in the President's proposals, is essential to eliminate these imbalances as well as provide for programs to meet the national responsibilities that transcend State and local boundaries. Ultimately, the effectiveness of our democracy rests on an educated and informed citizenry.

### *Health*

U.S. economic growth in the twentieth century has been associated with better health of the population as a whole as well as an increase in per capita expenditures on health and medical care. Public and private expenditures on health care increased from \$3.6 billion, or 3.5 percent of GNP, in 1929 to \$26.5 billion, or 5.4 percent of GNP, in 1960. This has been accompanied by a sharp increase in life expectancy and a reduction in death rates from communicable diseases.

At the same time that economic growth has contributed to an improvement in the health of our people, better health has contributed to economic growth. Better health makes possible an increase in the size of the labor force and in the effectiveness of effort on the job.

Further improvements in health would yield significant economic, as well as human, benefits. On an average day in 1960, 1.3 million employed persons—2 percent of civilian employment—were absent from work be-



cause of illness or accident. The days of work lost because of illness far exceeded the days of work lost because of industrial disputes; in fiscal year 1960, "currently employed" persons lost a total of 371 million days from work as a result of illness or injury, while the loss from industrial disputes in 1960 totaled 19 million days.

The costs of ill health have traditionally been calculated as the money spent for the prevention and treatment of accident and disease. The waste of human resources and the consequent loss of production is an important additional cost about which not enough is known. Where facts are available, as in the related area of vocational rehabilitation, the relationship between costs and benefits is impressive. In 1960, at an average cost of \$900 per rehabilitant under Federal-State programs, median wages of rehabilitated persons were raised from \$450 a year at acceptance to \$2,350 at closure, a difference of \$1,900 in the first year after rehabilitation.

Public support for medical research, the most basic of investments in better health, has been growing. In fiscal year 1962, total expenditures will exceed a billion dollars, of which 60 percent is supported by the Federal Government. Further expansion of research activities, where funds can be wisely spent and where qualified research personnel exist, is desirable both for humanitarian and economic reasons. Much of the necessary research is carried on by doctors of medicine. More rapid expansion of the number of physicians is required to insure that patient care needs, teaching needs, and research needs can all be met. This will be true even if needed improvements are made in the organization and financing of medical care.

Increased demands for medical services, stemming in part from new discoveries and in part from growth in population and changes in age and income structure, already mean unfilled internships and residencies in hospitals. The full medical needs of the country are not being met in many fields, including public health and preventive medicine. The Administration has presented a program to authorize Federal grants for the construction of medical, dental, osteopathic, and public health teaching facilities, project grants to plan for new facilities and improved educational programs, and scholarship aid to students. The importance of maintaining and improving the health of the Nation makes the enactment of this program a matter of great urgency.

### *Eliminating Racial Discrimination*

Racial discrimination is a national disgrace. In this respect, above all others, practice in the United States is a standing affront to professions of democratic principle. Discrimination inflicts immeasurable human and social costs on a large number of our citizens. In addition—and this is why it deserves particular mention in this Report—it inflicts an economic loss on the country.

Discriminatory practices in education, training, employment and union membership impede the development and utilization of human resources.

They reduce the efficiency and slow the growth of the economy, at the same time that they alter—and alter inequitably—the distribution of the fruits of economic progress.

Although significant reductions in discriminatory barriers have been accomplished in recent years, important problems remain. Many nonwhite families are trapped in a vicious circle: Job discrimination and lack of education limit their employment opportunities and result in low and unstable incomes; low incomes, combined with direct discriminations, reduce attainable levels of health and skill and thus limit occupational choice and income in the future; limited job opportunities result in limited availability of vocational education and apprenticeship training. Unless action is taken, today's training practices, affecting tomorrow's employment possibilities, will help to perpetuate inequitable employment patterns.

Our economy loses when individuals who are capable of acquiring skills are denied opportunities for training and are forced into the ranks of the unskilled, and when individuals with education, skill, and training face discriminatory hiring practices that result in their employment in low productivity jobs.

Discrimination is reflected in the distribution of income and in disparities in the levels of education attained by white and nonwhite groups. Nonwhite families had a median money income of \$3,233 in 1960. Although this represents a remarkable advance over the figure of \$2,099 for 1947 (in 1960 prices), the magnitude of the problem still remaining is indicated by the fact that in 1960 the median income for white families was \$5,835. In 1960, 11.0 percent of white but 31.7 percent of nonwhite families had money incomes of less than \$2,000, while 36.6 percent of white but only 13.6 percent of nonwhite families had money incomes of \$7,000 and over.

In 1947, 11 percent of the nonwhite population 14 years of age and over was illiterate; by 1959, this percentage had dropped to 7.5, with declines registered in every age group. The figure was, however, considerably higher than the 1.6 percent illiterate in the white population. Equally disturbing is the fact that in the nonwhite population the percentage of illiterates was higher for each age and sex group than the comparable percentage for the white population. While the median school<sup>e</sup> years completed for the nonwhite population 25 years of age and over had risen from 5.8 in 1940 to 8.1 in 1959, the median for the total population was 11.0 in 1959.

The unemployment rate in December 1961 was 5.2 percent for white males and 4.7 percent for white females, but 12.4 percent for nonwhite males and 10.7 percent for nonwhite females. Nonwhite workers made up less than 12 percent of the labor force, but accounted for 22 percent of the total unemployed and 24 percent of those unemployed 15 weeks or more.

Economic growth will be furthered by the adoption of nondiscriminatory policies and practices to insure that all Americans may develop their abilities to the fullest extent and that these abilities will be used. The Depart-

ment of Justice, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights are already acting vigorously. They should be joined in the campaign by all parts of our population and all units of government, business, and labor.

### INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

Technological knowledge sets limits on the productivity of labor and capital. As the frontiers of technology are pushed ahead, industrial practice and productivity follow, sometimes pressing close on the best that is known, sometimes lagging behind, with the gap varying from industry to industry and from firm to firm. A stimulus to economic growth can come either from increasing the rate at which the frontiers are advancing or from bringing the technology actually in use closer to the frontiers.

#### *Research and Development*

The advance of technological knowledge depends on the amount and effectiveness of the human and material resources devoted to research and development. The limited data available suggest that within industries and between industries there is a positive correlation between research effort and productivity growth. However, some of the most important developments affecting the productivity of a firm or industry may originate from research done by equipment and material suppliers, or from basic research done by government and the universities. The benefits of research activity are often widely shared.

Expenditures on research and development in 1960 totaled about \$14 billion, as shown in Table 13. In 1961 the total was probably in the neighborhood of \$15 billion, nearly three times the expenditures in 1953, and almost a third as large as business expenditures on fixed capital. After rough allowance for rising costs, the volume of research and development performed has approximately doubled since 1953. Between 1953

TABLE 13.—*Research and development expenditures, 1953 and 1957-60*

[Billions of dollars]

Type of research, financing, and performance	1953	1957	1958	1959	1960
Total expenditures.....	5.15	10.03	11.07	12.62	14.04
By type of research:					
Basic research.....	.43	.83	1.02	1.15	1.30
Applied research and development.....	4.72	9.20	10.05	11.47	12.74
By source of funds: <sup>1</sup>					
Federal Government.....	2.74	6.38	7.17	8.29	9.22
Industry.....	2.24	3.39	3.62	4.03	4.49
Universities and other nonprofit institutions.....	.17	.26	.28	.30	.33
By performer:					
Federal Government.....	.97	1.44	1.73	1.83	2.06
Industry <sup>2</sup> .....	3.63	7.66	8.30	9.55	10.53
Universities and other nonprofit institutions <sup>2</sup> .....	.55	.93	1.04	1.24	1.43

<sup>1</sup> Based on reports by performers.

<sup>2</sup> Includes research centers administered by organizations in this sector under contract with Federal agencies.

Source: National Science Foundation.

and 1960, research and development as a percentage of GNP in current prices doubled from 1.4 percent to 2.8 percent.

Research and development cover a wide range of activities aimed at increasing the stock of scientific and technical knowledge. As we move from basic research to applied research and to development, the goals become more closely defined in terms of specific practical objectives, the predictability of the results increases, and the benefits become less diffuse. More than 90 percent of research and development spending is for applied research and development—most of it for development. Slightly less than 10 percent is for basic research.

Approximately three-fourths of the Nation's total research and development effort is performed by industry, and over half of this is financed by the Federal Government. Profit considerations naturally lead private firms to concentrate on developing and improving marketable products. Even here, supplementary government support can pay off handsomely. Estimates suggest that hybrid corn research, of which perhaps one-third was publicly supported, yielded a substantial return to society over and above the returns to farmers and seed producers.

Less than one-third of all basic research is done by industry. Government, the universities, and other nonprofit institutions, although doing only one-fourth of total research, do most of the Nation's basic research. Such research seldom results directly or immediately in new products and processes. But in the long run, basic research is the key to important advances in technology. Fundamental inventions like the transistor—an outgrowth of basic research in solid-state physics—may revolutionize large sectors of industry and have a tremendous ultimate effect on productivity.

Although research and development spending is increasing rapidly in most industries, more than 55 percent of industrial research is performed by two industry groups, the aircraft and parts industry, and the electrical equipment and communications industry, as shown in Table 14. This heavy concentration of industrial research reflects primarily the concentration of defense contracts.

Industrial research is also heavily concentrated in large firms. In 1958, firms employing more than 5,000 persons accounted for 84 percent of total industrial research spending, significantly more than the share of these firms in manufacturing employment.

The Federal Government plays a much larger role in financing than in performing research. It is estimated that in 1961 the Government paid for about two-thirds of the total national research effort including, in addition to work done in government laboratories, almost 60 percent of the research undertaken in industry-run laboratories and over 70 percent of the research done by universities. About 70 percent of government research and development spending is accounted for by the Department of Defense. The Atomic Energy Commission and National Aeronautics and Space Administration together account for nearly 20 percent.

TABLE 14.—Funds for industrial research and development, by source and industry, 1960

Industry	Funds for research and development, 1960						Re-search and develop-ment funds as per-cent of net sales, 1959 <sup>1</sup>
	Amount (millions of dollars)			Percentage change from 1959			
	Total	Federal Gov-ern-ment	Com-pany	Total	Federal Gov-ern-ment	Com-pany	
Total.....	10, 497	6, 125	4, 372	10	9	11	4.2
Food and kindred products.....	106	9	97	19	( <sup>2</sup> )	15	.3
Paper and allied products.....	66	1	65	12	( <sup>2</sup> )	12	.8
Chemicals and allied products.....	1, 047	303	744	10	7	12	4.3
Petroleum refining and extraction.....	289	25	264	6	4	6	1.0
Rubber products.....	115	35	80	4	-5	8	2.0
Stone, clay, and glass products.....	82	4	78	14	( <sup>2</sup> )	11	1.4
Primary metals.....	164	18	146	19	20	19	.7
Fabricated metal products.....	126	54	72	2	-7	9	1.7
Machinery.....	993	384	609	5	-5	12	4.2
Electrical equipment and communication.....	2, 405	1, 634	771	7	4	16	11.3
Motor vehicles and other transportation equipment.....	849	216	633	-2	-13	3	3.4
Aircraft and parts.....	3, 482	3, 027	455	15	16	9	20.8
Professional and scientific instruments.....	416	211	205	18	21	15	8.3
Other industries.....	358	205	153	18	19	17	( <sup>2</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> Data apply to all manufacturing industries and to the communication and crude petroleum and extraction nonmanufacturing industries.

<sup>2</sup> Percent change not computed for an industry where the amount in the base period was less than \$15 million.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: National Science Foundation.

In addition to its direct contributions to research and development spending, the Federal Government has stimulated private research and development activity. The science information services of the National Science Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of Technical Services of the Department of Commerce, and other government agencies contribute to the over-all efficiency of national research and development. Federal tax law encourages research and development by making such costs fully deductible in the year they are incurred. The Small Business Act encourages spending on research and development, including cooperative research, by small companies. Moreover, the Federal Government makes an important contribution to the training of future research scientists and engineers through its support of education and basic research in the universities.

*Strengthening research and development.* During the 1950's, the number of professional scientists and engineers in the United States increased at an annual rate of approximately 6 percent. Total resources allocated to research and development grew at an even faster rate because a rising proportion of all scientists and engineers were engaged in research, and because supporting personnel, equipment, and material per research scientist increased. During the 1960's, these trends will continue, but one limit to growth will be the supply of scientists and engineers in certain fields. Future investment in research will be limited largely by the quantity and quality of earlier investment in education.

Overemphasis on current research and development activity should not be permitted to erode the underlying educational base. Just as research is investment for the economy, education is investment for research. The needs for educational expansion stressed earlier in this chapter include urgent requirements for laboratories, laboratory equipment, and other science teaching facilities.

A greater share of research and development resources and talent should be devoted to basic research and to prototype development and experimentation in fields which promise major advances in civilian technology. Military research helped to create such important discoveries as isotope medicine, the computer, and the jet engine. The important impact on civilian technology of these offspring of military research suggests that high returns might be achieved if sights were set higher in nonmilitary research. Since the risks of basic research and experimental development are very great, and since the rewards for success are not confined to single firms or even industries, there is a case for public support to attract additional resources into this work.

In a number of industries, firms which are highly efficient in production and marketing may be too small to undertake an efficient research and development program. In others, a research tradition is lacking, or research is discouraged because the benefits tend to diffuse beyond the market grasp of individual firms. In agriculture, all these conditions are present, and the high returns to society from government support of research suggest that comparable programs to increase research in certain manufacturing industries might be highly desirable.

An Administration bill to create an Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology has passed the Senate and is now pending before the House. Its enactment would be an important step in fulfilling the Government's responsibilities in this area. The competence and experience of the National Bureau of Standards could well be used in support of a program to fill the gaps in the national industrial research effort.

#### *More Effective Use of Existing Technology*

(1) In some industries there are legal obstacles to technical change. The housing construction codes of many localities provide a prominent example. In principle, these codes protect the public from shoddy construction; in practice, they often prevent the use of new materials, designs, and techniques which are superior to the old, and a lack of uniformity among codes in different localities discourages mass production of certain prefabricated housing components. With respect to construction codes in particular, the Housing and Home Finance Agency should continue to encourage the adoption of performance standards for codes and should strengthen its programs of testing and evaluation.

(2) American labor has a remarkable record of acceptance of new technology; but understandable resistance to the displacement of labor by new equipment has occasionally developed when opportunities for retraining and re-employment were not clearly visible. The Federal Government can help considerably, first, by pursuing effective policies to maintain full employment, and second, by expanding and improving its programs in job training and retraining.

(3) The process of technological change would be smoother if society knew better how to reap the rewards and reduce the costs. Research in the social, behavioral, and managerial sciences can lead to more efficient use of resources and to quicker grasp of the opportunities afforded by technological progress. Improved understanding may, in time, yield ways to ease the burdens of adjustment. Strengthening of research in these auxiliary fields is needed to gain maximum benefit from research which creates new technology.

(4) Innovation is facilitated by a flow of information about new technical developments. Since many firms, especially small ones, are not in a position to follow new technological developments closely, the Government can play a useful role by providing business with relevant information and analysis. These service functions of the Department of Commerce and the Small Business Administration should be substantially strengthened. The success of the Federal-State Extension Service in speeding the diffusion of agricultural technology serves to illustrate how effective such programs can be.

(5) The Panel on Civilian Technology, composed of a group of distinguished scientists, engineers, businessmen, and economists, has been brought together under the joint auspices of the office of the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, the Department of Commerce, and the Council of Economic Advisers. The panel is examining opportunities for stimulating civilian research and development as well as for more effective use of existing technology. It has begun to address itself particularly to those sectors of our economy where major social and economic benefits could be expected to accrue from technological advances.

(6) By eliminating monopolistic and collusive barriers to the entry of new business and by maintaining the spur of competition to innovation and the utilization of technology, antitrust enforcement tends to create conditions which encourage economic growth. (See Chapter 4.)

#### INVESTMENT IN PLANT AND EQUIPMENT

Between the resourcefulness of the labor force and the ideas of the laboratory on one side and the satisfaction of consumption needs on the other, the indissoluble link is the economy's stock of plant and machinery. Our own history and the experience of other industrial countries alike demonstrate the connection between physical investment and growth


of productive capacity. Without investment in new and renewed plant and equipment, skills and inventions remain preconditions of growth; with it, they become ingredients.

### *Investment as a Source of Growth*

Investment in fixed capital leads to increased capacity both by equipping new members of the labor force with capital up to existing standards and by providing greater amounts for all workers. Since 1929, the stock of privately owned plant and equipment (in constant prices) has grown relative to private man-hours worked by nearly 80 percent (Chart 10) and by nearly 50 percent relative to the private labor force. Nearly all of the latter increase has taken place during the postwar period. Between 1929 and 1947, the rate of investment was sufficient only to provide enough capital—although more modern capital—to keep pace with a growing labor supply. No increase in capital per worker occurred. Since 1947, the rate of growth in the ratio of capital stock to labor supply has been approximately 2.7 percent a year, but there is a perceptible difference between the growth records of the first and second halves of the postwar period. From 1947 to 1954, the amount of capital per worker increased by 3.5 percent a year; in contrast, the annual increase from 1954 to 1960 averaged only 1.9 percent.

**CHART 10**

## Indexes of Business Output, Capital Stock, and Man-Hours



SOURCE: COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (BASED ON DATA FROM VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SOURCES).



The importance of investment in the growth process is suggested by the parallel movement of the growth of potential output per man and the growth of capital per man (Table 15). Both ratios grew more rapidly after 1947 than before, and more rapidly between 1947 and 1954 than subsequently. In general, the experience since 1929 supports the belief that the more rapidly the capital stock grows relative to the labor force, the greater will be the growth in potential output per worker, provided that other necessary conditions are met.

TABLE 15.—*Growth in business potential capital-labor and output-labor ratios, 1929–60*

[Percent per year]

Item	1929 to 1947	1947 to 1960	1947 to 1954	1954 to 1960
Capital stock per worker <sup>1</sup> .....	0.0	2.7	3.5	1.9
Output per worker <sup>2</sup> .....	1.5	2.8	3.3	2.1

<sup>1</sup> Business capital stock is built up from private purchases of plant and equipment, with allowance for retirements; excludes religious, educational, hospital, other institutional, and farm residential construction.

<sup>2</sup> Business output is gross national product minus product originating in general government, government enterprises, households and institutions, the rest of the world, and services of existing houses.

NOTE.—Details of series are available upon request.

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

Though there was no increase in capital per worker between 1929 and 1947, there was a slow increase in productivity which must be attributed to technical progress and to improvement in the quality of both labor and capital. When, as in subsequent years, investment was more rapid, there was an accompanying acceleration of productivity gains. These gains were not simply the result of the separate contributions of the advance of knowledge, the improved skills of the working population, and the rise in capital per worker, but came in large part from the interaction of all three.

Investment in new equipment serves as a vehicle for technological improvements and is perhaps the most important way in which laboratory discoveries become incorporated in the production process. Without their embodiment in new equipment, many new ideas would lie fallow. Conversely, the impact of a dollar's investment on the quality of the capital stock depends on how rapidly increases in knowledge have taken place. This interaction between investment and technological change permits each worker to have not only more tools, but better tools as well.

The slower rate of growth of the capital stock in recent years provides one explanation for the accompanying slower growth of labor productivity and potential output. The proportion of output devoted to investment, and the rate of growth of the capital stock itself, are measures of the diversion of current resources to the creation of future capacity. During the period 1947–54, expenditures on business fixed investment averaged 11.0 percent of GNP and the stock grew at an annual rate of 4.2 percent (valued in 1961 prices). In the period 1955–60, 9.8 percent of GNP was invested and the capital stock grew at an annual rate of 3.2 percent. The ratio

of investment to potential GNP is even more relevant; in this case, the ratios are 10.9 percent and 9.4 percent for the two periods. This difference of 1.5 percent in the fraction of potential GNP invested represents nearly \$45 billion of additional capital.

### *Policies to Encourage Investment*

(1) *Adequate levels of demand.* The single most important stimulant to investment is the maintenance of full utilization of capacity. The historical record shows that when output falls below its potential the rate of growth of the capital stock declines. Expected profit from investment is strongly influenced by the expected demand for the output that the new capital will help produce, even if the investment is meant largely for cost reduction rather than capacity expansion. Estimates of future demand are colored by the experience of the present and the recent past. During periods of economic slack, estimates of future demand are relatively pessimistic, and many projects are foregone which would appear profitable under conditions of high demand.

There is a tendency to think of profitable investment opportunities for the whole economy as exhaustible: the more of them that are used up in any one year, the fewer remain. There may be some validity to this view for a single industry, which can mistakenly expand its capacity beyond the possibilities of future market demand. But for the entire economy, what appears as unavoidable excess capacity is in fact avoidable deficiency of demand. There are, and always will be, unsatisfied wants for a higher standard of living, though the demand for any particular product may perhaps be satiated. The investment boom of 1955-57 did not make inevitable the excess capacity that has ruled since then. Instead, it created an opportunity for higher levels of production in later years, had the demand been forthcoming. The opportunity was lost; even before the cyclical peak in the third quarter of 1957, the growth of demand slowed down and excess capacity began to emerge.

It is true that, with any given level of technology, a higher rate of investment can occur only through the acceptance of investment opportunities of lower profitability. But appropriate tax and monetary measures can make even these investments sufficiently attractive. And technical progress can have the same effect. To equip a more rapidly growing labor force also demands a larger volume of investment relative to potential GNP. Fortunately, if actual output is held close to a rising potential output, faster labor force growth will open opportunities for additions to plant and equipment which would be economically unattractive if the labor supply situation were tighter. Thus a higher ratio of investment to output can be more easily maintained. When excess capacity already exists, however, profitability is low for that reason alone, and the growing labor force appears as a threat, instead of the stimulus to investment it really is.

In addition to serving as an indicator of future profits, the level of aggregate demand, through its impact on current profits, plays an important role in providing finance for investment. The importance of the level of economic activity in determining profits is indicated in Chart 3, which shows that net and gross profits as a percentage of GNP fluctuate very closely with the rate of capacity utilization. A policy that sustains near-capacity operations goes beyond strengthening the profitability of investment; it insures an ample supply of low-cost internal funds, which itself encourages investment.

(2) *Monetary and credit policy.* The open market operations of the Federal Reserve and the debt-management operations of the Treasury exert a powerful influence on supply conditions in credit markets. If economic growth were the only end to be served, the sole object of monetary and credit policy would be to assure an adequate flow of funds to finance the needed capital formation at interest rates appropriate to the basic profitability of investment. This was pointed out by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in March 1961, in a statement to the Joint Economic Committee: "As I have said many times in the past, before this Committee and others, I am in favor of interest rates being as low as possible without stimulating inflation, because low rates can help to foster capital expenditures that, in turn, promote economic growth."

Use of monetary techniques for growth purposes must, of course, be limited by the demands placed on them by other national objectives. In the present situation, for example, monetary policy has a role to play in the attainment of recovery from recession and in the restoration of balance of payments equilibrium. Policies for growth and recovery are complementary, since any policy that stimulates investment will simultaneously stimulate aggregate demand. This situation, however, will not always prevail. When excessive demand threatens inflation, stability and growth goals will tend to push monetary policy in opposite directions. At such times, the importance of economic growth would suggest the major use of other measures—principally budgetary surpluses—to achieve stability. For when demand is strong enough to generate pressure on existing capacity, and only then, rapid growth requires that enough resources be withheld from other uses to make a sustained high rate of investment possible without inflation. Under these circumstances, a surplus in the Federal budget plays the constructive role of adding to national saving and making resources available for investment. The role of a policy of monetary ease at full employment is then to insure that the resources freed by a tight fiscal policy are indeed used for investment and not wasted in unemployment.

The current balance of payments problem puts additional constraints on the use of monetary policy to promote recovery and growth. The techniques developed by the Federal Reserve to meet the new situation have already been discussed in Chapter 1, Part II.

(3) *Tax policy.* Every tax system is the product of particular needs and economic conditions; no tax system can be neutral in its effects on the ways in which households and business firms earn and spend their incomes. If faster economic growth is desired, revision of the tax structure is called for, to permit a higher rate of investment once full use of resources is achieved.

The Administration's program encompasses two complementary approaches to this objective. The first is an investment tax credit equal to 8 percent of investment in eligible machinery and equipment; the second is revision of the guidelines for the tax lives of properties subject to depreciation.

The investment credit will stimulate investment by reducing the net cost of acquiring depreciable assets, thus increasing expected profitability. The increase will vary inversely with the expected life of the asset. For an asset with a service life of 10 years and an after-tax yield of 10 percent before the credit, the investment credit will increase the expected rate of return by about one-third. The increase in net yield will be greater for less durable equipment and smaller for more durable equipment.

Investment decisions are also influenced by the availability of funds. The investment tax credit will increase by some \$1.5 billion the flow of cash available for investment under conditions anticipated for 1962.

Since the credit applies only to newly acquired assets, the entire incentive effect is concentrated on the profitability of new capital and no revenue is lost in raising the profitability of assets already held by business firms. It is an efficient way of encouraging re-equipment and modernization of productive facilities, as well as the expansion of capacity. The credit will thus help to accelerate economic growth and improve our competitive position. It will also increase the attractiveness of investment at home relative to direct investment abroad. In both ways the credit will help to ease our balance of payments problem.

Revision of tax lives for depreciable property is desirable as a matter of equity to reflect more accurately the influence of obsolescence on economic lives of capital assets. Present guidelines were established 20 years ago on the basis of replacement practices of the depressed prewar years. Depreciation, designed to reflect the loss in value of plant and equipment over time, is a function not alone of "wear and tear," but also of technological progress, changes in the relative costs of economic inputs, competitive conditions, and consumer tastes and demand. Through its favorable effects on cash flows, expected rates of return, and risk, liberalized depreciation will tend to stimulate investment.

The investment tax credit, coupled with liberalized depreciation, will provide a strong and lasting stimulus to the high rate of investment that is a major requirement for accelerated economic growth. Together, they will provide incentives to invest comparable to those available in the rapidly growing industrial nations of the free world.

Attention to Federal income tax adjustments to stimulate investment must not be allowed to obscure the role of State and local tax policies and practices in economic growth. The tax collections of these governments are nearly half as large as Federal collections. In fiscal year 1960, they increased by more than 10 percent, or \$3.7 billion.

The power to tax under this governmental system is shared by thousands of separate jurisdictions. Improved coordination among them will improve economic efficiency. Identical tax sources are frequently utilized by two, three, and even four layers of government without appropriate cooperation. Taxing authorities occasionally use their powers in ways that capriciously affect decisions concerning the location of plants and disrupt normal competition. The result may be a misallocation of resources and economic loss.

The Congress has recognized the need for better intergovernmental coordination. It has provided for the creation of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to foster "the fullest cooperation and coordination of activities between the levels of government." The Advisory Commission, composed of representatives of the executive and legislative branches of all levels of government, has already made important recommendations for the coordination of local taxes by the States and for improved tax coordination and cooperation between Federal and State governments.

#### INVESTMENT IN NATURAL RESOURCES

Economic growth is not simply a matter of growth in the size and skills of the labor force, in the quantity and quality of capital goods, and in the productivity of the processes by which these inputs are combined. It is equally a matter of turning more and more of the earth's endowment of natural wealth—soil, sunlight, air, water, minerals, plant and animal life—to the purposes of man. America's position has generally been one of natural plenty, but we cannot complacently assume that the abundance of the past will also characterize the future.

But neither is there any reason to suppose that resource limitations will in the foreseeable future place serious limits on the growth of the economy. Technological change, substitution of abundant and cheap raw materials for scarce and expensive ones, investment in improved resource management and conservation, and increased reliance on imports all provide important offsets to the effects of increasing scarcity on the real cost of obtaining resource inputs. Taken together, these factors tend to keep the economy growing along the path of least resistance so far as its resource requirements are concerned. If the various offsets to increasing scarcity are not fully effective, resources can be obtained by digging and drilling deeper, utilizing lower grade deposits, constructing dams and better waste treatment facilities, and other measures involving higher costs. But the necessity

to devote more labor and capital to these tasks would constitute a drag on the economy, tending to cancel some of the efforts we make to stimulate growth. Indeed, taking the economy as a whole, it is equivalent to a decline in productivity.

### *The Historical Record*

A rough judgment as to the probable consequences of continued depletion of resources in the future can be derived by examining the record of the past. The long-term trend of raw materials prices relative to the prices of finished products is a useful, though by no means ideal, indicator of the effectiveness of the offsets to natural scarcity.

TABLE 16.—*Ratios of indexes of raw materials prices to index of finished products prices, 1900-57*  
[1920-24=100]

Period	All raw materials <sup>1 2</sup>	Agricultural products	Forest products	Minerals				
				Total <sup>2</sup>	Metals <sup>2</sup>	Fuels	Construction materials	Other non-metallic minerals
Annual average:								
1900-04.....	94	97	70	90	130	78	92	146
1905-09.....	96	103	77	81	139	68	79	127
1910-14.....	103	118	74	77	124	67	73	124
1915-19.....	108	121	74	87	130	76	72	124
1920-24.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1925-29.....	112	122	94	94	112	89	103	103
1930-34.....	88	89	93	84	103	78	107	84
1935-39.....	102	104	109	94	131	88	100	77
1940-44.....	111	120	127	88	118	81	91	86
1945-49.....	125	134	158	93	109	92	82	93
1950-54.....	128	128	187	105	133	103	82	105
1955-57.....	118	108	184	111	147	107	85	130
1957.....	116	105	174	111	136	110	84	123

<sup>1</sup> Excludes fishery and wildlife products, for which adequate price data are not available.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes gold.

NOTE.—Figures for earlier years, especially prior to 1915, are less reliable than those for later years. Annual index for each group has been divided by the over-all finished products index.

Source: Department of Commerce (based on data, including finished products price index, to be published by the Bureau of the Census in the forthcoming report, *Raw Materials in the United States Economy, 1900-57*, Working Paper No. 6).

Table 16 shows the movements of price indexes for all raw materials and for broad subgroups, relative to an index of prices of finished products. From 1900-04 to 1955-57—the last period for which data are available—the over-all index increased by 25½ percent, an average rate of increase just over 0.4 percent per year. The most striking feature of the table, however, is not this slow but visible trend toward increasing costs as our resource endowment has been exploited more intensively but the varying patterns of price movement shown by different commodities and by the same commodity at different times. The outstanding example of a strong upward price trend is forest products. Even in forestry, however, there are prelim-

inary indications that productivity gains are beginning to offset the effects of scarcity on prices. The index for all minerals has risen slightly less than that for all raw materials, and the subgroups of the minerals index show divergent movements. A considerably larger increase in the minerals index would undoubtedly have occurred if the opportunities of international trade had not been available. This is particularly true of the metals subgroup where net imports accounted for 44.8 percent of apparent consumption of metallic ores in 1957.

The index for agricultural products shows the effects of the great depression, the second World War and its aftermath, and the accelerated improvement of agricultural productivity in the 1950's. The last is largely responsible for the decline of the over-all index from its 1950-54 peak. It is reasonable to expect that improvements in agricultural productivity will continue to exert a substantial downward pressure on the over-all index in the future.

### *Implications for Public Policy*

The lessons to be drawn from this review of past trends are these: First, it is likely that increasing resource scarcity has had only a negligible retarding effect on economic growth during the present century. Rising real costs of obtaining some resources have been largely compensated by declining costs of obtaining others. Second, the historical record does not indicate that more rapid economic growth will simply result in our "running out of resources" more quickly. On the contrary, past investments have permitted resources to be extracted more efficiently and used more efficiently.

Public policy has contributed to this success by limitation of economic waste, the development and adoption of improved methods in agriculture, forestry, and other fields, the unified development of river valleys, and a variety of other measures. Finally, the opportunity to obtain raw materials from abroad has been important in the past and will be increasingly important in the future.

Preventing resource scarcity from being a drag on economic growth is by no means the only objective of policy in this field. Particularly for water, forest, and scenic resources, an important objective is the provision of aesthetic and recreational benefits which are not reflected in aggregate measures of economic activity because they do not pass through the market place. The difficulty of determining objective standards by which such benefits can be weighed is obviously not a valid reason for neglecting them.

### *Water Resources*

There is wide agreement that one of the most serious resource problems facing the United States at present and in the immediate future is the development of water resources. The use of water has been increasing rapidly as a result of population growth, higher living standards, increasing urbanization, rapid growth of industries that are heavy users of water,

increases in the amount of land under irrigation, and other factors. In the Eastern United States and the Pacific Northwest, the problem presented by these trends can be met for the next few decades by an adequate and appropriately timed program of investment in (1) multiple purpose water resource development which, in addition to other benefits, permits the collection and storage of water for use as needed and (2) facilities for treatment of industrial and municipal wastes. In some of the dry regions of the West, however, the opportunities for further development of water resources will be exhausted within the next two decades. Barring major scientific breakthroughs, the continued economic development of these regions will soon come to depend upon how effectively an almost fixed supply of water is used to satisfy the most important of the various industrial, agricultural, and municipal needs for water.

It is certain that additional investment to increase the quantity and to improve the quality of the supplies of water will be a major part of any solution to the problem. Pollution control, in particular, will require major investment expenditures in the coming decades. The enactment last year of the Administration's proposal for an expanded program of grants under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and extension of Federal authority to seek abatement of pollution of navigable waters were important steps forward. But the fact that water resources in some regions of the country will soon be close to fully developed calls attention to a consideration that is relevant to water resources policy for the country as a whole: investment in development of existing water supplies is not a complete solution to the problem of water scarcity, nor is it necessarily the economically desirable solution under every particular set of circumstances. A variety of offsets to increasing scarcity are available and each has a role to play. In particular, additional research and development in methods of conserving and augmenting water supplies, including desalinization, weather modification, reduction of evaporation losses, cheaper and more effective waste treatment and more efficient use of water in industry and agriculture may produce high returns.

Since expensive investments must be undertaken to increase the quantity and quality of water supplies, it is appropriate that the costs be reflected in prices charged industrial and agricultural users. To treat a costly commodity as if it were free only encourages excessive use. There is evidence that significant reductions in water withdrawals could be achieved in many important water using activities and that they can be expected to occur if proper deterrents are provided. The burdens of scarcity on the economy cannot be entirely eliminated by using scarce capital to augment the supply of scarce water. But the burden can be minimized by a proper balance between investments in increased supply on the one hand, and price increases to eliminate inefficient use on the other.



## *Agricultural Land*

The problem of agricultural land stands in sharp contrast to the problem of water resources. Whereas in the latter the problems requiring attention are those posed by increasing scarcity, in the former they are problems of adjusting to abundance.

Agriculture is the major source of downward pressure on the price index for all raw materials, and land is in ample supply. There are approximately 640 million acres of land suitable for cultivation in the United States at present, but only about 450 million are actually used for crops or pasture. Present indications are that only slightly more than 400 million acres of cropland (including cropland pastured and idle) will be in use by 1980 to produce agricultural products.

The major land resource investments required during the next several decades will, therefore, involve the conservation and protection of remaining farmland and the transfer of land to nonagricultural use rather than bringing more land into agricultural production. There are currently close to 70 million acres of land used for cropland which are subject to severe erosion hazard or otherwise not suitable for cultivation over the long run. Much of this land could be transferred to provide products or services, such as forestry and recreation, for which the demand is rising. At the same time, about 17 million of the 240 million acres of good land now in pasture or forest could be converted to cropland.

The Department of Agriculture currently has plans for a long-range land use adjustment program. This program has three major facets: transfer of cropland to grass; transfer of cropland to forest; and greater emphasis on wildlife and recreational development in the small watershed programs. As the program develops, it will be possible for supply management to place less emphasis on temporary diversion of acreage from the production of specific crops.

The present problems of U.S. agriculture, which reflect in part the fact that the pace of technological progress in agriculture exceeds the rate of growth in demand for farm products, should not blind us to the important lessons to be drawn from the record. When strong policy measures are taken well in advance, technological progress affords an escape from increasing scarcity. Indeed, it is technology that largely determines which portions of the environment are regarded as resources and which are not. Research not only makes possible the more effective use of existing resources, as in the case of agriculture, but may create important new ones. The record of agriculture also illustrates, however, the long lag between the decision to act and the appearance of the benefits. Careful and continuing analysis of present and future resource needs, coupled with readiness to act when the indications of potential difficulties become persuasive, is the best hope for success in meeting the resource requirements of rapid economic growth.

## INVESTMENT IN PUBLIC SERVICES

Accelerated economic growth will require increased public investment, just as it will require increased private investment. Without additional plant and equipment, governments at all levels will be unable to meet the increased demands for public services that arise both as a consequence of measures taken to stimulate growth and as a consequence of growth itself. If a high and rising educational level of the labor force is sought as a means to speed economic growth, additional investment in school and college buildings, furnishings, and laboratory equipment will be required. Demands for transportation of both people and goods will increase as a result of economic growth; meeting these demands will require additional investment in urban public transportation systems, airports, roads and highways.

Failure to make adequate investments in the physical basis of public services inevitably retards economic growth. In some cases, the connection is fairly easy to trace; inadequate investment in highways will bring an increase in congestion, with consequent declines in the productivity of trucks and truck drivers, and rising transportation costs. In other cases, the process by which a shortage of basic public services tends to retard the growth of output is less obvious, but no less real; education is an important example. As has been noted above, an inadequate effort to solve the water pollution problem will be paid for in higher costs of obtaining water of adequate quality—unless it is paid for by a decline in the health of the population and decreased productivity in water-using industrial processes. Inadequacy of public services also has effects on economic welfare that are not reflected in aggregate economic statistics. Commuters are well aware of the sacrifice of time that results from inadequate urban transportation systems. The sacrifice of recreational opportunities resulting from failure to make sufficient provisions for public parks as cities expand is another example.

The task of meeting the transportation, recreation, education, housing, and other needs of growing metropolitan areas poses a major challenge to our existing forms of political organization at the State and local level. Public facilities serving the needs of individual political jurisdictions within an urban area are often less efficient than they would be if they had been designed for all, or a large part, of the area. For example, lack of effective and well coordinated land use planning and zoning regulation has resulted in locational patterns of residential, commercial, and industrial developments that intensify transportation problems. Improved planning and coordination can increase the efficiency of public services and make cities better places in which to live. Progress can be achieved through continued Federal assistance to States and local bodies for the planning of urban area development, comprehensive urban renewal programs within cities, public improvement programs, and specific public improvements.

Although the Federal Government is making an important contribution to the solution of problems whose significance extends beyond the boundaries of political units at lower levels, it must be remembered that civil government is basically a State and local responsibility. About 80 percent of spending for civil government in 1960—for education, highways, water supply, sanitation, public health, police and fire protection, etc.—actually took place at the State and local level, with only about 15 percent of these local expenditures financed by Federal aid. State and local governments account for more than 70 percent of public civilian employment and for two-thirds of nonmilitary government payrolls. Their activities are a major factor in the economy.

As a Nation, we have surely not erred on the side of excessive public investment in recent years. Major sources of demand for public services have expanded sharply: for example, the number of automobiles and trucks has grown more rapidly than GNP, and the extent of urbanization has increased. Nevertheless, new nondefense public construction as a fraction of GNP was essentially unchanged in the 1950's from its level in the 1920's. It must also be noted that a substantial backlog of unsatisfied needs for schools, highways, and other public facilities was carried over into the decade of the 1950's from the second World War—probably a much greater backlog than was carried into the 1920's from the first.

Although these historical comparisons throw an interesting light on the changing role of the public sector in the U.S. economy, they do not provide firm standards for the future division of responsibility between the public and private sectors. That issue cannot be settled by the invocation of historical ratios any more than it should be settled by abstract argument. If our economy is to use its productive resources in reasonable accordance with a consensus as to national priorities, we must face the question of public versus private expenditures pragmatically, in terms of intrinsic merits and costs, not in terms of fixed preconceptions.

#### INVESTMENT IN HOUSING

The higher standard of living made possible by economic growth results from increased output of a wide variety of goods and services. Among these is one item which, by virtue of its economic importance, its great influence on the general quality of life, and the unique character of the capital investment required to expand its supply, deserves special attention in a discussion of economic growth. This item is housing.

The value of the current services supplied by the Nation's residential structures—the total of rents paid plus the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings—accounted for 13.1 percent of personal consumption expenditures in 1961, or 8.5 percent of GNP. Another 4.1 percent of GNP was accounted for by residential nonfarm construction—the total expenditures on replacing, improving, and adding to the nonfarm portion of the stock of residential structures. That stock itself represents roughly

one-fourth of our national wealth, about twice the share accounted for by producers' durable equipment.

These figures are, in part, a statistical image of the importance of the basic human need for shelter. To a greater extent, however, they reflect the fact that better housing is among the most important benefits that economic progress can confer. A dwelling that provides adequate protection against the elements may nevertheless be a serious hazard to the mental and physical health of its occupants, if it is overcrowded, lacking in hot and cold running water or plumbing facilities, or structurally unsound. A better home provides a healthier, safer, and more comfortable living environment; it affords greater opportunities for recreation, aesthetic enjoyment, and peace and quiet.

Few, if any, Americans actually lack a roof over their heads. But about one-fifth of the Nation's housing units are classified as "dilapidated" or else lack one or more of the basic plumbing facilities. Like the poverty that it reflects, substandard housing is a burden borne to a disproportionate extent by a few groups in the society; the aged, the nonwhite, the poorly educated, and families without a male breadwinner. The burden is perhaps most regrettable when it renders ineffective the measures society takes to promote equality of opportunity. The child who has no decent place in which to study can hardly take full advantage of the free education that is provided to him.

The elimination of substandard housing and the provision of a decent home in a suitable environment for all American families is an important objective of public policy in the housing field. The public interest has been deemed to extend also to the promotion of home ownership. Through the mortgage insurance and mortgage guaranty operations of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) and the secondary market operations of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Government facilitates homebuilding and the flow of private capital into home loans by providing insurance against the risk of default and making mortgage loans a more liquid investment for financial institutions. In addition, FNMA assists in the financing of certain special types of home mortgages, as authorized by the Congress and directed by the President. Public housing amounted to just over 3 percent of all nonfarm housing starts between 1947 and 1960.

These various activities played a major role in the substantial progress toward better housing for the Nation that was made during the 1950's. Whereas in 1950, 55.0 percent of occupied housing units were owner-occupied, 61.9 percent were owner-occupied in 1960. Nonfarm housing starts exceeded the increase in the number of nonfarm households by roughly 25 percent for the decade, providing a margin for replacement of housing units demolished by public and private improvement programs, for improvement of average quality, and to accommodate housing needs arising from migration and mobility of the American people. In recent years, about

30 percent of sales of new nonfarm housing units have been under the FHA or VA programs.

A sharp rise in the rate of household formation will occur in the latter part of this decade, reflecting the high birth rates of the middle and late 1940's. It is all the more important, therefore, that substantial progress in improving the average quality of the Nation's housing be made in the early part of the decade, when the need to increase its quantity will be less urgent. The enactment in the last session of Congress of the Administration-sponsored Housing Act of 1961 was a major step toward meeting the Nation's housing needs. In addition to extending and expanding existing programs for public housing, housing for the elderly, college housing, and farm housing, the Act provides for major new programs of FHA-insured loans to finance construction and rehabilitation of housing for moderate income families, and long-term FHA-insured home repair loans. These new types of loans are eligible for purchase by FNMA. Other important provisions make Federal assistance available to States and localities for various measures in the field of urban affairs, including planning, loans, and demonstration grants for mass transportation projects, and acquisition of land for permanent open-space uses, such as parks. Additional funds were authorized to finance the construction of community facilities. Finally, a series of provisions make additional assistance available for households and businesses displaced by urban renewal programs or other government actions.

Rapid economic growth should bring the national goal of decent housing and a suitable living environment for every American family well within reach during the present decade. Estimates prepared for the Council of Economic Advisers by the Housing and Home Finance Agency indicate that no American households need occupy a dilapidated structure by 1970. This could be achieved with about the present ratio of residential construction expenditures to GNP—provided that GNP itself grows at approximately the rate discussed earlier in this chapter. This estimate includes an allowance for expenditures on additions and alterations based on extrapolation of the 1950-60 trend, but this allowance is probably not adequate to make possible the elimination of housing that is deficient for reasons other than dilapidation. It is clear, however, that the virtually complete elimination of deficient housing is by no means an unrealistic objective in a context of rapid economic growth.

Construction costs have risen more rapidly than broad price indexes in recent years. For example, while the all-inclusive price index for GNP rose by 40 percent between 1947 and 1961, the subindex for nonfarm residential construction rose by 50 percent. If this were to continue, it would mean that the share of current-price GNP devoted to the building of houses must rise if the proportion of real output going into housing investment is not to fall. There is a need to identify artificial barriers to technological progress and to efficient allocation of resources in the construction industry. Their

reduction or removal can make a significant contribution to growth in this important sector of the economy.

## CONCLUSION

This Chapter began with the observation that sustained long-run growth of potential supply is both difficult to achieve and pointless of achievement unless the growth of demand keeps pace. Capacity to produce is not an end in itself, but an instrument for the satisfaction of needs and the discharge of responsibilities. The needs will go unfilled and the responsibilities unmet to the extent that growing productive power runs to waste in idle machines and unemployed men.

Here the objectives of stabilization policy and growth policy coalesce. The mandate of the Employment Act renews itself perpetually as maximum levels of production, employment and purchasing power rise through time. The weapons of stabilization policy—the budget, the tax system, control of the supply of money and credit—must be aimed anew, for their target is moving. In particular, as Part II of Chapter 1 explains, with given expenditures and given tax rates, the Federal budget surplus at full employment grows with the economy. If it grows too rapidly, it can become an obstacle to full employment, to healthy economic growth, indeed to its own realization. If it grows too slowly, it can contribute to inflationary pressure.

Some surplus at full employment may be desirable, to help to finance the formation of capital. How large it should be depends on the size of the investment program required by the economy, on the freely made saving decisions of families and business firms, and on the level of government expenditures. It is the function of monetary policy, the tax system, and transfer payments to help to generate demand for the investment needed for economic growth. It is the function of over-all fiscal policy to insure that investment demand is matched, at full employment, by an equivalent volume of private and public saving.

The course of the budget surplus at full employment depends on the growth of the national income, the responsiveness of tax revenues to a rising tax base, and the changing level of Federal outlays. Even if Federal expenditures remain a constant proportion of GNP, as they have in recent years, the surplus at full employment will grow slightly because the progressive character of the tax system causes revenues to rise relative to GNP. If expenditures remain constant, or nearly so, the full employment surplus will grow much more rapidly.

As the economy returns to the full employment track, the full employment surplus will need to be kept from growing indefinitely, and perhaps to be reduced. The choice—or rather the division, for it is unlikely to be an “either-or” matter—is between reductions in tax receipts and increases in government expenditures, whether Federal, State or local. A pragmatic decision will almost certainly involve both. It is unlikely that the most

urgent unmet needs of the population will lie all in the area of private consumption or all in the areas traditionally allotted to public consumption and investment. Undoubtedly much of the reduction in the full employment surplus should be channeled directly to private purchasing power, just as most, by far, of present consumption spending is in private hands. The choice of a balance between public and private expenditures is an important choice for society. It should be made consciously through the normal democratic processes. And it should be made by weighing the urgency of alternative uses of resources, rather than by appeal to simple slogans on one side or the other.

The concern of this chapter has been the source of rising productive potential and the policies that can strengthen them. Granted continued prosperity, we can have slower growth or faster growth. There is substitution between the composition of output in the present and the level of output in the future. Just as a single individual can increase his consumption possibilities in the future by present saving, so can a whole society provide more fully for its future by using present resources for acts of investment in the broadest sense. No absolute reduction in current consumption need occur; it is only necessary that consumption grow less rapidly than total output for a time. Indeed, future levels of consumption will be higher than they could otherwise be—the cost is primarily in postponement. Happily, for an advanced society like ours, much of what is described from this point of view as investment can also be seen as present enjoyment of some of the delights of civilization: widespread education, good health, and the search for knowledge.

## Chapter 3

# The Balance of International Payments

**T**HE RECOVERY AND GROWTH of the U.S. economy are not important for the United States alone. On the vigor of our economy depend in large measure the strength and stamina of the free world and the standing of freedom in the minds of men everywhere. Leadership in the world requires the support of a growing and dynamic domestic economy, using to the full its vast productive capacity. The other nations of the free world rely heavily on the United States as a market for their products and as a source of capital and technology for their economic growth. The United States has taken the lead in meeting the responsibilities of the advanced countries to foster the economic development of the low-income nations. The less developed countries need both public and private investment capital; they need full opportunity to sell their products in world markets in order to earn the industrial imports that their development programs require; and they need a democratic alternative to the communist prescription for economic development.

The U.S. balance of international payments is the outcome of countless separate transactions by governments, private businesses, and individuals. The obligations of world leadership entail large government outlays abroad. U.S. business firms and consumers pay out billions of dollars for foreign goods and services. U.S. corporations, financial institutions, and individuals acquire properties, buy securities, and lend money abroad. The United States is one of a very few countries with a long standing policy permitting residents and foreigners complete freedom to make payments abroad in its currency. For many years, the United States had little reason to be concerned whether all these payments were covered by corresponding receipts from abroad. Foreign demands for U.S. goods and services were large; the dollar was, and still is, a ticket of entry to the world's largest and most diversified market. In some periods, the surplus of receipts was so large that the United States took actions to moderate its effects both at home and abroad. And if international payments happened to exceed receipts in any year, foreigners were willing to hold most of the dollars they acquired; only a small part of the deficit had to be met from our large gold reserves.

Recently, persistent payments deficits and gold losses have made it necessary for the U.S. Government to give greater attention to the net financial outcome of its transactions, and those of its citizens, with the rest of the world. Payments need not and should not be directly controlled, but the



balance must be under control. Many private international transactions depend in large part on economic circumstances at home. Consequently, domestic economic policy must be framed with an eye to the balance of payments. Action to safeguard the international position of the dollar is today an essential part of policy for full employment and growth.

The policies adopted in 1961 to strengthen the balance of payments are already beginning to take effect. The deficit in the international payments of the United States, which had averaged \$3.7 billion annually in each of the three preceding years, was less than \$2.5 billion in 1961, according to preliminary estimates. Gold reserves declined by less than \$0.9 billion in 1961, compared with \$1.7 billion in 1960. The full effects of measures under way and proposed will in time restore a sustainable balance in U.S. transactions with the rest of the world.

This chapter examines first the background for policies to improve the balance of payments and safeguard the position of the dollar: the general objectives which guide U.S. international economic and financial policies; the trading, investing, and international banking functions of the United States and their interrelations; and recent changes in the world economy affecting the U.S. balance of payments. In the final sections of the chapter, policies that are under way and proposed are discussed: measures to balance the basic international accounts; measures to limit disruptive flows of short-term capital; and measures to strengthen the international monetary system.

## THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

### *Objectives of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy*

A basic objective of U.S. policy is to provide an economic environment in which the people of the United States and of all nations can steadily raise their standards of living. Economic growth at home will support, and will be supported by, progress and development abroad, provided that international cooperation and commerce distribute equitably and efficiently the fruits of productive specialization among all free nations. International financial arrangements and policies are means to this fundamental end. A stable and efficient system of international payments is essential to facilitate desirable international flows of goods, services, and capital. The dollar has become the principal international currency, and the stability of the dollar is the foundation of the international payments system which has evolved since the war. For this reason, the President has declared that the present gold value of the dollar will be maintained. To safeguard the stability of the dollar, the United States is determined to improve its balance of international payments.

*Postwar progress.* U.S. foreign economic policy since the war has sought to build an international economic environment in which goods, services, and capital flow freely across national boundaries. This policy has been based on

the conviction that a free exchange of products and capital in world-wide markets will raise standards of living both in the United States and in the rest of the world. The example of the vast continental market of the United States attests to the economic gains afforded by geographical specialization and exchange and by the mobilization of savings in one region to finance productive investment opportunities in another. Without this huge internal market, unhampered by trade restrictions between States, American standards of living could not have risen to their present heights. Throughout the world, similarly dramatic gains can be achieved by international specialization and trade.

The framework of international economic cooperation in the free world today, especially among the industrial countries, represents a notable achievement. The great depression and the war left a legacy of national restrictions on movements of goods and capital—exchange controls, quantitative restrictions on imports, bilateral clearing and trading arrangements, discrimination against dollar goods. Since the war, the countries of the free world have been engaged in clearing away this restrictive legacy. Even before the war ended, the foundations were laid for the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The United States provided aid and leadership in European economic reconstruction and trade liberalization through the Marshall Plan and through association with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Substantial progress has been made toward a world of currencies convertible at fixed exchange rates and toward freedom from direct and discriminatory controls over trade and payments. Progress has also been made, though less rapidly, toward a world of lower tariff barriers; here is an opportunity for a major step forward.

*Expanding trade: a new program.* Foreign trade is not so vital to the United States as it is to most other countries. But the contributions of trade to our domestic welfare are nonetheless real and important. Net foreign purchases of our products contribute to output, employment, and economic growth in the United States. More significant, the opportunity to sell our products abroad in exchange for foreign goods enables us to specialize the structure of our production and to diversify the patterns of our consumption. By specializing in the production and export of goods in which the United States is unexcelled, Americans are enabled to import goods which would be impossible or costly to produce at home. Foreign trade raises living standards by widening the choice of goods available to the American consumer and by providing him with some goods and services at lower prices.

As other countries have recovered from the devastation of war and have rebuilt and modernized their productive capacity, they have become increasingly vigorous competitors of the United States in world markets. The most notable new source of competition is the European Economic Community, or Common Market, which now includes France, Germany, Italy,

Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, and which shortly may include the United Kingdom and several other European countries. Members of the Common Market are committed to the rapid elimination of tariffs among themselves and the establishment of a common external tariff on imports from the rest of the world.

Still in its formative years, the Common Market has imparted amazing vitality to the economies of its members. U.S. exports to Western Europe have risen sharply in response to the rapid economic growth within the Common Market countries. We cannot be sure that this rise in exports will continue unless we can negotiate substantial reductions of the Common Market's external tariff. The evolution and enlargement of the Common Market inevitably increases tariff discrimination against U.S. exports; we must compete over this tariff barrier while members of the Common Market have steadily freer access to each other's markets.

The Administration is therefore proposing to the Congress a major revision in foreign trade policy. The President's current authority to negotiate tariff reductions has been virtually exhausted. For the first time since the original Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934, Congress is being asked to equip the President with new kinds of bargaining instruments for negotiating with the Common Market. We must assure access of the products of our farms and factories to the world's largest market outside our own. Successful negotiations will make possible increasing specialization of production in both Atlantic markets. It will also make it possible to offer the free nations of other continents greater access to markets on both sides of the Atlantic.

*Safeguarding the dollar.* A stable and efficient system of international payments is an integral part of the liberal international economic environment toward which the free world has been moving. Uncertainties about the value and convertibility of the proceeds of international transactions disrupt movements of goods, services, and capital between nations. Convertible currencies and stable exchange rates as envisaged in the Bretton Woods agreements provide assurance of the value of international claims acquired by trade or investment.

The United States performs a special world banking function in the present international payments system. The dollar, alone with the pound sterling among national currencies, has come to be used as a major international currency by the free world. Private traders, banks, and governments have chosen to use dollars both as a means of payment and as a store of value. Foreign countries hold liquid dollar balances, acquired in international transactions, in much the same way that individual depositors hold balances in commercial banks. Foreign governments and central banks accept dollars as a partial substitute for gold in their international reserves because the dollar is an international currency and because the policy of the U.S. Treasury is to sell gold on demand to foreign governments and monetary authorities at a fixed price. The dollar became a "reserve currency" without any conscious international decision to establish a payments system

based on key national currencies. Use of the dollar as a reserve currency has met growing needs for international reserves and economized the limited and slowly growing supply of gold.

Foreign central banks and governments hold as part of their international reserves \$11 billion of short-term dollar obligations, which can be used to purchase gold from the United States. In addition, foreign private short-term dollar holdings amount to \$8 billion. Whenever dollars held by foreign private banks or individuals, or dollars held by U.S. residents themselves, are sold to foreign central banks for other currencies, they become potential claims on our gold stock.

Because of the strategic role of the dollar, maintenance of its established gold value is essential to the stability and efficiency of the present system of international payments. Accordingly, when the President pledged that the gold value of the dollar would be maintained, he stated that "the full strength of our total gold stock and other international reserves stands behind the value of the dollar for use if needed." This reserve strength comprises \$17 billion in gold (two-fifths of the monetary gold stock of the free world), small amounts of convertible foreign currencies, and drawing rights on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), of which \$1.7 billion is automatically available under current practices of the Fund. An additional \$4.1 billion could become available in accordance with Fund policies, insofar as the Fund has available resources in gold and usable foreign currencies. The recent agreement to strengthen the IMF (discussed at the end of this chapter) should do much to assure the availability of such resources.

*Reducing the deficit.* Deficits in the U.S. balance of payments are financed either by drawing down our gold reserves or by increasing the potential foreign claims against them in the form of liquid dollar liabilities to foreigners, official and private. Large and continuing deficits cannot be financed indefinitely. U.S. reserves, although very large, are not inexhaustible. Foreigners have accumulated large liquid dollar balances, but they will not be willing to let these balances grow without limit.

Therefore, the policy of the U.S. Government, as stated by the President in his message to Congress of February 6, 1961, is to "gain control of our balance of payments position so that we can achieve over-all equilibrium in our international payments. This means that any sustained future outflow of dollars into the monetary reserves of other countries should come about only as a result of considered judgments as to the appropriate needs for dollar reserves."

*Maintaining basic objectives.* These related tasks—maintaining the external value of the dollar and bringing our international accounts into balance—must be accomplished by means which promote the basic national objectives from which the tasks derive. To balance our accounts by restrictions on trade and capital movements, for example, would confuse means and ends. Such restrictions would violate the fundamental principles

of international economic relations for which our policy has striven for many years with so much success. Similarly, the foreign policy of the United States calls for large loans and grants to foreign countries for development and for defense; and the maintenance of our military establishment abroad entails substantial overseas expenditures. To curtail the substance of these programs would provide no solution to the "dollar problem." Rather, the task of balance of payments policy is to find the foreign exchange resources necessary to finance them. Finally, full recovery and economic growth, primary national goals in themselves, are also essential elements in the long-run capacity of the United States to meet its international commitments and responsibilities. Measures to rectify the balance of payments must be consistent with expansion of the U.S. economy.

*The United States as Trader, Investor, and Banker*

*The accounts.* The U.S. balance of international payments over the last decade is shown in Table 17. In the table, international transactions are classified into four accounts: (1) *current account and unilateral transfers*, encompassing merchandise trade, earnings on U.S. foreign investments less foreign earnings on investments in the United States, services including tourism and ocean freight, private remittances, and government military expenditures and development grants; (2) *long-term capital account*, cover-

TABLE 17.—United States balance of international payments, 1951-61

[Billions of dollars]

Type of transaction	1951-55 average	1956-60 average	1958	1959	1960	1961 <sup>1</sup>
Current account and unilateral transfers.....	-0.6	0.8	-0.1	-2.3	1.5	2.4
Merchandise trade balance.....	2.4	3.9	3.3	1.0	4.7	5.5
Exports.....	13.4	17.7	16.3	16.3	19.4	19.7
Imports.....	-11.0	-13.8	-13.0	-15.3	-14.7	-14.2
Military expenditures, net <sup>2</sup> .....	-2.1	-2.8	-3.1	-2.8	-2.7	-2.5
Interest and dividends, net <sup>3</sup> .....	1.6	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.7
Other services, net.....	.2	-.1	-.2	-.2	-.3	-.4
Government nonmilitary grants.....	-2.1	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6	-1.9
Pensions and remittances.....	-.6	-.7	-.7	-.8	-.8	-.9
Long-term capital account.....	-.9	-3.0	-3.5	-2.1	-3.4	-2.5
U.S. direct investment <sup>4</sup> .....	-.7	-1.6	-1.1	-1.4	-1.7	-1.7
Other private U.S. investment.....	-.2	-.9	-1.4	-.9	-.9	-.6
Government loans (less repayments).....	-.2	-.8	-1.0	-.4	-1.1	-.7
Foreign long-term investment <sup>5</sup> .....	.2	.4	.....	.6	.3	.4
Balance on "basic" accounts (entries above).....	-1.4	-2.2	-3.6	-4.3	-1.9	-.1
U.S. short-term capital and foreign commercial credit.....	-.2	-.5	-.4	.1	-1.4	-1.0
Errors and omissions.....	.4	.3	.4	.5	-.6	-.4
Over-all balance [deficit (-)].....	-1.2	-2.3	-3.5	-3.7	-3.9	-1.5

<sup>1</sup> First 3 quarters at seasonally adjusted annual rate.

<sup>2</sup> Net of foreign military purchases in the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Excludes subsidiary earnings not repatriated.

<sup>4</sup> Excludes reinvested subsidiary earnings, amounting to \$1.3 billion in 1960.

<sup>5</sup> Excludes reinvested subsidiary earnings, amounting to \$0.2 billion in 1960.

NOTE.—Minus signs indicate payments to foreigners.

Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on Department of Commerce data.

ing direct investments in business enterprise abroad, private purchases of foreign securities, U.S. Government loans, and long-term investments by foreigners in the United States; (3) *short-term capital account*, including commercial credits under one year and U.S. purchases of foreign short-term securities; (4) *over-all balance*, comprising net purchases of monetary gold and convertible currencies plus decreases in U.S. liquid liabilities to foreigners.

The accounts are, of course, far more interrelated than a simple classification of transactions suggests; foreign aid, private direct investment, and private remittances often consist in shipment abroad of U.S. goods. Even dollar outflows which are not so closely linked to the purchase of U.S. goods and services frequently result in reverse payments to the United States, either directly from the immediate recipient or indirectly through transactions involving third countries. The volume of our exports and indeed the size of the trade surplus are thus not independent of the size of our government outlays and private investments overseas.

The first account covers international transactions which relate to the earning and spending of national income. A surplus in this account means that the Nation as a whole is earning more than it is spending in its relations with the rest of the world, and this "saving" leads to an increase in the net assets of the country. Throughout the period covered by the table, the United States had a substantial merchandise trade surplus which, with other current receipts, was usually enough to pay for large overseas military expenditures and government grants for foreign reconstruction and development. In the first three quarters of 1961, the surplus on current account and unilateral transfers was at an annual rate of \$2.4 billion.

The second account summarizes the transactions of the United States as an investing nation. In recent years the United States, as Table 17 shows, has invested in long-term foreign assets more than its surplus on current account and unilateral transfers. It has also lent to foreigners substantial amounts of short-term capital, as the third account in the table shows. The excess of our long-term investment and short-term lending over our surplus on current account and unilateral transfers—the over-all deficit—has been financed by increasing our liquid liabilities to foreigners and by selling gold.

The present payments problem of the United States is not one of solvency. The Nation is not "living beyond its means"; rather, its means are steadily increasing. At the end of 1960, the U.S. Government owned foreign assets totaling \$21 billion, in addition to its gold holdings of \$18 billion; and U.S. citizens owned another \$50 billion in assets abroad (Table 18). In total, U.S. net claims on foreigners (including reinvested subsidiary earnings on investments abroad) rose by \$4 billion in 1960, and the increase was perhaps as much in 1961. These increases substantially exceeded our losses of gold. Our foreign assets give basic long-run strength to the dollar; but because most of these assets are either privately owned or long-term investments or both, they cannot be quickly mobilized.

TABLE 18.—*International investment and gold position of the United States, 1949 and 1960*

[Billions of dollars, end of year]

Assets and liabilities	1949	1960 <sup>1</sup>
Assets.....	55.2	89.2
Gold, IMF subscription, and short-term.....	28.6	26.8
Monetary gold.....	24.6	17.8
International Monetary Fund subscription <sup>2</sup> .....	2.8	4.1
Short-term private.....	1.3	4.9
Long-term.....	26.6	62.4
Direct investment.....	10.7	32.7
Other private investment.....	4.9	12.6
U.S. Government claims <sup>3</sup> .....	11.0	17.0
Liabilities.....	16.9	44.7
Liquid.....	9.8	26.2
Short-term, by holders:		
Foreign official <sup>4</sup> .....	2.9	10.3
International Monetary Fund <sup>5</sup> .....	1.3	2.6
Other international organizations <sup>4</sup> .....	.4	1.4
Private <sup>6</sup> .....	4.6	9.6
Foreign and international holdings of U.S. Government bonds and notes.....	.6	2.3
Long-term.....	7.1	18.4
Direct investment.....	2.9	6.9
Other private investment.....	4.2	11.5
Excess of assets over liabilities.....	38.3	44.5

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.<sup>2</sup> Under current practices of IMF, the United States has a virtually automatic right to draw the amount of its subscription less the amount of U.S. liabilities to IMF as shown in the lower part of the table.<sup>3</sup> Includes U.S. Government claims in inconvertible currencies.<sup>4</sup> As reported by banks in the U.S.<sup>5</sup> Noninterest-bearing notes (and, in 1949, deposits).<sup>6</sup> Includes estimated foreign holding of U.S. currency and other liquid claims not accounted for elsewhere.

Note.—Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

It is useful to distinguish net payments resulting from merchandise trade, services, unilateral transfers, and long-term investment—the so-called basic accounts—from net payments resulting from the more volatile, and sometimes substantial, flows of short-term capital. The balance on basic accounts and the over-all balance are shown in Table 17 and Chart 11. In 1959 the “basic” deficit was larger than the over-all deficit because of net inflows of short-term capital, while in 1960 and again in 1961 the over-all deficit exceeded the deficit on basic accounts as a result of net outflows of short-term capital.


The *over-all balance* exerts a significant influence on the liquidity position of the United States. The change in the U.S. position resulting from over-all deficits in the past decade can be seen from the reduction in the monetary gold stock and the increase in U.S. liquid liabilities to foreigners, shown in Table 18 and Chart 12.

*Reserves and liquid liabilities.* In 1949, the United States held 70 per cent of the world monetary gold stock and half of the world total of official gold and foreign exchange reserves. Capital seeking haven from the political disruptions of the 1930's, followed by the import needs of war-torn Europe, produced this undue concentration of world reserves. In those

CHART 11

## Balance of Trade and Payments

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS



circumstances, deficits in the U.S. balance of payments served the very useful function of rebuilding the depleted reserves of other countries.

Countries chose to replenish reserves largely by holding dollars rather than by purchasing gold. While cumulative deficits totaled \$23 billion in the past 12 years (Chart 12), U.S. gold sales amounted to just \$7 billion, of which \$5 billion represented reacquisition of gold that the United States had obtained in the early postwar period. The rest of the deficit was settled by an increase in foreign dollar holdings.

Despite the continuous rise in foreign dollar holdings, the liquidity position of the United States is strong. The importance of the United States in international trade and international banking, the facilities offered by the New York money market, and the variety and quality of goods, services, and securities which dollars command within the United States make it advantageous for foreigners to hold large dollar balances. These working balances will not readily be withdrawn, although they are not entirely insensitive to yield opportunities abroad. Furthermore, as world trade expands, the size of these working balances is likely to rise.

The present position of the United States is satisfactory as long as foreign holders of dollars are confident that the gold value of the currency will be maintained. Loss of confidence can, however, result in a serious "run." Indeed—as the failures of basically sound and solvent com-



mercial banks before the days of deposit insurance testify—there is no conceivable liquidity position which can withstand general loss of confidence.

*Payments deficits and gold losses.* As U.S. experience in the past 12 years indicates, there is only a loose link between external deficits and gold losses. Deficits occur when total payments to foreigners exceed total receipts from foreigners; a decline in gold reserves occurs when a foreign government or central bank converts dollars into gold at the U.S. Treasury. A deficit in the balance of payments need not, and usually does not, coincide with an equal decline in gold reserves. Foreigners may increase their dollar holdings by part or all of the deficit—or, as happened in 1956, even by more than the deficit (Chart 12). Similarly, this country may lose gold even when it has a balance of payments surplus, if foreign official institutions wish to convert dollars acquired in the past.

Payments deficits contribute indirectly to gold losses by adding to the supply of dollars in foreign hands, thus increasing the likelihood that they will be acquired by governments which may wish to convert them into gold. Moreover, the fact that there are persistent payments deficits may reduce foreigners' willingness to hold dollars.

Three years of large payments deficits contributed to a temporary decline in confidence in the dollar and to the large gold sales of late 1960. An outflow of short-term funds began in mid-1960 as a normal response to higher interest rates abroad, but it was augmented when doubts arose about the stability of the dollar, as evidenced by substantial private purchases of gold on the London market. These doubts reflected a number of factors: the large payments deficits of 1958 and 1959 and the loss of gold associated with them, the outflow of funds early in 1960 associated with differentials in interest rates, the initial rise in the London gold price, and fears that strong action to defend the dollar would not be taken. Confidence was restored when the new Administration declared and demonstrated its determination to defend the dollar, intensified measures taken by the previous Administration to reduce the payments deficit, and inaugurated new measures.

#### *Recent Developments Affecting the U.S. Payments Position*


Although the United States has been running deficits in its international accounts since 1950, these deficits were moderate in amount and did not cause concern until 1958. Concern has arisen since then, partly because of the unexpected persistence of large deficits and partly because the deficits could not be attributed to temporary developments likely to be soon reversed. Several significant new factors changed the U.S. position in the world economy: (1) The establishment of external currency convertibility by most of the European countries at the end of 1958 removed an important barrier to international capital flows. (2) The establishment of the European Economic Community promised a large, rapidly growing, tariff-free market in Europe, holding out much the same investment opportunities as the

CHART 12


## Changes in U. S. Gold Stock and Liquid Liabilities to Foreigners

(Annual and Cumulative)

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS



BILLIONS OF DOLLARS



\*FIRST 3 QUARTERS.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TREASURY DEPARTMENT, AND BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.

tariff-free internal market of the United States. (3) Intercontinental ballistic missiles and restoration of political stability in Western Europe reduced the special attractions of the United States as a haven for funds and as a location for capital investment. (4) The large overseas military expenditures and extensive foreign aid programs of the United States came to be clearly recognized as long-term commitments. (5) The decline of the U.S. trade surplus, from \$6 billion in 1957 to a postwar low of \$1 billion in 1959, focused attention on the long-run improvement in the competitive position of Western European countries and Japan relative to the United States—an improvement caused mainly by remarkable advances in output and productivity in those countries. (6) In addition, a sharp rise in certain key prices in the United States relative to those of major competitors weakened the competitiveness of some U.S. products in world markets. (This development is described in Chapter 4.) (7) By 1958, gold and foreign exchange reserves of many European countries had been rebuilt from their depleted postwar levels; U.S. payments deficits were no longer needed for this purpose.

These developments occurred within a short span of years and affected not only the U.S. payments position itself but attitudes and expectations about its future. The U.S. economy, which was geared to the entirely different environment of the years of “dollar shortage,” suddenly had to adjust to a new situation. In brief, the required readjustment is that the United States must pay for overseas military commitments, grants, and investments to a greater extent by an export surplus earned in stiff world competition, and to a lesser extent by selling gold and accumulating liquid liabilities to foreigners. For the domestic economy, this implies changes in the structure of prices, wages, investment, and employment and a new orientation of American enterprise to world markets. A complete readjustment of this nature takes time.

#### POLICIES TO IMPROVE THE U.S. PAYMENTS POSITION

In the new environment of the 1960's, the United States cannot continue deficits of the size of the late 1950's. The balance of payments objective for the United States is to attain, at high employment levels, a balanced position in its basic international accounts during the next few years. We must move toward equilibrium at a pace which demonstrates clearly that the balance of payments is under control.

The objective of a balanced basic position does not mean that balance must be maintained continuously. In some years, a surplus in international payments will be appropriate; in other years, a deficit. But the average position over a period of years must be strong enough to maintain confidence in the parity of the dollar.

The primary task is to improve the position of the basic accounts. Progress toward balance in these accounts will itself diminish the likelihood of sustained short-term capital outflows. Therefore, in a discussion of pro-

pects and policies for improving the balance of payments position, it is convenient to discuss, first, the basic accounts, and then the short-term capital account.

### *Basic Accounts*

The underlying trend of the basic accounts position is not easy to discern from current quarterly and yearly statistics. It is difficult to disentangle movements of lasting significance from changes resulting from seasonal, cyclical, and random factors. When, in the first half of 1961, slack in the U.S. economy combined with boom conditions in Europe and Japan to bring our basic accounts into temporary surplus, it would have been clearly wrong to conclude that the problem was permanently solved. Conversely, subsequent reappearance of a deficit on basic accounts, which may even rise temporarily as recovery proceeds in the United States, reflects a reversal of cyclical influences rather than a deterioration in the underlying position. Long-run improvement resulting from competitive adjustments and government policies may be masked by temporary developments here and abroad.

The dimensions of the problem facing the United States may be indicated by the basic international accounts in the six-month period embracing the second and third quarters of 1961—the latest 6 months for which complete information is available—expressed in terms of annual rates (Table 19). Overseas military expenditures, less foreign military purchases in this country, were running at \$2.4 billion in mid-1961. Government grants and loans amounted to \$3.7 billion, but \$2.5 billion of these resulted directly in the export of U.S. goods and services, leaving \$1.2 billion to be otherwise financed. Long-term private investment abroad was running at about \$2.0 billion, and pensions and remittances to foreigners cost nearly \$900 million.

The overseas commitments and investments, resulting in payments of \$6.4 billion ( $2.4 + 1.2 + 2.0 + 0.9$ , rounded), must somehow be financed by net receipts from other transactions. This requirement was partially met by debt repayments by foreign governments (excluding special prepayments in April) and net earnings on services (excluding military transactions and receipts associated with government aid) amounting to \$2.2 billion at an annual rate. Full balance in the basic accounts would, therefore, have required a merchandise trade surplus (excluding exports financed directly by government grants and loans) of \$4.2 billion. This contrasts with the trade surplus of \$2.8 billion actually achieved. The resulting deficit of \$1.4 billion had to be financed by a sale of gold and an increase in our liquid liabilities to foreigners.

Without temporary cyclical factors, the gap would probably somewhat exceed the deficit of \$1.4 billion on basic accounts actually experienced during this period, since our gross national product (GNP) was still far below full employment levels. At full employment, imports can be expected to be higher than they were in mid-1961.

TABLE 19.—United States balance of international payments, 1960-61

[Millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

Type of transaction	1960, fourth quarter	1961			
		First quarter	Second quarter	Third quarter <sup>1</sup>	Second and third quarters (annual rates)
Current account and transfers, excluding major Government transactions.....	1,312	1,389	1,211	617	3,656
Merchandise trade balance <sup>2</sup> .....	999	1,080	911	488	2,798
Net balance on services <sup>3</sup> .....	543	519	521	340	1,722
Pensions and remittances.....	-230	-210	-221	-211	-864
Major Government transactions.....	-861	-870	<sup>5</sup> -713	-819	<sup>5</sup> -3,064
Military expenditures, net <sup>4</sup> .....	-642	-689	-611	-605	-2,432
Government grants and loans.....	-1,013	-1,000	-822	-1,014	-3,672
Exports of goods financed by Government grants and loans.....	563	580	452	605	2,114
Exports of services financed by Government grants and loans.....	86	107	87	115	404
Repayments of Government loans.....	145	132	<sup>5</sup> 181	80	<sup>5</sup> 522
Private long-term capital, net.....	-991	-356	-459	-542	-2,002
Balance on "basic" accounts (entries above).....	-540	163	<sup>5</sup> 39	-744	<sup>5</sup> -1,410
U.S. short-term capital and foreign commercial credit.....	-567	-484	-31	-240	-542
Errors and omissions.....	-327	-25	-409	125	-568
Over-all balance [deficit (-)].....	-1,434	-346	<sup>5</sup> -401	-859	<sup>5</sup> -2,520

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.<sup>2</sup> Excludes exports of goods financed by Government grants and loans.<sup>3</sup> Excludes military expenditures, net, and exports of services financed by Government grants and loans.<sup>4</sup> Includes private expenditures of foreign exchange by United States forces and their dependents; net of foreign military purchases in the United States.<sup>5</sup> Excludes \$649 million in receipts from foreign governments through extraordinary debt repayments.

Note.—Minus signs indicate payments to foreigners.

Source: Based on Department of Commerce data.

The payments position in the second and third quarters of 1961 reflects to only a small extent the impact of government balance of payments policies initiated during the year. The full effects of these measures, and of further measures planned or proposed, will take time. So will the full response of U.S. industry to the increased competitive challenge from abroad and to the improvement in the U.S. competitive position achieved in the past two years. But the gap to be narrowed and eventually closed is not large, less than 10 percent of our exports of goods and services and less than one-half of 1 percent of our GNP. Though it will take time to make the needed adjustments and for their effects to outweigh unfavorable cyclical factors, U.S. international reserves provide ample means to cover interim deficits on the basic accounts.

Improvement in the U.S. balance of payments is more than a U.S. problem. Our deficit is matched by corresponding surpluses elsewhere, especially in Europe. Unless the surplus countries allow their surpluses to decline, we cannot reduce our deficit without accentuating the payments problems of other deficit countries. Surplus and deficit countries bear joint responsibility for rectifying payments imbalances and for maintaining the

stability of the international monetary system during the period of adjustment.

Reducing the basic deficit involves either diminishing the outflows on government and net capital account or increasing the current account surplus. Both these approaches are being taken. Measures to reduce the payments deficit must be consistent with the primary objectives of U.S. policy: to fulfill foreign economic and military obligations, to encourage the flow of goods, services, and capital among nations, and to expand the U.S. economy. There is no single dramatic cure-all for the payments problem. Accordingly, the Administration is pursuing a variety of measures on many fronts.

*Military outlays.* U.S. military outlays in foreign countries have averaged nearly \$3 billion annually during the last six years even after foreign purchases of military equipment in the United States are deducted. These overseas expenditures by and for U.S. forces—for construction, logistical support, services, and personal purchases—are an integral part of the national defense effort. In addition, the United States provides substantial military grants in kind, valued at \$1.8 billion in 1960, to the governments of friendly nations.

The Department of Defense has taken several measures to conserve foreign exchange, including increased procurement of its supplies from U.S. sources even at higher cost to the federal budget.

More than half of the military outlays are in Europe. The Berlin situation is causing an increase in these outlays. The United States is currently discussing with the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO Allies measures which would have the effect of offsetting these dollar outlays for defense purposes. The Federal Republic of Germany is already making a substantial contribution in this regard. It is the objective of the Administration to work out arrangements which would offset as much of our overseas military expenditures as is feasible.

*Government loans and grants.* Government loans and grants have shifted markedly since the early 1950's from European countries and Japan to the less developed countries, and have risen from \$2.5 billion annually in the mid-1950's to an annual rate of \$3.8 billion during the first three quarters of 1961. Repayments on past government loans rose steadily during the 1950's, and in 1960 they exceeded \$600 million.

The growing size of our aid expenditures reflects the pressing needs of the less developed countries for capital. The recent U.S. payments deficits, however, have necessitated policies to reduce the foreign exchange cost of these programs. The President has instructed the aid agencies to tie development aid directly to purchases of U.S. goods and services wherever possible. In the first nine months of 1961, before this policy had taken full effect, nearly 70 percent of government loans and grant disbursements resulted directly in the export of U.S. goods and services.

Though a policy of tied aid may be unavoidable under present conditions, it has the twofold disadvantage of reducing the efficiency of a given level of aid and of shielding some U.S. export industries from foreign com-

petition. When the United States achieves over-all balance in its international accounts, it will be appropriate to discuss with European countries, Japan, and Canada the possibility of putting all the development aid of industrial countries on an untied basis.

The United States has encouraged other industrial countries to increase their aid efforts and to provide aid on an untied basis when their payments positions permit. Recent arrangements among several industrial countries to provide assistance for the development programs of India and Pakistan are examples of a new cooperative approach. Increased flows of development capital are of vital importance not only to the developing countries but also to the industrial countries, which will be able to sell to a vastly expanded market as the incomes and foreign exchange earnings of the less developed countries rise.

*Private long-term investment.* A highly developed economy like that of the United States today is quite naturally a source of capital for investment beyond, as well as within, its borders. This country is the world's largest source of savings. Since the United States is far ahead of many countries both in applied technology and in productive facilities per worker, there are bound to be attractive opportunities abroad for duplicating our advanced techniques of production.

Private long-term investment averaged \$2.6 billion a year in the last five years, substantially higher than in the early 1950's. In addition, re-invested earnings of U.S. subsidiaries abroad averaged \$1.1 billion annually. In 1961, U.S. private long-term investment abroad is estimated to have been about \$2.3 billion.

While outflows of U.S. capital are adding to our national wealth foreign properties which may yield substantial return flows of earnings in the balance of payments over future years, these outflows increase the payments deficit in the short run.

Since 1958-59, the share of U.S. direct investment outflows going toward Europe has increased substantially. The promise of an expanding European Common Market has enhanced the attractiveness of Europe as a location for production. Flows of saving to develop productive opportunities abroad increase the efficiency of the world economy. However, capital is not allocated efficiently when it moves primarily in response to tax advantages or to restrictive or discriminatory trade barriers abroad. If the President's trade program is enacted and the new common external tariff in Europe is reduced through negotiations, artificial incentives to invest behind the European tariff wall will be reduced. This is one important way in which an expansionist trade policy will improve the U.S. payments position.

The Administration has also proposed changes in the tax treatment of foreign income which, in addition to achieving greater equity relative to tax treatment of domestic income, will ease our balance of payments deficit. Under the President's proposal, earnings on U.S. investments in other

industrial countries would be taxed on the same basis as corporate earnings in the United States. This would be achieved by taxing U.S. corporations each year on their current share of the undistributed profits realized in that year by subsidiary corporations organized in economically advanced countries. Any decline in the outflow of U.S. capital resulting from a withdrawal of existing tax inducements would be consistent both with efficiency in the allocation of capital resources in the world and with equity between U.S. firms operating abroad and competing firms located in the United States. Legislation has also been proposed which would curtail tax haven privileges.

An additional proposal, discussed in earlier chapters, would provide a tax credit to spur domestic investment.

These measures, along with rising domestic activity, would increase the relative attractiveness of domestic, as opposed to foreign, investment. A higher rate of domestic economic expansion would increase the attractiveness of the United States for investment by foreigners.

The United States is urging countries in Western Europe to liberalize restrictions on the outflow of capital owned by their residents in order to permit more foreign capital issues to be offered in their markets and to permit more investment in the United States and in underdeveloped countries. Many European countries still limit foreign issues in their capital markets and control tightly purchases of foreign securities by their residents.

*Services.* Net exports of services, excluding military expenditures and sales, were at an annual rate of \$2.3 billion during the first three quarters of 1961. These services include travel expenditures, transportation services, royalties, interest, and dividends. Repatriated earnings on U.S. investments abroad, which are counted as receipts for services in the balance of payments accounts, amounted to \$3.2 billion in 1960. Our expenditures on foreign travel were \$1.7 billion, and foreigners spent nearly \$1.0 billion in this country.

During 1961, an Office of Tourism was established in the Department of Commerce to encourage foreign travel to the United States. In addition, the duty-free tourist allowance for returning U.S. travelers was reduced from \$500 to \$100 a person.

The proposed change in tax provisions regarding overseas investment should result in an increase in the repatriation of earnings from U.S. investments abroad.

*Merchandise trade.* Merchandise trade has earned large net receipts in every year since the war. The trade surplus has on average increased, but it has not increased sufficiently to cover the combined rise in overseas military, foreign aid, and investment outlays.

Restrictive commercial policies would be one way to try to check imports and increase the trade surplus. But raising tariffs and imposing quotas, while perhaps improving the trade position temporarily, would be



inconsistent with the liberal trade objectives of the United States and would invite retaliatory action abroad, thus reversing any temporary gains.

Imports could also be checked by restraining domestic economic activity. But this would be an absurdly costly policy for the United States because imports comprise only a small part of each dollar of final demand. To obtain a \$1 billion reduction in imports might require a \$25–35 billion reduction of GNP. Even this decrease in imports would not result in an equivalent improvement in the trade balance, for, as the dollar earnings of other countries declined, some of our best customers would curtail their purchases in the United States. Moreover, the prospects for fundamental balance of payments improvement would be dim in a continuously slack economy beset by excess capacity and deficient in incentives to make investments at home which raise productivity and lower costs. Sacrificing recovery for a temporary gain in the balance of payments position would be shortsighted and would not inspire confidence in the dollar.

Clearly, our efforts to improve the trade position must be expansive rather than restrictive. A program has been established under the direction of the Department of Commerce to promote exports, both by increasing awareness among U.S. businessmen of sales opportunities abroad and by increasing foreign awareness of the wide array and high quality of U.S. products. The program includes regional conferences and a more active field service in the United States to provide information on foreign markets, trade exhibits and missions abroad, and an increased number of government commercial representatives to aid the U.S. businessman abroad.

In addition to improving the flow of information about export possibilities, steps have been taken to improve U.S. competitiveness in the important dimensions of credit availability and export insurance for commercial and political risks—steps designed to place the U.S. businessman on a par with foreign exporters. The Export-Import Bank has established, in cooperation with the commercial banks and a group of insurance companies, simplified and expanded opportunities for obtaining credit and export insurance. An exporter is now able to arrange for full credit and insurance advantages directly with his local bank.

A fundamental requirement for increasing our trade balance is a domestic environment of full recovery and growth without inflation. We must exploit the gains in productivity available from bringing into full use the excess capacity now prevalent in U.S. industry, and we must speed the advance of U.S. technology. The measures to accelerate the growth of productivity outlined in Chapter 2 are, for these reasons, essential elements of policy for long-run improvement in the balance of payments. In particular, the tax credit for investment proposed by the President and the revision of depreciation guidelines underway at the Treasury will promote investment at home and make American industry more competitive. It is true that economic growth, by raising incomes in the United States, will tend to increase the purchases of foreign goods by U.S. consumers and

businesses. But economic growth achieved through advances in productivity and improvements in technology will also enable U.S. goods to compete more effectively with foreign products both in the United States and in foreign markets. The technological leadership and high productivity of the United States have proved in the past to be vital sources of our comparative advantage in world markets. And today, the most rapidly growing countries in the free world generally rank among those with the strongest international payments positions.

An accelerated advance in productivity will be of little help to the balance of payments, however, if the improvements are eroded away by increases in money costs and prices. The price increases of 1955-57 impaired the competitive position of several important U.S. industries in world markets. More recently, price and wage developments in the United States have been favorable relative to those in other countries. The stability of U.S. prices in the last three years, and the reasons for optimism concerning U.S. prices in the current economic recovery, are discussed in Chapter 4. Policies to avoid cost inflation at home can be reinforced by a liberal trade policy which expands the area of international competition to which U.S. producers are exposed.

The future course of exports will depend not only on U.S. policies but also on business activity, prices and wages, and commercial policy abroad. Successful international trade negotiations under the proposed Trade Expansion Act will provide increasing opportunities for U.S. exports. In addition, the United States continues to press for the elimination of open and concealed discrimination against U.S. goods—agricultural products provide outstanding examples—and against the products of third countries, many of which are good customers of the United States.

The continued expansion of the European economies is of great importance for the future of U.S. exports. And the rapid growth of all the industrial countries is of vital concern to the primary producing countries whose exports have been largely stagnant in recent years. As the exports of the primary producing countries increase, their purchases from the United States and other industrial countries will expand.

#### *Short-Term Capital Account*

Dollars are transferred to foreigners not only through deficits in the basic accounts of the United States, but also through short-term lending by Americans to foreigners. Much of this lending is commercially oriented and often provides financing for American exports. During the first half of 1961, for example, a large part of the short-term capital outflow from the United States was used to finance an increase in exports from the United States and other countries to Japan. An increase in such commercial credit will be a natural consequence of policies taken during 1961 to boost U.S. exports.

However, some flows of short-term capital are not linked directly to export financing. These flows of funds, both U.S. and foreign owned, have increased markedly since the establishment of external currency convertibility of the leading European countries in 1958, the relaxation of restrictions on capital transactions by their own nationals, and the re-establishment of confidence in the stability of European currencies.

Short-term capital movements are sensitive to differences in interest rates between major financial centers. In late 1960, for example, when yields on short-term securities were substantially higher in Canadian and European markets than in the United States, a significant volume of U.S. funds moved abroad. Again in the last few months of 1961 substantial amounts of capital moved abroad to benefit from higher yields.

Liquid funds also move in hope or fear of changes in exchange rates or regulations. For example, the revaluations of the German mark and the Dutch guilder in March 1961 led to expectations of further revaluations and resulted in large short-term capital flows. Movements of this kind often reflect objective factors related to basic balance of payments positions. But they sometimes respond to rumor and opinion unrelated to the basic situation.

A notable feature of the U.S. balance of payments in the past two years was the sharp swing in the balancing item, "errors and omissions," from a net inflow through 1959 of some \$500 million a year to a net outflow of \$650 million in 1960 and a further \$400 million in the first half of 1961. Preliminary estimates for late 1961 also show a large unrecorded outflow. This change no doubt reflected a sizable transfer of U.S. capital abroad and a withdrawal of foreign private capital, both of which moved outside channels normally covered by our recording network.

Flows of short-term capital, although they frequently perform a useful function, can be seriously disruptive. They can be large, sudden, erratic, contagious, and self-reinforcing. Monetary authorities are gradually adjusting their policies and techniques to cope with these flows. During the past two years, several steps were taken to reduce the incentive to shift capital among financial centers. Foremost among these was increasing cooperation among central banks to avoid large differentials in short-term interest rates among countries. High interest rates in Europe were lowered in late 1960 and early 1961. U.S. monetary policy and technique have been adapted to the new international financial environment in the manner described in Chapter 1. Although the Federal Reserve has maintained generally easy money and credit conditions, U.S. short-term rates have been held above levels characteristic of previous recession and recovery periods.

In December 1961, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation raised permissible interest rates on commercial-bank time deposits. The ceiling rate for deposits exceeding 12 months was raised from 3 percent to 4 percent a

year. As banks move rates up to the new ceilings, they will increase the attractiveness of holding funds in the United States.

Finally, the U.S. Treasury has, for the first time since the mid-1930's, engaged in foreign exchange operations in cooperation with foreign central banks. The Treasury this year undertook transactions in German marks and Swiss francs, both on a current basis and in the forward exchange market. The aim was to increase the cost to traders and investors of exchange risk "cover" for movements out of dollars, diminishing the incentive to shift funds abroad and increasing the incentive to move funds here.

Although these policies will moderate the disruptive flows of short-term capital, they cannot eliminate them. Further measures are therefore needed to neutralize or minimize the possible effects of such flows on the international monetary system.

### MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM

Stability of the present world monetary system depends upon confidence in the value of the dollar. Therefore, a primary aim of the United States and of other countries must be to correct the underlying conditions which result in persistent U.S. deficits and persistent surpluses elsewhere. This is fundamental, but it will take time.

While policies to achieve this fundamental adjustment are taking effect, full confidence must be maintained in the ability of the United States to meet foreign demands for gold. There are a number of measures which can strengthen the "banking" or liquidity position of the United States while the fundamental adjustment of the payments position proceeds. Some of them apply to the dollar alone; others are general measures to strengthen the world monetary system. All of them require a high degree of international consultation and cooperation.

One means of strengthening the U.S. liquidity position, as well as its payments position' at a given time, is to obtain advance repayment of long-term debts owed to the U.S. Government. For example, in April the Federal Republic of Germany prepaid \$587 million to the United States. This translated a long-term U.S. asset partly into a reduction of short-term U.S. liabilities and partly into a rise in U.S. holdings of German marks. The United States still has outstanding about \$2 billion of long-term loans to countries that have strong payments positions.

The gross reserve position can also be strengthened by borrowing directly in foreign currencies from other governments or central banks. This device was employed recently on a small scale when the United States borrowed from Switzerland \$46 million in Swiss francs in order to support forward exchange operations of the Treasury.

Recently, there has been increasing recognition that, even when large movements of private short-term capital cannot be prevented, they can be

offset by reverse movements of official capital. In March 1961, several central banks agreed through the so-called Basle arrangements to extend short-term credit to the United Kingdom to offset the flight of private funds from London.

Several countries now consider their drawing rights on the International Monetary Fund as an integral part of their foreign exchange reserves. In his Balance of Payments Message of February 6, 1961, President Kennedy stated that "access to the Fund's resources must be regarded as a part of our international reserves" and that, if appropriate, the United States would use its drawing rights. The drawing from the Fund of currencies equivalent to \$1.5 billion by the United Kingdom in August, and the prompt repayment of \$420 million as British reserves rose, indicate the flexibility with which drawing rights on the Fund can be used to supplement reserves. Furthermore, in accordance with recent IMF policy, member countries have increasingly made drawings in currencies other than the dollar, which the Fund formerly relied on heavily for most of its operations. This policy puts to effective use the Fund's holdings of the currencies of surplus countries. But the Fund's holdings of some of these currencies may not be fully adequate to meet the potential demands for them.

Improvement of the Fund's access to the currencies of the major industrial countries was discussed at the annual Fund meeting in Vienna in September. It was announced in early January that ten industrial countries have agreed to lend amounts of their currencies totaling \$6 billion, to the Fund if these resources should be required to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international monetary system. Availability of these special resources should enable the Fund better to perform its function of financing temporary payments deficits in the interests of maintaining general exchange rate stability.

In his February Message the President said, "Increasing international monetary reserves will be required to support the ever-growing volume of trade, services and capital movements among the countries of the free world. Until now the free nations have relied upon increased gold production and continued growth in holdings of dollars and pounds sterling. In the future, it may not always be desirable or appropriate to rely entirely on these sources. We must now, in cooperation with other lending countries, begin to consider ways in which international monetary institutions—especially the International Monetary Fund—can be strengthened and more effectively utilized, both in furnishing needed increases in reserves, and in providing the flexibility required to support a healthy and growing world economy."

The agreement to supplement the resources of the Fund is an important step toward strengthening the international monetary system to meet the demands which the continuing economic progress of the free world will place upon it in the future.

Finally, the newly created Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, comprising 18 European countries, the United States, and Canada, provides a continuing forum in which payments imbalances and internal or international monetary problems of concern to all members—as well as trade, development aid and other matters of common interest—can be discussed frankly and constructively. Still another forum for international cooperation is provided by the monthly meetings of central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle. Although the United States is not a member of the Bank for International Settlements, representatives of the Federal Reserve System participate informally in the discussions.

These measures of cooperation among nations, together with the large gold reserves of the United States, give this country the time to carry through the necessary adjustment in its balance of payments—and to carry it through in ways consistent with general economic expansion at home and abroad, with promotion of a world economy in which goods, services, and capital flow freely, and with the responsibilities of world leadership. They give us time, but not time to waste.

## Chapter 4

# Price Behavior in a Free and Growing Economy

### THE OBJECTIVES

**P**RICE BEHAVIOR embraces both changes in the over-all *level* of prices throughout the economy and changes in price *structure*—the relation of particular prices to each other. Changes in either the level or the structure of prices have far-reaching influences which can affect for better or worse the performance of a free economy. Both aspects of price behavior are closely related to major problems which confront the U.S. economy today.

Our success in solving the international payments problem (discussed in the previous chapter) will depend to a major extent on our ability to avoid inflation. To recognize this compelling reason for price stability is not to say that stable prices are desirable only for their contribution to the achievement of equilibrium in our balance of payments. Even creeping inflation has effects on the distribution of income which are always capricious and often cruel, and it may generate perverse changes in the structure of prices. Galloping inflation is profoundly disruptive of economic efficiency and growth. But to these persisting arguments for avoiding inflation is now added the pressing and immediate need to strengthen the competitiveness of U.S. industry in world markets.

International competitiveness is affected by many considerations, including quality, variety, service, credit facilities, and promptness in delivery. But after full weight is given to these considerations, price remains at the heart of the matter. The effect of price developments on our international competitive position will not, of course, be determined by the behavior of U.S. prices alone; what counts is the change in the ratio of U.S. prices to the prices of those countries with which we compete in world markets. There is independent reason to expect in the next few years a moderate upward price trend in some competitive countries, but a decline in the ratio of our prices to theirs is obviously more likely if our own prices remain stable than if they rise.

Large potential gains in national economic welfare are at stake in the course of price developments over the next year or two. Stable prices—together with the many other measures to strengthen our payments position discussed in Chapter 3—will move us toward equilibrium in our inter-

national payments. This, in turn, will remove a possible impediment to the vigorous pursuit of full employment.

It is always possible to strengthen the balance of payments, at least for a time, by weakening the economy. Checking and reversing the economic expansion would reduce our demand for imports by reducing our demand for all goods and services. Raising interest rates sharply would probably attract some foreign capital to the United States, but it would raise the cost and reduce the volume of domestic expenditures for new business plant and equipment and residential construction. This road to balance of payments equilibrium endangers the interests of the whole Nation and specifically the interests both of labor and of business; for the former it increases unemployment, while for the latter it lowers profits. Both groups stand to gain from price level stability, which lays the foundation for the harmonious coexistence of balance of payments equilibrium with full employment and rapid economic growth.

Price level stability does not, of course, require stability of all prices. On the contrary, the structure of relative prices constitutes the central nervous system of a decentralized economy. Changing relative prices are the signals and stimuli which foster the efficiency and guide the growth of such an economy.

Changing relative prices serve to ration scarce goods and services. They encourage consumers and business firms to economize on the use of things which have grown scarcer, and to use more freely those things which have become more abundant. They attract resources into the production of those things for which demand has increased, and encourage the outflow of resources from the production of things for which demand has declined. They provide generous rewards to innovators, and then assure that the benefits arising from innovation are widely diffused throughout the economy. They direct economic activity into the most productive channels. A smoothly functioning price system, while it cannot solve all of the resource-use problems of our economy, is nevertheless an indispensable agent for reconciling decentralized private decision-making with national economic objectives.

In the context of current economic policy goals, flexible relative prices play an important role in encouraging maximum production and shaping the pattern of growth. As the economy approaches full utilization of productive resources, premature and stubborn bottlenecks may arise in some sectors while labor and capital are underutilized elsewhere. This danger is lessened if productive resources are sufficiently mobile to shift promptly into the sectors of the economy which are coming under pressure. Flexible price and wage relationships are not in themselves sufficient to assure that capital and labor will flow from relatively declining to relatively expanding sectors. But flexible price and wage relationships can smooth the process, both by signaling the directions in which resource movements should occur, and by providing incentives to encourage such



shifts. Prices must fall as well as rise, however, if changing relative prices are to play their role in guiding resource movements without forcing a steady rise in the over-all level of prices.

## THE PRESENT SITUATION

### *Price Developments in Perspective*

The frequent characterization of the postwar period as generally "inflationary" obscures two important facts. First, increases in wholesale prices were concentrated in three periods: 1946-48, 1950, and 1955-57. In the other 9 of the 16 postwar years taken together, the net movement of wholesale prices was downward. Second, since the middle of 1958, the wholesale price level in the United States has been stable, and there are signs that the inflationary impulses set off by the second World War and reinforced by the Korean conflict have been weakening.

*War-induced inflation.* By far the strongest burst of inflation occurred immediately after the end of the war, and for obvious reasons. The stock of consumers' and producers' durable goods had been depleted during the long years of depression and war. Private debt had been reduced, and the heavy reliance on public debt financing of the war had provided households and firms with large supplies of liquid assets.

The result was a demand for consumer goods and plant and equipment which far exceeded the capacity of the economy to produce them. Although the Federal Government ran a substantial cash surplus in the 1946-48 period, which had the effect of reducing total demand for goods and services, aggregate demand nevertheless outran supply until late in 1948. From the end of the war through September 1948, the consumer price index rose by 35.2 percent, and the wholesale price index by 54.4 percent. In the recession which followed, both consumer and wholesale prices fell, the former by 1.9 percent between November 1948 and October 1949, the latter by 6.5 percent.

A new burst of excess-demand inflation was set off by the Korean hostilities. Between June 1950 and February 1951, consumer prices rose by 8.0 percent and wholesale prices by 16.3 percent, as consumers and businesses, remembering the shortages of 1942-45, scrambled to build up stocks of goods.

These two inflationary episodes account for 70 percent of the increase in the level of consumer prices since the second World War, and more than account for the increase in the wholesale price level. Costs rose steeply in these periods, but the major force pulling prices upward was clearly pressure of excessive demand for a wide range of products.

*Post-Korean price stability.* The scare-buying of late 1950 and early 1951 drove prices to a level from which a mild reaction set in. From mid-1951 to mid-1955, except for construction costs and the index of services to consumers, most price indexes remained stable or fell. Consumer prices for

food and other commodities, as well as wholesale price indexes of farm and nonfarm commodities, were lower in mid-1955 than they had been in mid-1951, despite the fact that large parts of the economy had operated at near capacity levels from the fall of 1952 to the fall of 1953.

Construction costs failed to stabilize in the post-Korean period; while the average of wholesale prices fell by 5.7 percent between February 1951 and May 1955, the Department of Commerce index of construction costs rose by 8.8 percent.

Another exception to this record of stability—consumer services—is highly important. Services have a weight of about one-third in the consumer price index. Prices of services, taken as a group, have risen in every year since the war, and have accounted for much of the rise in the consumer price index.

Because of the heterogeneous character of the services category, no single explanation can account for the behavior of the services index. Some tentative observations may be made, however, about the forces influencing the prices of particular services. *Residential occupancy* costs, with a weight of about 42 percent within the services category, include rents, mortgage payments and interest, real estate taxes, and property insurance. Rents and home prices tend to be influenced in the short run by the vacancy rate, and in the long run by changes in construction costs, interest rates, and property taxes. Movements in all these components tended to push the index upward in the postwar period. In addition, the retention of rent controls in some important areas well into the postwar period tended to delay the adjustment of rents to market forces. *Medical care service* prices, with a weight of about 14 percent, have been rising steeply. This is a sector, however, in which there has probably been a substantial improvement in the quality of services. If it were possible to take account of quality changes in the index, the rate of increase would have been less. *Regulated utility services* (telephone, gas, electricity, and water), with a combined weight of about 10 percent, are subject to substantial price lags. Depreciation costs recognized for rate-making purposes have tended to rise as the share of low-priced prewar capital goods in the rate base has diminished and the share of higher-priced postwar goods has increased. *Public transportation services* (transit fares and railroad fares), with a combined weight of about 4 percent, may have been influenced to a limited extent by the same forces mentioned in connection with regulated utility services, and to a further extent by the effects of declining demand on unit cost in industries where overhead costs are high. *Personal care services* (men's haircuts and certain beauty parlor services), with a weight of about 3 percent, are services not readily susceptible to improvements in labor productivity, though wages in this sector tend to move up in step with economy-wide trends.

*Inflation, 1955-58.* The relative price stability which began in 1951 gave way in 1955 to renewed inflationary pressure which persisted into early

1958. Although prices rose far less sharply than in 1946-48 or 1950-51, consumer prices rose by 8.0 percent from May 1955 to March 1958, and wholesale prices increased by 8.9 percent.

In contrast to the two earlier inflationary bursts, there is still considerable uncertainty as to the causes of rising prices during this period. A simple explanation running in terms of over-all excess demand is not satisfactory. If aggregate excess demand prevailed at all, it existed only briefly toward the end of 1955. After the end of 1955, capacity utilization slackened as investment created capacity more rapidly than final demands were increasing. Employment of production workers in manufacturing began to decline in the latter half of 1956 and was lower in 1957 than in 1955. The average work-week in manufacturing declined over this period—from 40.7 hours in 1955 to 40.4 in 1956 to 39.8 in 1957. Unemployment as a percent of the civilian labor force, seasonally adjusted, dipped below 4.0 percent in only three months during the entire period.

Any explanation of the 1955-58 price experience must give special weight to the fact that the 1955-57 boom was concentrated in durable manufactured goods. Demand strained production capacity in the machinery and equipment industries. Except for the third quarter of 1956, in which a strike occurred, the iron and steel industry operated at a rate above 90 percent of capacity from the second quarter of 1955 through the first quarter of 1957. Automobile production set an all-time record in 1955.

In this sector of the economy, prices and wages rose sharply. More than three-fourths of the 1955-58 rise in the index of wholesale industrial prices was directly attributable to price increases in metals and metal products and machinery and motive products (including motor vehicles). Substantial employment cost increases were negotiated in the automobile settlement of 1955 and the steel settlement of 1956. Both were three-year agreements, with the result that large wage commitments made in a boom environment became effective as the economy was slowing down. Price and wage behavior in this sector initiated impulses which spread to other parts of the economy, both via increases in materials and equipment cost and via imitative influences in wage settlements.

Elements of major importance in the 1955-58 episode were thus the existence of relatively high demand, principally in one sector of the economy; the use of market power by management to maintain profit margins despite rising costs; the exercise of market power by labor unions in an effort to capture a substantial share of rising profits for their membership; and the transmission of these developments to other sectors of the economy.

One of the striking and significant aspects of the 1955-58 inflation was the leading part played by industries which are important exporters. Metals, machinery, and transport equipment make up about two-thirds of U.S. exports of manufactures. What in this context is more important, these U.S. prices rose faster than the prices for similar goods in foreign countries. To take but one example, between 1956 and 1958 U.S. steel

prices rose nearly 20 percent more than the average price rise in five other major steel exporting countries.

During this period the United States experienced a noteworthy decline in its share of world exports of manufactures—from 30 percent in 1956 to 27½ percent in 1958. The decline was even sharper for some product groups; the U.S. share of world exports of iron and steel products, for example, declined from 19 percent to 14 percent. The relative increase in U.S. prices probably contributed—along with the rapid postwar growth in capacity and output abroad—to the drop in American export shares.

*Price behavior since 1958.* Since mid-1958, there has been stability on the average in the prices of commodities at wholesale and retail, with a continuing upward trend in consumer service prices. This record of relative price stability is in part the result of widespread excess capacity in the last few years, but it may also reflect a weakening of lagged price responses to the sharply inflationary episodes of 1946–48 and 1950–51.

An important element in the cessation of inflationary pressure has been the stability shown in the prices of metals and machinery. The index of metal and metal products, which rose by 17 percent from the beginning of 1955 to the end of 1956, and drifted irregularly upward through late 1959, has since remained below its 1959 high. The index of machinery and motive products, which rose by 22 percent from January 1955 to September 1959, has also been stable since then. Steel prices were raised once a year in the period 1952–58, for a total increase of 50 percent, but have not been raised since 1958.

Movements in construction costs are in sharp contrast to this pattern of price stability. After increasing against the general price trend over 1951–55, they rose 10.5 percent from May 1955 through March 1958—an increase significantly greater than the 8.9 percent rise in the wholesale price level over the same period. From March 1958 through December 1961, the increase was 5.8 percent.


As Chart 13 shows, a period of stability in the wholesale price index tends to be a period of slow rise in the consumer price index and in the implicit price index for GNP. The reason for the divergent behavior of consumer prices is primarily the service component already discussed; the price index for GNP rises because of the methods of measurement used for the government sector (in which no allowance is made for productivity increase), and for plant and equipment spending (where only partial allowance is made for quality change).

The chart also calls attention to an important difference between price behavior in the 1961 recovery and in the recovery of 1958. In 1958, stability in the wholesale price index resulted from a significant reduction in the prices of farm products and processed foods, balanced by a rise in industrial prices. In the first 10 months of recovery in 1958–59, the index for industrial commodities rose by 1.8 percent. By contrast, in 1961, the index of industrial prices fell by 0.3 percent between February and


CHART 13

# Price Developments


INDEX, 1961 = 100 (Ratio scale)



INDEX, 1947-49 = 100 (Ratio scale)



INDEX, 1947-49 = 100 (Ratio scale)



NOTE: TOP PANEL, QUARTERLY DATA; OTHER PANELS, MONTHLY DATA.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

December, reinforcing rather than offsetting a fall of 1.9 percent in farm and food prices. In all of the previous postwar recoveries, by contrast, the index of wholesale industrial prices rose over the first 10 months of recovery.

From the recession's turning point in February, through November, consumer prices rose by 0.6 percent. While this was a greater increase than the 0.2 percent by which the index rose in the first 9 months of recovery from the 1958 trough, the difference in performance is attributable to movements in the retail food index, which fell more sharply after the 1958 upturn than in 1961. The behavior of other major components was similar in the two recoveries, except for rents, which rose slightly more in 1958 than they did in 1961.

More than three-fourths of the rise in consumer prices during 1961 was attributable to higher service prices, particularly advances for health insurance and other health services, movie admissions, rent, and public transportation. Moderating the rise in the service price index were lower average mortgage interest rates and stable average prices for utilities.

#### *Wage and Cost Developments in Perspective*

Wages and salaries are at the same time the principal cost to employers, the main source of income to employees, and the major source of demand to the economy as a whole.

If living standards are to rise over time, real wages must increase. Stability in the general price level means, therefore, that average money wage rates should follow a generally rising path. As output per man-hour increases, rising money wage rates can be absorbed into stable labor costs per unit of output. So long as unit labor costs do not increase, rising wages are fully compatible with stability in the price level.

Whatever its cause, a rising price level is characteristically accompanied by a rate of wage increase in excess of the rate of increase in output per man-hour. It is quite true, of course, that when employment costs per man-hour rise more rapidly than output per man-hour, prices sooner or later will increase. But it is equally true that, when prices are pulled up by excess demand, competition for labor will tend to raise employment costs per man-hour faster than output per man-hour increases. Thus wage increases will tend to outstrip productivity increases *both* when the inflationary pressures arise from cost and when they arise from demand. The mere coexistence of rising prices and wages rising faster than productivity tells nothing about causation.

*Postwar wage changes.* While wages rose throughout the postwar period, they rose more rapidly in the first part of the period than in more recent years. The primary cause of the most rapid increases lies in the excess demand which was the legacy of the second World War and which arose again during the Korean mobilization. Hourly compensation in manufacturing increased at an average rate of nearly 7 percent a year between 1947

and 1953; the rate of increase fell to 5 percent between 1953 and 1957, and to less than 4 percent between 1957 and 1961 (Table 20). The period 1947-53, of course, included most of the two war-induced inflationary booms.

TABLE 20.—*Changes in compensation and productivity in all private nonagricultural industries and in manufacturing industries, 1947 to 1961*

Item	Percentage change per year			
	1947 to 1961 <sup>1</sup>	1947 to 1953	1953 to 1957	1957 to 1961 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Private nonagricultural industries, all employees:</b>				
Average hourly compensation <sup>2</sup> .....	5.1	6.2	4.6	4.0
Output per man-hour.....	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.5
<b>Manufacturing industries, all employees:</b>				
Average hourly compensation <sup>2</sup> .....	5.5	6.8	5.0	3.9
Output per man-hour.....	2.9	3.2	1.8	3.7
<b>Manufacturing industries, production workers:</b>				
Average gross hourly earnings.....	4.7	6.1	4.2	3.1
Average hourly earnings adjusted to exclude overtime and inter- industry shifts.....	4.7	5.9	4.2	3.4

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup> Wages and salaries of all employees and supplements to wages and salaries such as employer contributions for social insurance, for private pension, health, and welfare funds, for injuries, for pay of the military reserve, etc.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Department of Labor.

In the post-Korean years—a period which included three of the four postwar recessions—over-all demand conditions played a less decisive role in wage behavior. The movement of wages during this period reflected in part the power exercised in labor markets by strong unions and the power possessed by large companies to pass on higher wage costs in higher prices. Although the high demand of the 1955-57 period was concentrated in the area of durable manufactures, wages also rose by substantial increments in some less prosperous but highly organized industries.

The post-Korean years were marked by the coincidence of relatively large wage increases with declines in industry employment. Table 21 illustrates these developments as they are reflected in changes in average hourly earnings and the number of production workers for selected industries. Earnings in textiles and apparel, typically lower than the average for all manufacturing industries, fell further behind during the years 1954-61. Workers in retail trade received percentage wage increases equal to the average of those in manufacturing; the initial low wage level and the increase in employment in retailing suggest that this rise in wages reflects pressure of demand. Construction worker employment increased, and wages rose more than the average for manufacturing; indeed, over the entire postwar period, average hourly earnings in construction have risen more than 100 percent against a rise of 80 percent for production workers in manufacturing. In manufacturing and mining, unionization was undoubt-

TABLE 21.—Changes in average hourly earnings and employment of production workers in selected industries, September 1954 to September 1961

Industry	Average hourly earnings (dollars)		Employment (thousands)		Percentage change, September 1954 to September 1961	
	September 1954	September 1961 <sup>1</sup>	September 1954	September 1961 <sup>1</sup>	Average hourly earnings	Employment
Manufacturing <sup>2</sup> .....	1.78	2.33	12,821	12,407	31	-3
Blast furnaces and basic steel products.....	2.29	3.17	537	513	38	-4
Motor vehicles and equipment.....	2.24	2.84	479	470	27	-2
Flat glass.....	2.49	3.16	26	25	27	-4
Fabricated metals.....	1.89	2.48	835	839	31	( <sup>3</sup> )
Metal cans.....	1.98	2.91	55	54	47	-2
Petroleum refining.....	2.42	3.21	142	108	33	-24
Tires and inner tubes.....	2.25	3.13	84	75	39	-11
Textile-mill products.....	1.35	1.64	955	804	21	-16
Apparel and related products.....	1.38	1.65	1,065	1,082	20	2
Bituminous coal mining.....	2.41	3.15	201	128	31	-36
Contract construction.....	2.40	3.22	2,489	2,603	34	5
Class I railroads.....	1.94	2.69	4,064	4,723	39	-32
Retail trade <sup>5</sup> .....	1.30	1.70	5,589	6,096	31	9

<sup>1</sup> Includes data for Alaska and Hawaii.

<sup>2</sup> Also includes industries not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Increase of less than 0.5 percent.

<sup>4</sup> Data relate to all employees.

<sup>5</sup> Excludes eating and drinking places.

Note.—Data relate to production workers or nonsupervisory employees, except as noted.

Source: Department of Labor.

edly a factor in the increase in wages during a period of declining employment; the above-average increase in wages in construction reflects both unionization and the stimulus of strong demand.

The effect of unionization is also reflected in the contrast between earnings and employment of salaried workers in manufacturing and those of production workers in manufacturing over the period. Although aggregate salaries in manufacturing have risen twice as rapidly as aggregate wages, annual disbursements per worker for salaried workers increased at an average rate of only 3.8 percent a year during the period 1947-61, while disbursements per production worker increased at a rate of 4.9 percent. At the same time, the number of salaried workers was increasing at a rate of 3.7 percent a year, and the number of production workers declining at a rate of 0.5 percent.

*Recent wage developments.* Although wages and fringe benefits have continued to increase throughout the economy, the rate of increase in hourly earnings in manufacturing has declined steadily since 1957. The decline has been not only steady but large; as Table 22 demonstrates, the rate of increase in adjusted hourly earnings has fallen by one-half since 1955-56. These percentage movements are consistent with recent declines in median wage increases, measured in cents per hour, under major collective bargaining contracts. These are shown in Table 23.



TABLE 22.—Changes in average hourly earnings and hourly compensation in manufacturing industries, 1955 to 1961

Period	Percentage increase			
	Adjusted hourly earnings <sup>1</sup>		Average hourly compensation <sup>2</sup>	
	Current prices	Constant prices <sup>3</sup>	Current prices	Constant prices <sup>3</sup>
1955 to 1956.....	5.4	3.8	6.2	4.6
1956 to 1957.....	5.1	1.7	6.0	2.5
1957 to 1958.....	4.1	1.3	3.9	1.1
1958 to 1959.....	3.4	2.5	4.1	3.2
1959 to 1960.....	3.3	1.8	4.1	2.5
1960 to 1961 <sup>3</sup> .....	2.7	1.6	3.4	2.3

<sup>1</sup> Wages of production workers adjusted to exclude overtime and interindustry shifts.

<sup>2</sup> Wages and salaries of all employees and supplements to wages and salaries such as employer contributions for social insurance, for private pension, health, and welfare funds, for injuries, for pay of the military reserve, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Department of Labor.

TABLE 23.—Median hourly wage increases negotiated or effective in major collective bargaining situations, 1956-61

Year	Median hourly wage increases (cents)	
	Negotiated during year	Negotiated or effective during year
1956.....	10.7	10.8
1957.....	10.6	12.7
1958.....	8.8	12.6
1959.....	8.8	8.8
1960.....	8.7	9.4
1961 <sup>1</sup> .....	7.0	8.0

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Data are limited to major collective bargaining situations (generally those affecting 1,000 or more workers) in manufacturing and selected nonmanufacturing industries. The latter exclude construction, the service trades, finance, and government.

Source: Department of Labor.

Further evidence of this decline in the magnitude of wage increases is presented in Table 24. This table shows, for 1959-61, an increase in the number of workers affected by zero or negative wage changes and a decline in the number of workers receiving large percentage wage increases in major negotiations. The percentage of employees receiving wage increases of 3½ percent or more declined from 64 percent in 1959 to 35 percent in 1961.

Smaller percentage increases in hourly wages do not necessarily imply smaller percentage increases in real wages. In recent years, annual increases in consumer prices have tended to become smaller and thus have offset, to some extent, lower rates of increase in adjusted hourly earnings and total hourly compensation in manufacturing.

TABLE 24.—*Employees affected by major collective bargaining negotiations, by wage change, 1959–61*

Wage change	1959		1960		1961 <sup>1</sup>	
	Thousands of employees	Percent of total	Thousands of employees	Percent of total	Thousands of employees	Percent of total
Total employees affected.....	3,343	100	4,508	100	3,600	100
No wage change.....	111	3	191	4	234	7
Decrease in wages.....	4	( <sup>2</sup> )	2	( <sup>2</sup> )	17	( <sup>2</sup> )
Increase in wages.....	3,228	97	4,314	96	3,350	93
Under 2½ percent.....	254	8	994	22	1,095	30
2½ and under 3.....	198	6	414	9	625	17
3 and under 3½.....	567	18	1,131	25	385	11
3½ and over.....	2,144	64	1,763	39	1,245	35
Not specified or computed.....	34	1	11	( <sup>2</sup> )	.....	.....

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup> Less than 0.5 percent.

NOTE.—Data relate to changes negotiated during the year. They exclude changes negotiated in earlier years (i.e., deferred increases) and cost-of-living escalator adjustments.

Data are limited to major collective bargaining situations (generally those affecting 1,000 or more workers) in manufacturing and selected nonmanufacturing industries. The latter exclude construction, the service trades, finance, and government.

Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Labor.

For example, in 1956–57, a 5.1 percent rise in adjusted hourly earnings (as shown in Table 22) was translated into an increase of only 1.7 percent in real adjusted hourly earnings because consumer prices rose by 3.4 percent. In 1959–60, on the other hand, money earnings increased by only 3.3 percent, but real earnings rose by 1.8 percent because of a slower rise in consumer prices. Similarly, total hourly compensation in money terms increased by 6.0 percent in 1956–57 and by only 4.1 percent in 1958–59; however, as a result of differences in price movements, the percentage rise in real compensation was greater in the second period than in the first.

The recent slowing down in the rates of increase of money wages may signify a gradual weakening of some of the cost pressures in the economy. However, the continuation of this trend is by no means certain. With long-term contracts, the industries affected by negotiations vary considerably from year to year, and the behavior of average wage rates in any year may be fortuitously influenced by this consideration. Thus, in 1960, negotiations were concluded in basic steel; in 1961 new long-term agreements were negotiated in automobiles, automotive parts, meat-packing, farm equipment, and construction. In 1962 major contracts will expire in basic steel, aluminum, fabricated metals, construction, aircraft, airlines, and the maritime industry. It must also be remembered that the period 1957–61 was characterized by relatively high rates of unemployment; the test of wage behavior in a period characterized by stronger demand for labor is still ahead.

*The shares of wages and profits.* Employee compensation as a percent of corporate sales rose somewhat between the immediate postwar years and 1953–54, but since then the employee share has been below the 1953–54 high with no clear trend either up or down. This is shown in Table 25.

TABLE 25.—*Relation of employee compensation, profits, and capital consumption allowances to sales: All private corporations, 1947-61*

Period	Percent of sales					Profits after taxes plus capital consumption allowances
	Employee compensation	Profits			Capital consumption allowances	
		Before taxes	Before taxes plus inventory valuation adjustment	After taxes		
1947.....	23.3	8.3	6.6	5.0	1.8	6.9
1948.....	23.2	8.3	7.7	5.1	2.0	7.0
1949.....	23.7	6.9	7.4	4.1	2.3	6.4
1950.....	22.6	9.2	8.0	5.0	2.2	7.2
1951.....	23.2	8.4	8.1	3.8	2.3	6.0
1952.....	24.3	7.1	7.3	3.2	2.5	5.7
1953.....	25.3	7.1	6.9	3.2	2.7	5.9
1954.....	25.3	6.3	6.3	3.0	3.1	6.0
1955.....	23.7	7.2	6.9	3.6	3.1	6.7
1956.....	24.5	6.8	6.4	3.4	3.2	6.6
1957.....	24.2	6.1	5.9	3.0	3.2	6.3
1958.....	24.2	5.4	5.4	2.6	3.4	6.0
1959.....	24.2	6.3	6.2	3.0	3.3	6.4
1960.....	24.7	5.8	5.9	2.8	3.5	6.3
1961 <sup>1</sup> .....	24.5	5.8	5.9	2.8	3.6	6.4

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—The sum of compensation of employees, profits, and capital consumption allowances is a comparatively small percentage of sales because the latter includes all sales made by firms to other firms in successive stages of the production process, and, therefore, reflects a large amount of duplication. The comparative relations shown here would remain unaltered, however, if they were calculated on the basis of unduplicated sales.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

Corporate profits after taxes as a share of corporate sales were at their highest level in the 1947-50 period, when they were between 4.1 and 5.1 percent annually. Since 1951, the profit-after-tax share has been lower, fluctuating between 2.6 and 3.6 percent. Throughout the period, the profits share has shown a clear tendency to dip in periods of high unemployment and unutilized capacity.

A number of forces were involved in the behavior of profits. Unusually high inventory gains resulting from bursts of excess demand inflation swelled the profits share in 1947-48 and 1950; this can be seen in Table 25 by comparing corporate profits before taxes with profits before taxes plus inventory valuation adjustment. The rate of Federal corporate income taxation was increased in two steps from a level of 38 percent in 1947 to 52 percent in 1951, where it stands today; also, an excess profits tax was in effect from 1951 to 1953. Failure of the economy since the first half of 1957 to reach full employment has tended to depress the profits share in recent years.

Corporate capital consumption allowances (principally depreciation charges) have risen steadily throughout the postwar period as a share of corporate sales. One explanation of this trend is the fact that depreciation charges immediately after the war were based upon prewar prices of capital goods, and were thus further out of alignment with the replacement cost of business plant and equipment than they are today. In other words, as

compared with recent years, corporate profits in the earlier postwar years were relatively overstated and depreciation charges relatively understated. Also, the rise in depreciation charges is related to the Korean accelerated tax amortization program, and to the more generous depreciation formula enacted in the Revenue Act of 1954.

Corporate profits after taxes plus capital consumption allowances—"cash flow"—have shown considerable stability in relation to sales, particularly if allowance is made for the large inventory gains of 1947-48 and 1950. This is shown in the last column of Table 25. Cash flow is of course not the same as net profits; only a part of it is return on investment, and the remainder is an element of cost. But cash flow is a significant measure as an indication of potential availability of internally generated funds for the financing of investment.

### THE OUTLOOK FOR PRICES

Although over-all excess demand is unlikely to develop in 1962 and cost-price developments in the past year were favorable to continued price stability, the economic future can never be predicted with certainty. Unexpected inflationary pressures could emerge from any one of several sources: scare-buying induced by a national security crisis, the emergence of major bottlenecks caused by shifts in the pattern of demand, price increases for imported raw materials, exercise of market power by management or labor to increase their shares of the national income, or other causes which lie at least within the realm of possibility.

Nevertheless, a review of the relevant statistical and analytical evidence gives some grounds for optimism on the outlook for price behavior in the months ahead—though the evidence cannot, of course, be conclusive.

Changes in the wholesale price index are more closely related to our international competitiveness than are changes in the consumer price index or the GNP implicit price index. The consumer price index is heavily influenced by changes in the prices of consumer services and in wholesale and retail margins, which do not directly affect our international trade, and it does not encompass producers' durable equipment, which is a major component of our foreign trade. On the other hand, the all-inclusive GNP implicit price index includes major components which do not enter directly into international trade, such as consumer services and government services. As noted earlier in this chapter, stability in the wholesale price index is likely to be associated with a slow rise in the consumer price index and a slightly greater rise in the GNP implicit price index.

At the present time, we are on the plateau of a period of price stability. Wholesale prices have been stable for over 3½ years, and wholesale industrial prices (excluding farm and food prices) have been stable for more than 2½ years. Both the wholesale price index and wholesale industrial prices were lower in December 1961 than at the cyclical trough in February.

This was the first of the four postwar recoveries in which wholesale industrial prices fell during the first 10 months of recovery.

Recent wage changes have been consistent with these price developments. As indicated earlier, annual wage increases in manufacturing have been declining for several years. The index of wage and salary cost per unit of output in manufacturing changed little from the cyclical peak in July 1957 to the peak in May 1960; by contrast, there were substantial peak-to-peak increases from 1948 to 1953 and from 1953 to 1957.

Such encouragement as may be derived from these recent price and wage trends must be tempered by the realization that they do not provide full protection for fixed-income recipients, and relate mainly to a period characterized by excess unemployment and productive capacity. The U.S. economy last experienced full employment in the first half of 1957; the recovery of 1958-60 stopped well short of full employment. While some significance can be attached to the fact that adjusted hourly earnings in manufacturing increased slightly less in 1959, a year of recovery, than in 1958, a cyclical trough year, and from the further fact that wholesale industrial prices fell during the 1961 recovery, the behavior of wages and prices in a period of sustained slack is an insufficient basis for inferences about price-wage behavior when the economy is moving up toward full employment.

Other considerations provide somewhat firmer grounds for optimism. As indicated in the analysis of Chapter 1, the continued recovery of the economy in 1962 is not likely to create major supply bottlenecks or to reach a state of over-all excess demand. The supply outlook for major imported raw materials does not suggest that an inflationary stimulus will originate in this quarter.

Foreign competition in the last few years has injected a powerful price-restraining force into the U.S. economy. We are now faced with sharp competition from imports in our domestic markets and from the exports of other industrial countries in our traditional export markets. Competition of any kind, internal or external, provides strong discipline for prices; the effects of foreign competition are stronger than might be suggested by the absolute size of foreign trade in our economy. The response to import competition itself tends to limit imports, so that the volume of realized imports is not a full measure of the force exerted by foreign competition. Moreover, conventional views as to appropriate shares of markets have great weight in pricing and other decisions. The number of foreign automobiles imported never amounted to as much as 11 percent of sales in the United States, and yet they helped to bring about a radical change in the design and marketing policy of a great industry.

The commodities component of the consumer price index, which in the last few years has mirrored the stability in the wholesale price index, is likely to continue to follow the course of wholesale prices in the months ahead. The services component, which has risen steadily since the war

will probably continue to do so. There are some favorable signs, however, which may indicate a slowing down in the rise of the prices of services. The great postwar expansion in the housing supply and higher vacancy rates seem to have slowed down the rise in rents. Also, movements in the rates charged by public utilities subject to rate regulation should reflect increasingly the narrowing of the gap between original cost and replacement cost of capital goods included in the rate base.

The slowing down since 1957 in the upward creep of consumer prices has reduced the effects on wages of cost of living escalator provisions in labor contracts, and may moderate somewhat the pressure of employees for large wage increases. It is also worthy of note that escalator provisions have been eliminated from, or modified in, a number of collective bargaining agreements.

Developments in the steel industry in 1961 were propitious for the continuation of price stability. Steel prices at the end of the year were slightly below the level of the end of 1958. This was a striking shift in trend for an industry in which prices had risen at the average rate of 5.8 percent a year from 1940 to 1958.

In early 1960, the steel industry, after a long strike, reached a wage settlement with the Steelworkers Union which provided for an estimated 3.7 percent annual increase in employment cost per worker. Though still somewhat above the over-all trend rate of productivity increase, this was a considerably smaller settlement than the 1956 contract, the cost of which was estimated at 8 percent a year.

Under the 1960 contract, a wage increase was scheduled to take effect on October 1, 1961. Confronted on one side with increasing foreign competition, stronger rivalry with substitutes, and intraindustry price shading, and on the other with an increase in wage rates, steel companies were reported in the press to be weighing the desirability of an October 1 price increase. In this setting, the President on September 6 addressed a letter to the heads of the 12 largest steel companies. Urging them to preserve price stability, the President stressed the damaging impact of a steel price increase on the balance of payments. "Steel is a bellwether," he said, "as well as a major element in industrial costs. A rise in steel prices would force price increases in many industries and invite price increases in others."

The President said:

In emphasizing the vital importance of steel prices to the strength of our economy, I do not wish to minimize the urgency of preventing inflationary movements in steel wages. I recognize, too, that the steel industry, by absorbing increases in employment costs since 1958, has demonstrated a will to halt the price-wage spiral in steel. If the industry were now to forego a price increase, it would enter collective bargaining negotiations next spring with a record of three and a half years of price stability. It would clearly then be the turn of the labor representatives to limit wage demands to a level consistent with continued price stability. The moral position of the steel industry next spring—and its claim to the support of public opinion—will be strengthened by the exercise of price restraint now.

A week later, the President addressed a letter to the President of the United Steelworkers of America. Referring to the forthcoming collective bargaining negotiations, the President urged "a labor settlement within the limits of advances in productivity and price stability." The President expressed his confidence that "we can rely upon the leadership and members of the Steelworkers Union to act responsibly in the wage negotiations next year in the interests of all of the American people."

At the end of the year, steel prices had not been raised.

All of these considerations suggest that a resumption of inflation in the course of the economic expansion foreseen for 1962 is not inevitable. As the year opens, the atmosphere is favorable for reasonable price stability. Whether this atmosphere is preserved or dissipated will depend on the wisdom of Government, business, and labor, in evolving policies affecting prices and costs.

#### POLICIES AFFECTING PRICE BEHAVIOR

##### *The Setting*

The over-all stability of prices should be achieved in a manner consistent with the flexible response of individual prices and wage rates to changes in cost and demand within an environment of dynamic competition. Thus, government policies to promote price stability must work to maintain and increase the freedom of the private economy, not to limit it. In peacetime, attempts to stabilize prices through the imposition of direct wage and price controls or through interference with the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively are unacceptable. Also unacceptable are policies which pursue price stability without regard for the effects on employment, production, and purchasing power. Prices might be stabilized in an underemployed economy; but to accept heavy unemployment and persistent slack as the necessary cost of price stability is to undermine the vitality and flexibility of the economy and to reduce American strength.

Competitive behavior throughout the economy involves more than rivalry among firms selling similar products in a single market; it also involves hard bargaining between firms buying and selling from each other and between firms and unions. Abridgement of competition may be evidenced as much in permissive wage increases which are simply passed along in higher prices as in agreements among firms to divide markets.

Public policies to encourage economy-wide competition not only contribute to the goal of price stability; they also promote efficiency and the advance of productivity. Hence, such policies serve both the goal of economic growth and the goal of balance of payments equilibrium. In addition, such policies have an independent justification in that they make the economy more responsive to the demands of consumers and thereby improve the qualitative nature of the output generated by the economy at rising levels of activity. Improving the range of consumer choices is an important facet of economic progress, and one that gives ultimate meaning to policies of full employment and economic growth.

### *Policies to Foster Market Competition*

Competition in product markets is promoted by an increase in the number and diversity of market alternatives available and by the removal of anticompetitive restrictions on business behavior. Examples of the former are reduction of import barriers and encouragement of new and growing businesses. Examples of the latter are attempts to halt tendencies toward monopolization and to eliminate collusive agreements among firms through antitrust policy.

Reduction of import barriers widens and strengthens competition in domestic markets. The experience of the European Common Market has demonstrated clearly that a broadened scope for international competition tends to spur cost reduction and innovation and to stimulate economic vitality. Two factors have been of paramount importance in the success of this experiment. First, the terms of the Common Market agreement were such that producers understood well in advance the scope and timetable of coming tariff reductions and thus were able to prepare for them. Second, because free trade policies were pursued in an environment of rapid economic growth, increased foreign competition was not so much a threat to existing markets as an incentive to respond to new profit-making opportunities. Similar advantages can be reaped for the United States through the adoption of the new foreign trade expansion program proposed by the President. Although imports are now, and will remain, a much smaller proportion of sales in our market than in Europe, modest increases in imports can yield competitive benefits to the U.S. economy out of proportion to their size.

Public policy toward small business has as its purpose the strengthening of the small business sector of the economy and the removal of artificial and discriminatory barriers to the profitability and growth of small firms. Although some of the limitations upon small business participation in the economy arise from technological considerations and true cost economies associated with large size, important limitations arise from direct discrimination and from lack of access to capital, of widespread market contact, and of information. Programs which redress these imbalances of competitive advantage make possible the salutary competition of new and growing enterprises throughout the economy. Small firms are often particularly well-situated to perceive changing market needs and production possibilities, and to take the lead in adapting to them, thus contributing to the efficiency and growth of the economy.

Antitrust policies promote market competition by halting tendencies toward monopolization and by eliminating unfair methods of competition and illegal restraints upon trade. Antimerger actions are designed to prevent the disappearance of independent competitors and the consequent impairment of competition. Checking monopolistic price increases during periods of expanded demand is facilitated both by the continuing effort to prevent the increase of business concentration and by the detection



and prosecution of market conspiracies. The dissolution of such conspiracies is especially important during periods of economic expansion, for it is during such periods that potential competitors find it easiest to reach agreement on market divisions and price increases. An important by-product of corrective antitrust action is the deterrent effect which successful prosecution has upon other potential offenders. To the extent that potential anticompetitive developments are deterred and existing competitive elements in the economy preserved and strengthened, antitrust policy contributes to the maintenance of competition and price stability far more than a simple list of prosecutions would indicate.

#### GUIDEPOSTS FOR NONINFLATIONARY WAGE AND PRICE BEHAVIOR

There are important segments of the economy where firms are large or employees well-organized, or both. In these sectors, private parties may exercise considerable discretion over the terms of wage bargains and price decisions. Thus, at least in the short run, there is considerable room for the exercise of private power and a parallel need for the assumption of private responsibility.

Individual wage and price decisions assume national importance when they involve large numbers of workers and large amounts of output directly, or when they are regarded by large segments of the economy as setting a pattern. Because such decisions affect the progress of the whole economy, there is legitimate reason for public interest in their content and consequences. An informed public, aware of the significance of major wage bargains and price decisions, and equipped to judge for itself their compatibility with the national interest, can help to create an atmosphere in which the parties to such decisions will exercise their powers responsibly.

How is the public to judge whether a particular wage-price decision is in the national interest? No simple test exists, and it is not possible to set out systematically all of the many considerations which bear on such a judgment. However, since the question is of prime importance to the strength and progress of the American economy, it deserves widespread public discussion and clarification of the issues. What follows is intended as a contribution to such a discussion.

Mandatory controls in peacetime over the outcomes of wage negotiations and over individual price decisions are neither desirable in the American tradition nor practical in a diffuse and decentralized continental economy. Free collective bargaining is the vehicle for the achievement of contractual agreements on wages, fringes, and working conditions, as well as on the "web of rules" by which a large segment of industry governs the performance of work and the distribution of rewards. Similarly, final price decisions lie—and should continue to lie—in the hands of individual firms. It is, however, both desirable and practical that discretionary decisions on wages and prices recognize the national interest in the results. The guideposts

suggested here as aids to public understanding are not concerned primarily with the relation of employers and employees to each other, but rather with their joint relation to the rest of the economy.

*Wages, prices, and productivity.* If all prices remain stable, all hourly labor costs may increase as fast as economy-wide productivity without, for that reason alone, changing the relative share of labor and nonlabor incomes in total output. At the same time, each kind of income increases steadily in absolute amount. If hourly labor costs increase at a slower rate than productivity, the share of nonlabor incomes will grow or prices will fall, or both. Conversely, if hourly labor costs increase more rapidly than productivity, the share of labor incomes in the total product will increase or prices will rise, or both. It is this relationship among long-run economy-wide productivity, wages, and prices which makes the rate of productivity change an important benchmark for noninflationary wage and price behavior.

Productivity is a *guide* rather than a *rule* for appraising wage and price behavior for several reasons. First, there are a number of problems involved in measuring productivity change, and a number of alternative measures are available. Second, there is nothing immutable in fact or in justice about the distribution of the total product between labor and nonlabor incomes. Third, the pattern of wages and prices among industries is and should be responsive to forces other than changes in productivity.

*Alternative measures of productivity.* If the rate of growth of productivity over time is to serve as a useful benchmark for wage and price behavior, there must be some meeting of minds about the appropriate methods of measuring the trend rate of increase in productivity, both for industry as a whole and for individual industries. This is a large and complex

TABLE 26.—Annual rates of growth of output per man-hour, 1909 to 1960

[Based on establishment series]

Industry series	Average annual percentage change <sup>1</sup>			
	1909 to 1960	1947 to 1960	1947 to 1954	1954 to 1960
Total private economy.....	2.4	3.0	3.5	2.6
Nonagriculture.....	2.1	2.4	2.7	2.2
Nonmanufacturing.....	(2)	2.2	2.6	1.9
Manufacturing.....	(2)	2.8	2.9	2.9
Manufacturing corrected for varying rates of capacity utilization.....	(2)	2.8	2.8	3.1

<sup>1</sup> Computed from least squares trend of the logarithms of the output per man-hour indexes. See Table B-31 for indexes for 1947-60.

<sup>2</sup> Not available.

Sources: Department of Labor and Council of Economic Advisers.


subject and there is much still to be learned. The most that can be done at present is to give some indication of orders of magnitude, and of the range within which most plausible measures are likely to fall (Table 26).

There are a number of conceptual problems in connection with productivity measurement which can give rise to differences in estimates of its rate of growth. Three important conceptual problems are the following:

(1) Over what time interval should productivity trends be measured? Very short intervals may give excessive weight to business-cycle movements in productivity, which are not the relevant standards for wage behavior. The erratic nature of year-to-year changes in productivity is shown in Chart 14. Very long intervals may hide significant breaks in trends; indeed in the United States—and in other countries as well—productivity appears to have risen more rapidly since the end of the second World War than before. It would be wholly inappropriate for wage behavior in the 1960's to be governed by events long in the past. On the other hand, productivity in the total private economy appears to have advanced less rapidly in the second half of the postwar period than in the first.

CHART 14

## Indexes of Output per Man-Hour



NOTE: MAN-HOURS ESTIMATES BASED PRIMARILY ON ESTABLISHMENT DATA.

SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

(2) Even for periods of intermediate length, it is desirable to segregate the trend movements in productivity from those that reflect business-cycle forces. Where the basic statistical materials are available, this problem can be handled by an analytical separation of trend effects and the effects of changes in the rate of capacity utilization.

(3) Even apart from such difficulties, there often exist alternative statistical measures of output and labor input. The alternatives may differ conceptually or may simply be derived from different statistical sources. A difficult problem of choice may emerge, unless the alternative measures happen to give similar results.

Selected measures of the rate of growth of productivity in different sectors of the economy for different time periods are shown in Table 26. Several measures are given because none of the single figures is clearly superior for all purposes.

*The share of labor income.* The proportions in which labor and non-labor incomes share the product of industry have not been immutable throughout American history, nor can they be expected to stand forever where they are today. It is desirable that labor and management should bargain explicitly about the distribution of the income of particular firms or industries. It is, however, undesirable that they should bargain implicitly about the general price level. Excessive wage settlements which are paid for through price increases in major industries put direct pressure on the general price level and produce spillover and imitative effects throughout the economy. Such settlements may fail to redistribute income within the industry involved; rather they redistribute income between that industry and other segments of the economy through the mechanism of inflation.

*Prices and wages in individual industries.* What are the guideposts which may be used in judging whether a particular price or wage decision may be inflationary? The desired objective is a stable price level, within which particular prices rise, fall, or remain stable in response to economic pressures. Hence, price stability within any particular industry is not necessarily a correct guide to price and wage decisions in that industry. It is possible, however, to describe in broad outline a set of guides which, if followed, would preserve over-all price stability while still allowing sufficient flexibility to accommodate objectives of efficiency and equity. These are not arbitrary guides. They describe—briefly and no doubt incompletely—how prices and wage rates would behave in a smoothly functioning competitive economy operating near full employment. Nor do they constitute a mechanical formula for determining whether a particular price or wage decision is inflationary. They will serve their purpose if they suggest to the interested public a useful way of approaching the appraisal of such a decision.

If, as a point of departure, we assume no change in the relative shares of labor and nonlabor incomes in a particular industry, then a general guide

may be advanced for noninflationary wage behavior, and another for non-inflationary price behavior. Both guides, as will be seen, are only first approximations.

The general guide for noninflationary wage behavior is that the rate of increase in wage rates (including fringe benefits) in each industry be equal to the trend rate of over-all productivity increase. General acceptance of this guide would maintain stability of labor cost per unit of output for the economy as a whole—though not of course for individual industries.

The general guide for noninflationary price behavior calls for price reduction if the industry's rate of productivity increase exceeds the over-all rate—for this would mean declining unit labor costs; it calls for an appropriate increase in price if the opposite relationship prevails; and it calls for stable prices if the two rates of productivity increase are equal.

These are advanced as general guideposts. To reconcile them with objectives of equity and efficiency, specific modifications must be made to adapt them to the circumstances of particular industries. If all of these modifications are made, each in the specific circumstances to which it applies, they are consistent with stability of the general price level. Public judgments about the effects on the price level of particular wage or price decisions should take into account the modifications as well as the general guides. The most important modifications are the following:

(1) Wage rate increases would exceed the general guide rate in an industry which would otherwise be unable to attract sufficient labor; or in which wage rates are exceptionally low compared with the range of wages earned elsewhere by similar labor, because the bargaining position of workers has been weak in particular local labor markets.

(2) Wage rate increases would fall short of the general guide rate in an industry which could not provide jobs for its entire labor force even in times of generally full employment; or in which wage rates are exceptionally high compared with the range of wages earned elsewhere by similar labor, because the bargaining position of workers has been especially strong.

(3) Prices would rise more rapidly, or fall more slowly, than indicated by the general guide rate in an industry in which the level of profits was insufficient to attract the capital required to finance a needed expansion in capacity; or in which costs other than labor costs had risen.

(4) Prices would rise more slowly, or fall more rapidly, than indicated by the general guide in an industry in which the relation of productive capacity to full employment demand shows the desirability of an outflow of capital from the industry; or in which costs other than labor costs have fallen; or in which excessive market power has resulted in rates of profit substantially higher than those earned elsewhere on investments of comparable risk.

It is a measure of the difficulty of the problem that even these complex guideposts leave out of account several important considerations. Although output per man-hour rises mainly in response to improvements in the quantity and quality of capital goods with which employees are equipped, employees are often able to improve their performance by means within their own control. It is obviously in the public interest that incentives be preserved which would reward employees for such efforts.

Also, in connection with the use of measures of over-all productivity gain as benchmarks for wage increases, it must be borne in mind that average hourly labor costs often change through the process of up- or down-grading, shifts between wage and salaried employment, and other forces. Such changes may either add to or subtract from the increment which is available for wage increases under the over-all productivity guide.

Finally, it must be reiterated that collective bargaining within an industry over the division of the proceeds between labor and nonlabor income is not necessarily disruptive of over-all price stability. The relative shares can change within the bounds of noninflationary price behavior. But when a disagreement between management and labor is resolved by passing the bill to the rest of the economy, the bill is paid in depreciated currency to the ultimate advantage of no one.

It is no accident that productivity is the central guidepost for wage settlements. Ultimately, it is rising output per man hour which must yield the ingredients of a rising standard of living. Growth in productivity makes it possible for real wages and real profits to rise side by side.

Rising productivity is the foundation of the country's leadership of the free world, enabling it to earn in world competition the means to discharge its commitments overseas. Rapid advance of productivity is the key to stability of the price level as money incomes rise, to fundamental improvement in the balance of international payments, and to growth in the Nation's capacity to meet the challenges of the 1960's at home and abroad. That is why policy to accelerate economic growth stresses investments in science and technology, plant and equipment, education and training—the basic sources of future gains in productivity.

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Appendix A

**REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE  
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL  
OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS  
DURING 1961**

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DECEMBER 31, 1961.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: The Council of Economic Advisers submits this report on its activities during the calendar year 1961 in accordance with the requirements of Congress, as set forth in Section 4(d) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

WALTER W. HELLER, *Chairman*  
KERMIT GORDON  
JAMES TOBIN



# Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 1961

The Council of Economic Advisers was established nearly 16 years ago under the Employment Act of 1946. In 1961, for only the second time since the passage of the Act, a change of Administration took place, and the membership of the Council was entirely reconstituted.

## COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP

Walter W. Heller took office as Chairman of the Council on January 27, 1961. He is on leave of absence from the University of Minnesota where he served as Professor of Economics and Chairman of the Department of Economics in the School of Business Administration. He succeeded Raymond J. Saulnier, Professor of Economics at Barnard College, Columbia University, who had served as a member of the Council from April 4, 1955 and as Chairman from December 3, 1956 until his resignation on January 20, 1961.

Kermit Gordon took office as a member of the Council on January 27, 1961. He is on leave of absence from Williams College where he is David A. Wells Professor of Political Economy. James Tobin took office as a member of the Council on January 27, 1961. He is on leave of absence from Yale University where he is Sterling Professor of Economics. Messrs. Gordon and Tobin succeeded Messrs. Karl Brandt and Henry C. Wallich who resigned on January 20, 1961. Mr. Brandt resumed his duties as Professor of Economic Policy and Associate Director of the Food Research Institute at Stanford University. Mr. Wallich returned to his position as Professor of Economics at Yale University.

Following is a list of all past Council members, together with their dates of service:

Name	Position	Oath of office date	Separation date
Edwin G. Nourse	Chairman	August 9, 1946	November 1, 1949.
Leon H. Keyserling	Vice Chairman	August 9, 1946	November 1, 1949.
	Acting Chairman	November 2, 1949	May 9, 1950.
	Chairman	May 10, 1950	January 20, 1953.
John D. Clark	Member	August 9, 1946	May 9, 1950.
	Vice Chairman	May 10, 1950	February 11, 1953.
Roy Blough	Member	June 29, 1950	August 20, 1952.
Robert C. Turner	Member	September 8, 1952	January 20, 1953.
Arthur F. Burns	Chairman	March 19, 1953	December 1, 1956.
Neil H. Jacoby	Member	September 15, 1953	February 9, 1955.
Walter W. Stewart	Member	December 2, 1953	April 29, 1955.
Joseph S. Davis	Member	May 2, 1955	October 31, 1958.
Raymond J. Saulnier	Member	April 4, 1955	December 2, 1956.
	Chairman	December 3, 1956	January 20, 1961.
Paul W. McCracken	Member	December 3, 1956	January 31, 1959.
Karl Brandt	Member	November 1, 1958	January 20, 1961.
Henry C. Wallich	Member	May 7, 1959	January 20, 1961.

## COUNCIL STAFF

The Council is currently assisted by a senior professional staff of 19 economists and statisticians. The full-time professional staff members are Richard E. Attiyeh, Barbara R. Berman, Charles A. Cooper, Richard N. Cooper, Rashi Fein, Catherine H. Furlong, Frances M. James, Marshall A. Kaplan, David W. Lusher, Richard R. Nelson, Arthur M. Okun, George L. Perry, Lee E. Preston, Vernon W. Ruttan, Robert M. Solow, Walter F. Stettner, Lloyd Ulman, Leroy S. Wehrle, and Sidney G. Winter, Jr.

In addition, Kenneth J. Arrow, Henry W. Briefs, Martin Bronfenbrenner, Richard E. Caves, James Duesenberry, Otto Eckstein, Dale E. Hathaway, Peter B. Kenen, Burton H. Klein, Robert J. Lampman, John R. Meyer, James R. Nelson, Joseph A. Pechman, William A. Salant, Paul A. Samuelson, Charles L. Schultze, Warren L. Smith, Charles A. Taff, and Robert Triffin served the Council during 1961 as Consultants.

Bernard S. Beckler, Harold F. Breimyer, Samuel L. Brown, and Robert C. Colwell resigned from the Council during 1961 to accept positions elsewhere in government. Special mention should be made of the retirement of Collis Stocking on September 15, 1961. Mr. Stocking served the Council with distinction for 8 years as Administrative Officer and a Senior Economist.

## COUNCIL ACTIVITIES

The economic problems which confront the Council today are perhaps more complex than ever before. The Council has the unique responsibility and opportunity to view a wide variety of specific developments, policies, and proposals in the broad perspective of their combined effects on the national economy. Its central concern under the Employment Act is the stability, growth, and efficiency of the U.S. economy. Especially now, this concern compels the Council to consider the interconnections between domestic economic developments and policies and the international economic relations of the United States.

Responding to these concerns and to the request of the President that the Council play a broader role as an economic staff agency, the Council in 1961 added new staff members and consultants to strengthen its capabilities in studying problems in the fields of international economics, defense and disarmament economics, economic growth, manpower, consumer economics, natural resources, and the economics of technology and research and development.

By a variety of means, the Council in 1961 carried out its statutory responsibilities as a Presidential staff agency under the Employment Act. Much of its activity took the form of assistance to the President and day-to-day contacts with members of the White House staff and officials of other Executive Agencies. Its responsibilities were also discharged through such formal institutional arrangements as regular attendance of the Chair-

man of the Council at meetings of the Cabinet, and Council participation in the work of a number of interdepartmental committees.

The Council took an active part in the work of several new committees set up in 1961 to deal with special economic problems. A Council member served as chairman of an *ad hoc* committee on housing credit, consisting of representatives of the Federal agencies responsible for housing and its financing. The Council was represented on the White House Committee on Small Business and the Panel on Civilian Technology, and it worked with the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy.

Of particular importance was the development of new machinery for interagency cooperation in formulating fiscal estimates and policies. The Chairman of the Council served with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget on a committee charged with coordinating the economic, budgetary, and revenue estimates for which the three agencies have primary responsibility, and of reporting on them to the President. The estimates are developed with the aid of working groups representing the Council, the Treasury Department, and the Bureau of the Budget, and, in the preparation of projections of economic activity, several other agencies as well.

The Chairman of the Council served with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in an advisory group which met periodically with the President to review monetary developments, issues, and policies.

The members and staff of the Council served on such interagency groups as the Economic Growth Study Committee, the Advisory Committee on U.S. National Health Survey, the Civil and Defense Mobilization Board, the Committee on the Monthly Business Cycle Report, the Committee on Natural Resources of the Federal Council on Science and Technology, and the Special Advisory Committee on the Statistical Abstract.

The Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability, which had been established under Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953 and whose Chairman was the Chairman of the Council, was abolished on March 12, 1961 by order of the President. On the same date, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, established by Presidential letter of December 11, 1954, and on which the Council members had served, was also terminated. The functions of both these groups are now being performed elsewhere within the Government.

In the international sphere, the Council participated in the work of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, the National Security Council, the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, and the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Information.

The Council has increasingly been drawn into economic consultations of international organizations. Mr. Heller served as Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization for

European Economic Cooperation (beginning in October, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Mr. Tobin served on the U.S. delegation to this Committee and to its Working Party on Balance of Payments Equilibrium, and Mr. Robert Solow of the Council staff was Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Committee's Working Party on Policies for the Promotion of Economic Growth. Mr. Gordon was a member of the U.S. delegation to the first Ministerial Meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Mr. Heller and Mr. Tobin were members of the U.S. delegation to the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development held in Vienna in September. Mr. Gordon served on the U.S. delegation to the annual meetings of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Mr. Tobin was Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting of Senior Economic Advisers at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Mr. Heller was a member of the U.S. delegation to the first meeting of the Cabinet-level United States-Japan Committee on Economics and Trade.

#### CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

During 1961, the Council testified before the Joint Economic Committee on three occasions. In its initial appearance on March 6 a comprehensive statement on economic conditions and policy, entitled "The American Economy in 1961: Problems and Policies," was submitted.<sup>1</sup> In this document the Council also set forth the following six general principles to govern its policy on testimony before the Committee:

"1. The Council has a responsibility to explain to the Congress and to the public the general economic strategy of the President's program, especially as it relates to the objectives of the Employment Act. This is the same kind of responsibility that other Executive agencies assume in regard to programs in their jurisdictions.

"2. It is not appropriate or necessary for the Council to go into the details of legislative proposals or of administrative actions which fall primarily in the domain of operating Executive departments or agencies, who can and do testify before the appropriate committees. Our concern is with the over-all pattern of economic policy.

"3. The program of the President is, of course, the outcome of a decision process in which advice, recommendations, and considerations of many kinds, from many sources, inside and outside the Executive, play a part. The professional economic advice of the Council is one element; it is not and should not be the sole consideration in the formulation of Presidential economic policy, or of Congressional policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (87th Congress, First Session), *January 1961 Economic Report of the President and the Economic Situation and Outlook*, pp. 310-92.

“4. In Congressional testimony and in other public statements, the Council must protect its advisory relationship to the President. We assume that the Committee does not expect the Council to indicate in what respects its advice has or has not been taken by the President, nor to what extent particular proposals, or omissions of proposals, reflect the advice of the Council.

“5. Subject to the limits mentioned, members of the Council are glad to discuss, to the best of their knowledge and ability as professional economists, the economic situation and problems of the country, and the possible alternative means of achieving the goals of the Employment Act and other commonly held economic objectives. In this undertaking, the Council wishes to cooperate as fully as possible with the Committee and the Congress in achieving a better understanding of our economic problems and approaches to their solutions.

“6. The Council is composed of professional economists. But economic policy, as the Committee well knows, is not an exact science. The Council is, and necessarily must be, in harmony with the general aims and direction of the President and his Administration. A member of the Council who felt otherwise would resign. This general harmony is, of course, consistent with divergencies of views on specific issues.”<sup>2</sup>

On April 11, the Council testified on general economic matters before the full committee; and on June 19, it testified before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee.

In addition, Mr. Tobin represented the Council before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in support of S. 1740—the “Truth-in-Lending” bill.

#### NONGOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS AND ACTIVITIES

Section 4(e) (1) of the Employment Act directs that in carrying out its statutory responsibilities “the Council may constitute such advisory committees and may consult with such representatives of industry, agriculture, labor, consumers, State and local governments, and other groups as it deems advisable.” In accordance with this directive, the Council in 1961 actively sought the counsel and views of representatives of a wide variety of interests.

In the early months of the year, many of the new Council’s meetings with nongovernmental representatives were of an informal nature. However, more formal relations were subsequently established with a number of groups, including the Economic Policy Committee of the AFL-CIO, and the Committee on Domestic Economy of the Business Council. Roundtable discussions with business, financial, and academic economists were also organized. It is expected that these activities will be continued and expanded during the coming years.

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 311-14.

In an effort to stimulate wider understanding and consideration of current economic policy issues, Council members participated during 1961 in a number of public discussions, conferences, and radio and television programs. These included White House Regional Conferences held in 10 cities throughout the Nation.

#### PUBLICATIONS

In keeping with its responsibilities under the Employment Act, the outgoing Council assisted President Eisenhower in the preparation of the 1961 Economic Report to the Congress. Copies were distributed to members of the Joint Economic Committee, all other members of the Congress, Departments and Agencies of the Government, representatives of the press, and depository libraries throughout the country. The Superintendent of Documents sold 19,086 copies to the general public.

The Council prepares *Economic Indicators*, a monthly compendium of current economic statistics published by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. Copies are distributed to all members of the Congress and to depository libraries. In addition, 10,000 copies of each monthly issue are sold by the Superintendent of Documents to subscribers and others.

#### INCREASE IN APPROPRIATIONS

By direction of the President, the Council during the year undertook broadened responsibilities related to the basic directives of the Employment Act. The Council was also called upon to discharge functions performed in the previous Administration by a Special Assistant to the President with responsibilities for economic policy, a post which has been discontinued.

To carry out these expanded duties, the Council sought amendment of the Employment Act, to eliminate the \$345,000 ceiling on salaries contained in the original 1946 legislation, and an increase in its appropriation for fiscal 1962. The elimination of the salary ceiling, effected by H.R. 6094, was signed into law by the President on June 17. Subsequently, the Council received a supplemental appropriation of \$170,000 for salaries and other purposes for the fiscal year 1962, bringing its total appropriation for that year to \$584,000.



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**Appendix B**

**STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME,  
EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION**

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Note.—Detail in these tables will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii are not included unless specifically noted.

Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures are in current prices.



# NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE

TABLE B-1.—Gross national product or expenditure, 1929-61

(Billions of dollars)

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Personal consumption expenditures <sup>1</sup>	Gross private domestic investment <sup>2</sup>						Net exports of goods and services <sup>3</sup>	Government purchases of goods and services					
			Total	New construction			Producers' durable equipment	Net change in business inventories		Total	Federal			State and local	
				Total	Residential nonfarm	Other					Total	National defense <sup>4</sup>	Other		Less: Government sales
1929	104.4	79.0	16.2	8.7	3.6	5.1	5.8	1.7	0.8	8.5	1.3	1.3	(5)	7.2	
1930	91.1	71.0	10.3	6.2	2.1	4.1	4.5	-.4	-.7	9.2	1.4	1.4	(5)	7.8	
1931	76.3	61.3	5.5	4.0	1.6	2.4	2.3	-1.3	-.2	9.2	1.5	1.5	(5)	7.7	
1932	58.5	49.3	.9	1.9	.6	1.2	1.6	-2.6	.2	8.1	1.5	1.5	(5)	6.6	
1933	56.0	46.4	1.4	1.4	.5	1.0	1.6	-1.6	.2	8.0	2.0	2.0	(5)	6.0	
1934	65.0	51.9	2.9	1.7	.6	1.1	2.3	-1.1	.4	9.8	3.0	3.0	(5)	6.8	
1935	72.5	56.3	6.3	2.3	1.0	1.3	3.1	.9	-.1	10.0	2.9	2.9	(5)	7.1	
1936	82.7	62.6	8.4	3.3	1.6	1.7	4.2	1.0	-.1	11.3	4.8	4.8	(5)	7.0	
1937	90.8	67.3	11.7	4.4	1.9	2.5	5.1	2.2	.1	11.7	4.6	4.6	(5)	7.2	
1938	85.2	64.6	6.7	4.0	2.0	2.0	3.6	-.9	1.1	12.8	5.3	5.3	(5)	7.5	
1939	91.1	67.6	9.3	4.8	2.7	2.1	4.2	.4	.9	13.3	5.2	1.3	3.9	(5)	8.2
1940	100.6	71.9	13.2	5.5	3.0	2.5	5.5	2.2	1.5	14.1	6.2	2.2	4.0	(5)	7.9
1941	125.8	81.9	18.1	6.6	3.5	3.1	6.9	4.5	1.1	24.8	16.9	13.8	3.2	(5)	7.8
1942	159.1	89.7	9.9	3.7	1.7	2.0	4.3	1.8	-.2	59.7	52.0	49.6	2.7	0.2	7.7
1943	192.5	100.5	5.6	2.3	.9	1.4	4.0	-.8	-.2	88.6	81.2	80.4	1.5	.6	7.4
1944	211.4	109.8	7.1	2.7	.8	1.9	5.4	-1.0	-2.1	96.5	89.0	88.6	1.6	1.2	7.5
1945	213.6	121.7	10.4	3.8	1.1	2.7	7.7	-.1	-1.4	82.9	74.8	75.9	1.0	2.2	8.1
1946	210.7	147.1	28.1	11.0	4.8	6.3	10.7	6.4	4.9	30.5	20.6	18.8	4.5	2.7	9.9
1947	234.3	165.4	31.5	15.3	7.5	7.7	16.7	-.5	9.0	28.4	15.6	11.4	5.4	1.1	12.7
1948	259.4	178.3	43.1	19.5	10.1	9.3	18.9	4.7	3.5	34.5	19.3	11.6	8.2	.5	15.2
1949	258.1	181.2	33.0	18.8	9.6	9.2	17.2	-3.1	3.8	40.2	22.2	13.6	8.9	.2	17.9
1950	284.6	195.0	50.0	24.2	14.1	10.1	18.9	6.8	.6	39.0	19.3	14.3	5.2	.1	19.7
1951	329.0	209.8	56.3	24.8	12.5	12.3	21.3	10.2	2.4	60.5	38.8	33.9	5.2	.3	21.7
1952	347.0	219.8	49.9	25.5	12.8	12.7	21.3	3.1	1.3	76.0	52.9	46.4	6.7	.3	23.2
1953	365.4	232.6	50.3	27.6	13.8	13.8	22.3	.4	-.4	82.8	58.0	49.3	9.7	.3	24.9
1954	363.1	238.0	48.9	29.7	15.4	14.3	20.8	-1.6	1.0	75.3	47.5	41.2	6.0	.3	27.7
1955	397.5	256.9	63.8	34.9	18.7	16.2	23.1	5.8	1.1	75.6	45.3	39.1	6.6	.4	30.3
1956	419.2	269.9	67.4	35.5	17.7	17.8	27.2	4.7	2.9	79.0	45.7	40.4	5.7	.3	33.2
1957	442.8	283.2	66.1	36.1	17.0	19.0	28.5	1.6	4.9	86.5	49.7	44.4	5.7	.4	36.8
1958	444.5	295.2	56.6	35.5	18.0	17.4	23.1	-2.0	1.2	93.5	52.6	44.8	8.3	.5	40.8
1959	482.8	314.0	72.4	40.2	22.3	17.9	25.9	6.3	-.7	97.1	53.5	46.2	7.8	.5	43.6
1960	504.4	328.9	72.4	40.7	21.1	19.6	27.5	4.2	3.0	100.1	52.9	45.5	8.0	.6	47.2
1961 <sup>a</sup>	521.2	339.2	69.5	41.8	21.3	20.5	25.7	2.0	4.0	108.6	57.2	49.2	8.5	.5	51.4
Seasonally adjusted annual rates															
1959: I	472.2	305.8	70.4	39.0	21.9	17.1	24.3	7.1	-0.6	96.7	53.2	45.9	7.7	0.5	43.5
II	488.5	313.6	79.1	41.2	23.5	17.7	26.3	11.7	-1.7	97.5	53.9	46.5	7.9	.5	43.6
III	482.3	316.5	68.2	41.0	22.6	18.4	26.6	7.7	-.5	98.1	54.1	46.3	8.3	.5	44.0
IV	488.3	320.0	71.8	39.6	21.3	18.3	26.6	5.6	(5)	96.5	52.9	45.9	7.5	.5	43.6
1960: I	501.5	323.8	78.9	40.9	21.5	19.3	27.1	10.9	1.8	96.9	51.8	45.5	6.9	.6	45.0
II	506.4	329.9	74.6	40.7	21.2	19.5	28.6	5.4	2.3	99.6	52.9	45.5	7.9	.6	46.8
III	505.1	329.7	70.5	40.4	21.0	19.4	27.7	2.4	3.0	101.9	54.0	45.4	9.1	.6	48.0
IV	504.5	332.3	65.6	40.7	20.5	20.2	26.7	-.9	5.1	101.6	53.0	45.7	7.9	.6	48.6
1961: I	500.8	330.7	59.8	39.6	19.3	20.4	24.2	-4.0	5.3	105.0	54.7	47.2	8.0	.5	50.3
II	516.1	336.1	68.8	41.3	20.6	20.7	24.7	2.8	3.9	107.3	56.6	48.8	8.3	.5	50.6
III	525.8	341.0	73.2	42.7	22.1	20.6	26.0	4.5	2.6	109.0	57.4	49.0	8.9	.6	51.6
IV <sup>6</sup>	542.0	349.0	76.0	43.5	23.2	20.3	28.0	4.5	4.0	113.0	59.9	51.6	8.9	.6	53.2

<sup>1</sup> See Table B-9 for major components.

<sup>2</sup> See Table B-10 for further detail and explanation of components.

<sup>3</sup> For 1929-45, net exports of goods and services and net foreign investment have been equated, since foreign net transfers by Government were negligible during that period. See Table B-7 for exports and imports separately.

<sup>4</sup> This category corresponds closely to the national defense classification in the *Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1953*. See also Table B-56.

<sup>5</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>6</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-2.—Gross national product or expenditure, in 1961 prices, 1929-61<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars, 1961 prices]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Personal consumption expenditures				Gross private domestic investment					
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods	Services	Total	New construction			Producers' durable equipment	Change in business inventories
							Total	Residential non-farm	Other		
1929.....	209.8	142.8	15.7	70.6	56.5	42.4	25.5	19.2	15.3	13.5	3.4
1930.....	190.3	134.3	12.5	67.2	54.6	29.1	18.9	6.0	13.0	10.7	-0.6
1931.....	175.9	130.2	10.8	66.8	52.5	18.0	13.3	5.0	8.3	7.2	-2.5
1932.....	149.8	118.5	8.2	61.5	48.7	8.2	7.4	2.5	4.9	4.3	-6.5
1933.....	146.3	115.7	8.0	59.7	45.0	5.7	5.6	1.9	3.8	4.5	-4.4
1934.....	160.3	121.6	9.1	63.7	48.8	9.9	6.3	2.2	4.1	6.1	-2.4
1935.....	175.6	129.1	11.3	67.2	50.5	18.7	8.2	3.6	4.6	8.2	2.3
1936.....	200.5	142.1	13.9	74.9	53.3	25.9	11.5	5.4	6.1	11.2	3.2
1937.....	210.9	147.1	14.6	77.5	55.1	31.7	13.8	5.8	7.9	12.7	5.3
1938.....	201.5	144.6	11.8	78.8	54.0	18.8	12.3	6.0	6.3	8.8	-2.3
1939.....	218.1	152.7	14.1	83.0	55.7	26.2	14.7	8.0	6.8	10.3	1.1
1940.....	236.8	160.8	16.2	86.8	57.8	34.6	16.5	8.6	7.9	13.3	4.9
1941.....	275.8	171.4	18.7	92.6	60.1	43.7	18.5	9.2	9.3	15.6	9.6
1942.....	315.3	167.9	11.5	94.5	61.9	22.4	9.5	4.2	5.3	9.0	3.9
1943.....	355.2	172.3	9.9	97.4	65.0	13.5	5.4	2.0	3.3	8.4	-0.3
1944.....	381.1	178.6	9.1	101.7	67.8	15.0	5.9	1.7	4.2	11.1	-2.0
1945.....	373.8	190.9	10.4	109.7	70.9	20.8	8.2	2.2	6.0	15.5	-2.8
1946.....	325.4	213.8	20.5	116.4	76.9	50.8	21.1	8.6	12.5	19.6	10.1
1947.....	324.9	217.4	24.6	113.9	78.9	50.8	24.2	11.3	12.9	26.4	.2
1948.....	337.5	221.6	26.0	113.7	82.0	59.4	27.5	13.4	14.1	27.6	4.2
1949.....	338.3	227.3	27.8	115.0	84.4	47.4	27.1	13.2	13.9	24.1	-3.8
1950.....	366.5	241.0	34.0	118.1	88.9	66.9	33.1	18.2	14.9	25.9	7.9
1951.....	396.5	243.2	30.8	120.3	92.1	69.3	31.6	15.1	10.5	26.7	11.0
1952.....	411.7	249.6	30.1	124.4	95.1	60.9	31.5	15.0	16.5	26.5	2.9
1953.....	430.6	261.5	35.0	128.0	98.5	61.6	33.5	16.0	17.5	27.4	.8
1954.....	422.0	265.0	34.3	129.1	101.6	59.1	36.0	18.1	18.0	25.3	-2.2
1955.....	455.1	284.7	41.9	135.7	107.2	75.0	41.0	21.3	19.7	27.4	6.6
1956.....	464.8	294.2	40.2	140.9	113.0	74.6	39.2	19.1	20.2	30.3	5.0
1957.....	473.6	302.1	40.8	143.4	117.9	70.0	38.6	18.0	20.6	29.9	1.5
1958.....	466.1	304.7	37.6	144.2	122.9	59.2	37.6	19.1	18.6	23.6	-2.1
1959.....	497.3	322.4	43.3	150.2	128.9	73.5	41.4	22.8	18.6	25.9	6.2
1960.....	511.1	332.7	44.2	153.4	135.1	73.0	41.1	21.1	20.0	27.5	4.4
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	521.2	339.2	42.3	155.6	141.2	69.5	41.8	21.3	20.5	25.7	2.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1959: I.....	490.3	316.3	41.5	148.0	126.8	72.1	40.7	22.7	18.0	24.4	7.0
II.....	504.4	322.8	44.1	150.7	128.0	80.2	42.5	24.1	18.4	26.2	11.5
III.....	495.2	324.1	44.0	150.6	129.5	69.0	42.0	23.0	19.0	26.4	.6
IV.....	499.4	326.4	43.8	151.5	131.2	72.6	40.4	21.6	18.9	26.6	5.5
1960: I.....	511.5	329.3	44.6	152.5	132.3	80.1	41.5	21.7	19.8	27.2	11.4
II.....	514.2	333.9	44.9	154.6	134.4	75.0	41.1	21.2	19.9	28.4	5.4
III.....	510.6	333.1	43.2	153.6	136.3	70.6	40.7	21.0	19.7	27.6	2.3
IV.....	508.0	334.2	44.0	152.9	137.3	66.3	41.1	20.6	20.5	26.9	-1.7
1961: I.....	502.9	331.7	39.8	153.2	138.7	60.2	40.0	19.4	20.6	24.2	-4.0
II.....	516.9	336.7	42.1	154.3	140.4	68.9	41.4	20.6	20.7	24.7	2.8
III.....	525.0	340.6	42.3	156.3	142.0	73.0	42.5	22.0	20.5	26.0	4.5
IV <sup>3</sup> .....	540.2	347.8	45.2	158.8	143.8	75.9	43.4	23.2	20.2	28.0	4.5

See footnotes at end of table, p. 209.



TABLE B-2.—Gross national product or expenditure, in 1961 prices, 1929-61<sup>1</sup>—Continued

[Billions of dollars, 1961 prices]

Year or quarter	Net exports of goods and services <sup>2</sup>	Government purchases of goods and services				
		Total	Federal			State and local
			Total <sup>3</sup>	National defense <sup>4</sup>	Other	
1929.....	1.1	23.4	3.8	(5)	(5)	19.7
1930.....	.9	25.9	4.3	(5)	(5)	21.6
1931.....	.4	27.3	4.7	(5)	(5)	22.6
1932.....	.2	25.9	4.9	(5)	(5)	21.0
1933.....	-.3	25.2	6.7	(5)	(5)	18.5
1934.....	-.1	28.8	8.8	(5)	(5)	20.0
1935.....	-1.3	29.2	8.5	(5)	(5)	20.6
1936.....	-1.5	34.0	13.1	(5)	(5)	21.0
1937.....	-.9	32.9	12.3	(5)	(5)	20.7
1938.....	1.6	36.5	14.6	(5)	(5)	22.0
1939.....	1.0	38.2	14.0	3.4	10.6	24.2
1940.....	1.9	39.5	16.7	6.0	10.7	22.8
1941.....	.2	60.5	39.1	31.8	7.3	21.4
1942.....	-2.3	127.3	107.8	102.3	5.5	19.5
1943.....	-6.0	175.4	157.6	154.8	2.9	17.7
1944.....	-6.1	193.6	176.2	173.1	3.1	17.4
1945.....	-4.8	168.8	149.0	147.0	2.1	17.8
1946.....	5.0	55.8	35.9	28.1	7.8	19.9
1947.....	9.5	47.2	24.6	16.1	8.5	22.5
1948.....	3.1	53.4	29.1	16.7	12.4	24.3
1949.....	3.8	59.9	32.2	19.4	12.8	27.7
1950.....	1.4	57.2	27.5	20.1	7.4	29.7
1951.....	3.6	80.4	50.0	43.3	6.7	30.4
1952.....	2.6	98.7	67.8	59.2	8.6	31.0
1953.....	.4	107.1	74.8	63.2	11.6	32.3
1954.....	2.3	95.6	60.5	52.0	8.5	35.0
1955.....	2.5	92.9	55.4	47.4	8.0	37.5
1956.....	4.3	91.8	53.0	46.4	6.6	38.7
1957.....	5.7	95.8	55.0	48.7	6.3	40.8
1958.....	1.5	100.6	56.6	47.7	8.9	44.0
1959.....	-.3	101.6	55.8	47.6	8.2	45.8
1960.....	3.7	101.8	53.8	45.7	8.1	48.0
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	4.0	108.6	57.2	48.6	8.5	51.4
Seasonally adjusted annual rates						
1959: I.....	-0.6	102.4	56.2	48.0	8.2	46.2
II.....	-1.4	102.8	56.7	48.4	8.3	46.1
III.....	(7)	102.2	56.1	47.4	8.6	46.1
IV.....	.9	99.5	54.3	46.6	7.6	45.2
1960: I.....	2.6	99.5	53.1	46.0	7.1	46.4
II.....	3.0	102.3	54.4	46.2	8.2	47.9
III.....	3.6	103.2	54.6	45.4	9.2	48.6
IV.....	5.6	101.9	53.0	45.1	7.9	48.9
1961: I.....	5.3	105.7	54.9	46.8	8.0	50.8
II.....	3.8	107.5	56.9	48.5	8.4	50.6
III.....	2.6	108.8	57.2	48.3	8.9	51.6
IV <sup>6</sup> .....	4.0	112.5	59.9	51.0	8.9	52.7

<sup>1</sup> These estimates represent an approximate conversion of the Department of Commerce series in 1954 prices. (See Tables B-3 and B-6.) This was done by major components, using the implicit price indexes converted to a 1961 base. Although it would have been preferable to redefine the series by minor components, this would not substantially change the results except possibly for the period of World War II, and for the series on change in business inventories.

For explanation of conversion of estimates in current prices to those in 1954 prices, see *U. S. Income and Output, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business, 1958*.

<sup>2</sup> For 1929-45, net exports of goods and services and net foreign investment have been equated, since foreign net transfers by Government were negligible during that period.

<sup>3</sup> Net of Government sales, which are not shown separately in this table. See Table B-1 for Government sales in current prices.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Table B-1.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>6</sup> Not available separately.

<sup>7</sup> Less than \$50 million.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Council of Economic Advisers.

TABLE B-3.—Gross national product or expenditure, in 1954 prices, 1929-61<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars, 1954 prices]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Personal consumption expenditures				Gross private domestic investment					
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods	Services	Total	New construction			Producers' durable equipment	Change in business inventories
							Total	Residential non-farm	Other		
1929	181.8	128.1	14.9	65.3	48.0	35.0	20.9	8.7	12.2	11.1	3.0
1930	164.5	120.3	11.8	62.1	46.4	23.6	15.4	5.1	10.4	8.8	-0.7
1931	153.0	116.6	10.3	61.8	44.6	15.0	10.9	4.2	6.6	5.9	-1.8
1932	130.1	106.0	7.8	56.9	41.4	3.9	6.0	2.1	3.9	3.5	-5.6
1933	126.6	103.5	7.5	55.2	40.8	4.0	4.6	1.6	3.0	3.0	-4.2
1934	138.5	108.9	8.6	58.8	41.5	7.4	5.1	1.9	3.2	5.0	-2.8
1935	152.9	115.8	10.7	62.1	42.9	16.1	6.7	3.1	3.6	6.7	2.6
1936	173.3	127.7	13.1	69.2	45.3	21.0	9.4	4.6	4.9	9.2	2.4
1937	183.5	132.1	13.8	71.6	46.8	27.0	11.3	5.0	6.3	10.5	5.2
1938	175.1	129.9	11.2	72.8	45.9	15.5	10.1	5.1	5.0	7.3	-1.8
1939	189.3	137.3	13.3	76.7	47.2	21.6	12.2	6.8	5.4	8.5	1.0
1940	205.8	144.6	15.3	80.2	49.1	29.0	13.6	7.3	6.3	10.9	4.5
1941	238.1	154.3	17.6	85.6	51.1	36.7	15.3	7.9	7.4	12.9	8.6
1942	266.9	150.8	10.9	87.3	52.6	18.8	7.8	3.6	4.2	7.4	3.6
1943	296.7	154.6	9.4	90.0	55.2	10.7	4.4	1.7	2.7	6.9	-0.6
1944	317.9	160.2	8.6	94.0	57.6	12.3	4.8	1.4	3.4	9.2	-1.7
1945	314.0	171.4	9.8	101.4	60.2	17.0	6.6	1.8	4.8	12.7	-2.4
1946	282.5	192.3	19.4	107.6	65.3	42.4	17.3	7.3	10.0	16.1	9.0
1947	282.3	195.6	23.3	105.3	67.0	41.5	19.9	9.6	10.3	21.7	-1.1
1948	293.1	199.3	24.6	105.1	69.6	49.8	22.7	11.4	11.2	22.8	4.4
1949	292.7	204.3	26.3	106.3	71.7	38.5	22.3	11.2	11.1	19.8	-3.6
1950	318.1	216.8	32.1	109.2	75.5	55.9	27.4	15.5	11.9	21.3	7.2
1951	341.8	218.5	29.2	111.2	78.2	57.7	26.0	12.9	13.2	22.0	9.7
1952	353.5	224.2	28.5	115.0	80.8	50.4	26.0	12.8	13.2	21.8	2.6
1953	369.0	235.1	33.1	118.3	83.7	50.6	27.6	13.6	14.0	22.5	5.5
1954	363.1	238.0	32.4	119.3	86.3	48.9	29.7	15.4	14.3	20.8	-1.6
1955	392.7	256.0	39.6	125.4	91.0	62.5	33.9	18.2	15.7	22.5	6.1
1956	400.9	264.3	38.0	130.3	96.0	61.7	32.3	16.2	16.1	25.0	4.5
1957	408.6	271.2	38.5	132.6	100.1	58.1	31.8	15.3	16.5	24.6	1.6
1958	401.3	273.2	35.5	133.3	104.4	49.0	31.1	16.2	14.8	19.4	-1.5
1959	428.4	289.3	41.0	138.8	109.5	61.1	34.3	19.4	14.8	21.3	5.5
1960	440.8	298.3	41.8	141.8	114.7	60.6	33.9	18.0	16.0	22.7	4.0
1961 <sup>2</sup>	448.9	303.8	40.0	143.9	119.9	57.6	34.5	18.1	16.4	21.2	1.9
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1959: I	422.1	283.8	39.2	136.8	107.7	59.9	33.7	19.3	14.4	20.1	6.2
II	434.4	289.7	41.7	139.3	108.8	66.9	35.2	20.5	14.7	21.6	10.1
III	426.6	290.8	41.6	139.2	110.0	57.3	34.7	19.6	15.1	21.7	8.8
IV	430.7	292.8	41.4	140.0	111.4	60.4	33.4	18.3	15.1	21.9	5.0
1960: I	441.0	295.4	42.1	140.9	112.4	66.6	34.3	18.4	15.9	22.4	9.9
II	443.4	299.5	42.5	142.9	114.2	62.3	33.9	18.1	15.9	23.4	4.9
III	440.2	298.6	40.8	142.0	115.8	58.6	33.6	17.9	15.7	22.7	2.3
IV	438.4	299.6	41.6	141.3	116.6	54.9	33.9	17.5	16.4	22.1	-1.1
1961: I	433.2	297.0	37.6	141.6	117.8	49.6	32.9	16.5	16.4	19.9	-3.2
II	445.5	301.6	39.8	142.6	119.2	57.3	34.1	17.6	16.6	20.3	2.9
III	451.8	305.0	39.9	144.5	120.6	60.4	35.1	18.7	16.4	21.4	3.9
IV <sup>3</sup>	465.2	311.6	42.7	146.8	122.2	62.9	35.9	19.7	16.2	23.1	4.0

See footnotes at end of table, p. 211.

TABLE B-3.—Gross national product or expenditure, in 1954 prices, 1929-61<sup>1</sup>—Continued

[Billions of dollars, 1954 prices]

Year or quarter	Net exports of goods and services <sup>2</sup>			Government purchases of goods and services			Gross private product
	Net exports	Exports	Imports	Total	Federal <sup>3</sup>	State and local	
1929.....	0.2	11.1	10.9	18.5	2.9	15.6	171.5
1930.....	.2	9.9	9.7	20.5	3.4	17.1	153.7
1931.....	-.3	8.4	8.7	21.6	3.7	17.9	142.0
1932.....	-.3	6.8	7.1	20.5	3.9	16.6	119.4
1933.....	-.8	6.8	7.7	19.9	5.3	14.6	115.0
1934.....	-.6	6.9	7.5	22.8	6.9	15.8	125.1
1935.....	-1.9	7.3	9.2	23.0	6.7	16.3	138.7
1936.....	-2.2	7.7	9.8	26.9	10.3	16.6	156.6
1937.....	-1.6	9.3	10.9	26.0	9.6	16.4	167.8
1938.....	.8	9.3	8.5	28.8	11.4	17.4	158.0
1939.....	.3	9.5	9.2	30.1	11.0	19.1	172.1
1940.....	1.1	10.5	9.4	31.1	13.1	18.0	188.1
1941.....	-.6	10.6	11.3	47.7	30.7	16.9	216.0
1942.....	-2.9	7.6	10.5	100.1	84.7	15.4	234.8
1943.....	-6.6	6.7	13.2	137.9	123.9	14.0	246.4
1944.....	-6.7	7.4	14.1	152.2	138.4	13.8	259.8
1945.....	-5.6	9.8	15.3	131.2	117.1	14.0	257.0
1946.....	3.8	15.8	12.0	43.9	28.2	15.8	252.7
1947.....	8.0	19.2	11.1	37.2	19.4	17.8	259.6
1948.....	2.0	14.7	12.8	42.1	22.9	19.2	270.3
1949.....	2.6	15.1	12.4	47.2	25.3	21.9	268.7
1950.....	.2	14.5	14.2	45.1	21.6	23.5	293.3
1951.....	2.2	17.3	15.1	63.3	39.3	24.1	311.1
1952.....	1.2	16.9	15.7	77.7	53.3	24.5	320.4
1953.....	-1.9	16.4	17.3	84.3	58.8	25.5	336.2
1954.....	1.0	17.5	16.5	75.3	47.5	27.7	330.8
1955.....	.9	19.2	18.3	73.2	43.5	29.7	360.4
1956.....	2.5	22.4	19.8	72.3	41.7	30.6	368.2
1957.....	3.8	24.4	20.6	75.5	43.2	32.2	375.4
1958.....	-2.2	21.4	21.6	79.3	44.5	34.8	367.9
1959.....	-2.1	22.2	24.3	80.1	43.9	36.2	394.6
1960.....	1.7	25.3	23.6	80.2	42.3	38.0	406.1
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	2.0	25.5	23.5	85.6	45.0	40.7	413.1
Seasonally adjusted annual rates							
1959: I.....	-2.2	21.1	23.4	80.7	44.2	36.5	( <sup>5</sup> )
II.....	-3.2	21.5	24.6	81.0	44.6	36.4	( <sup>5</sup> )
III.....	-1.9	23.2	25.1	80.5	44.0	36.5	( <sup>5</sup> )
IV.....	-1.9	23.1	24.0	78.4	42.7	35.8	( <sup>5</sup> )
1960: I.....	.6	24.5	23.9	78.4	41.7	36.7	( <sup>5</sup> )
II.....	1.0	25.4	24.4	80.6	42.7	37.8	( <sup>5</sup> )
III.....	1.6	25.4	23.7	81.3	42.9	38.4	( <sup>5</sup> )
IV.....	3.5	26.1	22.6	80.3	41.6	38.7	( <sup>5</sup> )
1961: I.....	3.3	25.7	22.4	83.3	43.1	40.2	( <sup>5</sup> )
II.....	1.9	24.5	22.6	84.7	44.7	40.0	( <sup>5</sup> )
III.....	.6	25.2	24.5	85.7	45.0	40.8	( <sup>5</sup> )
IV <sup>5</sup> .....	2.0	26.5	24.6	88.7	47.1	41.7	( <sup>5</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> For explanation of conversion of estimates in current prices to those in 1954 prices, see *U.S. Income and Output, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business*, 1958. See Table B-6 for implicit price deflators.

<sup>2</sup> For 1929-45, net exports of goods and services and net foreign investment have been equated, since foreign net transfers by Government were negligible during that period.

<sup>3</sup> Net of Government sales.

<sup>4</sup> Gross national product less compensation of general government employees; i.e., gross product accruing from domestic business, households, and institutions, and from the rest of the world.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>6</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-4.—Gross national product by major type of product, 1947-61

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Final sales	Inventory change	Goods output									Services	Construction
				Total			Durable goods			Nondurable goods				
				Total goods	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change		
1947.....	234.3	234.8	-0.5	143.8	144.3	-0.5	47.4	46.0	1.4	96.4	98.2	-1.8	71.8	18.7
1948.....	259.4	254.7	4.7	157.0	152.3	4.7	49.8	48.9	.9	107.2	103.4	3.8	78.1	24.3
1949.....	258.1	261.1	-3.1	149.3	152.4	-3.1	47.9	49.9	-2.1	101.5	102.4	-1.0	83.5	25.2
1950.....	284.6	277.8	6.8	163.6	156.8	6.8	60.7	56.7	4.0	102.9	100.1	2.8	89.8	31.2
1951.....	329.0	318.7	10.2	191.8	181.6	10.2	74.4	67.5	6.9	117.4	114.1	3.3	102.9	34.2
1952.....	347.0	343.9	3.1	198.2	195.2	3.1	75.6	74.5	1.2	122.6	120.7	1.9	112.3	36.4
1953.....	365.4	364.9	.4	206.9	206.4	.4	79.8	78.9	.9	127.0	127.5	-.5	119.5	39.0
1954.....	363.1	364.8	-1.6	197.4	199.0	-1.6	71.6	74.1	-2.5	125.9	125.0	.9	124.1	41.6
1955.....	397.5	391.7	5.8	217.2	211.4	5.8	84.3	81.3	3.0	132.9	130.2	2.7	133.4	46.9
1956.....	419.2	414.5	4.7	227.6	223.0	4.7	89.6	86.7	2.8	138.1	136.2	1.8	143.3	48.2
1957.....	442.8	441.2	1.6	238.2	236.6	1.6	94.5	93.4	1.0	143.7	143.2	.5	154.5	50.1
1958.....	444.5	446.5	-2.0	229.4	231.4	-2.0	80.4	83.3	-2.8	149.0	148.1	.9	164.2	50.9
1959.....	482.8	476.5	6.3	250.3	244.0	6.3	94.9	91.3	3.6	155.4	152.8	2.6	176.2	56.3
1960.....	504.4	500.2	4.2	258.5	254.3	4.2	96.7	94.3	2.5	161.8	160.0	1.8	189.3	56.6
1961 <sup>1</sup> .....	521.2	519.2	2.0	258.9	256.9	2.0	92.8	92.7	.2	166.0	164.2	1.8	203.5	58.8
Seasonally adjusted annual rates														
1959:														
I.....	472.2	465.2	7.1	245.4	238.3	7.1	93.5	88.1	5.4	151.9	150.2	1.7	170.7	56.2
II.....	488.5	476.8	11.7	256.2	244.6	11.7	101.1	92.4	8.8	155.1	152.2	2.9	174.2	58.1
III.....	482.3	481.6	.7	247.8	247.1	.7	91.6	93.6	-2.0	156.2	153.5	2.7	177.6	56.9
IV.....	488.3	482.7	5.6	251.7	246.1	5.6	93.4	90.9	2.4	158.3	155.1	3.2	182.2	54.4
1960:														
I.....	501.5	490.5	10.9	261.8	250.9	10.9	102.5	93.1	9.4	159.3	157.8	1.5	183.8	55.8
II.....	506.4	501.0	5.4	262.3	256.9	5.4	100.2	96.3	3.9	162.1	160.6	1.5	187.3	56.4
III.....	505.1	502.7	2.4	257.2	254.8	2.4	94.6	94.2	.4	162.6	160.6	2.0	191.2	56.7
IV.....	504.5	506.4	-1.9	252.8	254.6	-1.9	89.5	93.4	-3.8	163.2	161.3	2.0	194.6	57.2
1961:														
I.....	500.8	504.8	-4.0	245.7	249.7	-4.0	81.6	87.4	-5.8	164.1	162.3	1.8	197.9	57.2
II.....	516.1	513.2	2.8	257.1	254.3	2.8	90.9	91.2	-.3	166.2	163.0	3.2	201.1	57.9
III.....	525.8	521.3	4.5	261.4	256.9	4.5	96.1	92.6	3.5	165.3	164.3	1.0	205.1	59.2
IV <sup>1</sup> .....	542.0	537.5	4.5	271.2	266.6	4.5	102.6	99.3	3.3	168.5	167.3	1.3	209.9	61.0

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-5.—Gross national product by major type of product, in 1954 prices, 1947-61<sup>1</sup>

(Billions of dollars, 1954 prices)

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Final sales	Inventory change	Goods output									Services	Construction
				Total			Durable goods			Nondurable goods				
				Total goods	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change		
1947	282.3	282.4	-0.1	163.3	163.4	-0.1	55.8	54.3	1.5	107.5	109.2	-1.6	94.7	24.3
1948	293.1	288.7	4.4	167.7	163.4	4.4	55.4	54.6	.8	112.3	108.8	3.5	97.2	28.2
1949	292.7	296.3	-3.6	162.3	165.9	-3.6	51.9	54.3	-2.4	110.5	111.6	-1.2	100.7	29.7
1950	318.1	310.9	7.2	177.6	170.4	7.2	65.3	61.0	4.3	112.3	109.4	2.9	105.0	35.4
1951	341.8	332.1	9.7	191.7	182.0	9.7	74.6	67.4	7.1	117.1	114.5	2.6	114.2	36.0
1952	353.5	350.9	2.6	196.8	194.2	2.6	75.1	73.9	1.2	121.8	120.3	1.5	119.8	36.9
1953	369.0	368.5	.5	207.7	207.2	.5	80.8	79.8	1.0	126.9	127.4	-.5	122.5	38.8
1954	363.1	364.8	-1.6	197.4	199.0	-1.6	71.6	74.1	-2.5	125.9	125.0	.9	124.1	41.6
1955	392.7	386.6	6.1	216.9	210.8	6.1	83.1	80.1	3.0	133.8	130.7	3.1	130.2	45.6
1956	400.9	396.4	4.5	221.4	217.0	4.5	84.9	82.3	2.7	136.5	134.7	1.8	135.5	43.9
1957	408.6	406.9	1.6	223.4	221.7	1.6	85.5	84.5	1.0	137.9	137.2	.7	141.2	44.0
1958	401.3	402.8	-1.5	211.5	213.1	-1.5	71.7	74.1	-2.4	139.8	139.0	.8	145.2	44.5
1959	428.4	422.9	5.5	228.6	223.1	5.5	82.9	79.8	3.1	145.7	143.3	2.4	151.7	48.1
1960	440.8	436.8	4.0	234.6	230.6	4.0	84.7	82.4	2.3	150.0	148.3	1.7	158.7	47.5
1961 <sup>2</sup>	448.9	447.1	1.9	233.6	231.7	1.9	80.9	80.8	.1	152.7	153.9	1.8	166.3	49.1
Seasonally adjusted annual rates														
1959:														
I	422.1	416.0	6.2	224.9	218.7	6.2	82.1	77.5	4.6	142.8	141.3	1.5	148.7	48.5
II	434.4	424.3	10.1	234.0	223.9	10.1	88.2	80.7	7.5	145.8	143.2	2.6	150.5	49.9
III	426.6	425.8	.8	226.0	225.1	.8	79.6	81.3	-1.7	146.4	143.9	2.5	152.3	48.4
IV	430.7	425.6	5.0	229.4	224.4	5.0	81.6	79.6	2.0	147.8	144.8	3.0	155.2	46.0
1960:														
I	441.0	431.1	9.9	238.3	228.4	9.9	89.7	81.4	8.3	148.7	147.0	1.6	155.6	47.1
II	443.4	438.5	4.9	237.9	233.0	4.9	87.4	83.9	3.5	150.6	149.1	1.5	158.0	47.4
III	440.2	437.9	2.3	233.3	231.1	2.3	82.5	82.1	.4	150.8	148.9	1.9	159.4	47.4
IV	438.4	439.5	-1.1	228.9	230.0	-1.1	79.0	82.0	-3.0	149.8	148.0	1.9	161.6	47.9
1961:														
I	433.2	436.5	-3.2	221.9	225.2	-3.3	71.4	76.5	-5.1	150.5	148.7	1.8	163.2	48.0
II	445.5	442.6	2.9	232.5	229.7	2.9	79.4	79.6	-.2	153.2	150.0	3.1	164.7	48.3
III	451.8	447.9	3.9	235.4	231.6	3.9	83.5	80.5	3.0	151.9	151.0	.9	167.1	49.2
IV <sup>2</sup>	465.2	461.3	4.0	244.5	240.5	4.0	89.3	86.5	2.8	155.2	154.0	1.2	170.0	50.7

<sup>1</sup> For explanation of conversion of estimates in current prices to those in 1954 prices, see *U.S. Income and Output, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business*, 1958.<sup>2</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-6.—*Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-67*

[Index numbers, 1954=100]

Year or quarter	Gross national product <sup>1</sup>	Personal consumption expenditures				Gross private domestic investment <sup>1</sup>			
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods	Services	New construction			Producers' durable equipment
						Total	Residential non-farm	Other	
1929.....	57.4	61.6	62.0	57.7	66.8	41.7	41.8	41.6	52.5
1930.....	55.4	59.0	60.5	54.8	64.2	40.0	40.8	39.7	50.5
1931.....	49.9	52.6	53.5	46.9	60.3	36.5	37.1	36.2	47.9
1932.....	44.9	46.5	47.0	40.0	55.3	31.1	30.1	31.7	45.5
1933.....	44.2	44.8	46.1	40.3	50.7	31.2	29.8	31.9	43.1
1934.....	46.9	47.6	48.8	45.3	50.7	33.3	33.1	33.4	45.9
1935.....	47.4	48.6	47.9	47.2	50.9	34.1	32.6	35.4	45.6
1936.....	47.7	49.1	47.9	47.4	51.9	34.8	34.3	35.2	45.4
1937.....	49.5	50.9	50.3	49.1	53.8	39.0	37.8	39.9	48.7
1938.....	48.7	49.8	50.8	46.7	54.5	39.1	39.2	39.1	50.2
1939.....	48.1	49.2	50.2	45.8	54.5	39.0	39.5	38.4	49.4
1940.....	48.9	49.7	50.7	46.4	54.8	40.1	40.9	39.1	50.6
1941.....	52.9	53.1	54.8	50.5	56.8	43.4	44.6	42.2	54.0
1942.....	59.6	59.5	64.2	58.8	59.8	47.6	47.7	47.6	58.5
1943.....	64.9	65.0	70.3	65.8	62.8	53.0	51.4	54.0	58.4
1944.....	66.5	68.6	78.7	69.5	65.5	56.3	56.2	56.3	59.3
1945.....	68.0	71.0	82.8	72.2	67.1	57.8	60.0	56.9	60.0
1946.....	74.6	76.5	82.0	78.8	71.1	63.7	65.3	62.6	66.7
1947.....	83.0	84.6	88.4	88.7	76.8	76.6	78.4	74.8	76.8
1948.....	88.5	89.5	92.4	94.0	81.7	85.9	88.6	83.1	83.1
1949.....	88.2	88.7	93.5	90.9	83.6	84.3	85.9	82.6	87.0
1950.....	89.5	89.9	94.6	91.4	85.9	88.3	90.9	85.1	89.0
1951.....	96.2	96.0	101.1	99.0	89.8	95.3	97.5	93.1	96.8
1952.....	98.1	98.0	102.2	100.1	93.6	98.4	100.3	96.5	97.5
1953.....	99.0	99.0	99.4	99.7	97.7	100.1	101.3	98.9	99.0
1954.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1955.....	101.2	100.4	100.1	99.5	101.7	103.1	103.0	103.2	102.6
1956.....	104.6	102.1	101.3	100.9	104.1	109.8	109.0	110.7	109.0
1957.....	108.4	105.1	104.7	103.9	107.0	113.5	111.2	115.7	115.7
1958.....	110.8	107.3	104.9	106.3	109.4	114.2	111.2	117.6	118.9
1959.....	112.7	108.6	106.3	106.1	112.5	117.4	114.9	120.7	121.5
1960.....	114.4	110.3	106.1	107.5	115.2	119.8	117.1	122.8	121.5
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	116.1	111.6	105.8	108.2	117.7	121.1	117.5	125.1	121.5
1959: I.....	111.9	107.8	105.9	105.9	110.9	115.8	113.3	119.3	120.9
1959: II.....	112.4	108.3	106.7	105.8	112.1	117.0	114.5	120.4	121.6
1959: III.....	113.0	108.8	106.8	106.1	113.0	118.1	115.6	121.3	122.3
1959: IV.....	113.4	109.3	105.7	106.6	114.0	118.5	116.1	121.5	121.2
1960: I.....	113.7	109.6	106.1	106.8	114.5	119.2	116.8	122.0	121.4
1960: II.....	114.2	110.1	106.8	107.3	114.9	119.9	117.4	122.7	121.9
1960: III.....	114.7	110.4	106.5	107.5	115.4	120.0	117.3	123.1	121.9
1960: IV.....	115.1	110.9	105.2	108.3	116.1	120.0	116.9	123.4	120.8
1961: I.....	115.6	111.3	104.9	108.5	116.8	120.3	116.6	124.1	121.6
1961: II.....	115.8	111.4	105.7	108.1	117.4	121.0	117.2	125.0	121.5
1961: III.....	116.4	111.8	105.9	108.2	118.1	121.7	118.0	125.9	121.5
1961: IV <sup>2</sup> .....	116.5	112.0	106.6	108.0	118.7	121.4	117.9	125.6	121.4

See footnotes at end of table, p. 215.

TABLE B-6.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-61—Continued

(Index numbers, 1954=100)

Year or quarter	Exports and imports of goods and services <sup>1</sup>		Government purchases of goods and services		
	Exports	Imports	Total	Federal	State and local
1929.....	63.1	57.3	45.8	44.5	46.1
1930.....	55.0	48.9	44.9	41.8	45.5
1931.....	43.2	39.7	42.7	41.7	43.0
1932.....	36.2	32.3	39.4	38.2	39.7
1933.....	35.2	29.3	40.3	38.3	41.1
1934.....	43.0	33.8	42.9	43.2	42.8
1935.....	44.7	36.0	43.4	43.7	43.3
1936.....	46.0	36.9	44.0	46.9	42.2
1937.....	48.9	41.1	45.1	47.3	43.8
1938.....	46.5	38.0	44.5	46.1	43.4
1939.....	46.9	38.6	44.2	46.8	42.7
1940.....	51.2	40.9	45.2	47.0	43.9
1941.....	56.1	43.0	51.9	55.1	46.2
1942.....	64.9	48.9	59.6	61.4	49.8
1943.....	68.1	51.3	64.3	65.6	52.7
1944.....	73.3	53.3	63.4	64.3	54.6
1945.....	75.3	57.4	63.2	63.9	57.4
1946.....	80.8	65.5	69.4	73.0	63.0
1947.....	93.4	79.7	76.4	80.8	71.5
1948.....	98.6	86.3	82.0	84.4	79.3
1949.....	92.7	82.0	85.1	88.0	81.7
1950.....	90.3	87.8	86.5	89.6	83.7
1951.....	103.3	102.8	95.5	98.7	90.2
1952.....	103.0	102.8	97.8	99.2	94.8
1953.....	101.0	98.2	98.3	98.6	97.5
1954.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1955.....	100.7	99.9	103.3	104.1	102.2
1956.....	103.4	101.8	109.2	109.7	108.6
1957.....	107.4	103.2	114.6	114.9	114.2
1958.....	105.9	99.2	117.9	118.3	117.3
1959.....	103.9	98.1	121.3	122.0	120.3
1960.....	105.2	100.0	124.8	125.2	124.2
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	107.3	99.4	126.8	127.2	126.5
1959: I.....	104.7	97.3	119.8	120.4	119.0
II.....	103.7	96.4	120.3	120.8	119.7
III.....	103.2	97.7	121.9	122.9	120.7
IV.....	104.1	100.0	123.0	124.0	122.0
1960: I.....	104.7	100.0	123.6	124.2	122.9
II.....	105.2	100.2	123.6	123.7	123.5
III.....	105.5	100.3	125.3	125.8	124.9
IV.....	105.6	99.4	126.5	127.4	125.6
1961: I.....	107.1	99.5	126.1	127.0	125.1
II.....	107.8	99.5	126.6	126.8	126.4
III.....	107.1	99.3	127.1	127.6	126.6
IV <sup>2</sup> .....	107.0	99.3	127.5	127.3	127.7

<sup>1</sup> Separate deflators are not available for total gross private domestic investment, change in business inventories, and net exports of goods and services.

For explanation of conversion of estimates in current prices to those in 1954 prices, see *U.S. Income and Output, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business, 1958*.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-7.—Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-67

(Billions of dollars)

Year or quarter	Persons			Business			International				
	Dis-posable personal income	Per-sonal con-sumption ex-pen-ditures	Per-sonal saving or dis-saving (-)	Gross re-tained earn-ings <sup>1</sup>	Gross private do-mestic invest-ment	Excess of re-celpts or in-vest-ment (-)	For-eign net trans-fers by gov-ernment <sup>2</sup>	Net exports of goods and services <sup>3</sup>			Excess of trans-fers or net ex-ports (-)
								Net exports	Ex-ports	Im-ports	
1929	83.1	79.0	4.2	11.5	16.2	-4.7	(2)	0.8	7.0	6.3	-0.8
1930	74.4	71.0	3.4	8.8	10.3	-1.5	(2)	.7	5.4	4.8	-.7
1931	63.8	61.3	2.5	5.2	5.5	-.3	(2)	.2	3.6	3.4	-.2
1932	48.7	49.3	-.6	2.7	.9	1.8	(2)	.2	2.5	2.3	-.2
1933	45.7	46.4	-.6	2.6	1.4	1.2	(2)	.2	2.4	2.3	-.2
1934	52.0	51.9	.1	4.9	2.9	2.0	(2)	.4	3.0	2.5	-.4
1935	58.3	56.3	2.0	6.3	6.3	.1	(2)	-.1	3.3	3.3	.1
1936	66.2	62.6	3.6	6.5	8.4	-1.9	(2)	-.1	3.5	3.6	-.1
1937	71.0	67.3	3.7	7.8	11.7	-4.0	(2)	-.1	4.6	4.5	-.1
1938	65.7	64.6	1.1	7.8	6.7	1.2	(2)	1.1	4.3	3.2	-1.1
1939	70.4	67.6	2.9	8.3	9.3	-1.0	(2)	.9	4.4	3.5	-.9
1940	76.1	71.9	4.2	10.4	13.2	-2.8	(2)	1.5	5.4	3.8	-1.5
1941	93.0	81.9	11.1	11.5	18.1	-6.6	(2)	1.1	6.0	4.8	-1.1
1942	117.5	89.7	27.8	14.1	9.9	4.3	(2)	-.2	4.9	5.1	-.2
1943	133.5	100.5	33.0	16.3	5.6	10.7	(2)	-2.2	4.5	6.8	2.2
1944	146.8	109.8	36.9	17.2	7.1	10.1	(2)	-2.1	5.4	7.5	2.1
1945	150.4	121.7	28.7	15.6	10.4	5.2	(2)	-1.4	7.4	8.8	1.4
1946	170.6	147.1	13.5	13.1	28.1	-15.1	0.3	4.9	12.8	7.9	-4.6
1947	170.1	165.4	4.7	18.9	31.5	-12.6	.1	9.0	17.9	8.9	-8.9
1948	189.3	178.3	11.0	25.6	43.1	-16.5	1.6	3.5	14.5	11.0	-1.9
1949	189.7	181.2	8.5	27.6	33.0	-5.4	3.2	3.8	14.0	10.2	-.5
1950	207.7	195.0	12.6	27.7	50.0	-22.3	2.8	.6	13.1	12.5	2.2
1951	227.5	209.8	17.7	31.5	56.3	-24.8	2.1	2.4	17.9	15.5	-.2
1952	238.7	219.8	18.9	33.2	49.9	-16.6	1.5	1.3	17.4	16.1	-.2
1953	252.5	232.6	19.8	34.3	50.3	-16.0	1.6	-.4	16.6	17.0	2.0
1954	256.9	238.0	18.9	35.5	48.9	-13.4	1.4	1.0	17.5	16.5	.4
1955	274.4	256.9	17.5	42.1	63.8	-21.8	1.5	1.1	19.4	18.3	.4
1956	292.9	269.9	23.0	43.0	67.4	-24.3	1.5	2.9	23.1	20.2	-1.5
1957	308.8	285.2	23.6	45.6	66.1	-20.5	1.5	4.9	26.2	21.3	-3.5
1958	317.9	293.2	24.7	44.8	56.6	-11.9	1.3	1.2	22.7	21.5	-.1
1959	337.3	314.0	23.4	50.7	72.4	-21.7	1.5	-.7	23.1	23.8	2.3
1960	351.8	328.9	22.9	51.7	72.4	-20.7	1.6	3.0	26.7	23.6	-1.5
1961	364.9	339.2	25.7	54.2	69.5	-15.3	1.6	4.0	27.3	23.4	-2.4
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1959: I	329.8	305.8	23.9	49.3	70.4	-21.1	1.5	-0.6	22.1	22.7	2.2
II	338.4	313.6	24.8	52.1	79.1	-27.0	1.4	-1.7	22.3	24.0	3.1
III	338.7	316.5	22.3	49.8	68.2	-18.4	1.3	-.5	24.0	24.5	1.8
IV	342.3	320.0	22.3	51.4	71.8	-20.4	1.9	(9)	24.1	24.0	1.9
1960: I	345.7	323.8	21.8	52.0	78.9	-27.0	1.5	1.8	25.6	23.9	-.2
II	352.7	329.9	22.8	51.9	74.6	-22.7	1.6	2.3	26.7	24.4	-.7
III	354.4	329.7	24.6	51.8	70.5	-18.7	1.5	3.0	26.8	23.8	-1.4
IV	354.9	332.3	22.7	51.2	65.6	-14.4	1.6	5.1	27.6	22.4	-3.6
1961: I	354.3	330.7	23.7	50.3	59.8	-9.5	1.6	5.3	27.6	22.3	-3.7
II	361.8	336.1	25.8	53.9	68.8	-14.9	1.5	3.9	26.4	22.5	-2.4
III	357.7	341.0	26.8	54.8	73.2	-18.4	1.7	2.6	27.0	24.3	-.9
IV	375.6	349.0	26.6	(7)	76.0	(7)	1.5	4.0	28.4	24.4	-2.5

See footnotes at end of table, p. 217.



TABLE B-7.—Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-61—Continued

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Government							Total income or receipts	Statistical discrepancy	Gross national product or expenditure
	Receipts			Expenditures			Surplus or deficit (-) on income and product account			
	Net receipts	Tax and non-tax receipts or accruals	Transfers, interest, and subsidies <sup>3</sup>	Purchases of goods and services	Total expenditures	Transfers, interest, and subsidies <sup>3</sup>				
1929.....	9.5	11.3	1.7	8.5	10.2	1.7	1.0	104.2	0.3	104.4
1930.....	8.9	10.8	1.8	9.2	11.0	1.8	-.3	92.1	-1.0	91.1
1931.....	6.4	9.5	3.1	9.2	12.3	3.1	-2.8	75.4	.8	76.3
1932.....	6.4	8.9	2.5	8.1	10.6	2.5	-1.7	57.7	.8	58.5
1933.....	6.7	9.3	2.6	8.0	10.7	2.6	-1.4	55.0	.9	56.0
1934.....	7.4	10.5	3.1	9.8	12.8	3.1	-2.4	64.2	.7	65.0
1935.....	8.0	11.4	3.4	10.0	13.3	3.4	-2.0	72.7	-.2	72.5
1936.....	8.9	12.9	4.1	11.8	15.9	4.1	-3.0	81.6	1.1	82.7
1937.....	12.3	15.4	3.1	11.7	14.8	3.1	.6	91.0	-.2	90.8
1938.....	11.2	15.0	3.8	12.8	16.6	3.8	-1.6	84.8	.5	85.2
1939.....	11.2	15.4	4.2	13.3	17.5	4.2	-2.1	89.9	1.2	91.1
1940.....	13.3	17.7	4.4	14.1	18.5	4.4	-.7	99.8	.8	100.6
1941.....	21.0	25.0	4.0	24.8	28.8	4.0	-3.8	125.4	.4	125.8
1942.....	28.3	32.6	4.3	59.7	64.0	4.3	-31.4	169.0	-.8	159.1
1943.....	44.4	49.2	4.8	88.6	93.4	4.8	-44.2	194.2	-1.7	192.5
1944.....	44.6	51.2	6.5	96.5	103.1	6.5	-51.9	208.6	2.8	211.4
1945.....	43.1	53.2	10.1	82.9	92.9	10.1	-39.7	209.1	4.5	213.6
1946.....	34.6	51.1	16.5	30.5	47.0	16.5	4.1	208.6	2.1	210.7
1947.....	41.6	57.1	15.4	28.4	43.8	15.4	13.3	230.7	3.5	234.3
1948.....	42.8	59.2	16.5	34.5	51.0	16.5	8.2	260.3	-.8	259.4
1949.....	37.0	56.4	19.4	40.2	59.5	19.4	-3.1	257.5	.5	258.1
1950.....	47.2	69.3	22.1	39.0	61.1	22.1	8.2	285.3	-.7	284.6
1951.....	66.6	85.5	18.9	60.5	79.4	18.9	6.1	327.7	1.2	329.0
1952.....	72.2	90.6	18.4	76.0	94.4	18.4	-3.9	345.6	1.4	347.0
1953.....	75.7	94.9	19.2	82.8	102.0	19.2	-7.1	364.1	1.3	365.4
1954.....	68.5	90.0	21.5	75.3	96.7	21.5	-6.7	362.3	.9	363.1
1955.....	78.4	101.4	23.0	75.6	98.6	23.0	2.9	396.5	1.0	397.5
1956.....	94.2	109.5	25.3	79.0	104.3	25.3	5.2	421.6	-2.4	419.2
1957.....	87.5	116.3	28.7	86.5	115.3	28.7	1.0	443.4	-.6	442.8
1958.....	82.0	115.1	33.1	93.5	126.6	33.1	-11.4	446.0	-1.5	444.5
1959.....	94.9	129.3	34.4	97.1	131.6	34.4	-2.2	484.5	-1.7	482.8
1960.....	102.0	139.1	37.1	100.1	137.2	37.1	1.9	507.1	-2.6	504.4
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	<sup>5</sup> 102.4	<sup>5</sup> 143.6	41.2	108.6	149.8	41.2	-6.2	<sup>5</sup> 523.0	<sup>5</sup> -1.7	<sup>5</sup> 521.2
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1959: I.....	92.6	126.3	33.8	96.7	130.4	33.8	-4.1	473.1	-0.9	472.2
II.....	97.4	131.3	33.9	97.5	131.4	33.9	-.1	489.3	-.9	488.5
III.....	95.3	129.3	34.0	98.1	132.1	34.0	-2.8	485.1	-2.8	482.3
IV.....	94.4	130.4	36.0	96.5	132.5	36.0	-2.0	490.1	-1.8	488.3
1960: I.....	103.4	139.4	36.0	96.9	132.9	36.0	6.5	502.5	-1.1	501.5
II.....	103.1	140.0	36.8	99.6	136.5	36.8	3.5	509.3	-2.9	506.4
III.....	101.4	138.8	37.4	101.9	139.3	37.4	-.5	509.1	-4.0	505.1
IV.....	99.7	138.3	38.6	101.6	140.2	38.6	-1.9	507.4	-2.9	504.5
1961: I.....	97.1	136.9	39.8	105.0	144.8	39.8	-7.9	503.4	-2.6	500.8
II.....	100.7	141.9	41.2	107.3	148.5	41.2	-6.6	517.9	-1.8	516.1
III.....	103.0	145.4	42.3	109.0	151.3	42.3	-6.0	527.3	-1.5	525.8
IV <sup>4</sup> .....	(?)	(?)	41.7	113.0	154.8	41.7	(?)	(?)	(?)	542.0

<sup>1</sup> Undistributed corporate profits, corporate inventory valuation adjustment, capital consumption allowances, and excess of wage accruals over disbursements.

<sup>2</sup> For 1929-45, foreign net transfers by Government were negligible; therefore, for that period, net exports of goods and services and net foreign investment have been equated.

<sup>3</sup> Government transfer payments to persons, foreign net transfers by Government, net interest paid by government, and subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>5</sup> Data for corporate profits are approximations for the year as a whole; data for fourth quarter are not available. All other data incorporating or derived from these figures are correspondingly approximate.

<sup>6</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>7</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-8.—Gross private and government product, in current and 1961 prices, 1929-61

[Billions of dollars]

Year	Current prices					1961 prices <sup>4</sup>				
	Total gross national product	Gross private product <sup>1</sup>			Gross government product <sup>2</sup>	Total gross national product	Gross private product <sup>1</sup>			Gross government product <sup>2</sup>
		Total	Farm <sup>3</sup>	Non-farm			Total	Farm <sup>3</sup>	Non-farm	
1929.....	104.4	100.1	9.8	90.3	4.3	209.8	195.1	15.8	179.3	14.7
1930.....	91.1	86.6	7.7	78.8	4.5	190.3	174.9	14.5	160.4	15.4
1931.....	76.3	71.6	6.2	65.4	4.7	175.9	160.3	16.9	143.4	15.6
1932.....	58.5	54.0	4.4	49.6	4.4	149.8	134.5	15.9	118.7	15.3
1933.....	56.0	51.3	4.6	46.7	4.7	146.3	129.9	15.7	114.2	16.4
1934.....	65.0	59.4	4.3	55.1	5.6	160.3	141.4	13.0	128.4	18.9
1935.....	72.5	66.6	6.9	59.6	5.9	175.6	155.4	15.8	139.6	20.2
1936.....	82.7	75.5	6.3	69.2	7.3	200.5	176.8	13.5	163.2	23.7
1937.....	90.8	83.9	8.1	75.8	6.9	210.9	188.6	16.9	171.6	22.3
1938.....	85.2	77.6	6.7	70.9	7.6	201.5	177.3	17.1	160.2	24.2
1939.....	91.1	83.5	6.5	77.0	7.6	218.1	193.7	17.1	176.6	24.4
1940.....	100.6	92.8	6.8	86.0	7.8	236.8	211.6	16.8	194.9	25.1
1941.....	125.8	116.4	9.4	107.0	9.4	275.8	244.5	18.0	226.5	31.3
1942.....	159.1	144.0	13.4	130.6	15.1	315.3	269.8	19.6	250.2	45.5
1943.....	192.5	167.0	15.3	151.7	25.6	355.2	283.8	18.0	265.8	71.4
1944.....	211.4	179.2	15.7	163.5	32.2	381.1	298.6	18.5	280.1	82.5
1945.....	213.6	178.4	16.2	162.2	35.2	373.8	292.9	17.4	275.5	80.9
1946.....	210.7	189.9	19.3	170.7	20.7	325.4	283.0	17.6	265.4	42.4
1947.....	234.3	217.6	20.7	196.9	16.7	324.9	292.6	16.2	278.4	32.3
1948.....	259.4	242.0	23.8	218.2	17.4	337.5	305.1	18.5	286.6	32.4
1949.....	258.1	238.7	19.3	219.4	19.4	338.3	304.4	17.6	286.8	34.0
1950.....	284.6	263.8	20.5	243.2	20.8	366.5	331.3	18.6	312.8	35.2
1951.....	329.0	301.7	23.6	278.2	27.3	398.5	352.9	17.3	335.5	43.7
1952.....	347.0	316.0	22.8	293.2	31.0	411.7	364.6	18.0	346.6	47.1
1953.....	365.4	333.6	20.9	312.7	31.8	430.6	384.0	18.7	365.3	46.6
1954.....	363.1	330.8	20.3	310.5	32.3	422.0	376.1	19.5	356.6	45.9
1955.....	397.5	363.5	19.6	343.9	34.0	455.1	409.3	20.5	388.8	45.8
1956.....	419.2	382.8	19.3	363.5	36.4	464.8	418.4	20.1	398.3	46.4
1957.....	442.8	403.8	19.4	384.5	38.9	473.6	426.4	19.8	406.7	47.2
1958.....	444.5	402.6	21.3	381.2	42.0	466.1	418.6	20.0	398.5	47.5
1959.....	482.8	438.6	19.9	418.7	44.1	497.3	449.3	19.9	429.4	48.0
1960.....	504.4	457.1	20.8	436.3	47.3	511.1	461.9	20.9	441.1	49.2
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	521.2	470.4	21.0	449.4	50.8	521.2	470.4	21.0	449.4	50.8

<sup>1</sup> Gross national product less compensation of general government employees, i. e., gross product accruing from domestic business, households, and institutions, and from the rest of the world.

<sup>2</sup> See *Survey of Current Business*, October 1958, for description of series and estimates in current and constant prices and implicit deflators for 1910-57.

<sup>3</sup> Includes compensation of general government employees and excludes compensation of employees in government enterprises. Government enterprises are those agencies of government whose operating costs are at least to a substantial extent covered by the sale of goods and services, in contrast to the general activities of government which are financed mainly by tax revenues and debt creation. Government enterprises, in other words, conduct operations essentially commercial in character, even though they perform them under governmental auspices. The Post Office and public power systems are typical examples of government enterprises. On the other hand, State universities and public parks, where the fees and admissions cover only a nominal part of operating costs, are part of general government activities.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Table B-2.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Council of Economic Advisers.

TABLE B-9.—Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-61

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total personal consumption expenditures	Durable goods				Nondurable goods				Services					
		Total	Automobiles and parts	Furniture and household equipment	Other	Total	Food excluding alcoholic beverages <sup>1</sup>	Clothing and shoes <sup>2</sup>	Gasoline and oil	Other	Total	Housing <sup>3</sup>	Household operation	Transportation	Other
1929.....	79.0	9.2	3.2	4.8	1.2	37.7	19.5	9.4	1.8	7.0	32.1	11.4	4.0	2.6	14.0
1930.....	71.0	7.2	2.2	3.9	1.1	34.0	18.0	8.0	1.7	6.3	29.8	11.0	3.9	2.2	12.7
1931.....	61.3	5.5	1.6	3.1	.9	28.9	14.7	6.9	1.5	5.7	26.9	10.3	3.5	1.9	11.2
1932.....	49.3	3.6	.9	2.1	.6	22.8	11.4	5.1	1.5	4.8	22.9	9.0	3.0	1.6	9.3
1933.....	46.4	3.5	1.1	1.9	.5	22.3	10.9	4.6	1.5	5.3	20.7	7.9	2.8	1.5	8.5
1934.....	51.9	4.2	1.4	2.2	.6	26.7	12.2	5.7	1.6	7.2	21.0	7.6	3.0	1.6	8.8
1935.....	56.3	5.1	1.9	2.6	.7	29.3	13.6	6.0	1.7	7.9	21.9	7.6	3.2	1.7	9.4
1936.....	62.6	6.3	2.3	3.2	.8	32.8	15.2	6.6	1.9	9.1	23.5	7.9	3.4	1.9	10.3
1937.....	67.3	6.9	2.4	3.6	1.0	35.2	16.4	6.8	2.1	9.9	25.1	8.4	3.7	2.0	11.1
1938.....	64.6	5.7	1.6	3.1	.9	34.0	15.6	6.8	2.1	9.5	25.0	8.8	3.6	1.9	10.7
1939.....	67.6	6.7	2.2	3.5	1.0	35.1	15.7	7.1	2.2	10.1	25.8	9.0	3.8	2.0	11.0
1940.....	71.9	7.8	2.7	3.9	1.1	37.2	16.7	7.4	2.3	10.8	26.9	9.3	4.0	2.1	11.4
1941.....	81.9	9.7	3.4	4.9	1.4	43.2	19.4	8.8	2.6	12.3	29.0	10.0	4.3	2.4	12.3
1942.....	89.7	7.0	.7	4.7	1.6	51.3	23.7	11.0	2.1	14.5	31.5	10.8	4.9	2.7	13.1
1943.....	100.5	6.6	.8	3.9	1.9	59.3	27.8	13.4	1.3	16.7	34.7	11.3	5.2	3.4	14.7
1944.....	109.8	6.8	.8	3.8	2.2	65.4	30.6	14.6	1.4	18.7	37.7	11.9	5.9	3.7	16.3
1945.....	121.7	8.1	1.0	4.6	2.5	73.2	34.1	16.5	1.8	20.8	40.4	12.4	6.4	4.0	17.5
1946.....	147.1	15.9	3.9	8.7	3.3	84.8	40.7	18.2	3.0	22.9	46.4	13.8	6.7	5.1	20.8
1947.....	165.4	20.6	6.3	11.0	3.4	93.4	45.8	18.8	3.6	25.2	51.4	15.6	7.4	5.5	23.0
1948.....	178.3	22.7	7.4	11.9	3.4	98.7	48.2	20.1	4.4	26.0	56.9	17.6	7.9	6.0	25.4
1949.....	181.2	24.6	9.8	11.5	3.3	96.6	46.4	19.3	5.0	25.9	60.0	19.3	8.4	6.1	26.2
1950.....	195.0	30.4	13.0	14.0	3.4	99.8	47.4	19.6	5.4	27.4	64.9	21.2	9.3	6.3	28.1
1951.....	209.8	29.5	11.6	14.2	3.7	110.1	53.4	21.1	6.0	29.5	70.2	23.2	10.1	6.9	29.9
1952.....	219.8	29.1	11.0	14.1	3.9	115.1	55.8	21.9	6.7	30.7	75.6	25.4	10.8	7.4	32.0
1953.....	232.6	32.9	14.0	14.7	4.1	118.0	56.6	21.9	7.5	31.8	81.8	27.5	11.7	8.0	34.6
1954.....	238.0	32.4	13.4	14.8	4.3	119.3	57.7	21.9	8.0	31.7	86.3	29.1	12.1	7.9	37.1
1955.....	256.9	39.6	18.3	16.6	4.8	124.8	59.2	23.4	8.8	33.4	92.5	30.7	13.5	8.3	39.9
1956.....	269.9	38.5	15.8	17.4	5.3	131.4	62.2	24.5	9.6	35.2	100.0	32.7	14.8	8.6	43.8
1957.....	285.2	40.4	17.1	17.4	5.8	137.7	65.2	25.4	10.4	36.7	107.1	35.2	15.8	9.0	47.0
1958.....	293.2	37.3	13.9	17.4	6.0	141.6	67.4	25.7	10.5	38.0	114.3	37.7	16.9	9.2	50.6
1959.....	314.0	43.5	18.1	18.9	6.6	147.3	68.4	27.4	11.0	40.5	123.2	39.9	18.1	10.0	55.2
1960.....	328.9	44.3	18.6	18.8	6.9	152.4	70.2	28.1	11.6	42.5	132.2	42.2	19.6	10.5	59.9
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	339.2	42.3	16.8	18.5	7.0	155.6	71.9	28.4	11.8	43.6	141.2	44.5	21.1	10.8	64.9
Seasonally adjusted annual rates															
1959: I.....	305.8	41.6	17.2	18.0	6.3	144.9	68.0	26.5	10.7	39.7	119.4	39.3	17.5	9.5	53.2
II.....	313.6	44.5	19.0	18.9	6.5	147.3	68.5	27.8	10.9	40.2	121.9	39.8	17.8	9.8	54.5
III.....	316.5	44.4	18.4	19.2	6.7	147.7	68.2	27.6	11.1	40.8	124.4	40.1	18.2	10.2	55.8
IV.....	320.0	43.7	17.6	19.3	6.8	149.3	68.9	27.8	11.1	41.5	127.0	40.5	18.9	10.2	57.3
1960: I.....	323.8	44.7	18.8	19.1	6.7	150.5	69.1	28.1	11.4	41.9	128.6	41.1	19.2	10.4	57.9
II.....	329.9	45.3	19.3	19.0	7.0	153.3	70.5	28.3	11.6	42.9	131.2	41.9	19.5	10.5	59.3
III.....	329.7	43.4	17.8	18.7	6.9	152.7	70.0	28.3	11.6	42.8	133.6	42.7	19.7	10.5	60.8
IV.....	332.3	43.8	18.6	18.3	6.8	153.1	71.1	27.7	11.8	42.4	135.4	43.1	20.0	10.5	61.7
1961: I.....	330.7	39.4	14.8	17.8	6.8	153.7	71.0	27.9	11.7	43.1	137.5	43.6	20.6	10.5	62.8
II.....	336.1	42.0	16.7	18.3	7.0	154.1	71.3	27.6	11.7	43.5	139.9	44.2	20.9	10.7	64.1
III.....	341.0	42.3	16.4	18.8	7.0	156.2	72.4	28.6	11.8	43.4	142.4	44.8	21.2	10.9	65.5
IV <sup>4</sup> .....	349.0	45.5	19.2	19.2	7.1	158.5	72.8	29.6	11.9	44.2	145.0	45.5	21.6	11.0	66.9

<sup>1</sup> Quarterly data are estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>2</sup> Includes standard clothing issued to military personnel.

<sup>3</sup> Includes imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-10.—Gross private domestic investment, 1929–61

(Billions of dollars)

Year or quarter	Total gross private domestic investment	Fixed investment									Change in business inventories			
		Total	New construction <sup>1</sup>						Producers' durable equipment			Total	Non-farm	Farm
			Total	Residential non-farm	Other <sup>2</sup>			Total	Non-farm	Farm				
					Total	Non-farm	Farm							
1929.....	16.2	14.6	8.7	3.6	5.1	4.8	0.3	5.8	5.2	0.6	1.7	1.8	-0.2	
1930.....	10.3	10.6	6.2	2.1	4.1	3.9	.2	4.5	4.0	.5	-.4	-.1	-.3	
1931.....	5.5	6.8	4.0	1.6	2.4	2.3	.1	2.8	2.6	.3	-1.3	-1.6	-.3	
1932.....	9.9	3.5	1.9	.6	1.2	1.2	(3)	1.6	1.4	.1	-2.6	-2.6	(3)	
1933.....	1.4	3.0	1.4	.5	1.0	1.0	.9	1.6	1.5	.1	-1.6	-1.4	-.3	
1934.....	2.9	4.0	1.7	.6	1.1	1.0	.1	2.3	2.1	.3	-1.1	.2	-1.3	
1935.....	6.3	5.4	2.3	1.0	1.3	1.2	.1	3.1	2.7	.4	.9	.4	.5	
1936.....	8.4	7.4	3.3	1.6	1.7	1.6	.2	4.2	3.6	.5	1.0	2.1	-1.1	
1937.....	11.7	9.5	4.4	1.9	2.5	2.3	.2	5.1	4.5	.6	2.2	1.7	.5	
1938.....	6.7	7.6	4.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	.2	3.6	3.1	.5	-.9	-1.0	.1	
1939.....	9.3	8.9	4.8	2.7	2.1	1.9	.2	4.2	3.7	.5	.4	.3	.1	
1940.....	13.2	11.0	5.5	3.0	2.5	2.2	.2	5.5	4.9	.6	2.2	1.9	.3	
1941.....	18.1	13.6	6.6	3.5	3.1	2.8	.3	6.9	6.1	.8	4.5	4.0	.5	
1942.....	9.9	8.1	3.7	1.7	2.0	1.7	.3	4.3	3.7	.7	1.8	.7	1.2	
1943.....	5.6	6.4	2.3	.9	1.4	1.2	.3	4.0	3.5	.6	-.8	-.6	-.2	
1944.....	7.1	8.2	2.7	.8	1.9	1.6	.3	5.4	4.7	.7	-1.0	-.6	-.4	
1945.....	10.4	11.5	3.8	1.1	2.7	2.5	.3	7.7	6.9	.7	-1.1	-.6	-.5	
1946.....	28.1	21.8	11.0	4.8	6.3	5.4	.9	10.7	9.8	.9	6.4	6.4	(3)	
1947.....	31.5	31.9	15.3	7.5	7.7	6.3	1.4	16.7	14.9	1.8	-.5	1.3	-1.8	
1948.....	43.1	38.4	19.5	10.1	9.3	7.8	1.5	18.9	16.4	2.6	4.7	3.0	1.7	
1949.....	33.0	36.0	18.8	9.6	9.2	7.7	1.5	17.2	14.4	2.9	-3.1	-2.2	-.9	
1950.....	50.0	43.2	24.2	14.1	10.1	8.5	1.6	18.9	16.2	2.7	6.8	6.0	.8	
1951.....	56.3	46.1	24.8	12.5	12.3	10.4	1.8	21.3	18.4	2.9	10.2	9.1	1.2	
1952.....	49.9	46.8	25.5	12.8	12.7	10.8	1.9	21.3	18.6	2.7	3.1	2.1	.9	
1953.....	50.3	49.9	27.6	13.8	13.8	12.1	1.7	22.3	19.5	2.8	.4	1.1	-.6	
1954.....	48.9	50.5	29.7	15.4	14.3	12.7	1.6	20.8	18.5	2.3	-1.6	-2.1	.5	
1955.....	63.8	58.1	34.9	18.7	16.2	14.6	1.6	23.1	20.6	2.5	5.8	5.5	.3	
1956.....	67.4	62.7	35.5	17.7	17.8	16.3	1.6	27.2	25.0	2.2	4.7	5.1	-.4	
1957.....	66.1	64.6	36.1	17.0	19.0	17.5	1.6	28.5	26.2	2.3	1.6	.8	.8	
1958.....	56.6	58.6	35.5	18.0	17.4	15.9	1.5	23.1	20.3	2.8	-2.0	-2.9	.9	
1959.....	72.4	66.1	40.2	22.3	17.9	16.2	1.7	25.9	23.0	2.9	6.3	6.2	.1	
1960.....	72.4	68.2	40.7	21.1	19.6	18.0	1.6	27.5	25.1	2.4	4.2	4.0	.3	
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	69.5	67.5	41.8	21.3	20.5	18.6	1.9	25.7	23.4	2.4	2.0	1.7	.3	
Seasonally adjusted annual rates														
1959: I.....	70.4	63.3	39.0	21.9	17.1	15.6	1.5	24.3	21.4	2.9	7.1	6.9	0.2	
II.....	79.1	67.5	41.2	23.5	17.7	16.0	1.6	26.3	23.3	2.9	11.7	11.6	.1	
III.....	68.2	67.6	41.0	22.6	18.4	16.7	1.7	26.6	23.6	2.9	.7	.7	(3)	
IV.....	71.8	66.2	39.6	21.3	18.3	16.6	1.7	26.6	23.8	2.8	5.6	5.5	.1	
1960: I.....	78.9	68.0	40.9	21.5	19.3	17.7	1.7	27.1	24.7	2.4	10.9	10.8	.1	
II.....	74.6	69.3	40.7	21.2	19.5	17.8	1.7	28.6	26.0	2.5	5.4	5.1	.3	
III.....	70.5	68.1	40.4	21.0	19.4	17.8	1.6	27.7	25.3	2.4	2.4	2.0	.4	
IV.....	65.6	67.4	40.7	20.5	20.2	18.6	1.6	26.7	24.3	2.4	-1.9	-2.2	.3	
1961: I.....	59.8	63.8	39.6	19.3	20.4	18.8	1.5	24.2	21.7	2.5	-4.0	-4.3	.3	
II.....	68.8	66.0	41.3	20.6	20.7	18.5	2.2	24.7	22.4	2.3	2.8	2.4	.4	
III.....	73.2	68.7	42.7	22.1	20.6	18.5	2.1	26.0	23.8	2.2	4.5	4.1	.4	
IV <sup>4</sup> .....	76.0	71.5	43.5	23.2	20.3	18.5	1.8	28.0	25.6	2.4	4.5	4.3	.2	

<sup>1</sup> Revisions in series on new construction shown in Table B-35 have not yet been incorporated into these series.

<sup>2</sup> Includes petroleum and natural gas well drilling, which are excluded from estimates in Table B-35.

<sup>3</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-11.—National income by type of income, 1929-61  
[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total national income <sup>1</sup>	Compensation of employees <sup>2</sup>	Business and professional income and inventory valuation adjustment			Income of farm proprietors <sup>3</sup>	Rental income of persons	Corporate profits and inventory valuation adjustment			Net interest
			Total	Income of unincorporated enterprises	Inventory valuation adjustment			Total	Corporate profits before taxes <sup>4</sup>	Inventory valuation adjustment	
1929.....	87.8	51.1	8.8	8.6	0.1	6.0	5.4	10.1	9.6	0.5	6.4
1930.....	75.7	46.8	7.4	6.7	.8	4.1	4.8	6.6	3.3	3.3	6.0
1931.....	59.7	39.7	5.6	5.0	.6	3.2	3.8	1.6	-.8	2.4	5.8
1932.....	42.5	31.1	3.4	3.1	.3	1.9	2.7	-2.0	-3.0	1.0	5.4
1933.....	40.2	29.5	3.2	3.7	-.5	2.4	2.0	-2.0	-.2	-2.1	5.0
1934.....	49.0	34.3	4.6	4.6	-.1	2.4	1.7	1.1	1.7	-.6	4.9
1935.....	57.1	37.3	5.4	5.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.0	1.7	2.9	3.1	-.2	4.8
1936.....	64.9	42.9	6.5	6.6	-.1	4.0	1.8	5.0	5.7	-.7	4.7
1937.....	73.6	47.9	7.1	7.1	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.6	2.1	6.2	6.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	4.7
1938.....	67.6	45.0	6.8	6.6	.2	4.3	2.6	4.3	3.3	1.0	4.6
1939.....	72.8	48.1	7.3	7.5	-.2	4.3	2.7	5.7	6.4	-.7	4.6
1940.....	81.6	52.1	8.4	8.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	4.6	2.9	9.1	9.3	-.2	4.5
1941.....	104.7	64.8	10.9	11.5	-.6	6.5	3.5	14.5	17.0	-2.5	4.5
1942.....	137.7	85.3	13.9	14.3	-.4	10.0	4.5	19.7	20.9	-1.2	4.3
1943.....	170.3	109.6	16.8	17.0	-.2	11.4	5.1	23.8	24.6	-.8	3.7
1944.....	182.6	121.3	18.0	18.1	-.1	11.5	5.4	23.0	23.3	-.3	3.3
1945.....	181.2	123.2	19.0	19.1	-.1	11.8	5.6	18.4	19.0	-.6	3.2
1946.....	180.9	117.7	21.3	23.0	-1.7	15.3	6.2	17.3	22.6	-5.3	3.1
1947.....	198.2	128.8	19.9	21.4	-1.5	15.5	6.5	23.6	29.5	-5.9	3.8
1948.....	223.5	141.0	22.4	22.8	-.4	17.8	7.3	30.8	33.0	-2.2	4.2
1949.....	217.7	140.8	22.7	22.2	.5	12.9	8.3	28.2	26.4	1.9	4.8
1950.....	241.9	154.2	23.5	24.6	-1.1	14.0	9.0	35.7	40.6	-5.0	5.5
1951.....	279.3	180.3	26.0	26.3	-.3	16.3	9.4	41.0	42.2	-1.2	6.3
1952.....	292.2	195.0	26.9	26.7	.2	15.3	10.2	37.7	36.7	1.0	7.1
1953.....	305.6	208.8	27.4	27.6	-.2	13.3	10.5	37.3	38.3	-1.0	8.2
1954.....	301.8	207.6	27.8	27.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	12.7	10.9	33.7	34.1	-.3	9.1
1955.....	330.2	223.9	30.4	30.6	-.2	11.8	10.7	43.1	44.9	-1.7	10.4
1956.....	350.8	242.5	32.1	32.6	-.5	11.6	10.9	42.0	44.7	-2.7	11.7
1957.....	366.9	255.5	32.7	33.0	-.3	11.8	11.9	41.7	43.2	-1.5	13.4
1958.....	367.4	257.1	32.5	32.6	-.1	13.5	12.2	37.2	37.4	-.3	14.8
1959.....	399.6	278.4	35.0	35.2	-.1	11.3	11.9	46.4	46.8	-.5	16.6
1960.....	417.1	293.7	36.2	36.3	-.1	12.0	11.7	45.1	45.0	( <sup>5</sup> )	18.4
1961 <sup>6</sup> .....	430.2	302.9	36.5	36.4	-.1	13.1	11.5	46.2	46.1	7.1	20.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1959: I.....	390.7	270.6	34.1	34.2	-0.1	12.5	12.0	45.3	46.1	-0.9	16.2
II.....	405.2	280.0	35.2	35.6	-.4	11.5	11.9	50.2	51.5	-1.3	16.4
III.....	399.4	280.5	35.3	35.5	-.2	10.6	11.8	44.4	44.8	-.4	16.7
IV.....	402.8	282.4	35.3	35.2	.1	10.8	11.7	45.5	44.9	-.7	17.0
1960: I.....	413.5	290.2	35.8	36.1	-.3	10.5	11.7	47.4	48.1	-.7	17.8
II.....	419.2	294.6	36.4	36.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	12.3	11.7	45.9	46.3	-.4	18.3
III.....	419.0	296.0	36.3	36.1	.2	12.4	11.7	44.1	43.2	.9	18.6
IV.....	416.5	294.0	36.3	36.5	-.2	12.7	11.7	42.9	42.6	.3	18.9
1961: I.....	412.2	292.6	36.0	35.9	( <sup>5</sup> )	12.9	11.5	40.0	39.6	.4	19.2
II.....	426.0	300.2	36.3	36.0	.3	12.9	11.5	45.5	45.2	.3	19.6
III.....	434.3	306.2	36.6	36.7	-.1	12.8	11.5	47.0	47.2	-.2	20.2
IV <sup>6</sup> .....	( <sup>6</sup> )	312.7	37.2	37.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	13.6	11.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	20.7

<sup>1</sup> National income is the total net income earned in production. It differs from gross national product mainly in that it excludes depreciation charges and other allowances for business and institutional consumption of durable capital goods, and indirect business taxes. See Table B-12.

<sup>2</sup> Wages and salaries and supplements to wages and salaries (employer contributions for social insurance; employer contributions to private pension, health, and welfare funds; compensation for injuries; directors' fees; pay of the military reserve; and a few other minor items).

<sup>3</sup> Excludes income resulting from net reductions of farm inventories and gives credit in computing income to net additions to farm inventories during the period. Data for 1929-45 differ from those shown in Table B-70 because of revisions by the Department of Agriculture not yet incorporated into the national income accounts.

<sup>4</sup> See Table B-62 for corporate tax liability (Federal and State income and excess profits taxes) and corporate profits after taxes.

<sup>5</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>6</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>7</sup> Data for corporate profits are approximations for the year as a whole; data for fourth quarter are not available. All other data incorporating or derived from these figures are correspondingly approximate.

<sup>8</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-12.—Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-61

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Gross national product	Less: Capital consumption allowances			Equals: Net national product	Plus: Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises	Less:					Equals: National income
		Total	Depreciation charges	Other <sup>1</sup>			Indirect business taxes			Business transfer payments	Statistical discrepancy	
							Total	Federal	State and local			
1929	104.4	8.6	7.7	0.9	95.8	-0.1	7.0	1.2	5.8	0.6	0.3	87.8
1930	91.1	8.5	7.7	.8	82.6	-1	7.2	1.0	6.1	.5	-1.0	75.7
1931	76.3	8.2	7.6	.6	68.1	(2)	6.9	.9	6.0	.6	.8	59.7
1932	58.5	7.6	7.0	.6	50.9	(2)	6.8	.9	5.8	.7	.8	42.5
1933	56.0	7.2	6.7	.5	48.8	(2)	7.1	1.6	5.4	.7	.9	40.2
1934	65.0	7.1	6.6	.5	57.9	.3	7.8	2.2	5.6	.6	.7	49.0
1935	72.5	7.2	6.7	.6	65.3	.4	8.2	2.2	6.0	.6	-2	57.1
1936	82.7	7.5	6.7	.8	75.2	(2)	8.7	2.3	6.4	.6	1.1	64.9
1937	90.8	7.7	6.9	.8	83.0	.1	9.2	2.4	6.8	.6	-2	73.6
1938	85.2	7.8	6.9	.8	77.4	.2	9.2	2.2	6.9	.4	.5	67.6
1939	91.1	7.8	7.1	.7	83.3	.5	9.4	2.3	7.0	.5	1.2	72.8
1940	100.6	8.1	7.3	.8	92.5	.4	10.0	2.6	7.4	.4	.8	81.6
1941	125.8	9.0	8.1	1.0	116.8	.1	11.3	3.6	7.7	.5	.4	104.7
1942	159.1	10.2	9.2	1.0	149.0	.2	11.8	4.0	7.7	.5	-8	137.7
1943	192.5	10.9	9.9	1.0	181.6	.2	12.7	4.9	7.8	.5	-1.7	170.3
1944	211.4	12.0	10.8	1.2	199.4	.7	14.1	6.2	8.0	.5	2.8	182.6
1945	213.6	12.5	11.2	1.3	201.0	.8	15.5	7.1	8.4	.5	4.5	181.2
1946	210.7	10.7	9.0	1.7	200.0	.9	17.3	7.9	9.4	.6	2.1	180.9
1947	234.3	13.0	11.1	2.0	221.3	-2	18.6	7.9	10.8	.7	3.5	198.2
1948	259.4	15.5	13.1	2.4	244.0	-2	20.4	8.1	12.3	.7	-8	223.5
1949	258.1	17.3	15.1	2.2	240.8	-2	21.6	8.2	13.5	.8	.5	217.7
1950	284.6	19.1	16.5	2.6	265.5	.2	23.7	9.0	14.7	.8	-7	241.9
1951	329.0	22.0	18.8	3.2	307.0	.2	25.6	9.5	16.1	1.0	1.2	279.3
1952	347.0	24.0	20.9	3.1	323.0	-2	28.1	10.5	17.6	1.2	1.4	292.2
1953	365.4	26.5	23.1	3.5	338.9	-4	30.2	11.2	19.0	1.4	1.3	305.6
1954	363.1	28.8	25.2	3.6	334.3	-2	30.2	10.1	20.1	1.3	.9	301.8
1955	397.5	32.0	27.9	4.0	365.5	(2)	32.9	11.0	21.8	1.5	1.0	330.2
1956	419.2	34.4	30.5	3.9	384.8	.9	35.7	11.6	24.1	1.6	-2.4	350.8
1957	442.8	37.4	33.4	4.0	405.3	1.0	38.2	12.2	26.0	1.8	-6	366.9
1958	444.5	38.6	35.2	3.4	405.9	1.1	39.3	11.9	27.4	1.8	-1.5	367.4
1959	482.8	40.8	37.2	3.7	442.0	.4	42.7	13.0	29.6	1.8	-1.7	399.6
1960	504.4	43.1	39.3	3.8	461.4	.5	45.6	14.0	31.6	1.8	-2.6	417.1
1961 <sup>2</sup>	521.2	45.2	41.5	3.7	476.0	1.3	47.1	13.8	33.3	1.8	-1.7	430.2
Seasonally adjusted annual rates												
1959: I	472.2	39.8	(2)	(2)	432.5	0.7	41.5	12.6	28.9	1.8	-0.9	390.7
II	488.5	40.6	(2)	(2)	447.8	.5	42.1	12.7	29.4	1.8	-.9	405.2
III	482.3	41.1	(2)	(2)	441.2	.3	43.1	13.3	29.8	1.8	-2.8	399.4
IV	488.3	41.8	(2)	(2)	446.5	.3	43.9	13.6	30.3	1.8	-1.8	402.8
1960: I	501.5	42.5	(2)	(2)	459.0	.5	45.3	14.1	31.2	1.8	-1.1	413.5
II	506.4	43.0	(2)	(2)	463.4	.6	45.9	14.2	31.7	1.8	-2.9	419.2
III	505.1	43.2	(2)	(2)	461.9	.5	45.5	13.8	31.7	1.8	-4.0	419.0
IV	504.5	43.7	(2)	(2)	460.9	.5	45.9	13.8	32.1	1.8	-2.9	416.5
1961: I	500.8	44.2	(2)	(2)	456.6	.5	45.7	13.3	32.4	1.8	-2.6	412.2
II	516.1	45.0	(2)	(2)	471.1	1.4	46.4	13.6	32.9	1.8	-1.8	426.0
III	525.8	45.5	(2)	(2)	480.3	1.8	47.5	14.0	33.5	1.8	-1.5	434.3
IV <sup>3</sup>	542.0	46.1	(2)	(2)	496.0	1.5	48.9	14.5	34.4	1.8	(2)	(2)

<sup>1</sup> Accidental damage to fixed capital and capital outlays charged to current account.

<sup>2</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>4</sup> Data for corporate profits are approximations for the year as a whole; data for fourth quarter are not available. All other data incorporating or derived from these figures are correspondingly approximate.

<sup>5</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-13.—Relation of national income and personal income, 1929-61

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	National income	Less:			Plus:				Equals: Personal income
		Corporate profits and inventory valuation adjustment	Contributions for social insurance	Excess of wage accruals over disbursements	Government transfers to persons	Net interest paid by government	Dividends	Business transfer payments	
1929.....	87.8	10.1	0.2	-----	0.9	1.0	5.8	0.6	85.8
1930.....	75.7	6.6	.3	-----	1.0	1.0	5.5	.5	76.9
1931.....	59.7	1.6	.3	-----	2.1	1.1	4.1	.6	65.7
1932.....	42.5	-2.0	.3	-----	1.4	1.1	2.6	.7	50.1
1933.....	40.2	-2.0	.3	-----	1.5	1.2	2.1	.7	47.2
1934.....	49.0	1.1	.3	-----	1.6	1.2	2.6	.6	53.6
1935.....	57.1	2.9	.3	-----	1.8	1.1	2.9	.6	60.2
1936.....	64.9	5.0	.6	-----	2.9	1.1	4.5	.6	68.5
1937.....	73.6	6.2	1.8	-----	1.9	1.2	4.7	.6	73.9
1938.....	67.6	4.3	2.0	-----	2.4	1.2	3.2	.4	68.6
1939.....	72.8	5.7	2.1	-----	2.5	1.2	3.8	.5	72.9
1940.....	81.6	9.1	2.3	-----	2.7	1.3	4.0	.4	78.7
1941.....	104.7	14.5	2.8	-----	2.6	1.3	4.5	.5	96.3
1942.....	137.7	19.7	3.5	-----	2.6	1.5	4.3	.5	123.5
1943.....	170.3	23.8	4.5	0.2	2.5	2.1	4.5	.5	151.4
1944.....	182.6	23.0	5.2	- .2	3.1	2.8	4.7	.5	165.7
1945.....	181.2	18.4	6.1	-----	5.6	3.7	4.7	.5	171.2
1946.....	180.9	17.3	6.0	-----	10.9	4.5	5.8	.6	179.3
1947.....	198.2	23.6	5.7	-----	11.1	4.4	6.5	.7	191.6
1948.....	223.5	30.8	5.2	-----	10.5	4.5	7.2	.7	210.4
1949.....	217.7	28.2	5.7	-----	11.6	4.7	7.5	.8	208.3
1950.....	241.9	35.7	6.9	-----	14.3	4.8	9.2	.8	228.5
1951.....	279.3	41.0	8.2	.1	11.6	5.0	9.0	1.0	256.7
1952.....	292.2	37.7	8.6	-----	12.0	5.0	9.0	1.2	273.1
1953.....	305.6	37.3	8.7	-.1	12.9	5.2	9.2	1.4	288.3
1954.....	301.8	33.7	9.7	-----	15.0	5.4	9.8	1.3	289.8
1955.....	330.2	43.1	11.0	-----	16.0	5.4	11.2	1.5	310.2
1956.....	350.8	42.0	12.6	-----	17.2	5.7	12.1	1.6	332.9
1957.....	366.9	41.7	14.5	-----	20.1	6.2	12.6	1.8	351.4
1958.....	367.4	37.2	14.8	-----	24.5	6.2	12.4	1.8	360.3
1959.....	399.6	46.4	17.6	-----	25.4	7.1	13.4	1.8	383.3
1960.....	417.1	45.1	20.7	-----	27.3	7.8	14.1	1.8	402.2
1961 <sup>1</sup> .....	<sup>2</sup> 430.2	<sup>2</sup> 46.2	21.9	-----	31.0	7.3	14.4	1.8	416.7
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1959: I.....	390.7	45.3	17.1	-----	24.9	6.6	13.0	1.8	374.7
II.....	405.2	50.2	17.6	-----	25.1	6.9	13.3	1.8	384.6
III.....	399.4	44.4	17.7	-----	25.2	7.2	13.7	1.8	385.1
IV.....	402.8	45.5	17.8	-----	26.3	7.5	13.8	1.8	388.9
1960: I.....	413.5	47.4	20.4	-----	26.3	7.7	14.0	1.8	395.5
II.....	419.2	45.9	20.7	-----	26.8	7.8	14.0	1.8	403.1
III.....	419.0	44.1	21.1	-----	27.5	7.8	14.1	1.8	405.1
IV.....	416.5	42.9	20.8	-----	28.8	7.7	14.3	1.8	405.4
1961: I.....	412.2	40.0	21.2	-----	30.1	7.5	14.2	1.8	404.7
II.....	426.0	45.5	21.7	-----	31.0	7.3	14.2	1.8	413.2
III.....	434.3	47.0	22.0	-----	31.6	7.2	14.3	1.8	420.3
IV <sup>1</sup> .....	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	22.6	-----	31.4	7.2	15.0	1.8	428.6

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>2</sup> Data for corporate profits are approximations for the year as a whole; data for fourth quarter are not available. All other data incorporating or derived from these figures are correspondingly approximate.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-14.—Sources of personal income, 1929-67

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total personal income	Wage and salary disbursements <sup>1</sup>						Other labor income <sup>1</sup>	Proprietors' income <sup>2</sup>	
		Total	Commodity-producing industries		Distributive industries	Service industries	Government		Business and professional	Farm <sup>3</sup>
			Total	Manufacturing						
1929	85.8	50.4	21.5	16.1	15.6	8.4	4.9	0.6	8.8	6.0
1930	76.9	46.2	18.5	13.8	14.5	8.0	5.2	.6	7.4	4.1
1931	65.7	39.1	14.3	10.8	12.5	7.1	5.3	.5	5.6	3.2
1932	50.1	30.5	9.9	7.7	9.8	5.8	5.0	.5	3.4	1.9
1933	47.2	29.0	9.8	7.8	8.8	5.2	5.1	.4	3.2	2.4
1934	53.6	33.7	12.1	9.6	9.9	5.7	6.1	.4	4.6	2.4
1935	60.2	36.7	13.5	10.8	10.7	5.9	6.5	.5	5.4	5.0
1936	68.5	41.9	15.8	12.4	11.8	6.5	7.9	.6	6.5	4.0
1937	73.9	46.1	18.4	14.6	13.2	7.1	7.5	.6	7.1	5.6
1938	68.6	43.0	15.3	11.8	12.6	6.8	8.2	.6	6.8	4.3
1939	72.9	45.9	17.4	13.6	13.3	7.1	8.2	.6	7.3	4.3
1940	78.7	49.8	19.7	15.6	14.2	7.5	8.4	.7	8.4	4.6
1941	96.3	62.1	27.5	21.7	16.3	8.1	10.2	.7	10.9	6.5
1942	123.5	82.1	39.2	30.9	18.0	9.0	16.0	.9	13.9	10.0
1943	151.4	105.6	49.0	40.9	20.1	9.9	26.6	1.1	16.8	11.4
1944	165.7	117.0	50.4	42.9	22.7	10.9	33.0	1.5	18.0	11.5
1945	171.2	117.6	45.9	38.2	24.8	12.0	34.9	1.8	19.0	11.8
1946	179.3	119.9	46.0	36.5	30.9	14.3	20.6	1.9	21.3	15.3
1947	191.6	122.8	54.3	42.5	35.2	16.0	17.3	2.3	19.9	15.5
1948	210.4	135.2	60.3	46.5	38.8	17.3	18.8	2.7	22.4	17.8
1949	208.3	134.4	56.9	43.9	39.0	17.9	20.5	3.0	22.7	12.9
1950	228.5	146.4	63.5	49.4	41.3	19.3	22.3	3.8	23.5	14.0
1951	256.7	170.7	74.9	58.3	46.0	21.1	28.8	4.8	26.0	16.3
1952	273.1	184.9	80.5	63.0	48.7	22.6	32.9	5.3	26.9	15.3
1953	288.3	198.1	88.1	69.9	51.8	24.3	33.9	6.0	27.4	13.3
1954	289.8	196.3	84.1	66.1	52.3	25.5	34.4	6.2	27.8	12.7
1955	310.2	210.9	91.4	72.3	55.8	27.8	36.0	7.1	30.4	11.8
1956	332.9	227.6	98.7	77.7	60.3	30.5	38.0	8.1	32.1	11.6
1957	351.4	238.5	102.2	80.6	63.4	32.8	40.2	9.1	32.7	11.8
1958	360.3	239.8	97.9	76.7	63.8	34.8	43.2	9.4	32.5	13.5
1959	383.3	258.5	107.2	84.7	68.2	37.7	45.3	10.3	35.0	11.3
1960	402.2	271.3	110.4	87.4	71.8	40.7	48.4	10.9	36.2	12.0
1961 <sup>6</sup>	416.7	279.7	111.2	87.8	73.4	43.1	51.9	11.1	36.5	13.1
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1959: I	374.7	251.4	104.3	82.2	66.3	36.2	44.7	9.9	34.1	12.5
II	384.6	260.1	109.5	86.6	68.1	37.4	45.1	10.2	35.2	11.5
III	385.1	260.3	107.5	85.0	69.1	38.2	45.5	10.5	35.3	10.6
IV	388.9	261.9	107.8	85.1	69.2	39.1	45.9	10.7	35.3	10.8
1960: I	395.5	268.3	111.4	88.6	70.4	39.6	46.9	10.6	35.8	10.5
II	403.1	272.4	111.8	88.5	72.3	40.5	47.8	10.8	36.4	12.3
III	405.1	273.2	110.5	87.2	72.5	41.2	49.0	10.9	36.3	12.4
IV	405.4	271.3	108.0	85.2	72.1	41.5	49.7	11.2	36.3	12.7
1961: I	404.7	270.1	106.1	83.8	71.8	41.8	50.4	10.8	36.0	12.9
II	413.2	277.3	110.7	87.5	72.8	42.5	51.3	10.8	36.3	12.9
III	420.3	282.7	112.8	88.9	74.3	43.6	52.1	11.2	36.6	12.8
IV <sup>4</sup>	428.6	288.7	115.2	90.8	74.8	44.7	54.0	11.5	37.2	13.6

See footnotes at end of table, p. 225.



TABLE B-14.—Sources of personal income, 1929-61—Continued

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Rental income of persons	Dividends	Personal interest income	Transfer payments					Less: Personal contributions for social insurance	Non-agricultural personal income <sup>4</sup>
				Total	Old-age and survivors insurance benefits	State unemployment insurance benefits	Veterans' benefits	Other		
1929.....	5.4	5.8	7.4	1.5	-----	-----	0.6	0.9	0.1	77.7
1930.....	4.8	5.5	6.9	1.5	-----	-----	.6	.9	.1	70.8
1931.....	3.8	4.1	6.9	2.7	-----	-----	1.6	1.1	.2	60.9
1932.....	2.7	2.6	6.6	2.2	-----	-----	.8	1.4	.2	46.9
1933.....	2.0	2.1	6.2	2.1	-----	-----	.5	1.6	.2	43.6
1934.....	1.7	2.6	6.1	2.2	-----	-----	.4	1.8	.2	49.8
1935.....	1.7	2.9	5.9	2.4	-----	-----	.5	1.9	.2	53.9
1936.....	1.8	4.5	5.3	3.5	-----	-----	1.9	1.6	.2	63.2
1937.....	2.1	4.7	5.9	2.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	.6	1.8	.6	67.0
1938.....	2.6	3.2	5.8	2.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	0.4	.5	1.9	.6	62.8
1939.....	2.7	3.8	5.8	3.0	( <sup>5</sup> )	.4	.5	2.0	.6	67.1
1940.....	2.9	4.0	5.8	3.1	( <sup>5</sup> )	.5	.5	2.0	.7	72.6
1941.....	3.5	4.5	5.8	3.1	0.1	.3	.5	2.2	.8	88.0
1942.....	4.5	4.3	5.8	3.1	.1	.3	.5	2.2	1.2	111.5
1943.....	5.1	4.5	5.8	3.0	.2	.1	.5	2.2	1.8	137.6
1944.....	5.4	4.7	6.2	3.6	.2	.1	.9	2.4	2.2	151.6
1945.....	5.6	4.7	6.9	6.2	.3	.4	2.8	2.7	2.3	156.8
1946.....	6.2	5.8	7.6	11.4	.4	1.1	6.8	3.2	2.0	161.2
1947.....	6.5	6.5	8.2	11.8	.5	.8	6.7	3.8	2.1	172.8
1948.....	7.3	7.2	8.7	11.3	.6	.8	5.8	4.2	2.2	189.2
1949.....	8.3	7.5	9.4	12.4	.7	1.7	5.1	4.9	2.2	192.1
1950.....	9.0	9.2	10.3	15.1	1.0	1.4	4.9	7.9	2.9	211.3
1951.....	9.4	9.0	11.2	12.6	1.9	.8	3.9	6.0	3.4	237.0
1952.....	10.2	9.0	12.1	13.2	2.2	1.0	3.9	6.2	3.8	254.3
1953.....	10.5	9.2	13.4	14.3	3.0	1.0	3.7	6.6	3.9	271.5
1954.....	10.9	9.8	14.6	16.2	3.6	2.0	3.8	6.7	4.6	273.8
1955.....	10.7	11.2	15.8	17.5	4.9	1.4	4.2	7.0	5.2	295.0
1956.....	10.9	12.1	17.5	18.8	5.7	1.4	4.2	7.5	5.8	317.9
1957.....	11.9	12.6	19.6	21.9	7.3	1.8	4.4	8.4	6.7	336.1
1958.....	12.2	12.4	21.0	26.3	8.5	3.9	4.6	9.4	6.9	343.0
1959.....	11.9	13.4	23.6	27.2	10.2	2.5	4.5	10.0	7.9	368.1
1960.....	11.7	14.1	26.2	29.1	11.1	2.8	4.6	10.6	9.3	386.2
1961 <sup>6</sup> .....	11.5	14.4	27.3	32.8	12.6	4.0	4.8	11.5	9.7	399.4
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1959: I.....	12.0	13.0	22.8	26.8	9.5	2.9	4.6	9.8	7.8	358.2
II.....	11.9	13.3	23.4	26.9	10.3	2.2	4.6	9.9	7.9	369.1
III.....	11.8	13.7	23.9	27.0	10.4	2.1	4.4	10.2	8.0	370.8
IV.....	11.7	13.8	24.4	28.2	10.5	2.8	4.5	10.3	8.0	374.1
1960: I.....	11.7	14.0	25.5	28.1	10.7	2.4	4.6	10.5	9.2	381.0
II.....	11.7	14.0	26.1	28.6	11.2	2.4	4.5	10.5	9.2	386.6
III.....	11.7	14.1	26.4	29.3	11.3	2.9	4.5	10.6	9.3	388.7
IV.....	11.7	14.3	26.7	30.6	11.4	3.8	4.6	10.8	9.3	388.7
1961: I.....	11.5	14.2	26.8	32.0	11.8	3.8	4.7	11.7	9.5	387.8
II.....	11.5	14.2	27.0	32.9	12.5	4.5	4.8	11.1	9.7	396.3
III.....	11.5	14.3	27.4	33.5	12.7	4.0	4.8	11.9	9.8	403.2
IV.....	11.5	15.0	28.0	33.2	13.4	3.8	4.8	11.3	10.0	410.4

<sup>1</sup> The total of wage and salary disbursements and other labor income differs from compensation of employees in Table B-11 in that it excludes employer contributions for social insurance and excludes the excess of wage accruals over wage disbursements.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes income resulting from net reductions of inventories and gives credit in computing income to net additions to inventories during the period.

<sup>3</sup> Data for 1929-45 differ from those in Table B-70 because of revisions by the Department of Agriculture not yet incorporated into the national income accounts.

<sup>4</sup> Nonagricultural income is personal income exclusive of net income of unincorporated farm enterprises, farm wages, agricultural net interest, and net dividends paid by agricultural corporations.

<sup>5</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>6</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-15.—Disposition of personal income, 1929-61

Year or quarter	Personal income	Less: Personal taxes <sup>1</sup>	Equals: Disposable personal income	Less: Personal consumption expenditures	Equals: Personal saving	Saving as percent of disposable personal income (percent)
Billions of dollars						
1929.....	85.8	2.6	83.1	79.0	4.2	5.1
1930.....	76.9	2.5	74.4	71.0	3.4	4.6
1931.....	65.7	1.9	63.8	61.3	2.5	3.9
1932.....	50.1	1.5	48.7	49.3	— .6	-1.2
1933.....	47.2	1.5	45.7	46.4	— .6	-1.3
1934.....	53.6	1.6	52.0	51.9	.1	.2
1935.....	60.2	1.9	58.3	56.3	2.0	3.4
1936.....	68.5	2.3	66.2	62.6	3.6	5.4
1937.....	73.9	2.9	71.0	67.3	3.7	5.2
1938.....	68.6	2.9	65.7	64.6	1.1	1.7
1939.....	72.9	2.4	70.4	67.6	2.9	4.1
1940.....	78.7	2.6	76.1	71.9	4.2	5.5
1941.....	96.3	3.3	93.0	81.9	11.1	11.9
1942.....	123.5	6.0	117.5	89.7	27.8	23.7
1943.....	151.4	17.8	133.5	100.5	33.0	24.7
1944.....	165.7	18.9	146.8	109.8	36.9	25.1
1945.....	171.2	20.9	150.4	121.7	28.7	19.1
1946.....	179.3	18.7	160.6	147.1	13.5	8.4
1947.....	191.6	21.5	170.1	165.4	4.7	2.8
1948.....	210.4	21.1	189.3	178.3	11.0	5.8
1949.....	208.3	18.7	189.7	181.2	8.5	4.5
1950.....	228.5	20.8	207.7	195.0	12.6	6.1
1951.....	256.7	29.2	227.5	209.8	17.7	7.8
1952.....	273.1	34.4	238.7	219.8	18.9	7.9
1953.....	288.3	35.8	252.5	232.6	19.8	7.8
1954.....	289.8	32.9	256.9	238.0	18.9	7.4
1955.....	310.2	35.7	274.4	256.9	17.5	6.4
1956.....	332.9	40.0	292.9	269.9	23.0	7.9
1957.....	351.4	42.6	308.8	285.2	23.6	7.6
1958.....	360.3	42.3	317.9	293.2	24.7	7.8
1959.....	383.3	46.0	337.3	314.0	23.4	6.9
1960.....	402.2	50.4	351.8	328.9	22.9	6.5
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	416.7	51.8	364.9	339.2	25.7	7.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates						
1959: I.....	374.7	44.9	329.8	305.8	23.9	7.2
II.....	384.6	46.1	338.4	313.6	24.8	7.3
III.....	385.1	46.4	338.7	316.5	22.3	6.6
IV.....	388.9	46.6	342.3	320.0	22.3	6.5
1960: I.....	395.5	49.9	345.7	323.8	21.8	6.3
II.....	403.1	50.5	352.7	329.9	22.8	6.5
III.....	405.1	50.8	354.4	329.7	24.6	6.9
IV.....	405.4	50.5	354.9	332.3	22.7	6.4
1961: I.....	404.7	50.3	354.3	330.7	23.7	6.7
II.....	413.2	51.4	361.8	336.1	25.8	7.1
III.....	420.3	52.5	367.7	341.0	26.8	7.3
IV <sup>2</sup> .....	428.6	53.1	375.6	349.0	26.6	7.1

<sup>1</sup> Includes also such items as fines and penalties.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-16.—Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures, in current and 1961 prices, 1929-61

Year or quarter	Total disposable personal income (billions of dollars)		Per capita disposable personal income (dollars)		Total personal consumption expenditures (billions of dollars)		Per capita personal consumption expenditures (dollars)		Population (thousands) <sup>4</sup>
	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>1</sup>	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>1</sup>	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>2</sup>	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>2</sup>	
1929.....	83.1	150.3	682	1,233	79.0	142.8	648	1,172	121,875
1930.....	74.4	140.6	604	1,142	71.0	134.3	576	1,090	123,188
1931.....	63.8	135.5	514	1,091	61.3	130.2	494	1,049	124,449
1932.....	48.7	117.1	390	938	49.3	118.5	395	948	124,949
1933.....	45.7	114.0	364	908	46.4	115.7	369	921	125,690
1934.....	52.0	121.8	411	963	51.9	121.6	410	961	126,485
1935.....	58.3	133.7	458	1,050	56.3	129.1	442	1,014	127,362
1936.....	66.2	150.1	516	1,170	62.6	142.1	488	1,109	128,181
1937.....	71.0	155.0	551	1,203	67.3	147.1	522	1,141	128,961
1938.....	65.7	147.0	506	1,132	64.6	144.6	497	1,113	129,969
1939.....	70.4	158.9	537	1,212	67.6	152.7	516	1,165	131,028
1940.....	76.1	170.2	576	1,289	71.9	160.8	544	1,217	132,122
1941.....	93.0	194.6	697	1,458	81.9	171.4	614	1,285	133,402
1942.....	117.5	220.0	871	1,631	89.7	167.9	665	1,245	134,860
1943.....	133.5	229.0	976	1,674	100.5	172.3	735	1,260	136,739
1944.....	146.8	238.7	1,061	1,725	109.8	178.6	793	1,290	138,397
1945.....	150.4	235.7	1,075	1,685	121.7	190.9	870	1,364	139,928
1946.....	160.6	233.4	1,136	1,651	147.1	213.8	1,040	1,512	141,389
1947.....	170.1	223.5	1,180	1,551	165.4	217.4	1,148	1,508	144,126
1948.....	189.3	235.2	1,291	1,604	178.3	221.6	1,216	1,511	146,631
1949.....	189.7	238.0	1,272	1,596	181.2	227.3	1,215	1,524	149,188
1950.....	207.7	256.7	1,369	1,692	195.0	241.0	1,286	1,589	151,683
1951.....	227.5	263.6	1,474	1,708	209.8	243.2	1,359	1,576	154,360
1952.....	238.7	270.9	1,520	1,725	219.8	249.6	1,400	1,590	157,028
1953.....	252.5	284.0	1,582	1,780	232.6	261.5	1,457	1,638	159,636
1954.....	256.9	286.1	1,582	1,762	238.0	265.0	1,465	1,632	162,417
1955.....	274.4	304.2	1,660	1,840	256.9	284.7	1,554	1,723	165,270
1956.....	292.9	319.4	1,742	1,900	269.9	294.2	1,605	1,749	168,176
1957.....	308.8	327.1	1,804	1,911	285.2	302.1	1,666	1,765	171,198
1958.....	317.9	330.5	1,826	1,898	293.2	304.7	1,684	1,751	174,060
1959.....	337.3	346.3	1,905	1,956	314.0	322.4	1,773	1,821	177,076
1960.....	351.8	355.7	1,947	1,969	328.9	332.7	1,820	1,841	180,670
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	364.9	364.9	1,987	1,987	339.2	339.2	1,847	1,847	183,650
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1959: I.....	329.8	341.1	1,874	1,938	305.8	316.3	1,737	1,797	176,012
II.....	338.4	348.5	1,915	1,972	313.6	322.8	1,775	1,827	176,714
III.....	338.7	346.7	1,908	1,953	316.5	324.1	1,783	1,826	177,493
IV.....	342.3	349.3	1,920	1,959	320.0	326.4	1,795	1,831	178,291
1960: I.....	345.7	351.7	1,924	1,957	323.8	329.3	1,802	1,833	179,690
II.....	352.7	357.0	1,956	1,980	329.9	333.9	1,829	1,852	180,328
III.....	354.4	358.0	1,957	1,977	329.7	333.1	1,821	1,839	181,084
IV.....	354.9	357.0	1,951	1,963	332.3	334.2	1,827	1,837	181,898
1961: I.....	354.3	355.4	1,940	1,946	330.7	331.7	1,811	1,817	182,601
II.....	361.8	362.5	1,974	1,978	336.1	336.7	1,834	1,837	183,292
III.....	367.7	367.3	1,998	1,996	341.0	340.6	1,853	1,851	184,054
IV <sup>6</sup> .....	375.6	374.5	2,032	2,026	349.0	347.8	1,888	1,882	184,851

<sup>1</sup> Estimates in current prices divided by the implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditures on a 1961 base.

<sup>2</sup> See Table B-2 for explanation.

<sup>3</sup> Total expenditures in 1961 prices divided by population.

<sup>4</sup> Population of the United States including armed forces abroad. Annual data are for July 1; quarterly data are for middle of period.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Council of Economic Advisers.

TABLE B-17.—Financial saving by individuals, 1939-61<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total	Cur- rency and bank de- posits	Sav- ings shares ( <sup>2</sup> )	Securities				Private insurance re- serves ( <sup>4</sup> )	Non- in- sured pen- sion funds	Gov- ern- ment in- surance and pen- sion re- serves <sup>5</sup>	Less: Increase in debt		
				Total	U.S. sav- ings bonds	Other gov- ern- ment <sup>3</sup>	Cor- porate and other				Mort- gage debt <sup>6</sup>	Con- sumer debt <sup>7</sup>	Secu- rities loans <sup>8</sup>
1939	4.2	3.0	0.1	-0.8	0.7	-0.9	-0.6	1.7	0.1	1.3	0.5	0.8	-0.2
1940	4.2	2.9	.3	-.4	.9	-.8	-.4	1.8	.1	1.3	.8	1.0	-.2
1941	10.5	4.8	.4	2.6	2.8	.4	-.5	2.1	.1	1.9	.8	.7	-.1
1942	29.3	10.9	.3	10.3	8.0	2.3	( <sup>9</sup> )	2.5	.1	2.6	.1	-3.0	.3
1943	38.7	16.2	.6	14.1	11.1	3.2	-.3	2.8	.2	3.9	-.4	-1.0	.6
1944	41.4	17.5	.8	15.7	11.8	4.6	-.7	3.2	.6	5.0	-.1	.1	1.4
1945	37.3	19.0	1.1	9.9	6.8	4.2	-1.2	3.5	.9	5.1	.2	.5	1.5
1946	14.1	10.6	1.2	-1.4	1.0	-2.4	( <sup>9</sup> )	3.4	.3	3.6	3.6	2.3	-2.3
1947	6.5	2.0	1.3	2.4	2.0	-.3	.7	3.6	.3	3.5	4.6	2.8	-.8
1948	2.8	-1.8	1.3	3.1	1.6	.4	1.1	3.8	.4	3.6	4.7	2.4	.4
1949	2.2	-1.4	1.6	2.4	1.5	.2	.7	3.7	.6	2.3	4.1	2.6	.3
1950	.8	3.5	1.7	.9	.2	-.1	.7	3.9	.9	1.1	7.3	3.6	.2
1951	11.1	5.9	2.3	.5	-.5	-.4	1.4	4.1	1.4	4.2	6.6	1.0	-.3
1952	13.1	7.0	3.3	3.5	.1	1.3	2.2	4.8	1.5	4.4	6.5	4.4	.6
1953	10.9	4.7	4.0	3.4	.2	2.0	1.2	5.0	1.8	3.2	7.3	2.6	.4
1954	9.5	5.4	4.8	.4	.6	-.9	.7	5.2	1.9	2.6	9.0	1.0	.9
1955	7.1	3.3	5.2	6.4	.3	3.9	2.2	5.5	2.1	3.1	11.8	6.1	.6
1956	14.1	4.7	5.4	5.2	-.1	3.3	2.0	5.5	2.4	3.6	10.3	3.1	-.8
1957	15.5	4.9	5.2	4.6	-1.9	3.8	2.8	5.1	2.9	3.2	7.9	2.5	-.1
1958	16.9	10.2	6.3	1.3	-.5	-.7	2.6	5.3	3.1	.6	9.3	2.2	.4
1959	13.6	3.5	7.3	11.1	-1.8	12.0	.9	5.5	3.4	2.3	13.0	6.3	.2
1960	10.4	3.9	8.1	1.4	-.2	.5	1.2	5.5	3.7	3.3	11.6	3.7	.3
1961 <sup>10</sup>	17.9	10.5	9.2	1.1	.8	-1.0	1.3	5.7	3.9	1.9	12.4	1.0	.9
1959: I	4.1	.1	1.4	2.7	-.2	2.6	.3	1.3	.9	.1	3.3	.3	-.6
II	3.5	.3	2.4	2.4	-.4	2.7	.1	1.4	.8	1.5	2.9	2.2	1
III	4.6	2.7	1.2	3.1	-.5	3.3	.3	1.2	.8	.9	3.4	1.9	( <sup>9</sup> )
IV	1.4	.4	2.3	3.0	-.6	3.5	.1	1.6	.9	-.2	3.4	2.4	.6
1960: I	3.2	-2.1	1.6	2.6	-.2	2.7	.1	1.2	1.0	.3	3.1	-.5	-1.3
II	1.6	-.2	2.4	-.2	-.1	-.2	.2	1.3	.9	2.1	2.6	2.0	.1
III	4.3	3.2	1.4	.6	( <sup>9</sup> )	.1	.5	1.4	.9	1.0	2.7	.7	.8
IV	1.4	2.9	2.7	-1.5	.1	-2.0	.4	1.7	.9	-.1	3.2	1.5	.6
1961: I	4.8	1.6	2.0	-1.1	.3	-1.3	( <sup>9</sup> )	1.3	1.0	-.2	2.7	-1.7	-1.0
II	8.2	1.7	2.7	-.3	.1	-1.8	1.4	1.3	.9	1.5	3.0	.6	.9
III	6.3	3.8	1.4	1.3	.2	1.1	-.1	1.4	.9	.7	3.1	.1	.1
IV <sup>10</sup>	3.5	3.5	3.1	1.1	.2	.9	( <sup>9</sup> )	1.6	1.0	-.1	3.7	2.0	.9

<sup>1</sup> Individuals' saving, in addition to personal holdings, covers saving of unincorporated business, trust funds, and nonprofit institutions in the forms specified.

<sup>2</sup> Includes shares in savings and loan associations and shares and deposits in credit unions.

<sup>3</sup> "Other government" includes U.S. Government issues (except savings bonds), State and local government securities, and beginning 1951, nonguaranteed Federal agency issues, which are included in "corporate and other" for years prior to 1951.

<sup>4</sup> Includes insured pension reserves.

<sup>5</sup> Includes Social Security funds, State and local retirement systems, etc.

<sup>6</sup> Mortgage debt to institutions on one- to four-family nonfarm dwellings.

<sup>7</sup> Consumer debt owed to corporations, largely attributable to purchases of automobiles and other durable consumer goods, although including some debt arising from purchases of consumption goods. Policy loans on Government and private life insurance have been deducted from those items of saving.

<sup>8</sup> Change in bank loans to brokers and dealers and others for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities.

<sup>9</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>10</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Figures beginning 1957 have been revised since the *Economic Report of the President, January 1961*.

In addition to the concept of saving shown above, there are other concepts of individuals' saving, with varying degrees of coverage, currently in use. The personal saving estimates of the Department of Commerce are derived as the difference between disposable personal income and expenditures. Conceptually, Commerce saving includes the following items not included in Securities and Exchange Commission saving: Housing, farm and unincorporated business investment in inventories and plant and equipment, net of depreciation, and increase in debt. Government insurance is excluded from the Commerce saving series. For a reconciliation of the two series, see Securities and Exchange Commission *Statistical Bulletin, July 1961*, and *Survey of Current Business, July 1961*.

The flow-of-funds system of accounts of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System includes capital investments as well as financial components of saving and covers saving of Federal, State, and local governments, businesses, financial institutions, and consumers. While the Federal Reserve's estimates of consumer saving in financial form are similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission estimates of individuals' saving, there are some statistical and conceptual differences in the two sets of data.

Revisions for 1955-61 in the consumer credit statistics of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System have not yet been incorporated into these estimates.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included for all periods.

Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.

TABLE B-18.—Sources and uses of gross saving, 1929-61

(Billions of dollars)

Year or quarter	Gross private saving and government surplus or deficit on income and product transactions							Gross investment			Statistical discrepancy
	Total	Private saving			Government surplus or deficit (-)			Total	Gross private domestic investment	Net foreign investment <sup>1</sup>	
		Total	Personal saving	Gross business saving	Total	Federal	State and local				
1929.....	16.7	15.7	4.2	11.5	1.0	1.2	-0.1	17.0	16.2	0.8	0.3
1930.....	11.9	12.2	3.4	8.8	- .3	.3	-.5	11.0	10.3	.7	-1.0
1931.....	4.9	7.7	2.5	5.2	-2.8	-2.1	-7	5.7	5.5	.2	.8
1932.....	.3	2.0	- .6	2.7	-1.7	-1.5	-2	1.1	.9	.2	.8
1933.....	.6	1.9	- .6	2.6	-1.4	-1.3	( <sup>2</sup> )	1.5	1.4	.2	.9
1934.....	2.6	5.0	.1	4.9	-2.4	-2.9	.5	3.3	2.9	.4	.7
1935.....	6.4	8.4	2.0	6.3	-2.0	-2.6	.6	6.2	6.3	-.1	-.2
1936.....	7.2	10.1	3.6	6.5	-3.0	-3.5	.5	8.3	8.4	-.1	1.1
1937.....	12.1	11.5	3.7	7.8	.6	- .2	.7	11.8	11.7	.1	-.2
1938.....	7.3	8.9	1.1	7.8	-1.6	-2.0	.4	7.8	6.7	1.1	.5
1939.....	9.0	11.2	2.9	8.3	-2.1	-2.2	.1	10.2	9.3	.9	1.2
1940.....	13.9	14.6	4.2	10.4	- .7	-1.4	.7	14.7	13.2	1.5	.8
1941.....	18.8	22.6	11.1	11.5	-3.8	-5.1	1.3	19.2	18.1	1.1	.4
1942.....	10.5	41.9	27.8	14.1	-31.4	-33.2	1.8	9.7	9.9	-.2	-.8
1943.....	5.1	49.3	33.0	16.3	-44.2	-46.7	2.5	3.4	5.6	-2.2	-1.7
1944.....	2.3	54.2	36.9	17.2	-51.9	-54.6	2.7	5.0	7.1	-2.1	2.8
1945.....	4.5	44.3	28.7	15.6	-39.7	-42.3	2.6	9.0	10.4	-1.4	4.5
1946.....	30.6	26.5	13.5	13.1	4.1	2.2	1.9	32.7	28.1	4.6	2.1
1947.....	36.8	23.6	4.7	18.9	13.3	12.2	1.1	40.4	31.5	8.9	3.5
1948.....	45.9	37.6	11.0	26.6	8.2	8.0	.3	45.0	43.1	1.9	-.8
1949.....	33.0	36.1	8.5	27.6	-3.1	-2.5	-.6	33.5	33.0	.5	.5
1950.....	48.5	40.3	12.6	27.7	8.2	9.2	-1.0	47.8	50.0	-2.2	-.7
1951.....	55.3	49.2	17.7	31.5	6.1	6.4	-.3	56.6	56.3	.2	1.2
1952.....	48.3	52.2	18.9	33.2	-3.9	-3.9	.1	49.7	49.9	-.2	1.4
1953.....	47.0	54.1	19.8	34.3	-7.1	-7.4	.3	48.3	50.3	-2.0	1.3
1954.....	47.6	54.4	18.9	35.5	-6.7	-5.8	-.9	48.5	48.9	-.4	.9
1955.....	62.4	59.6	17.5	42.1	2.9	3.8	-1.0	63.4	63.8	-.4	1.0
1956.....	71.3	66.1	23.0	43.0	5.2	5.7	-.5	68.8	67.4	1.5	-2.4
1957.....	70.2	69.2	23.6	45.6	1.0	2.0	-1.0	69.6	66.1	3.5	-.6
1958.....	58.0	69.5	24.7	44.8	-11.4	-9.4	-2.1	56.6	56.6	-.1	-1.5
1959.....	71.8	74.0	23.4	50.7	-2.2	-1.8	-.4	70.1	72.4	-2.3	-1.7
1960.....	76.5	74.6	22.9	51.7	1.9	3.3	-1.4	73.9	72.4	1.5	-2.6
1961 <sup>3</sup> .....	73.6	79.9	25.7	54.2	-6.2	-3.6	-2.7	71.9	69.5	2.4	-1.7
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1959: I.....	69.1	73.2	23.9	49.3	-4.1	-2.7	-1.4	68.2	70.4	-2.2	-0.9
II.....	76.8	76.9	24.8	52.1	-1	.5	-.6	76.0	79.1	-3.1	-.9
III.....	69.3	72.1	22.3	49.7	-2.8	-2.5	-.4	66.4	68.2	-1.8	-2.8
IV.....	71.7	73.7	22.3	51.4	-2.0	-2.4	.4	69.9	71.8	-1.9	-1.8
1960: I.....	80.3	73.8	21.8	52.0	6.5	6.5	( <sup>2</sup> )	79.2	78.9	.2	-1.1
II.....	78.2	74.7	22.8	51.9	3.5	4.5	-1.0	75.3	74.6	.7	-2.0
III.....	75.9	76.4	24.6	51.7	-.5	1.4	-1.9	71.9	70.5	1.4	-4.0
IV.....	72.0	73.9	22.7	51.2	-1.9	.4	-2.3	69.1	65.6	3.6	-2.9
1961: I.....	66.1	74.0	23.7	50.4	-7.9	-5.5	-2.4	63.5	59.8	3.7	-2.6
II.....	73.1	79.7	25.8	53.9	-6.6	-4.3	-2.3	71.3	68.8	2.4	-1.8
III.....	75.6	81.6	26.8	54.8	-6.0	-3.1	-2.9	74.1	73.2	.9	-1.5
IV <sup>4</sup> .....	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	26.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	78.6	76.0	2.5	( <sup>5</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> Net exports of goods and services less foreign net transfers by Government. For 1929-45, net foreign investment and net exports of goods and services have been equated, since foreign net transfers by Government were negligible during that period.

<sup>2</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>4</sup> Data for corporate profits are approximations for the year as a whole; data for fourth quarter are not available. All other data incorporating or derived from these figures are correspondingly approximate.

<sup>5</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

# EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY

TABLE B-19.—*Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-61*

Year or month	Noninstitutional population <sup>1</sup>	Total labor force (including armed forces) <sup>1</sup>	Armed forces <sup>1</sup>	Civilian labor force					Total labor force as percent of noninstitutional population	Unemployment as percent of civilian labor force
				Total	Employment <sup>2</sup>			Unemployment <sup>2</sup>		
					Total	Agricultural	Non-agricultural			
Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over								Percent		
<b>Old definitions:<sup>2</sup></b>										
1929	(*)	49,440	260	49,180	47,630	10,450	37,180	1,550	(*)	3.2
1930	(*)	50,080	260	49,820	45,480	10,340	35,140	4,340	(*)	8.7
1931	(*)	50,680	260	50,420	42,400	10,290	32,110	8,020	(*)	15.9
1932	(*)	51,250	250	51,000	38,940	10,170	28,770	12,060	(*)	23.6
1933	(*)	51,840	250	51,590	38,760	10,090	28,670	12,830	(*)	24.9
1934	(*)	52,490	260	52,230	40,890	9,900	30,990	11,340	(*)	21.7
1935	(*)	53,140	270	52,870	42,260	10,110	32,150	10,610	(*)	20.1
1936	(*)	53,740	300	53,440	44,410	10,000	34,410	9,030	(*)	16.9
1937	(*)	54,320	320	54,000	46,300	9,820	36,480	7,700	(*)	14.3
1938	(*)	54,950	340	54,610	44,220	9,690	34,530	10,390	(*)	19.0
1939	(*)	55,600	370	55,230	45,750	9,610	36,140	9,480	(*)	17.2
1940	100,380	56,180	540	55,640	47,520	9,540	37,980	8,120	56.0	14.6
1941	101,520	57,530	1,620	55,910	50,350	9,100	41,250	5,590	56.7	9.9
1942	102,610	60,380	3,970	56,410	53,750	9,250	44,500	2,660	58.8	4.7
1943	103,660	64,560	9,020	55,540	54,470	9,080	45,390	1,070	62.3	1.9
1944	104,690	66,040	11,410	54,630	53,960	8,950	45,010	670	63.1	1.2
1945	105,520	65,290	11,430	53,860	52,820	8,590	44,240	1,040	61.9	1.9
1946	106,520	60,970	3,450	57,520	55,250	8,320	46,930	2,270	57.2	3.9
1947	107,608	61,758	1,590	60,168	58,027	8,266	49,761	2,142	57.4	3.6
<b>New definitions:<sup>2</sup></b>										
1947	107,608	61,758	1,590	60,168	57,812	8,256	49,557	2,356	57.4	3.9
1948	108,632	62,898	1,456	61,442	59,117	7,960	51,156	2,325	57.9	3.8
1949	109,773	63,721	1,616	62,105	58,423	8,017	50,406	3,682	58.0	5.9
1950	110,929	64,749	1,650	63,099	59,748	7,497	52,251	3,351	58.4	5.3
1951	112,075	65,983	3,097	62,884	60,784	7,048	53,736	2,099	58.9	3.3
1952	113,270	66,960	3,594	62,966	61,035	6,792	54,243	1,932	58.8	3.1
1953	115,094	67,362	3,547	63,815	61,945	6,555	55,390	1,870	58.5	2.9
1954	116,219	67,818	3,350	64,468	60,890	6,495	54,395	3,578	58.4	5.6
1955	117,388	68,896	3,048	65,848	62,944	6,718	56,225	2,904	58.7	4.4
1956	118,734	70,387	2,857	67,530	64,708	6,572	58,135	2,822	59.3	4.2
1957	120,445	70,744	2,797	67,946	65,011	6,222	58,789	2,936	58.7	4.3
1958	121,950	71,284	2,637	68,647	63,966	5,844	58,122	4,681	58.5	6.8
1959	123,366	71,946	2,552	69,394	65,581	5,836	59,745	3,813	58.3	5.5
1960	124,878	72,820	2,514	70,306	66,392	5,696	60,697	3,913	58.3	5.6
<i>Including Alaska and Hawaii</i>										
1960	125,368	73,126	2,514	70,612	66,681	5,723	60,958	3,931	58.3	5.6
1961	127,852	74,175	2,572	71,603	66,796	5,463	61,333	4,806	58.0	6.7
1960: January	124,606	70,689	2,521	68,168	64,020	4,611	59,409	4,149	56.7	6.1
February	124,716	70,970	2,521	68,449	64,520	4,619	59,901	3,931	56.9	5.7
March	124,839	70,993	2,520	68,473	64,267	4,565	59,702	4,206	56.9	6.1
April	124,917	72,331	2,512	69,819	66,159	5,393	60,765	3,660	57.9	5.2
May	125,033	73,171	2,504	70,667	67,208	5,837	61,371	3,459	58.5	4.9
June	125,162	75,499	2,497	73,002	68,579	6,856	61,722	4,423	60.3	6.1
July	125,288	75,215	2,509	72,706	68,689	6,885	61,805	4,017	60.0	5.5
August	125,499	74,551	2,481	72,070	68,282	6,454	61,828	3,788	59.4	5.3
September	125,717	73,672	2,517	71,155	67,767	6,588	61,179	3,388	58.6	4.8
October	125,936	73,592	2,523	71,069	67,490	6,247	61,244	3,579	58.4	5.0
November	126,222	73,746	2,533	71,213	67,182	5,666	61,516	4,031	58.4	5.7
December	126,482	73,079	2,530	70,549	66,009	4,950	61,059	4,540	57.8	6.4

See footnotes at end of table, p. 231.

TABLE B-19.—Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-67—Continued

Year or month	Non-institutional population <sup>1</sup>	Total labor force (including armed forces) <sup>1</sup>	Armed forces <sup>1</sup>	Civilian labor force					Total labor force as percent of non-institutional population	Unemployment as percent of civilian labor force
				Total	Employment <sup>2</sup>			Unemployment <sup>2</sup>		
					Total	Agricultural	Non-agricultural			
Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over										
Percent										
<i>Including Alaska and Hawaii</i>										
1961: January.....	126,725	72,361	2,524	69,837	64,452	4,634	59,818	5,385	57.1	7.7
February.....	126,918	72,894	2,534	70,360	64,655	4,708	59,947	5,705	57.4	8.1
March.....	127,115	73,540	2,529	71,011	65,516	4,977	60,539	5,495	57.9	7.7
April.....	127,337	73,216	2,520	70,696	65,734	5,000	60,734	4,962	57.5	7.0
May.....	127,558	74,059	2,513	71,546	66,778	5,544	61,234	4,768	58.1	6.7
June.....	127,768	76,790	2,504	74,286	68,706	6,671	62,035	5,580	60.1	7.5
July.....	127,986	76,153	2,514	73,639	68,499	6,453	62,046	5,140	59.5	7.0
August.....	128,183	75,610	2,529	73,081	68,539	6,325	62,215	4,542	59.0	6.2
September.....	128,372	73,670	2,547	71,123	67,038	5,666	61,372	4,035	57.4	5.7
October.....	128,570	74,345	2,586	71,759	67,824	5,964	61,860	3,934	57.8	5.5
November.....	128,756	74,096	2,757	71,339	67,349	5,199	62,149	3,990	57.5	5.6
December.....	128,941	73,372	2,813	70,559	66,467	4,418	62,049	4,091	56.9	5.8
Seasonally adjusted <sup>4</sup>										
1960: January.....				69,773	66,136	5,693	60,253	3,664	-----	5.3
February.....				69,989	66,653	5,738	60,813	3,388	-----	4.8
March.....				69,586	65,780	5,296	60,366	3,812	-----	5.5
April.....				70,524	66,963	5,677	61,255	3,620	-----	5.1
May.....				70,826	67,007	5,470	61,617	3,567	-----	5.1
June.....				71,152	67,168	5,737	61,599	3,842	-----	5.4
July.....				70,726	66,948	5,855	61,193	3,863	-----	5.5
August.....				70,796	66,747	5,799	61,035	4,132	-----	5.8
September.....				71,013	67,030	6,055	60,996	4,037	-----	5.7
October.....				70,575	66,362	5,659	60,697	4,414	-----	6.3
November.....				71,356	67,048	5,799	61,210	4,389	-----	6.2
December.....				71,118	66,407	5,924	60,454	4,819	-----	6.8
1961: January.....				71,481	66,583	5,721	60,667	4,736	-----	6.6
February.....				71,943	66,792	5,848	60,860	4,891	-----	6.8
March.....				72,166	67,058	5,774	61,212	4,970	-----	6.9
April.....				71,410	66,532	5,263	61,224	4,889	-----	6.8
May.....				71,403	66,578	5,196	61,480	4,923	-----	6.9
June.....				72,404	67,293	5,582	61,911	4,946	-----	6.8
July.....				71,633	66,763	5,487	61,432	4,938	-----	6.9
August.....				71,789	66,998	5,683	61,417	4,957	-----	6.9
September.....				70,981	66,309	5,208	61,188	4,843	-----	6.8
October.....				71,260	66,690	5,402	61,308	4,831	-----	6.8
November.....				71,482	67,215	5,321	61,840	4,345	-----	6.1
December.....				71,128	66,868	5,198	61,435	4,344	-----	6.1

<sup>1</sup> Data for 1940-52 revised to include about 150,000 members of the armed forces who were outside the United States in 1940 and who were, therefore, not enumerated in the 1940 Census and were excluded from the 1940-52 estimates.

<sup>2</sup> See Note.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

<sup>4</sup> Seasonally adjusted totals may differ from the sum of components because totals and components have been seasonally adjusted separately.

NOTE.—Civilian labor force data beginning with March 1960 are based on a 333-area sample. For May 1956-February 1960 they are based on a 330-area sample; for January 1954-April 1956 they are based on a 230-area sample; for 1946-53 on a 68-area sample; for 1940-45 on a smaller sample; and for 1929-39 on sources other than direct enumeration.

Effective January 1957, persons on layoff with definite instructions to return to work within 30 days of layoff and persons waiting to start new wage and salary jobs within the following 30 days are classified as unemployed. Such persons had previously been classified as employed (with a job but not at work). The combined total of the groups changing classification has averaged about 200,000 to 300,000 a month in recent years. The small number of persons in school during the survey week and waiting to start new jobs are classified as not in the labor force instead of employed, as formerly. Persons waiting to open new businesses or start new farms within 30 days continued to be classified as employed.

Beginning July 1955, monthly data are for the calendar week ending nearest the 15th of the month; previously, for week containing the 8th. Annual data are averages of monthly figures.

For the years 1940-52, estimating procedures made use of 1940 Census data; for subsequent years, 1950 Census data were used. For the effects of this change on the historical comparability of the data, see *Annual Report on the Labor Force, 1954*, Series P-50, No. 59, April 1955, p. 12.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-20.—Employment and unemployment, by age and sex, 1942-61

[Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over]

Year or month	Total civilian labor force	Employed						Unemployed							
		Total employed	14-19 years		20-44 years		45 years and over		Total unemployed	14-19 years		20-44 years		45 years and over	
			Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>Old definitions:<sup>1</sup></b>															
1942	56,410	53,750	5,770	20,790	9,400	14,160	3,630	2,660	510	670	520	770	190		
1943	55,540	54,470	6,350	17,550	11,050	15,160	4,360	1,070	290	180	260	240	100		
1944	54,630	53,960	6,050	16,380	11,280	15,480	4,770	670	200	140	170	110	50		
1945	53,860	52,820	5,480	15,830	11,140	15,520	4,850	1,040	190	330	270	200	50		
1946	57,520	55,250	4,550	21,170	9,870	15,280	4,380	2,270	290	1,200	280	410	90		
1947	60,168	58,027	4,717	23,409	9,828	15,474	4,600	2,142	425	920	303	396	99		
1948	61,442	59,378	4,841	23,842	10,098	15,677	4,924	2,064	415	757	353	414	127		
1949	62,105	58,710	4,512	23,483	10,087	15,491	5,138	3,395	595	1,329	559	719	194		
1950	63,099	59,957	4,564	23,833	10,376	15,666	5,517	3,142	543	1,119	552	697	232		
1951	62,884	61,005	4,614	23,594	10,833	16,144	5,819	1,879	356	515	419	402	190		
1952	62,966	61,293	4,530	23,372	10,917	16,345	6,130	1,673	362	495	344	345	127		
1953	63,811	62,213	4,514	23,715	10,953	16,725	6,306	1,602	312	512	300	363	116		
1954	64,468	61,238	4,285	23,178	10,730	16,649	6,395	3,230	515	1,158	617	684	256		
1955	65,848	63,193	4,446	23,768	11,000	16,878	7,101	2,654	471	854	502	606	222		
1956	67,530	64,979	4,764	24,051	11,271	17,294	7,598	2,551	510	784	491	530	239		
<b>New definitions:<sup>1</sup></b>															
1957	67,946	65,011	4,719	23,992	11,247	17,247	7,803	2,936	574	936	566	605	254		
1958	68,647	63,966	4,511	23,374	11,028	17,036	8,015	4,681	757	1,715	850	965	392		
1959	69,394	65,581	4,789	23,952	11,080	17,316	8,443	3,813	727	1,233	708	789	356		
1960 <sup>2</sup>	70,612	66,681	5,033	24,064	11,282	17,478	8,823	3,931	792	1,276	730	782	348		
1961	71,603	66,796	5,158	23,894	11,318	17,449	8,978	4,806	921	1,549	911	969	455		
<b>1960:</b>															
January	68,168	64,020	4,064	23,659	10,821	17,124	8,350	4,149	635	1,484	723	934	373		
February	68,449	64,520	4,187	23,732	10,944	17,159	8,499	3,931	607	1,402	708	904	308		
March	68,473	64,267	4,104	23,606	10,988	17,108	8,463	4,626	698	1,531	675	923	380		
April	69,819	66,159	4,522	23,957	11,420	17,482	8,775	3,660	658	1,267	633	755	346		
May	70,667	67,208	4,808	24,225	11,582	17,625	8,968	3,459	765	1,059	656	680	299		
June	73,002	68,579	6,224	24,410	11,438	17,654	8,854	4,423	1,569	1,133	751	653	316		
July	72,706	68,689	6,827	24,380	11,239	17,567	8,676	4,017	1,020	1,193	784	670	348		
August	72,070	68,282	6,439	24,439	11,148	17,529	8,730	3,788	805	1,179	747	710	345		
September	71,155	67,767	5,015	24,376	11,499	17,687	9,191	3,388	665	1,035	734	668	295		
October	71,069	67,490	4,961	24,250	11,534	17,694	9,053	3,579	663	1,077	737	727	373		
November	71,213	67,182	4,729	24,070	11,479	17,684	9,221	4,031	683	1,310	850	777	412		
December	70,549	66,009	4,522	23,679	11,303	17,420	9,087	4,540	728	1,648	772	989	403		
<b>1961:</b>															
January	69,837	64,452	4,137	23,306	11,011	17,184	8,816	5,385	784	2,011	919	1,200	472		
February	70,360	64,655	4,237	23,187	11,167	17,152	8,914	5,705	809	2,103	1,040	1,260	491		
March	71,011	65,516	4,371	23,329	11,422	17,340	9,055	5,495	827	1,997	980	1,193	499		
April	70,696	65,734	4,415	23,663	11,355	17,377	8,921	4,962	778	1,713	931	1,060	480		
May	71,546	66,778	4,761	23,823	11,540	17,520	9,134	4,768	876	1,546	901	977	469		
June	74,286	68,706	6,373	24,243	11,438	17,621	9,030	5,580	1,763	1,499	965	831	521		
July	73,639	68,499	6,921	24,280	11,050	17,446	8,799	5,140	1,304	1,466	931	917	521		
August	73,081	68,539	6,877	24,327	11,106	17,495	8,736	4,542	958	1,410	888	866	420		
September	71,123	67,038	4,984	24,325	11,273	17,527	8,930	4,085	797	1,166	892	898	424		
October	71,759	67,824	5,038	24,293	11,649	17,682	9,160	3,934	736	1,127	907	751	411		
November	71,339	67,349	4,953	24,136	11,502	17,629	9,130	3,930	750	1,180	849	827	383		
December	70,559	66,467	4,829	23,816	11,303	17,400	9,117	4,091	669	1,375	739	934	372		

<sup>1</sup> See Note, Table B-19 for explanation of differences between the old and new definitions.<sup>2</sup> Beginning January 1960, data for Alaska and Hawaii are included.

NOTE.—Data are not available prior to 1942 for all the age/sex groups above.

See Note, Table B-19 for information on area sample used and reporting periods.

Source: Department of Labor.



TABLE B-21.—Employed persons not at work, by reason for not working, and special groups of unemployed persons, 1946-61

[Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over]

Year or month	Employed persons not at work, by reason for not working						Special groups of un- employed persons <sup>2</sup>	
	Total	Bad weather	Indus- trial dispute	Vacation	Illness	All other reasons <sup>1</sup>	Tempo- rary layoff <sup>3</sup>	New wage and salary job <sup>4</sup>
<b>New definitions: <sup>5</sup></b>								
1946.....	2,103	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	662	819	( <sup>6</sup> )	97	58
1947.....	2,260	211	95	834	847	273	123	92
1948.....	2,490	197	97	1,044	844	308	141	121
1949.....	2,243	110	79	1,044	719	291	185	101
1950.....	2,440	151	85	1,137	718	349	92	116
1951.....	2,459	111	57	1,073	782	436	117	103
1952.....	2,555	68	164	1,130	775	418	142	117
1953.....	2,529	96	73	1,171	827	362	167	101
1954.....	2,688	73	53	1,361	776	425	221	127
1955.....	2,683	103	61	1,268	835	416	133	117
1956.....	2,888	109	76	1,346	901	456	124	147
1957.....	3,017	139	45	1,447	962	425	151	110
1958.....	3,076	182	59	1,479	882	474	166	120
1959.....	3,161	115	160	1,494	907	484	128	134
1960 <sup>7</sup> .....	3,231	168	40	1,576	942	505	147	119
1961.....	3,146	143	56	1,492	898	556	149	129
1960: January.....	2,343	351	47	334	1,144	466	133	85
February.....	2,730	302	50	398	1,466	514	139	95
March.....	2,791	826	57	324	1,121	464	112	76
April.....	2,243	32	39	868	856	448	149	120
May.....	2,086	88	48	645	873	431	146	79
June.....	3,772	19	58	2,293	767	634	126	272
July.....	7,291	23	38	5,692	783	756	185	134
August.....	6,924	29	26	5,293	842	736	200	154
September.....	2,639	30	34	1,339	817	419	140	123
October.....	2,063	26	64	815	810	348	159	98
November.....	1,913	38	12	543	889	431	114	102
December.....	1,989	253	7	374	934	420	188	89
1961: January.....	2,045	194	20	337	979	515	206	54
February.....	2,173	260	12	430	997	474	260	71
March.....	2,044	213	10	407	942	471	210	101
April.....	2,020	189	32	394	945	460	120	135
May.....	2,026	56	28	641	902	399	137	96
June.....	3,839	75	18	2,178	807	761	127	311
July.....	7,357	88	53	5,568	833	814	102	157
August.....	6,604	3	40	4,805	831	928	186	177
September.....	2,928	88	229	1,336	849	427	113	160
October.....	2,354	6	166	815	927	441	101	102
November.....	2,189	172	43	585	910	480	99	99
December.....	2,170	372	24	409	858	505	130	83

<sup>1</sup> Beginning 1957, includes persons waiting to open new businesses or start new farms within 30 days.

<sup>2</sup> Under the old definitions of employment and unemployment, these groups were included in the "employed but not at work" category.

<sup>3</sup> Persons on layoff with definite instructions to return to work within 30 days of the layoff.

<sup>4</sup> Persons scheduled to start new wage and salary jobs within 30 days. Under the old definitions, the "new job or business" group included these persons as well as persons waiting to open new businesses or start new farms within 30 days (see "all other" category in this table) and persons in school during the survey week and waiting to start new jobs (these are now classified as "not in the labor force").

<sup>5</sup> See Note, Table B-19 for explanation.

<sup>6</sup> Not available.

<sup>7</sup> Beginning January 1960, data for Alaska and Hawaii are included.

NOTE.—See Note, Table B-19 for information on area sample used and reporting periods.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-22.—Unemployed persons, by duration of unemployment, 1946-61

Year or quarter	Total un- employed	Duration of unemployment				Average duration of unem- ployment (weeks)
		4 weeks and under	5-14 weeks	15-26 weeks	Over 26 weeks	
Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over						
<b>Old definitions: <sup>1</sup></b>						
1946.....	2,270	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )	141	( <sup>3</sup> )
1947.....	2,142	1,041	704	234	164	9.8
1948.....	2,064	1,087	669	193	116	8.6
1949.....	3,395	1,517	1,195	427	256	10.0
1950.....	3,142	1,307	1,055	425	357	12.1
1951.....	1,879	1,003	574	166	137	9.7
1952.....	1,673	925	517	148	84	8.3
1953.....	1,602	910	482	132	79	8.1
1954.....	3,230	1,303	1,115	495	317	11.7
1955.....	2,654	1,138	815	367	336	13.2
1956.....	2,551	1,214	805	301	232	11.3
<b>New definitions: <sup>1</sup></b>						
1957.....	2,936	1,485	890	321	239	10.4
1958.....	4,681	1,833	1,397	785	667	13.8
1959.....	3,813	1,658	1,113	499	571	14.5
1960 <sup>4</sup> .....	3,931	1,799	1,176	502	454	12.8
1961.....	4,806	1,897	1,375	728	804	15.5
1959: I.....	4,612	1,609	1,542	684	777	15.9
II.....	3,686	1,687	821	526	623	15.2
III.....	3,467	1,626	1,062	311	468	13.6
IV.....	3,506	1,712	1,021	357	417	12.8
1960: I <sup>4</sup> .....	4,095	1,634	1,432	563	467	13.3
II.....	3,847	1,957	910	545	435	12.3
III.....	3,731	1,741	1,171	403	416	12.3
IV.....	4,050	1,861	1,190	499	499	13.0
1961: I.....	5,528	1,997	1,922	903	705	14.0
II.....	5,103	2,043	1,188	953	919	16.0
III.....	4,589	1,831	1,314	544	900	16.4
IV.....	4,005	1,724	1,079	512	691	16.0

<sup>1</sup> See Note, Table B-19 for explanation of differences between the old and new definitions.

<sup>2</sup> For duration of less than 6 months, data are available only for under 3 months (1,568,000) and 3 to 6 months (564,000).

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

<sup>4</sup> Beginning January 1960, data for Alaska and Hawaii are included.

NOTE.—See Note, Table B-19 for information on area sample used and reporting periods.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-23.—Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1940-61

Year or month	All programs			State programs						
	Covered employment <sup>1</sup>	Insured unemployment (weekly average) <sup>2,3</sup>	Total benefits paid (millions of dollars) <sup>2</sup>	Insured unemployment <sup>3</sup>	Initial claims	Exhaustions <sup>4</sup>	Insured unemployment as percent of covered employment		Benefits paid	
							Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Total (millions of dollars) <sup>5</sup>	Average weekly check (dollars) <sup>6</sup>
	Thousands			Weekly average, thousands			Percent			
1940	24,291	1,331	534.7	1,282	214	50	5.6		518.7	10.56
1941	28,136	842	358.8	814	164	30	3.0		344.3	11.06
1942	30,819	661	350.4	649	122	21	2.2		344.1	12.66
1943	32,419	149	80.5	147	36	4	.5		79.6	13.84
1944	31,714	111	67.2	105	29	2	.4		62.4	15.90
1945	30,087	720	574.9	589	116	5	2.1		445.9	18.77
1946	31,856	2,804	2,378.5	1,295	189	38	4.3		1,094.9	18.50
1947	33,876	1,805	1,785.0	1,009	187	24	3.1		775.1	17.83
1948	34,646	1,468	1,328.7	1,002	210	20	3.0		789.9	19.03
1949	33,098	2,479	2,269.8	1,979	322	37	6.2		1,736.0	20.48
1950	34,308	1,605	1,467.6	1,503	236	36	4.6		1,373.1	20.76
1951	36,334	1,000	862.9	969	208	16	2.8		840.4	21.09
1952	37,006	1,069	1,043.5	1,024	215	18	2.9		998.2	22.79
1953	38,072	1,065	1,050.6	995	218	15	2.8		962.2	23.58
1954	36,617	2,048	2,291.8	1,865	303	34	5.2		2,026.9	24.93
1955	40,014	1,395	1,560.2	1,254	226	25	3.5		1,350.3	25.04
1956	42,758	1,318	1,540.6	1,212	226	20	3.2		1,389.7	27.02
1957	43,447	1,567	1,913.0	1,450	268	23	3.6		1,733.9	28.17
1958	44,501	3,269	4,209.2	2,509	370	50	6.4		3,512.7	30.58
1959	45,727	2,099	2,803.0	1,682	281	33	4.4		2,279.0	30.41
1960	46,334	2,067	3,022.7	1,906	331	31	4.8		2,726.7	32.87
1961 <sup>7</sup>	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,996	4,358.0	2,290	350	46	5.6		3,422.7	33.80
1960: January	45,446	2,359	264.4	2,180	386	29	5.6	4.3	235.2	31.90
February	45,409	2,326	274.6	2,157	301	30	5.5	4.2	247.8	32.26
March	45,389	2,370	314.6	2,209	301	33	5.7	4.5	287.1	32.39
April	46,240	2,078	259.6	1,939	293	35	4.9	4.3	237.4	32.50
May	46,473	1,801	223.0	1,682	264	31	4.3	4.2	204.9	32.24
June	46,963	1,700	216.8	1,588	272	31	4.0	4.4	198.9	32.33
July	46,900	1,826	198.7	1,686	339	29	4.3	4.7	183.8	32.37
August	47,017	1,804	229.7	1,657	306	28	4.2	5.1	206.3	32.99
September	47,012	1,781	230.8	1,598	274	27	4.0	5.4	201.8	33.54
October	46,602	1,839	214.9	1,678	332	29	4.2	5.7	189.9	33.73
November	46,270	2,225	258.6	2,039	396	31	5.1	6.3	231.1	34.01
December	46,282	2,847	332.4	2,639	494	36	6.6	6.4	300.2	34.18
1961: January	44,756	3,515	436.4	3,266	541	44	8.1	6.1	397.6	34.34
February	44,467	3,638	435.5	3,394	480	49	8.4	6.3	399.3	34.45
March	44,873	3,403	500.9	3,168	372	53	7.8	6.3	461.5	34.37
April	( <sup>8</sup> )	3,626	419.4	2,779	367	58	6.8	5.9	362.5	34.18
May	( <sup>8</sup> )	3,290	457.2	2,328	297	54	5.7	5.6	320.1	33.46
June	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,877	403.9	1,991	279	53	4.9	5.3	264.4	32.92
July	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,678	321.9	1,958	357	50	4.8	5.3	224.0	32.91
August	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,357	333.5	1,744	271	44	4.3	5.2	237.2	33.36
September	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,122	263.4	1,558	257	38	3.8	5.1	185.0	33.12
October	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,018	255.3	1,502	277	35	3.7	5.1	180.9	33.30
November	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,172	261.4	1,662	320	34	4.1	5.1	190.9	33.67
December <sup>7</sup>	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,533	286.1	2,017	395	35	5.0	4.8	218.5	34.11

<sup>1</sup> Includes persons under the State, UCFE (Federal employee, effective January 1955), and RRB (Railroad Retirement Board) programs. Beginning October 1958, also includes the UCX program (unemployment compensation for ex-servicemen).

<sup>2</sup> Includes State, UCFE, RR, UCX, UCV (unemployment compensation for veterans, October 1952-January 1960), and SRA (Servicemen's Readjustment Act, September 1944-September 1951) programs. Also includes Federal and State programs for temporary extension of benefits beginning June 1958.

<sup>3</sup> Covered workers who have completed at least 1 week of unemployment.

<sup>4</sup> Individuals receiving final payments in benefit year.

<sup>5</sup> Includes benefits paid under extended duration provisions of State laws, beginning June 1958.

<sup>6</sup> For total unemployment only.

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>8</sup> March 1961 is latest month for which data are available for all programs combined; workers covered by State programs account for about 87 percent of the total.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included for all periods and for Puerto Rico since January 1961. Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-24.—Number of wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-61<sup>1</sup>

[Thousands of employees]

Year or month	Total wage and salary workers	Manufacturing			Mining	Contract construction	Transportation and public utilities	Wholesale and retail trade	Finance, insurance, and real estate	Service and miscellaneous	Government (Federal, State, and local)
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods							
1929.....	31,339	10,702	(2)	(2)	1,087	1,497	3,916	6,123	1,509	3,440	3,065
1930.....	29,424	9,562	(2)	(2)	1,009	1,372	3,685	5,797	1,475	3,376	3,148
1931.....	26,649	8,170	(2)	(2)	873	1,214	3,254	5,284	1,407	3,183	3,264
1932.....	23,628	6,931	(2)	(2)	731	970	2,816	4,683	1,341	2,931	3,225
1933.....	23,711	7,397	(2)	(2)	744	809	2,672	4,755	1,295	2,873	3,166
1934.....	25,953	8,501	(2)	(2)	883	862	2,750	5,281	1,319	3,058	3,299
1935.....	27,053	9,069	(2)	(2)	897	912	2,786	5,431	1,335	3,142	3,481
1936.....	29,082	9,827	(2)	(2)	946	1,145	2,973	5,809	1,388	3,326	3,668
1937.....	31,026	10,794	(2)	(2)	1,015	1,112	3,134	6,265	1,432	3,518	3,756
1938.....	29,209	9,440	(2)	(2)	891	1,055	2,863	6,179	1,425	3,473	3,883
1939.....	30,618	10,278	4,715	5,564	854	1,150	2,936	6,426	1,462	3,517	3,995
1940.....	32,376	10,985	5,363	5,622	925	1,294	3,038	6,750	1,502	3,681	4,202
1941.....	36,554	13,192	6,968	6,225	957	1,790	3,274	7,210	1,549	4,924	4,660
1942.....	40,125	15,280	8,823	6,458	992	2,170	3,460	7,118	1,638	5,081	5,483
1943.....	42,452	17,602	11,084	6,518	925	1,567	3,647	6,982	1,502	4,148	6,080
1944.....	41,883	17,328	10,856	6,472	892	1,094	3,829	7,314	1,476	4,163	6,043
1945.....	40,394	15,524	9,074	6,450	836	1,132	3,906	7,058	1,497	4,241	5,944
1946.....	41,674	14,703	7,742	6,962	862	1,661	4,061	8,376	1,697	4,719	5,595
1947.....	43,881	15,545	8,385	7,159	955	1,982	4,166	8,955	1,754	5,050	5,474
1948.....	44,891	15,582	8,326	7,256	994	2,169	4,189	9,272	1,829	5,206	5,650
1949.....	43,778	14,441	7,489	6,953	930	2,165	4,001	9,284	1,857	5,264	5,856
1950.....	45,222	15,241	8,094	7,147	901	2,333	4,034	9,386	1,919	5,382	6,026
1951.....	47,849	16,393	9,089	7,304	929	2,603	4,226	9,742	1,991	5,576	6,389
1952.....	48,825	16,632	9,349	7,284	898	2,634	4,248	10,004	2,069	5,730	6,609
1953.....	50,232	17,549	10,110	7,438	866	2,623	4,290	10,247	2,146	5,867	6,645
1954.....	49,022	16,314	9,129	7,185	791	2,612	4,084	10,235	2,234	6,002	6,751
1955.....	50,675	16,882	9,541	7,340	792	2,802	4,141	10,535	2,335	6,274	6,914
1956.....	52,408	17,243	9,834	7,409	822	2,999	4,244	10,858	2,429	6,536	7,277
1957.....	52,904	17,174	9,856	7,319	828	2,923	4,241	10,886	2,477	6,749	7,626
1958.....	51,423	15,945	8,830	7,116	751	2,778	3,976	10,750	2,519	6,811	7,893
1959.....	53,380	16,667	9,369	7,298	731	2,955	4,010	11,125	2,597	7,105	8,190
1960.....	54,347	16,762	9,441	7,321	709	2,882	4,017	11,412	2,684	7,361	8,520
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	54,076	16,268	9,044	7,224	667	2,760	3,923	11,365	2,748	7,514	8,831
Seasonally adjusted											
1959: January....	52,446	16,294	9,097	7,197	751	2,914	3,990	10,895	2,554	6,962	8,086
February.....	52,612	16,400	9,184	7,216	744	2,896	3,997	10,941	2,557	6,994	8,083
March.....	52,843	16,601	9,345	7,256	747	2,911	4,007	10,877	2,569	7,023	8,108
April.....	53,328	16,744	9,482	7,262	749	2,988	4,013	11,068	2,578	7,065	8,123
May.....	53,606	16,891	9,601	7,290	758	2,981	4,032	11,127	2,586	7,088	8,143
June.....	53,779	16,966	9,667	7,329	756	2,992	4,035	11,152	2,593	7,104	8,151
July.....	53,879	17,036	9,696	7,340	766	2,982	4,034	11,173	2,604	7,113	8,171
August.....	53,357	16,534	9,182	7,352	693	2,989	4,007	11,222	2,606	7,132	8,174
September....	53,413	16,556	9,208	7,348	677	2,954	4,005	11,198	2,618	7,153	8,252
October.....	53,353	16,444	9,126	7,318	682	2,930	3,989	11,216	2,625	7,178	8,289
November....	53,622	16,600	9,268	7,332	722	2,920	3,997	11,228	2,628	7,201	8,326
December....	54,116	16,907	9,569	7,338	726	2,982	4,015	11,259	2,636	7,232	8,359

See footnotes at end of table, p. 237.

TABLE B-24.—Number of wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-61<sup>1</sup>—  
Continued

[Thousands of employees]

Year or month	Total wage and salary workers	Manufacturing			Mining	Contract construction	Transportation and public utilities	Wholesale and retail trade	Finance, insurance, and real estate	Service and miscellaneous	Government (Federal, State, and local)
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods							
Seasonally adjusted											
1960: January	54,211	16,988	9,659	7,329	716	2,922	4,022	11,315	2,641	7,256	8,351
February	54,445	17,063	9,719	7,344	723	2,974	4,034	11,355	2,655	7,287	8,354
March	54,427	17,054	9,683	7,371	722	2,759	4,039	11,356	2,661	7,287	8,549
April	54,702	17,037	9,652	7,385	729	2,901	4,054	11,439	2,666	7,307	8,569
May	54,584	16,985	9,608	7,377	725	2,921	4,040	11,442	2,670	7,326	8,475
June	54,538	16,901	9,526	7,375	717	2,912	4,039	11,436	2,679	7,357	8,497
July	54,514	16,813	9,451	7,362	698	2,928	4,031	11,465	2,685	7,398	8,496
August	54,403	16,701	9,377	7,324	706	2,902	4,022	11,455	2,696	7,402	8,519
September	54,301	16,619	9,322	7,297	700	2,879	4,008	11,422	2,704	7,400	8,569
October	54,190	16,489	9,208	7,281	698	2,877	3,991	11,423	2,707	7,415	8,590
November	53,995	16,351	9,111	7,240	693	2,832	3,976	11,371	2,719	7,431	8,622
December	53,707	16,174	8,988	7,186	679	2,757	3,950	11,334	2,723	7,447	8,643
1961: January	53,581	16,021	8,863	7,158	672	2,773	3,931	11,347	2,727	7,439	8,671
February	53,485	15,962	8,797	7,165	667	2,765	3,922	11,296	2,731	7,460	8,682
March	53,561	16,023	8,820	7,203	668	2,792	3,919	11,252	2,732	7,463	8,712
April	53,663	16,119	8,904	7,215	666	2,766	3,901	11,320	2,732	7,425	8,734
May	53,894	16,275	9,058	7,217	670	2,742	3,903	11,355	2,739	7,436	8,774
June	54,182	16,373	9,114	7,259	669	2,795	3,914	11,392	2,747	7,471	8,821
July	54,335	16,392	9,138	7,254	672	2,776	3,942	11,437	2,748	7,533	8,835
August	54,333	16,381	9,131	7,250	665	2,770	3,939	11,410	2,757	7,546	8,865
September	54,304	16,323	9,105	7,218	666	2,754	3,939	11,363	2,756	7,567	8,936
October	54,385	16,261	9,112	7,249	661	2,758	3,929	11,365	2,764	7,580	8,967
November <sup>2</sup>	54,517	16,460	9,221	7,248	666	2,720	3,926	11,368	2,770	7,603	8,995
December <sup>3</sup>	54,491	16,521	9,265	7,256	660	2,703	3,908	11,339	2,772	7,621	8,967

<sup>1</sup> Includes all full- and part-time wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments who worked during, or received pay for, any part of the pay period ending nearest the 15th of the month. Excludes proprietors, self-employed persons, domestic servants, and unpaid family workers. Not comparable with estimates of nonagricultural employment of the civilian labor force (Table B-19) which include proprietors, self-employed persons, domestic servants, and unpaid family workers; which count persons as employed when they are not at work because of industrial disputes, bad weather, etc.; and which are based on a sample survey of households, whereas the estimates in this table are based on reports from employing establishments.

<sup>2</sup> Not available.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Series revised to conform to 1957 Standard Industrial Classification and March 1959 benchmark data. For further details, see *Employment and Earnings*, Annual Supplement Issue, November 1961.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January 1959.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-25.—Average weekly hours of work in selected industries, 1929-61

Year or month	Manufacturing			Contract construction	Retail trade (except eating and drinking places)	Wholesale trade	Bituminous coal mining	Class I railroads <sup>1</sup>	Telephone communication <sup>2</sup>
	Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods						
1929.....	44.2	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	38.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1930.....	42.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	33.3	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1931.....	40.5	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	28.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1932.....	38.3	32.5	41.9	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	27.0	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1933.....	38.1	34.7	40.0	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	29.3	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1934.....	34.6	33.8	35.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	26.8	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1935.....	36.6	37.2	36.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	41.6	26.2	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1936.....	39.2	40.9	37.7	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	42.9	28.5	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1937.....	38.6	39.9	37.4	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	43.1	27.7	( <sup>3</sup> )	38.8
1938.....	35.6	34.9	36.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	42.3	23.3	( <sup>3</sup> )	38.9
1939.....	37.7	37.9	37.4	( <sup>3</sup> )	43.4	41.8	26.8	43.7	39.1
1940.....	38.1	39.2	37.0	( <sup>3</sup> )	43.2	41.3	27.8	44.3	39.5
1941.....	40.6	42.0	38.9	( <sup>3</sup> )	42.8	41.1	30.7	45.8	40.1
1942.....	43.1	45.0	40.3	( <sup>3</sup> )	41.8	41.4	32.4	47.0	40.5
1943.....	45.0	46.5	42.5	( <sup>3</sup> )	40.9	42.3	36.3	48.7	41.9
1944.....	45.2	46.5	43.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	41.0	43.0	43.0	48.9	42.3
1945.....	43.5	44.0	42.3	( <sup>3</sup> )	40.9	42.8	42.0	48.5	41.7
1946.....	40.3	40.4	40.5	( <sup>3</sup> )	41.3	41.6	41.3	46.0	39.4
1947.....	40.4	40.5	40.2	38.2	41.0	41.1	40.3	46.4	37.4
1948.....	40.0	40.4	39.6	38.1	40.9	41.0	37.7	46.2	39.2
1949.....	39.1	39.4	38.9	37.7	41.0	40.8	32.3	43.7	38.5
1950.....	40.5	41.1	39.7	37.4	41.1	40.7	34.7	40.8	38.9
1951.....	40.6	41.5	39.5	38.1	40.9	40.8	34.9	41.0	39.1
1952.....	40.7	41.5	39.7	38.9	40.5	40.7	33.8	40.6	38.5
1953.....	40.5	41.2	39.6	37.9	39.8	40.6	34.1	40.6	38.7
1954.....	39.6	40.1	39.0	37.2	39.7	40.5	32.3	40.8	38.9
1955.....	40.7	41.3	39.9	37.1	39.6	40.7	37.3	41.9	39.6
1956.....	40.4	41.0	39.6	37.5	39.1	40.5	37.5	41.7	39.5
1957.....	39.8	40.3	39.2	37.0	38.7	40.3	36.3	41.7	39.0
1958.....	39.2	39.5	38.8	36.8	38.7	40.2	33.3	41.6	38.4
1959.....	40.3	40.7	39.7	37.0	38.7	40.6	35.8	41.9	39.2
1960.....	39.7	40.1	39.2	36.7	38.5	40.5	35.8	41.7	39.6
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	39.8	40.2	39.3	37.0	38.1	40.4	35.7	42.1	39.3
	Seasonally adjusted				Unadjusted				
1960: January.....	40.4	40.9	39.6	36.4	38.5	40.4	37.7	41.0	38.8
February.....	40.1	40.6	39.4	36.9	38.5	40.1	36.2	42.7	39.2
March.....	39.9	40.4	39.3	35.9	38.4	40.2	37.8	42.9	39.1
April.....	39.8	40.2	39.3	37.0	38.7	40.3	36.2	41.6	38.9
May.....	40.1	40.4	39.7	36.5	38.5	40.4	35.5	41.7	39.2
June.....	39.9	40.2	39.5	36.7	38.5	40.6	36.6	42.8	39.4
July.....	39.9	40.2	39.5	37.2	38.4	40.8	36.5	41.0	39.8
August.....	39.6	40.0	39.1	36.8	38.5	40.6	34.9	42.6	39.5
September.....	39.4	39.8	38.9	37.0	38.4	40.6	34.1	40.6	40.8
October.....	39.5	39.9	38.9	37.2	38.4	40.6	34.9	40.9	40.0
November.....	39.3	39.7	38.7	36.8	38.5	40.5	33.4	40.5	40.4
December.....	38.5	39.0	38.1	34.8	38.2	40.4	34.8	41.9	39.5
1961: January.....	39.0	39.3	38.7	37.5	38.3	40.3	35.3	41.1	39.0
February.....	39.3	39.6	38.8	38.1	38.4	40.1	34.7	42.6	39.1
March.....	39.3	39.7	39.1	36.9	38.2	40.2	31.4	42.2	38.8
April.....	39.7	40.0	39.3	35.7	38.2	40.3	32.9	40.4	38.7
May.....	39.8	40.2	39.3	36.3	38.3	40.3	34.7	43.0	38.9
June.....	39.9	40.4	39.5	36.8	38.1	40.6	37.0	43.0	39.2
July.....	40.0	40.5	39.5	36.9	38.2	40.7	38.0	41.6	39.6
August.....	40.0	40.5	39.3	37.1	37.9	40.6	36.8	43.2	39.5
September.....	39.6	39.8	39.2	36.7	38.0	40.5	36.8	41.9	40.3
October.....	40.2	40.6	39.6	37.2	38.0	40.6	37.9	42.1	40.1
November <sup>5</sup> .....	40.6	41.2	39.7	37.5	37.9	40.6	37.7	( <sup>3</sup> )	39.4
December <sup>5</sup> .....	40.3	41.0	39.7	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> Based upon data summarized in the M-300 report by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Hours and earnings data relate to all employees who received pay during the month, except executives, officials, and staff assistants.

<sup>2</sup> Prior to April 1945, data relate to all employees except executives.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

<sup>4</sup> Nine-month average, April through December, because of new series started in April 1945.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Series revised; see Note, Table B-24.

Data are for production workers in manufacturing and mining, construction workers in contract construction, and for nonsupervisory employees in other industries (except as noted). Data are for pay period ending nearest the 15th of the month.

The annual figures for 1961 are simple arithmetic averages of the monthly figures shown and are not strictly comparable with the averages for earlier years, which have been weighted by data on employment. See Table B-28 for unadjusted average weekly hours in manufacturing.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January 1959.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-26.—Average gross hourly earnings in selected industries, 1929-61

Year or month	Manufacturing			Contract construction	Retail trade (except eating and drinking places)	Wholesale trade	Bituminous coal mining	Class I railroads <sup>1</sup>	Telephone communication <sup>2</sup>	Agriculture <sup>3</sup>
	Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods							
1929	\$0.560	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	\$0.659	(4)	(4)	\$0.241
1930	.546	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	.662	(4)	(4)	.226
1931	.539	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	.626	(4)	(4)	.172
1932	.441	\$0.492	\$0.412	(4)	(4)	(4)	.503	(4)	(4)	.129
1933	.437	.467	.419	(4)	(4)	(4)	.485	(4)	(4)	.115
1934	.526	.550	.505	(4)	(4)	(4)	.651	(4)	(4)	.129
1935	.544	.571	.520	(4)	(4)	\$0.610	.720	(4)	(4)	.142
1936	.550	.580	.519	(4)	(4)	.628	.768	(4)	(4)	.152
1937	.617	.667	.566	(4)	(4)	.658	.828	(4)	\$0.774	.172
1938	.620	.679	.572	(4)	(4)	.674	.849	(4)	.816	.166
1939	.627	.691	.571	(4)	\$0.484	.688	.358	\$0.730	.822	.166
1940	.655	.716	.590	(4)	.494	.711	.854	.733	.827	.169
1941	.726	.799	.627	(4)	.518	.763	.960	.743	.820	.206
1942	.851	.937	.709	(4)	.559	.828	1.030	.937	.843	.208
1943	.957	1.048	.787	(4)	.606	.898	1.101	.852	.870	.353
1944	1.011	1.105	.844	(4)	.653	.948	1.147	.948	.911	.423
1945	1.016	1.099	.886	(4)	.699	.990	1.199	.955	\$.962	.472
1946	1.075	1.144	.995	(4)	.797	1.107	1.357	1.087	1.124	.515
1947	1.217	1.278	1.145	\$1.541	.901	1.220	1.582	1.186	1.197	.547
1948	1.328	1.395	1.259	1.713	.972	1.308	1.835	1.301	1.248	.580
1949	1.378	1.453	1.295	1.792	1.015	1.360	1.877	1.427	1.345	.559
1950	1.440	1.519	1.347	1.863	1.050	1.427	1.944	1.572	1.398	.561
1951	1.56	1.65	1.44	2.02	1.13	1.52	2.14	1.73	1.49	.625
1952	1.65	1.75	1.51	2.13	1.18	1.61	2.22	1.83	1.59	.661
1953	1.74	1.86	1.68	2.28	1.25	1.70	2.40	1.88	1.68	.672
1954	1.78	1.90	1.62	2.39	1.29	1.76	2.40	1.93	1.76	.661
1955	1.86	1.99	1.67	2.45	1.34	1.83	2.47	1.96	1.82	.675
1956	1.95	2.08	1.77	2.57	1.40	1.94	2.72	2.12	1.86	.705
1957	2.05	2.19	1.85	2.71	1.47	2.02	2.92	2.26	1.95	.728
1958	2.11	2.26	1.91	2.82	1.52	2.09	2.93	2.44	2.05	.757
1959	2.19	2.36	1.98	2.93	1.57	2.19	3.12	2.54	2.18	.798
1960	2.26	2.43	2.05	3.07	1.62	2.25	3.15	2.61	2.26	.818
1961 <sup>6</sup>	2.32	2.49	2.11	3.18	1.68	2.31	3.14	2.67	2.36	.834
1960: January	2.26	2.43	2.02	3.03	1.61	2.22	3.17	2.60	2.22	.896
February	2.26	2.43	2.03	3.04	1.61	2.22	3.15	2.61	2.23	-----
March	2.26	2.43	2.03	3.10	1.61	2.24	3.15	2.56	2.24	-----
April	2.25	2.41	2.04	3.01	1.62	2.24	3.16	2.58	2.22	.751
May	2.26	2.42	2.04	3.02	1.63	2.25	3.17	2.58	2.24	-----
June	2.26	2.42	2.05	3.02	1.63	2.26	3.19	2.58	2.24	-----
July	2.26	2.42	2.06	3.06	1.63	2.26	3.14	2.62	2.26	.812
August	2.25	2.41	2.04	3.07	1.63	2.24	3.16	2.59	2.26	-----
September	2.27	2.44	2.06	3.10	1.64	2.25	3.13	2.64	2.24	-----
October	2.27	2.43	2.06	3.12	1.64	2.25	3.14	2.65	2.30	.820
November	2.27	2.43	2.07	3.10	1.64	2.25	3.11	2.64	2.30	-----
December	2.29	2.46	2.09	3.16	1.61	2.26	3.12	2.65	2.32	-----
1961: January	2.29	2.45	2.09	3.17	1.66	2.28	3.14	2.65	2.32	.909
February	2.29	2.45	2.09	3.16	1.65	2.28	3.12	2.70	2.32	-----
March	2.29	2.46	2.09	3.14	1.65	2.28	3.10	2.64	2.32	-----
April	2.31	2.47	2.10	3.15	1.67	2.30	3.12	2.68	2.33	.757
May	2.32	2.48	2.11	3.16	1.68	2.30	3.12	2.65	2.34	-----
June	2.32	2.49	2.11	3.16	1.69	2.32	3.17	2.66	2.35	-----
July	2.33	2.49	2.12	3.16	1.69	2.32	3.17	2.68	2.36	.825
August	2.31	2.48	2.10	3.17	1.69	2.31	3.14	2.65	2.37	-----
September	2.33	2.50	2.12	3.22	1.70	2.34	3.15	2.69	2.42	-----
October	2.34	2.51	2.13	3.22	1.71	2.33	3.13	2.67	2.41	.843
November <sup>6</sup>	2.36	2.53	2.13	3.24	1.71	2.33	3.13	(4)	2.42	-----
December <sup>6</sup>	2.37	2.54	2.14	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	-----

<sup>1</sup> For coverage of series, see footnote 1, Table B-25.

<sup>2</sup> Prior to April 1945, data relate to all employees except executives; for April 1945-May 1949, mainly to employees subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act; and beginning June 1949, to nonsupervisory employees only.

<sup>3</sup> Weighted average of all farm wage rates on a per hour basis.

<sup>4</sup> Not available.

<sup>5</sup> Nine-month average, April through December, because of new series started in April 1945.

<sup>6</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Series revised; see Note, Table B-24.

Data are for production workers in manufacturing and mining, construction workers in contract construction, and for all nonsupervisory employees in other industries (except as noted). Data are for pay period ending nearest the 15th of the month.

The annual figures for 1961 are simple arithmetic averages of the monthly figures shown and are not strictly comparable with the averages for earlier years, which have been weighted by data on man-hours.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January 1959.

Sources: Department of Labor and Department of Agriculture.

TABLE B-27.—Average gross weekly earnings in selected industries, 1929-61

Year or month	Manufacturing			Contract construction	Retail trade (except eating and drinking places)	Wholesale trade	Bituminous coal mining	Class I railroads <sup>1</sup>	Telephone communication <sup>2</sup>
	Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods						
1929.....	\$24.76	\$26.84	\$22.47	(3)	(3)	(3)	\$25.11	(3)	(3)
1930.....	23.00	24.42	21.40	(3)	(3)	(3)	22.04	(3)	(3)
1931.....	20.64	20.98	20.09	(3)	(3)	(3)	17.59	(3)	(3)
1932.....	16.89	15.99	17.26	(3)	(3)	\$26.75	13.58	(3)	(3)
1933.....	16.65	16.20	16.76	(3)	(3)	25.19	14.21	(3)	(3)
1934.....	18.20	18.59	17.73	(3)	(3)	25.44	17.45	(3)	(3)
1935.....	19.91	21.24	18.77	(3)	(3)	25.38	18.86	(3)	(3)
1936.....	21.56	23.72	19.57	(3)	(3)	26.96	21.89	(3)	(3)
1937.....	23.82	26.61	21.17	(3)	(3)	28.36	22.94	(3)	\$30.03
1938.....	22.07	23.70	20.65	(3)	(3)	28.51	19.78	(3)	31.74
1939.....	23.64	26.19	21.36	(3)	\$21.01	28.76	22.99	\$31.90	32.14
1940.....	24.96	28.07	21.83	(3)	21.34	29.36	23.74	32.47	32.67
1941.....	29.48	33.56	24.39	(3)	22.17	31.36	29.47	34.03	32.88
1942.....	36.68	42.17	28.57	(3)	23.37	34.28	33.37	39.34	34.14
1943.....	43.07	48.73	33.45	(3)	24.79	37.99	39.97	41.49	36.45
1944.....	45.70	51.38	36.38	(3)	26.77	40.76	49.32	46.36	38.54
1945.....	44.20	48.36	37.48	(3)	28.59	42.37	50.36	46.32	40.12
1946.....	43.32	46.22	40.30	(3)	32.92	46.05	56.04	50.00	44.29
1947.....	49.17	51.76	46.03	\$58.87	36.94	50.14	63.75	55.03	44.77
1948.....	53.12	56.36	49.50	65.27	39.75	53.63	69.18	60.11	48.92
1949.....	53.88	57.25	50.38	67.56	41.62	55.49	60.63	62.36	51.78
1950.....	58.32	62.43	53.48	69.68	43.16	58.08	67.46	64.14	54.38
1951.....	63.34	68.48	56.88	76.96	46.22	62.02	74.69	70.93	58.26
1952.....	67.16	72.63	59.95	82.86	47.79	65.53	75.04	74.30	61.22
1953.....	70.47	76.63	62.57	86.41	49.75	69.02	81.84	76.33	65.02
1954.....	70.49	76.19	63.18	88.91	51.21	71.28	77.52	78.74	68.46
1955.....	75.70	82.19	66.63	90.90	53.06	74.48	92.13	82.12	72.07
1956.....	78.78	85.28	70.09	96.38	54.74	78.57	102.00	88.40	73.47
1957.....	81.59	88.26	72.52	100.27	56.89	81.41	106.00	94.24	76.05
1958.....	82.71	89.27	74.11	103.78	58.82	84.02	97.57	101.50	78.72
1959.....	88.26	96.05	78.61	108.41	60.76	88.91	111.70	106.43	85.46
1960.....	89.72	97.44	80.36	112.67	62.37	91.13	112.77	108.84	89.50
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	92.34	100.10	82.92	117.66	64.01	93.32	112.10	112.41	92.75
1960: January.....	91.08	99.39	79.59	106.96	61.66	89.69	119.51	106.60	86.14
February.....	89.95	97.93	79.37	106.40	61.50	89.02	114.03	111.45	87.42
March.....	89.72	97.69	78.97	107.88	61.50	90.05	119.07	109.82	87.58
April.....	88.65	96.40	78.95	111.67	62.37	90.27	114.39	107.33	86.36
May.....	90.40	97.77	80.38	111.74	62.27	90.90	112.54	107.59	87.81
June.....	90.63	97.77	81.18	113.55	63.24	91.76	116.75	110.42	88.26
July.....	90.17	96.80	81.78	116.89	63.73	92.21	114.61	107.42	89.95
August.....	89.55	96.40	80.78	117.27	63.90	90.94	110.28	110.33	89.27
September.....	89.89	97.60	80.75	116.57	62.98	91.35	106.73	107.18	95.47
October.....	90.12	97.69	80.55	119.18	62.65	91.35	109.59	108.39	92.00
November.....	89.21	96.23	80.52	110.98	62.48	91.13	103.87	106.92	92.92
December.....	88.62	96.19	79.84	108.07	61.82	91.30	108.58	111.04	91.64
1961: January.....	89.08	96.29	80.47	115.39	63.25	91.88	110.84	108.92	90.48
February.....	89.31	96.29	80.47	114.08	62.87	91.43	108.26	115.02	90.71
March.....	89.54	97.17	80.88	112.41	62.70	91.66	97.34	111.41	90.02
April.....	90.78	98.31	81.27	112.77	63.46	92.69	102.65	108.27	90.17
May.....	92.10	99.70	82.29	116.29	63.84	92.69	108.26	113.95	91.03
June.....	93.03	101.09	83.56	119.13	64.90	94.19	117.29	114.38	92.12
July.....	93.20	100.35	84.16	119.76	65.57	94.42	120.46	111.49	93.46
August.....	92.86	100.44	83.58	122.05	65.23	93.79	115.55	114.48	93.62
September.....	92.73	100.00	83.74	120.43	64.60	94.77	115.92	112.71	97.53
October.....	94.54	102.66	84.77	123.00	64.64	94.60	118.63	112.41	96.64
November <sup>5</sup> .....	95.82	103.98	84.99	118.26	64.13	94.60	118.00	(3)	95.35
December <sup>5</sup> .....	95.90	104.39	85.17	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)

<sup>1</sup> For coverage of series, see footnote 1, Table B-25.

<sup>2</sup> Prior to April 1945, data relate to all employees except executives; for April 1945-May 1949, mainly to employees subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act; and beginning June 1949, to nonsupervisory employees only.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

<sup>4</sup> Nine-month average, April through December, because of new series started in April 1945.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Series revised; see Note, Table B-24.

Data are for production workers in manufacturing and mining, construction workers in contract construction, and for nonsupervisory employees in other industries (except as noted). Data are for pay period ending nearest the 15th of the month.

The annual figures for 1961 are simple arithmetic averages of the monthly figures shown and are not strictly comparable with the averages for earlier years, which have been weighted by data on man-hours.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January 1959.

Source: Department of Labor.



TABLE B-28.—Average weekly hours and hourly earnings, gross and excluding over-time, in manufacturing industries, 1939-61

Year or month	All manufacturing industries					Durable goods manufacturing industries				Nondurable goods manufacturing industries			
	Average weekly hours		Average hourly earnings			Average weekly hours		Average hourly earnings		Average weekly hours		Average hourly earnings	
	Gross	Excluding over-time	Gross	Excluding over-time	Excluding over-time and inter-industry shift (1947-49=100)	Gross	Excluding over-time	Gross	Excluding over-time	Gross	Excluding over-time	Gross	Excluding over-time
1939.....	37.7	(1)	\$0.627	(1)	51.6	37.9	(1)	\$0.691	(1)	37.4	(1)	\$0.571	(1)
1940.....	38.1	(1)	.655	(1)	(1)	39.2	(1)	.716	(1)	37.0	(1)	.590	(1)
1941.....	40.6	(1)	.726	\$0.691	<sup>2</sup> 53.5	42.0	(1)	.799	\$0.762	38.9	(1)	.627	\$0.613
1942.....	43.1	(1)	.851	.793	<sup>2</sup> 60.2	45.0	(1)	.937	.872	40.3	(1)	.709	.684
1943.....	45.0	(1)	.957	.881	<sup>2</sup> 65.5	46.5	(1)	1.048	.966	42.5	(1)	.787	.748
1944.....	45.2	(1)	1.011	.933	<sup>2</sup> 70.1	46.5	(1)	1.105	1.019	43.1	(1)	.844	.798
1945.....	43.5	(1)	1.016	<sup>3</sup> 949	<sup>2</sup> 72.9	44.0	(1)	1.099	<sup>3</sup> 1.031	42.3	(1)	.886	<sup>3</sup> 841
1946.....	40.3	(1)	1.075	1.035	<sup>2</sup> 80.8	40.4	(1)	1.144	1.111	40.5	(1)	.995	.962
1947.....	40.4	(1)	1.217	1.18	92.7	40.5	(1)	1.278	1.24	40.2	(1)	1.145	1.11
1948.....	40.0	(1)	1.328	1.29	101.3	40.4	(1)	1.395	1.35	39.6	(1)	1.250	1.21
1949.....	39.1	(1)	1.378	1.34	106.0	39.4	(1)	1.453	1.42	38.9	(1)	1.295	1.26
1950.....	40.5	(1)	1.440	1.39	109.3	41.1	(1)	1.519	1.46	39.7	(1)	1.347	1.31
1951.....	40.6	(1)	1.56	1.51	118.0	41.5	(1)	1.65	1.59	39.5	(1)	1.44	1.40
1952.....	40.7	(1)	1.65	1.59	124.1	41.5	(1)	1.75	1.68	39.7	(1)	1.51	1.46
1953.....	40.5	(1)	1.74	1.68	130.9	41.2	(1)	1.86	1.79	39.6	(1)	1.58	1.53
1954.....	39.6	(1)	1.78	1.73	135.2	40.1	(1)	1.90	1.84	39.0	(1)	1.62	1.58
1955.....	40.7	(1)	1.86	1.79	139.3	41.3	(1)	1.99	1.91	39.9	(1)	1.67	1.62
1956.....	40.4	37.6	1.95	1.89	146.8	41.0	38.0	2.08	2.01	39.6	37.2	1.77	1.72
1957.....	39.8	37.5	2.05	1.99	154.3	40.3	37.9	2.19	2.12	39.2	37.0	1.85	1.80
1958.....	39.2	37.2	2.11	2.05	160.7	39.5	37.6	2.26	2.21	38.8	36.6	1.91	1.86
1959.....	40.3	37.6	2.19	2.12	166.1	40.7	38.0	2.36	2.28	39.7	37.0	1.98	1.91
1960.....	39.7	37.3	2.26	2.20	171.6	40.1	37.7	2.43	2.36	39.2	36.7	2.05	1.99
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	39.8	37.4	2.32	2.25	176.2	40.2	37.9	2.49	2.42	39.3	36.8	2.11	2.05
1960: January.....	40.3	37.5	2.26	2.19	169.8	40.9	38.0	2.43	2.35	39.4	36.8	2.02	1.96
February.....	39.8	37.2	2.26	2.19	170.0	40.3	37.6	2.43	2.35	39.1	36.6	2.03	1.96
March.....	39.7	37.2	2.26	2.19	170.5	40.2	37.7	2.43	2.36	38.9	36.4	2.03	1.97
April.....	39.4	37.2	2.25	2.19	170.7	40.0	37.9	2.41	2.35	38.7	36.4	2.04	1.98
May.....	40.0	37.5	2.26	2.19	171.0	40.4	38.0	2.42	2.35	39.4	36.9	2.04	1.98
June.....	40.1	37.6	2.26	2.19	171.7	40.4	38.0	2.42	2.35	39.6	37.0	2.05	1.98
July.....	39.9	37.5	2.26	2.19	171.7	40.0	37.7	2.42	2.35	39.7	37.1	2.06	1.99
August.....	39.8	37.3	2.25	2.18	171.5	40.0	37.6	2.41	2.34	39.6	37.0	2.04	1.98
September.....	39.6	37.1	2.27	2.20	172.0	40.0	37.5	2.44	2.36	39.2	36.6	2.06	1.99
October.....	39.7	37.2	2.27	2.20	172.5	40.2	37.7	2.43	2.36	39.1	36.6	2.06	2.00
November.....	39.3	37.1	2.27	2.21	173.1	39.6	37.5	2.43	2.37	38.9	36.6	2.07	2.01
December.....	38.7	36.6	2.29	2.23	174.3	39.1	37.1	2.46	2.40	38.2	36.0	2.09	2.03
1961: January.....	38.9	37.0	2.29	2.24	175.0	39.3	37.5	2.45	2.39	38.5	36.4	2.09	2.04
February.....	39.0	37.1	2.29	2.23	174.9	39.3	37.5	2.45	2.39	38.5	36.4	2.09	2.03
March.....	39.1	37.1	2.29	2.24	175.3	39.5	37.7	2.46	2.40	38.7	36.5	2.09	2.04
April.....	39.3	37.2	2.31	2.25	175.8	39.8	37.8	2.47	2.41	38.7	36.5	2.10	2.05
May.....	39.7	37.5	2.32	2.25	176.3	40.2	38.1	2.48	2.42	39.0	36.7	2.11	2.05
June.....	40.1	37.7	2.32	2.25	176.2	40.6	38.3	2.49	2.42	39.6	37.0	2.11	2.04
July.....	40.0	37.5	2.33	2.26	176.4	40.3	38.0	2.49	2.42	39.7	37.1	2.12	2.05
August.....	40.2	37.6	2.31	2.24	175.9	40.5	38.0	2.48	2.41	39.8	37.0	2.10	2.03
September.....	39.8	37.0	2.33	2.25	176.4	40.0	37.3	2.50	2.41	39.5	36.6	2.12	2.05
October.....	40.4	37.6	2.34	2.26	177.3	40.9	38.2	2.51	2.43	39.8	36.9	2.13	2.06
November.....	40.6	37.8	2.36	2.28	178.2	41.1	38.2	2.53	2.45	39.9	37.1	2.13	2.06
December <sup>4</sup> .....	40.5	37.7	2.37	2.29	(1)	41.1	38.2	2.54	2.46	39.8	37.1	2.14	2.07

<sup>1</sup> Not available.

<sup>2</sup> April used. Annual average not available.

<sup>3</sup> Eleven-month average; August 1945 excluded because of VJ Day holiday period.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Series revised; see Note, Table B-24.

Data relate to production workers and are for pay period ending nearest the 15th of the month.

The annual figures for 1961 are simple arithmetic averages of the monthly figures shown and are not strictly comparable with the averages for earlier years, which have been weighted by data on employment (in the case of hours) and man-hours (in the case of earnings).

See Table B-25 for seasonally adjusted average gross weekly hours.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January 1959.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-29.—Average weekly earnings, gross and spendable, in manufacturing industries, in current and 1961 prices, 1939-61

Year or month	Average gross weekly earnings		Average spendable weekly earnings <sup>2</sup>			
			Worker with no dependents		Worker with three dependents	
	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>1</sup>	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>1</sup>	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>1</sup>
1939.....	\$23.64	\$50.84	\$23.37	\$50.26	\$23.40	\$50.32
1940.....	24.06	53.22	24.46	52.15	24.71	52.69
1941.....	29.48	59.92	27.96	56.83	29.19	59.33
1942.....	36.68	67.30	31.80	58.35	36.31	66.62
1943.....	43.07	74.39	35.95	62.09	41.33	71.38
1944.....	45.70	77.72	37.99	64.61	43.76	74.42
1945.....	44.20	73.42	36.82	61.16	42.59	70.75
1946.....	43.32	66.34	37.31	57.14	42.79	65.53
1947.....	49.17	65.82	42.10	56.36	47.58	63.69
1948.....	53.12	66.07	46.57	57.92	52.31	65.06
1949.....	53.88	67.60	47.21	59.23	52.95	66.44
1950.....	58.32	72.54	50.26	62.51	56.36	70.10
1951.....	63.34	72.89	52.97	60.96	60.18	69.25
1952.....	67.16	75.63	55.04	61.98	62.98	70.92
1953.....	70.47	78.74	57.59	64.35	65.60	73.30
1954.....	70.49	78.50	58.45	65.09	65.65	73.11
1955.....	75.70	84.49	62.51	69.77	69.79	77.89
1956.....	78.78	86.67	64.92	71.42	72.25	79.48
1957.....	81.59	86.71	66.93	71.13	74.31	78.97
1958.....	82.71	85.62	67.82	70.21	75.23	77.88
1959.....	88.26	90.52	71.89	73.73	79.40	81.44
1960.....	89.72	90.63	72.57	73.30	80.11	80.92
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	92.34	92.34	74.60	74.60	82.18	82.18
1960: January.....	91.08	92.84	73.62	75.05	81.18	82.75
February.....	89.95	91.51	72.75	74.01	80.29	81.68
March.....	89.72	91.18	72.57	73.75	80.11	81.41
April.....	88.65	89.82	71.75	72.70	79.26	80.30
May.....	90.40	91.50	73.10	73.99	80.65	81.63
June.....	90.63	91.55	73.28	74.02	80.83	81.65
July.....	90.17	90.99	72.92	73.58	80.46	81.19
August.....	89.55	90.36	72.44	73.10	79.97	80.70
September.....	89.89	90.61	72.71	73.30	80.24	80.89
October.....	90.12	90.48	72.88	73.17	80.42	80.74
November.....	89.21	89.48	72.18	72.40	79.71	79.95
December.....	88.62	88.80	71.72	71.86	79.24	79.40
1961: January.....	89.08	89.35	72.08	72.30	79.60	79.84
February.....	89.31	89.49	72.26	72.40	79.78	79.94
March.....	89.54	89.72	72.43	72.58	79.97	80.13
April.....	90.78	90.96	73.39	73.54	80.95	81.11
May.....	92.10	92.38	74.41	74.63	81.99	82.24
June.....	93.03	93.22	75.15	75.30	82.74	82.91
July.....	93.20	93.01	75.29	75.14	82.88	82.71
August.....	92.86	92.67	75.01	74.86	82.61	82.45
September.....	92.73	92.36	74.91	74.61	82.50	82.17
October.....	94.54	94.07	76.36	75.98	83.98	83.56
November <sup>3</sup> .....	95.82	95.44	77.39	77.08	85.03	84.69
December <sup>3</sup> .....	95.99	(4)	77.52	(4)	85.17	(4)

<sup>1</sup> Estimates in current prices divided by the consumer price index on a 1961 base (using 11-month average).

<sup>2</sup> Average gross weekly earnings less social security and income taxes.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>4</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Series revised; see Note, Table B-24.

Data relate to production workers and are for pay period ending nearest the 15th of the month.

The annual figures for 1961 are simple arithmetic averages of the monthly figures shown and are not strictly comparable with the averages for earlier years, which have been weighted by data on man-hours. Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January 1959.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-30.—Labor turnover rates in manufacturing industries, 1930-61  
[Rates per 100 employees]

Year or month	Accession rates		Separation rates		
	Total <sup>1</sup>	New hires	Total <sup>2</sup>	Quits	Layoffs
1930.....	3.8	(3)	5.9	1.9	3.6
1931.....	3.7	(3)	4.8	1.1	3.5
1932.....	4.1	(3)	5.2	.9	4.2
1933.....	6.5	(3)	4.5	1.1	3.2
1934.....	5.7	(3)	4.9	1.1	3.7
1935.....	5.1	(3)	4.3	1.1	3.0
1936.....	5.3	(3)	4.0	1.3	2.4
1937.....	4.3	(3)	5.2	1.5	3.5
1938.....	4.7	(3)	4.8	.8	3.9
1939.....	5.0	(3)	3.7	1.0	2.6
1940.....	5.4	(3)	4.0	1.1	2.6
1941.....	6.5	(3)	4.7	2.4	1.6
1942.....	9.3	(3)	7.8	4.6	1.3
1943.....	9.1	(3)	8.6	6.3	.7
1944.....	7.4	(3)	8.1	6.2	.7
1945.....	7.7	(3)	9.6	6.1	2.6
1946.....	8.1	(3)	7.2	5.2	1.4
1947.....	6.2	(3)	5.7	4.1	1.1
1948.....	5.4	(3)	5.4	3.4	1.6
1949.....	4.3	(3)	5.0	1.9	2.9
1950.....	5.3	(3)	4.1	2.3	1.3
1951.....	5.3	4.1	5.3	2.9	1.4
1952.....	5.4	4.1	4.9	2.8	1.4
1953.....	4.8	3.6	5.1	2.8	1.6
1954.....	3.6	1.9	4.1	1.4	2.3
1955.....	4.5	3.0	3.9	1.9	1.5
1956.....	4.2	2.8	4.2	1.9	1.7
1957.....	3.6	2.2	4.2	1.6	2.1
1958.....	3.6	1.7	4.1	1.1	2.6
1959.....	4.2	2.6	4.1	1.5	2.0
1960.....	3.8	2.2	4.3	1.3	2.4
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	4.2	2.2	4.0	1.2	2.2
Seasonally adjusted					
1960: January.....	4.3	2.6	3.6	1.5	1.6
February.....	4.1	2.6	4.1	1.6	1.9
March.....	3.8	2.4	4.3	1.5	2.2
April.....	3.7	2.2	4.3	1.4	2.2
May.....	3.9	2.4	4.2	1.4	2.2
June.....	3.7	2.2	4.5	1.4	2.6
July.....	3.6	2.1	4.6	1.3	2.6
August.....	3.8	2.2	4.4	1.3	2.7
September.....	3.7	2.1	4.3	1.3	2.6
October.....	3.6	1.9	4.2	1.2	2.3
November.....	3.5	1.9	4.3	1.1	2.6
December.....	3.3	1.8	4.9	1.1	2.9
1961: January.....	4.0	1.8	4.7	1.1	2.9
February.....	3.8	1.7	4.5	1.1	2.9
March.....	4.6	1.9	4.2	1.1	2.3
April.....	4.4	2.0	3.5	1.0	1.9
May.....	4.2	2.1	3.8	1.2	2.0
June.....	3.9	2.1	4.0	1.2	2.2
July.....	4.0	2.2	4.3	1.1	2.5
August.....	4.1	2.3	3.8	1.2	1.9
September.....	3.7	2.2	4.1	1.3	2.2
October.....	4.4	2.5	3.6	1.3	1.7
November <sup>5</sup> .....	4.0	2.4	3.8	1.3	1.8

<sup>1</sup> Includes rehires and other accessions, not published separately.

<sup>2</sup> Includes discharges and miscellaneous separations, not published separately. (Prior to 1940 quits include miscellaneous separations.)

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

<sup>4</sup> January-November average.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Series revised; see Note, Table B-24.

Beginning January 1943, data relate to all employees; previously to production workers only.

Beginning January 1959, transfers between establishments of the same firm are included in total accessions and total separations, therefore rates for these items are not strictly comparable with prior data.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January 1959.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-31.—Indexes of output per man-hour and related data, 1947-61

[1947-49=100]

Year	Output per man-hour					Output <sup>1</sup>					Man-hours				
	Total private	Agriculture	Nonagricultural industries			Total private	Agriculture	Nonagricultural industries			Total private	Agriculture	Nonagricultural industries		
			Total	Manufacturing	Non-manufacturing			Total	Manufacturing	Non-manufacturing			Total	Manufacturing	Non-manufacturing
Establishment basis <sup>2</sup>															
1947	96.7	90.5	97.5	97.5	97.2	97.5	92.9	97.9	100.9	96.2	100.8	102.7	100.4	103.5	99.0
1948	100.2	107.1	99.4	100.2	98.9	101.5	106.0	101.2	103.0	100.2	101.3	99.0	101.8	102.8	101.3
1949	103.1	102.2	103.2	102.5	103.8	100.9	100.5	101.0	96.0	103.6	97.9	98.3	97.9	93.7	99.8
1950	110.4	116.2	108.7	109.2	108.4	110.2	106.0	110.5	111.1	110.2	99.8	91.2	101.7	101.7	101.7
1951	113.1	114.5	110.5	111.2	109.9	116.9	99.5	118.1	121.8	116.2	103.4	86.9	106.9	109.5	105.7
1952	115.5	124.5	111.9	112.8	111.3	120.4	103.3	121.6	125.5	119.6	104.2	83.0	108.7	111.3	107.5
1953	120.2	138.6	114.9	118.1	112.7	126.3	107.1	127.7	138.1	122.2	105.1	77.3	111.1	116.9	108.4
1954	122.3	148.3	116.7	117.1	116.5	124.3	111.5	125.2	125.1	125.2	101.6	75.2	107.3	106.8	107.5
1955	127.6	153.5	121.6	125.3	119.7	135.4	117.6	136.7	141.3	134.3	106.1	76.6	112.4	112.8	112.2
1956	127.9	156.4	121.1	126.5	118.4	138.3	114.8	140.0	145.0	137.4	108.1	73.4	115.6	114.6	116.0
1957	132.4	166.7	124.7	126.8	123.7	141.0	113.2	143.1	143.0	143.1	106.5	67.9	114.8	112.8	115.7
1958	135.5	181.6	126.8	129.1	126.3	138.2	114.8	139.9	133.7	143.2	102.0	63.2	110.3	103.6	113.4
1959	140.3	181.1	131.4	138.7	128.1	148.2	114.3	150.7	153.0	149.5	105.6	63.1	114.7	110.3	116.7
1960	143.3	191.3	133.7	141.9	130.2	152.6	119.2	155.0	156.0	154.5	106.5	62.3	115.9	109.9	118.7
1961	148.2	205.6	137.6	146.5	137.6	155.2	120.3	157.7	156.6	162.5	104.7	58.5	114.6	106.9	118.1
Labor force basis <sup>4</sup>															
1947	97.4	90.6	98.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	97.5	92.9	97.9	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	100.1	102.5	99.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1948	100.3	107.5	99.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.5	106.0	101.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.2	98.6	101.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1949	102.2	101.6	102.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	100.9	100.5	101.0	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	98.7	98.9	98.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1950	110.3	116.1	108.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	110.2	106.0	110.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	99.9	91.3	101.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1951	115.2	114.1	112.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	116.9	99.5	118.1	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.5	87.2	104.7	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1952	118.9	124.0	115.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	120.4	103.3	121.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.3	83.3	105.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1953	123.9	138.0	119.0	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	126.3	107.1	127.7	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.9	77.6	107.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1954	127.0	147.9	121.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	124.3	111.5	125.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	97.9	75.4	102.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1955	133.1	152.9	127.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	135.4	117.6	136.7	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.7	76.9	107.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1956	133.6	155.8	127.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	138.3	114.8	140.0	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	103.5	73.7	110.1	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1957	138.0	167.0	130.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	141.0	113.2	143.1	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	102.2	67.8	109.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1958	140.0	182.2	131.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	138.2	114.8	139.9	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	98.7	63.0	106.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1959	145.9	181.4	136.9	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	148.2	114.3	150.7	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.6	63.0	110.1	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1960	148.3	191.9	138.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	152.6	119.2	155.0	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	102.9	62.1	111.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )
1961	152.3	206.7	141.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	155.2	120.3	157.7	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	101.9	58.2	111.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> Output refers to gross national product in 1954 prices.

<sup>2</sup> Man-hour estimates based primarily on establishment data.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>4</sup> Man-hour estimates based primarily on labor force data.

<sup>5</sup> Not available.

 NOTE.—For information on sources and methodology, see Bureau of Labor Statistics (Department of Labor) Bulletin No. 1249, *Trends in Output per Man-hour in the Private Economy, 1909-58*.

Source: Department of Labor.

# PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY

TABLE B-32.—Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1947-61

[1957=100]

Year or month	Total industrial production <sup>1</sup>	Final products						Materials		
		Total	Consumer goods <sup>2</sup>			Equipment, including defense		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods
			Total	Auto-motive products	Home goods	Total	Business			
1947.....	65.3	64.8	69.6	66.0	71.2	53.0	66.4	65.8	65.1	65.6
1948.....	68.0	67.3	71.8	69.0	74.2	55.7	69.0	68.9	67.7	69.0
1949.....	64.3	65.1	71.4	68.4	68.7	49.7	60.3	63.6	61.2	64.9
1950.....	74.5	73.5	81.5	86.1	94.6	53.9	64.6	75.4	75.8	74.1
1951.....	80.8	79.3	80.6	76.2	81.5	75.0	78.9	82.2	83.8	79.7
1952.....	83.8	85.2	82.5	68.6	81.6	90.0	89.4	82.7	84.8	79.9
1953.....	90.8	90.7	88.1	86.8	93.4	96.1	91.8	90.8	96.1	85.1
1954.....	85.4	86.5	87.2	80.8	89.1	85.0	80.8	84.4	84.4	84.3
1955.....	96.0	94.6	96.5	112.5	100.7	90.9	87.2	97.1	99.9	94.1
1956.....	99.3	98.9	98.7	93.0	104.5	99.1	99.4	99.7	100.5	98.8
1957.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1958.....	92.9	95.1	99.0	82.5	96.2	87.3	85.2	91.0	85.9	96.5
1959.....	104.9	106.5	110.0	102.8	115.0	99.5	99.6	103.5	100.3	106.9
1960.....	108.0	110.6	114.4	117.2	115.2	102.9	104.7	105.7	101.7	109.9
1961 <sup>3</sup> .....	109.0	111.9	116.1	106.2	116.8	103.6	104.7	106.4	100.0	113.4
Seasonally adjusted										
1960: January.....	111.1	111.7	115.9	127.3	123.3	103.3	105.6	110.4	110.3	110.6
February.....	109.6	109.9	113.3	122.2	116.9	102.2	105.1	109.6	109.2	110.0
March.....	109.1	109.9	113.2	114.0	114.8	103.5	105.1	108.3	106.9	109.9
April.....	108.7	110.7	115.0	117.2	117.9	102.1	103.8	107.5	105.2	110.1
May.....	109.7	112.3	116.4	120.4	121.7	104.1	105.8	107.3	104.8	110.2
June.....	109.4	112.1	116.6	121.2	120.2	103.2	105.3	106.4	101.9	111.3
July.....	109.4	111.9	115.8	113.7	117.0	104.3	106.3	106.1	101.1	111.7
August.....	108.3	111.0	115.0	115.4	114.3	103.1	105.1	105.1	99.7	111.0
September.....	106.7	110.2	113.7	116.0	112.1	103.1	104.8	103.7	98.7	109.1
October.....	106.1	110.4	114.3	120.0	110.2	102.7	104.5	102.8	97.3	108.9
November.....	104.5	109.0	112.7	112.6	109.9	101.7	102.9	101.1	93.9	109.0
December.....	103.0	108.0	111.7	105.7	110.0	100.6	101.8	99.0	90.5	108.2
1961: January.....	102.3	106.6	110.2	93.8	108.3	99.5	100.8	98.1	89.8	107.2
February.....	102.1	106.6	110.2	89.9	109.0	99.5	100.7	98.2	89.4	107.8
March.....	102.6	106.7	110.6	88.0	109.7	99.0	99.8	99.1	90.4	108.6
April.....	105.6	109.2	113.7	103.2	113.6	100.1	101.6	102.9	95.5	111.0
May.....	108.3	110.8	115.4	107.8	116.9	101.6	102.6	106.2	100.6	112.3
June.....	110.4	112.7	117.8	113.3	122.3	102.4	103.9	108.7	103.5	114.3
July.....	112.0	114.3	119.5	115.4	123.5	103.9	105.1	109.5	104.1	115.4
August.....	113.0	114.7	119.8	116.5	119.9	104.7	105.7	111.2	105.9	117.1
September.....	111.0	112.9	116.4	95.9	121.1	105.9	106.7	109.2	103.7	115.2
October.....	112.8	115.5	119.5	110.4	121.2	107.4	108.3	110.6	105.2	116.5
November.....	114.2	117.1	120.8	121.2	122.1	109.8	110.6	111.3	105.8	117.3
December <sup>3</sup> .....	115.2	118.2	122.2	128	(4)	110.5	112	111.8	106	118

<sup>1</sup> Annual indexes for 1929-46 are, respectively: 38.2, 31.8, 26.3, 20.6, 24.3, 26.4, 30.5, 36.1, 39.5, 31.2, 38.1, 43.6, 56.1, 68.9, 82.4, 81.1, 70.0, and 59.2.

<sup>2</sup> Also includes apparel and consumer staples, not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>4</sup> Not available.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-33.—Industrial production indexes, industry groupings, 1947-61

[1957=100]

Year or month	Total industrial production	Manufacturing									
		Total	Durable manufactures							Clay, glass, and lumber	Furniture and miscellaneous
			Total	Primary metals	Fabricated metal products	Machinery	Transportation equipment	Instruments and related products			
1947.....	65.3	66.1	61.8	30.8	74.9	62.6	40.3	54.8	77.7	75.3	
1948.....	68.0	68.6	64.4	34.1	76.2	63.8	44.0	56.4	81.8	79.3	
1949.....	64.3	64.8	58.5	70.8	68.8	56.7	44.2	50.3	74.1	73.4	
1950.....	74.5	75.5	71.3	89.1	84.2	69.7	52.9	58.5	89.9	85.8	
1951.....	80.8	81.5	80.3	96.9	90.0	79.6	59.0	67.1	94.3	82.1	
1952.....	83.8	84.8	85.1	88.5	87.8	88.4	68.6	79.7	91.6	84.4	
1953.....	90.8	92.1	96.0	100.3	98.8	96.4	86.2	87.0	95.1	91.9	
1954.....	85.4	85.8	85.0	81.3	88.8	84.3	78.7	84.7	92.0	89.0	
1955.....	96.0	96.7	97.9	105.5	96.9	92.6	95.9	90.5	103.3	100.3	
1956.....	99.3	99.5	100.0	103.7	97.4	102.8	91.5	97.3	104.7	103.5	
1957.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
1958.....	92.9	92.4	86.8	78.0	91.6	85.2	84.2	94.1	96.5	95.6	
1959.....	104.9	105.3	101.5	89.5	103.9	102.8	97.8	112.2	111.3	111.7	
1960.....	108.0	108.2	104.3	90.3	106.0	106.4	101.7	118.9	108.5	116.1	
1961 <sup>1</sup> .....	109.0	108.8	102.9	88.3	104.8	106.1	97.3	118.2	107.2	116.7	
Seasonally adjusted											
1960: January.....	111.1	111.9	110.9	115.4	108.6	109.7	107.0	118.4	111.7	116.3	
February.....	109.6	110.3	109.4	109.7	108.1	108.0	106.7	117.3	111.6	115.7	
March.....	109.1	109.5	107.8	105.7	106.6	108.4	103.7	118.6	107.6	115.8	
April.....	108.7	109.0	105.9	99.0	103.8	106.8	102.3	117.0	111.3	117.2	
May.....	109.7	110.2	107.0	93.6	107.9	108.5	106.1	119.5	110.8	119.3	
June.....	109.4	109.7	105.3	87.5	108.4	108.6	101.4	120.6	112.9	120.1	
July.....	109.4	109.7	105.4	85.1	108.7	110.0	101.3	121.4	112.6	119.1	
August.....	108.3	108.3	103.6	82.8	107.7	107.2	100.8	122.0	108.6	118.0	
September.....	106.7	106.6	101.8	79.8	105.8	105.3	101.2	118.2	106.6	114.0	
October.....	106.1	106.0	100.6	78.3	105.4	101.8	101.8	118.6	105.6	114.9	
November.....	104.5	104.1	98.0	73.6	101.0	102.1	96.7	118.7	102.8	113.4	
December.....	103.0	102.4	95.8	69.3	100.7	101.2	93.3	116.4	100.2	110.4	
1961: January.....	102.3	101.4	94.6	71.2	96.5	101.3	88.9	116.0	100.4	108.7	
February.....	102.1	101.3	94.3	72.6	95.7	100.8	87.6	113.1	99.7	109.2	
March.....	102.6	101.9	94.7	73.5	96.3	100.5	88.1	113.0	101.9	109.8	
April.....	105.6	105.2	98.7	82.0	98.6	102.9	94.0	112.8	105.1	112.3	
May.....	108.3	108.2	102.7	89.9	104.8	104.3	99.0	115.9	107.1	115.3	
June.....	110.4	110.5	105.3	92.3	107.3	107.3	100.6	118.6	111.8	118.7	
July.....	112.0	112.2	107.3	94.6	108.1	110.2	102.2	119.4	113.0	118.5	
August.....	113.0	113.1	107.9	98.2	111.0	108.5	102.7	121.9	112.2	119.5	
September.....	111.0	111.0	105.1	98.7	105.3	107.8	94.5	121.0	110.5	119.7	
October.....	112.8	112.8	106.8	96.0	109.8	108.6	100.5	121.2	108.2	121.4	
November.....	114.2	114.2	109.1	96.9	111.9	110.3	105.9	122.9	108.2	124.3	
December <sup>1</sup> .....	115.2	115.3	110.3	100	112	112	109	123	107	123	

See footnotes at end of table, p. 247.

TABLE B-33.—Industrial production indexes, industry groupings, 1947-67—Continued

[1957=100]

Year or month	Manufacturing					Mining	Utilities
	Nondurable manufactures						
	Total	Textile, apparel, and leather products	Paper and printing	Chemical, petroleum, and rubber products	Foods, beverages, and tobacco		
1947.....	70.0	83.5	68.1	50.6	83.4	76.4	38.9
1948.....	72.3	87.1	70.9	54.1	82.7	80.3	43.4
1949.....	71.1	83.1	70.8	52.7	83.6	71.2	46.3
1950.....	79.1	91.9	78.4	64.7	86.5	79.5	52.7
1951.....	81.7	90.1	81.1	71.8	88.3	87.3	60.1
1952.....	83.3	92.2	79.4	74.5	90.2	86.5	65.2
1953.....	86.9	93.6	84.5	80.2	91.2	88.8	71.1
1954.....	86.9	89.6	86.9	79.3	92.8	86.2	76.5
1955.....	95.0	98.4	94.6	91.8	96.2	94.8	85.4
1956.....	98.9	101.1	99.3	96.3	99.8	100.1	93.6
1957.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1958.....	99.9	99.2	99.2	98.8	102.1	91.4	104.5
1959.....	110.3	115.2	107.6	112.7	106.5	95.3	115.0
1960.....	113.4	114.8	111.5	117.7	109.4	97.1	123.1
1961 <sup>1</sup> .....	116.7	115.0	115.1	122.4	113.3	97.9	131.2
	Seasonally adjusted						
1960: January.....	113.1	116.4	111.3	116.4	108.8	98.0	120.2
February.....	111.6	114.3	110.4	114.9	107.2	96.4	120.9
March.....	112.0	115.0	109.6	115.6	107.9	96.0	123.5
April.....	113.2	116.0	110.3	117.9	108.4	97.9	122.9
May.....	114.6	118.3	112.1	119.2	109.2	97.0	121.9
June.....	115.7	118.8	112.0	122.2	109.6	97.2	123.4
July.....	115.5	118.6	112.3	121.7	109.3	97.5	124.0
August.....	114.8	117.0	112.2	120.3	109.6	98.0	125.2
September.....	113.0	112.2	112.3	117.5	109.6	96.3	125.5
October.....	113.3	112.1	112.8	116.8	110.8	96.9	124.0
November.....	112.3	111.1	111.9	116.0	109.5	98.0	122.9
December.....	111.2	107.5	110.8	114.6	110.4	97.8	122.9
1961: January.....	110.5	105.0	111.1	114.0	110.2	97.6	124.6
February.....	110.8	107.4	111.4	113.4	110.1	96.3	125.1
March.....	111.6	110.2	111.2	113.3	111.2	96.3	124.9
April.....	113.9	111.8	113.1	118.0	111.9	97.4	127.1
May.....	115.5	113.3	113.6	121.7	112.1	97.1	130.4
June.....	117.4	115.7	114.9	124.6	113.1	97.6	131.5
July.....	119.0	118.2	114.8	127.4	113.9	97.8	131.7
August.....	120.2	120.3	117.8	127.3	114.2	98.7	134.6
September.....	118.9	118.1	117.1	125.7	113.8	97.1	135.4
October.....	121.0	121.7	117.4	128.0	116.1	99.5	135.8
November.....	121.2	120.9	118.3	128.1	116.2	100.6	136.0
December.....	122.0	121	121	130	116	100.5	137.0

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-34.—Business expenditures for new plant and equipment, 1939 and 1945-62

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total <sup>1</sup>	Manufacturing			Mining	Transportation		Public utilities	Commercial and other <sup>2</sup>
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods		Railroad	Other		
1939.....	5.51	1.94	0.76	1.19	0.33	0.28	0.36	0.52	2.08
1945.....	8.69	3.98	1.59	2.39	.38	.55	.57	.50	2.70
1946.....	14.85	6.79	3.11	3.68	.43	.58	.92	.79	5.33
1947.....	20.61	8.70	3.41	5.30	.69	.89	1.30	1.54	7.49
1948.....	22.06	9.13	3.48	5.65	.88	1.32	1.28	2.54	6.90
1949.....	19.28	7.15	2.59	4.56	.79	1.35	.89	3.12	5.98
1950.....	20.60	7.49	3.14	4.36	.71	1.11	1.21	3.31	6.78
1951.....	25.64	10.85	5.17	5.68	.93	1.47	1.49	3.66	7.24
1952.....	26.49	11.63	5.61	6.02	.98	1.40	1.60	3.89	7.09
1953.....	28.32	11.91	5.65	6.26	.99	1.31	1.56	4.55	8.00
1954.....	26.83	11.04	5.09	5.95	.98	1.31	1.51	4.22	8.23
1955.....	28.70	11.44	5.44	6.00	.96	.92	1.60	4.31	9.47
1956.....	35.08	14.95	7.62	7.33	1.24	1.23	1.71	4.90	11.05
1957.....	36.96	15.96	8.02	7.94	1.24	1.40	1.77	6.20	10.40
1958.....	30.53	11.43	5.47	5.96	.94	.75	1.50	6.09	9.82
1959.....	32.54	12.07	5.77	6.29	.99	.92	2.02	5.67	10.88
1960.....	35.68	14.48	7.18	7.30	.99	1.03	1.94	5.68	11.57
1961 <sup>3</sup> .....	34.50	13.72	6.27	7.45	.99	.67	1.84	5.56	11.71
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1959: I.....	30.60	11.20	5.25	5.95	0.95	0.65	1.70	5.80	10.35
II.....	32.50	11.80	5.75	6.05	.95	1.00	2.10	5.80	10.85
III.....	33.35	12.25	5.85	6.40	1.00	1.30	2.15	5.60	11.05
IV.....	33.60	12.85	6.15	6.70	1.05	.85	2.15	5.50	11.20
1960: I.....	35.15	14.10	7.15	6.95	1.00	1.00	2.00	5.75	11.35
II.....	36.30	14.70	7.40	7.30	1.05	1.10	2.15	5.70	11.60
III.....	35.90	14.65	7.35	7.30	1.00	1.00	1.90	5.60	11.75
IV.....	35.50	14.40	6.85	7.55	.90	1.00	1.80	5.70	11.65
1961: I.....	33.85	13.75	6.50	7.25	.95	.70	1.75	5.35	11.30
II.....	33.50	13.50	6.20	7.30	1.00	.70	1.80	5.50	11.05
III.....	34.70	13.65	6.10	7.55	1.00	.65	1.90	5.65	11.85
IV <sup>3</sup> .....	35.90	14.00	6.35	7.65	1.00	.60	1.90	5.70	12.65
1962: I <sup>3</sup> .....	36.50	14.55	6.70	7.85	1.00	.70	1.80	5.50	12.90

<sup>1</sup> Excludes agriculture.

<sup>2</sup> Commercial and other includes trade, service, finance, communications, and construction.

<sup>3</sup> Estimates for fourth quarter 1961 and first quarter 1962 based on anticipated capital expenditures reported by business in late October and November 1961. The quarterly anticipations include adjustments, when necessary, for systematic tendencies in anticipatory data.

NOTE.—These figures do not agree precisely with the plant and equipment expenditures included in the gross national product estimates of the Department of Commerce. The main difference lies in the inclusion in the gross national product of investment by farmers, professionals, and institutions, and of certain outlays charged to current account.

This series is not available for years prior to 1939 and for 1940 to 1944.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Commerce.



TABLE B-35.—New construction activity, 1929-61  
[Value put in place, millions of dollars]

Year or month	Total new construction	Private construction						Public construction	
		Total <sup>1</sup>	Residential building (non-farm)	Nonresidential building and other construction					
				Total	Commercial <sup>2</sup>	Industrial	Public utility		Other <sup>3</sup>
1929	10,793	8,307	3,625	4,682	1,135	949	1,578	1,020	2,486
1930	8,741	5,883	2,075	3,808	893	532	1,527	856	2,858
1931	6,427	3,768	1,565	2,203	454	221	946	582	2,659
1932	3,538	1,676	630	1,046	223	74	467	282	1,862
1933	2,879	1,231	470	761	130	176	261	194	1,648
1934	3,720	1,509	625	884	173	191	326	194	2,211
1935	4,232	1,999	1,010	989	211	158	363	257	2,233
1936	6,497	2,981	1,565	1,416	290	266	518	342	3,516
1937	6,999	3,903	1,875	2,028	387	492	705	344	3,096
1938	6,980	3,560	1,990	1,570	285	232	605	448	3,420
1939	8,198	4,389	2,680	1,709	292	254	683	480	3,809
1940	8,682	5,054	2,985	2,069	348	442	771	508	3,628
1941	11,957	6,206	3,510	2,696	409	801	872	614	5,751
1942	14,075	3,415	1,715	1,700	155	346	786	413	10,660
1943	8,301	1,979	885	1,094	33	156	570	385	6,322
1944	5,259	2,186	815	1,371	56	208	725	382	3,073
1945	5,809	3,411	1,276	2,135	203	642	827	463	2,398
1946	12,627	10,396	4,752	5,644	1,153	1,689	1,374	1,428	2,231
1947	17,901	14,582	7,535	7,047	957	1,702	2,338	2,050	3,319
1948	23,243	18,539	10,122	8,417	1,397	1,397	3,043	2,580	4,704
1949	24,183	17,914	9,642	8,272	1,182	972	3,323	2,795	6,269
1950	29,947	23,081	14,100	8,981	1,415	1,062	3,330	3,174	6,866
1951	32,700	23,447	12,529	10,918	1,498	2,117	3,729	3,574	9,253
1952	34,670	23,889	12,842	11,047	1,137	2,320	4,043	3,547	10,781
1953	37,019	25,783	13,777	12,006	1,791	2,229	4,475	3,511	11,236
1954	39,234	27,556	15,379	12,177	2,212	2,030	4,161	3,774	11,678
1955	44,164	32,440	18,705	13,735	3,218	2,399	4,363	3,755	11,724
1956	45,815	33,067	17,677	15,390	3,631	3,084	4,893	3,782	12,748
1957	47,845	33,766	17,019	16,747	3,564	3,557	5,414	4,212	14,079
1958	48,950	33,493	18,047	15,446	3,589	2,382	5,087	4,388	15,457
1959	54,109	38,002	22,331	15,671	3,914	2,098	4,990	4,669	16,107
New series: <sup>4</sup>									
1959	56,555	40,344	24,962	15,382	3,930	2,106	5,008	4,338	16,211
1960	55,556	39,603	22,546	17,057	4,180	2,851	5,323	4,703	15,953
1961 <sup>5</sup>	57,492	40,439	22,566	17,873	4,663	2,759	5,392	5,059	17,053
Seasonally adjusted annual rates (New series <sup>4</sup> )									
1960:									
January	54,820	40,299	23,799	16,500	4,158	2,596	5,088	4,658	14,521
February	55,220	40,095	23,153	16,942	4,323	2,722	5,216	4,681	15,125
March	54,998	39,846	22,908	16,938	4,203	2,760	5,281	4,694	15,152
April	54,657	39,414	22,526	16,888	4,158	2,785	5,244	4,701	15,243
May	55,243	39,383	22,608	16,775	4,066	2,786	5,214	4,709	15,860
June	55,514	39,765	22,870	16,895	3,995	2,796	5,413	4,691	15,749
July	55,750	39,487	22,748	16,739	3,976	2,839	5,252	4,672	16,263
August	55,837	39,474	22,448	17,026	4,033	2,880	5,410	4,703	16,363
September	55,599	39,316	22,102	17,214	4,134	2,958	5,418	4,704	16,283
October	55,532	39,200	21,834	17,366	4,262	3,010	5,361	4,733	16,352
November	56,079	39,624	22,016	17,608	4,378	3,025	5,452	4,753	16,455
December	56,650	39,639	21,916	17,723	4,519	3,025	5,458	4,721	17,011
1961:									
January	56,018	38,575	20,649	17,926	4,848	3,053	5,308	4,717	17,443
February	55,717	37,962	20,016	17,946	4,821	2,992	5,384	4,749	17,755
March	55,794	38,511	20,508	18,003	4,743	2,957	5,398	4,905	17,283
April	55,504	38,986	21,042	17,944	4,636	2,921	5,323	5,064	16,518
May	55,518	39,232	21,257	17,975	4,515	2,849	5,383	5,228	16,286
June	57,206	40,328	22,271	18,057	4,510	2,750	5,382	5,415	16,878
July	57,039	41,176	23,118	18,058	4,578	2,672	5,457	5,351	15,863
August	57,983	41,281	23,306	17,975	4,646	2,588	5,470	5,271	16,702
September	58,910	41,709	23,782	17,927	4,718	2,610	5,422	5,177	17,201
October	58,905	41,767	24,026	17,741	4,681	2,608	5,404	5,048	17,138
November	61,180	42,172	24,625	17,547	4,608	2,554	5,377	5,008	19,008
December <sup>5</sup>	59,953	42,696	25,191	17,505	4,641	2,537	5,368	4,959	17,257

<sup>1</sup> Data in this table do not agree with the new construction expenditures included in the gross national product. The latter data include expenditures for crude petroleum and natural gas well drilling, and do not reflect revisions in the "new series" presented above. (See Table B-1.)

<sup>2</sup> Office buildings, warehouses, stores, restaurants, and garages.

<sup>3</sup> Farm, institutional, and all other.

<sup>4</sup> New series beginning January 1959 not comparable with prior data. In addition to major differences between old and new series, data for Alaska and Hawaii are included beginning January 1959. For details, see *Construction Activity*, C 30-13, August 1960, and C 30-25 (Supplement), July 1961, Bureau of the Census.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-36.—New public construction activity, 1929-61

[Value put in place, millions of dollars]

Year	Total new public construction <sup>1</sup>				Major types of new public construction						
	All public sources	Federal		State and local	Highway	Educational	Hospital and institutional	Sewer and water and miscellaneous public service	Conservation and development	Military facilities	All other public <sup>2</sup>
		Direct	Federal aid								
1929.....	2,486	155	80	2,251	1,266	389	101	404	115	19	192
1930.....	2,858	209	104	2,545	1,516	364	118	500	137	29	194
1931.....	2,659	271	235	2,153	1,355	285	110	479	156	40	234
1932.....	1,862	333	111	1,418	958	130	83	291	150	34	216
1933.....	1,648	516	286	846	847	52	49	160	359	36	145
1934.....	2,211	626	721	864	1,000	148	51	228	518	47	219
1935.....	2,233	814	567	852	845	153	38	246	700	37	214
1936.....	3,516	797	1,566	1,153	1,362	366	74	509	658	29	518
1937.....	3,096	776	1,117	1,203	1,226	253	73	445	605	37	457
1938.....	3,420	717	1,320	1,383	1,421	311	97	492	551	62	486
1939.....	3,809	759	1,377	1,673	1,381	468	127	507	570	125	631
1940.....	3,628	1,182	946	1,500	1,302	156	54	469	528	385	734
1941.....	3,751	3,751	697	1,303	1,066	158	42	393	500	1,620	1,972
1942.....	10,660	9,313	475	872	734	128	35	254	357	5,016	4,136
1943.....	6,322	5,609	268	445	446	63	44	156	285	2,550	2,778
1944.....	3,073	2,505	126	442	362	41	58	125	163	837	1,487
1945.....	2,398	1,737	99	562	398	59	85	152	130	690	884
1946.....	2,231	865	244	1,122	764	101	85	278	260	188	555
1947.....	3,319	840	409	2,070	1,344	287	77	492	424	204	491
1948.....	4,704	1,177	417	3,110	1,661	618	213	699	670	158	685
1949.....	6,269	1,488	461	4,320	2,015	934	458	803	852	137	1,070
1950.....	6,866	1,625	462	4,779	2,134	1,133	499	819	942	177	1,162
1951.....	9,253	2,981	481	5,791	2,353	1,513	527	959	912	887	2,102
1952.....	10,781	4,185	626	5,970	2,679	1,619	495	958	900	1,387	2,743
1953.....	11,236	4,134	687	6,415	3,015	1,714	369	1,050	892	1,290	2,906
1954.....	11,678	3,418	728	7,532	3,680	2,134	333	1,171	773	1,003	2,584
1955.....	11,724	2,777	790	8,157	3,861	2,442	300	1,318	701	1,287	1,815
1956.....	12,748	2,742	896	9,110	4,431	2,556	300	1,659	826	1,360	1,616
1957.....	14,079	2,993	1,314	9,772	4,954	2,825	354	1,737	971	1,287	1,951
1958.....	15,457	3,388	2,130	9,939	5,545	2,875	390	1,838	1,019	1,402	2,388
1959 <sup>3</sup> .....	16,211	3,755	2,790	9,666	5,870	2,656	428	2,018	1,130	1,488	2,621
1960.....	15,953	3,665	2,453	9,835	5,464	2,818	400	2,136	1,221	1,386	2,528
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	17,053	3,830	2,484	10,739	5,800	3,053	370	2,166	1,361	1,386	2,917

<sup>1</sup> For expenditures classified by ownership, combine "Federal aid" and "State and local" columns to obtain State and local ownership. "Direct" column stands as it is for Federal ownership.

<sup>2</sup> Includes nonresidential building other than educational and hospital and institutional (industrial, commercial, public administration, social and recreational, and miscellaneous), public residential buildings, and publicly owned parks and playgrounds, memorials, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Beginning with 1959, data include estimates for Alaska and Hawaii. Comparability with earlier data is not seriously affected since these two States accounted for less than two-thirds of one percent of total new public construction in 1959.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-37.—Housing starts and applications for financing, 1929-61  
(Thousands of units)

Year or month	Total housing starts (farm and nonfarm)		Nonfarm housing starts				Private housing starts, seasonally adjusted annual rates		Proposed home construction <sup>2</sup>	
	Total private and public <sup>1</sup>	Private	Total private and public <sup>1</sup>	Private		Total farm and non-farm	Non-farm	FHA applications	VA appraisal requests	
				Total	Government programs					
										FHA
1929			509.0	509.0						
1930			330.0	330.0						
1931			254.0	254.0						
1932			134.0	134.0						
1933			93.0	93.0						
1934			126.0	126.0						
1935			221.0	215.7	14.0			20.6		
1936			319.0	304.2	49.4			47.8		
1937			336.0	332.4	60.0			49.8		
1938			406.0	399.3	118.7			131.1		
1939			515.0	458.4	158.1			179.8		
1940			602.6	529.6	180.1			231.2		
1941			706.1	619.5	220.4			288.5		
1942			356.0	301.2	165.7			238.5		
1943			191.0	183.7	146.2			144.4		
1944			141.8	138.7	93.3			62.9		
1945			209.3	208.1	41.2	4 8.8		56.6	(9)	
1946			670.5	662.5	69.0	91.8		121.7	(9)	
1947			849.0	845.6	229.0	160.3		286.4	(9)	
1948			931.6	913.5	294.1	71.1		293.2	(9)	
1949			1,025.1	988.8	363.8	90.8		327.0	(9)	
1950			1,396.0	1,352.2	486.7	191.2		397.7	(9)	
1951			1,091.3	1,020.1	263.5	148.6		192.8	164.4	
1952			1,127.0	1,068.5	279.9	141.3		267.9	226.3	
1953			1,103.8	1,068.3	262.0	156.0		253.7	251.4	
1954			1,220.4	1,201.7	276.3	307.0		338.6	535.4	
1955			1,328.9	1,309.5	276.7	392.9		306.2	620.8	
1956			1,118.1	1,083.9	189.3	270.7		197.7	401.5	
1957			1,041.9	992.8	168.4	128.3		198.8	159.4	
1958			1,208.4	1,141.5	295.4	102.1		341.7	234.2	
1959	(9)	(9)	1,378.5	1,342.8	332.5	109.3		369.7	234.0	
New series <sup>6</sup>										
1959	1,553.5	1,516.8	1,531.3	1,494.6	332.5	109.3		369.7	234.0	
1960	1,296.0	1,252.1	1,274.0	1,230.1	260.9	74.6		242.4	142.9	
1961 <sup>7</sup>	1,354.6	1,303.5	1,326.3	1,275.3	244.4	83.3		243.8	177.8	
1960: January	87.4	86.0	83.4	82.0	15.9	4.1	1,382	1,302	16.3	11.2
February	93.3	90.7	92.3	89.7	17.6	4.8	1,283	1,366	21.1	12.9
March	98.9	90.5	92.8	89.4	21.9	5.2	1,104	1,089	27.4	12.9
April	124.8	123.0	123.0	121.2	25.4	7.3	1,295	1,275	22.5	13.7
May	133.8	130.2	131.7	128.1	25.2	6.9	1,331	1,309	22.4	14.4
June	128.2	122.8	126.6	121.2	26.5	7.7	1,279	1,264	23.7	15.2
July	118.3	114.3	116.6	112.6	23.6	7.4	1,227	1,209	19.6	8.5
August	135.1	130.3	133.0	128.2	26.3	8.2	1,355	1,335	22.9	12.4
September	102.6	96.9	100.6	94.9	21.9	6.8	1,089	1,067	20.1	11.6
October	113.2	110.4	110.1	107.3	22.6	5.9	1,273	1,237	18.3	10.0
November	94.5	92.8	93.5	91.8	20.2	5.5	1,220	1,206	14.8	10.3
December	70.9	64.2	70.4	63.7	13.8	4.8	996	987	13.2	10.0
1961: January	72.5	69.8	71.0	68.3	14.0	4.9	1,127	1,098	14.3	9.4
February	81.0	75.8	77.7	72.5	13.0	4.9	1,169	1,115	16.9	12.0
March	109.7	104.6	107.3	102.2	20.1	6.4	1,296	1,262	24.0	17.7
April	115.3	111.0	113.0	108.7	20.1	6.1	1,166	1,143	20.8	17.5
May	130.7	126.6	128.3	124.2	23.7	8.0	1,291	1,268	23.9	14.7
June	138.3	132.4	135.3	129.5	22.1	7.8	1,331	1,351	23.4	17.6
July	128.5	125.2	126.0	122.7	21.3	7.3	1,343	1,318	20.6	15.1
August	130.1	127.0	127.3	124.2	25.5	8.4	1,396	1,301	24.4	17.4
September	128.2	122.4	126.5	120.7	20.9	7.3	1,323	1,365	19.6	15.7
October	128.9	124.0	126.4	121.5	23.4	9.2	1,434	1,404	22.1	16.1
November	104.8	101.9	103.1	100.2	22.9	7.3	1,242	1,319	17.4	13.5
December	86.6	82.8	84.4	80.6	17.4	5.7	1,306	1,264	16.4	11.0

<sup>1</sup> Military housing starts, including those financed with mortgages insured by FHA under Section 803 of the National Housing Act, are included in total private and public starts but excluded from total private starts and from FHA starts.

<sup>2</sup> Units in mortgage applications for new home construction.

<sup>3</sup> FHA program approved in June 1934; all 1934 activity included in 1935.

<sup>4</sup> Monthly estimates for September 1945-May 1950 were prepared by Housing and Home Finance Agency.

<sup>5</sup> Not available.

<sup>6</sup> In addition to major differences between old and new series arising from revisions in sources and methods, new series include data for Alaska and Hawaii. For details, see *Housing Starts*, C20-11 (Supplement), Bureau of the Census, May 1960.

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary; December and year 1961 estimated by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Data for VA programs include Alaska and Hawaii; FHA programs include Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

Sources: Department of Commerce, Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration (VA), and Housing and Home Finance Agency (except as noted).

TABLE B-38.—Sales and inventories in manufacturing and trade, 1939-61

Year or month	[Amounts in billions of dollars]											
	Total manufacturing and trade <sup>1</sup>			Manufacturing			Wholesale trade <sup>1</sup>			Retail trade <sup>1</sup>		
	Sales <sup>2</sup>	Inventories <sup>3</sup>	Ratio <sup>4</sup>	Sales <sup>2</sup>	Inventories <sup>3</sup>	Ratio <sup>4</sup>	Sales <sup>2</sup>	Inventories <sup>3</sup>	Ratio <sup>4</sup>	Sales <sup>2</sup>	Inventories <sup>3</sup>	Ratio <sup>4</sup>
1939.....	10.8	20.1	1.77	5.1	11.5	2.11	2.2	3.1	1.34	3.5	5.5	1.53
1940.....	12.1	22.2	1.72	5.9	12.8	2.06	2.4	3.2	1.30	3.9	6.1	1.49
1941.....	15.8	28.8	1.58	8.2	17.0	1.78	3.0	4.0	1.20	4.6	7.8	1.48
1942.....	18.6	31.1	1.66	10.4	19.3	1.77	3.4	3.8	1.19	4.8	8.0	1.76
1943.....	21.9	31.3	1.40	12.8	20.1	1.51	3.8	3.7	.97	5.3	7.6	1.43
1944.....	23.8	31.1	1.33	13.8	19.5	1.45	4.2	3.9	.94	5.9	7.6	1.31
1945.....	23.9	30.9	1.30	12.9	18.4	1.48	4.5	4.6	.91	6.5	7.9	1.21
1946.....	27.0	42.7	1.33	12.6	24.5	1.66	5.7	6.2	.91	8.7	12.1	1.15
1947.....	33.0	50.2	1.41	15.9	28.9	1.71	6.9	7.1	1.00	10.2	14.2	1.26
1948.....	36.3	55.6	1.47	17.6	31.7	1.72	7.5	7.9	1.01	11.1	16.0	1.39
1949.....	34.8	51.9	1.55	16.4	28.9	1.86	7.2	7.6	1.07	11.1	15.5	1.41
1950.....	40.0	62.9	1.38	19.3	34.3	1.57	8.4	9.1	.96	12.3	19.5	1.38
1951.....	44.7	73.6	1.58	22.3	42.8	1.77	9.4	9.7	1.05	13.0	21.0	1.63
1952.....	45.9	74.8	1.60	22.8	43.8	1.90	9.6	10.0	1.01	13.5	21.0	1.52
1953.....	48.4	77.4	1.59	24.5	45.4	1.84	9.8	10.5	1.06	14.1	21.5	1.53
1954.....	47.4	74.3	1.59	23.5	43.0	1.86	9.7	10.4	1.07	14.1	20.9	1.51
1955.....	52.3	80.6	1.47	26.3	46.4	1.68	10.6	11.4	1.02	15.3	22.8	1.43
1956.....	54.8	88.7	1.55	27.7	52.3	1.79	11.3	13.0	1.08	15.8	23.4	1.47
1957.....	56.3	90.8	1.60	28.4	53.5	1.89	11.3	12.7	1.13	16.7	24.6	1.44
1958.....	54.0	85.5	1.61	26.2	49.2	1.93	11.1	12.0	1.10	16.7	24.3	1.43
1959.....	60.0	90.6	1.48	29.7	52.4	1.72	12.3	12.6	1.00	18.0	25.5	1.39
1960.....	61.0	94.1	1.54	30.4	53.7	1.78	12.3	13.2	1.05	18.3	27.2	1.45
1961 <sup>5 6</sup> .....	61.7	95.0	1.52	30.8	55.0	1.75	<sup>8</sup> 12.6	<sup>8</sup> 13.3	1.06	18.3	26.8	1.45
Seasonally adjusted												
1960: January.....	61.6	91.7	1.49	31.1	53.3	1.71	12.4	12.7	1.02	18.1	25.6	1.42
February.....	62.3	92.6	1.49	31.6	53.9	1.71	12.5	12.7	1.02	18.2	26.0	1.43
March.....	61.3	93.6	1.53	30.8	54.3	1.76	12.2	12.8	1.05	18.2	26.4	1.45
April.....	62.5	93.9	1.50	31.0	54.7	1.76	12.6	12.9	1.02	18.9	26.3	1.39
May.....	61.9	94.6	1.53	31.0	55.0	1.77	12.4	13.1	1.05	18.4	26.6	1.44
June.....	61.8	94.8	1.53	30.8	55.1	1.79	12.5	13.0	1.04	18.5	26.6	1.44
July.....	60.9	94.6	1.55	30.4	54.9	1.80	12.3	13.0	1.06	18.1	26.7	1.47
August.....	60.7	94.7	1.56	30.1	55.0	1.82	12.3	13.1	1.06	18.2	26.6	1.46
September.....	60.4	94.6	1.57	30.1	54.7	1.82	12.2	13.1	1.08	18.1	26.8	1.48
October.....	60.3	94.8	1.57	29.6	54.4	1.84	12.2	13.2	1.09	18.5	27.2	1.47
November.....	59.9	94.6	1.58	29.3	54.0	1.85	12.2	13.3	1.08	18.4	27.4	1.49
December.....	59.4	94.1	1.59	29.1	53.7	1.84	12.3	13.2	1.07	17.9	27.2	1.52
1961: January.....	58.7	93.6	1.60	28.7	53.7	1.87	<sup>8</sup> 12.2	<sup>8</sup> 13.1	1.08	17.8	26.8	1.51
February.....	59.3	93.4	1.58	29.0	53.6	1.85	12.4	13.2	1.06	17.8	26.6	1.49
March.....	60.2	92.7	1.54	29.6	53.3	1.80	12.5	13.3	1.06	18.1	26.1	1.44
April.....	60.1	93.0	1.55	30.1	53.4	1.77	12.1	13.4	1.11	17.9	26.2	1.47
May.....	61.6	93.1	1.51	30.8	53.4	1.73	12.8	13.5	1.05	18.0	26.2	1.46
June.....	61.9	93.1	1.50	30.9	53.4	1.73	12.8	13.5	1.06	18.2	26.2	1.44
July.....	61.7	93.5	1.52	31.2	53.5	1.72	12.5	13.6	1.09	18.0	26.3	1.46
August.....	62.4	93.6	1.50	31.4	54.0	1.72	12.8	13.6	1.06	18.2	26.0	1.43
September.....	61.6	94.3	1.53	31.4	54.4	1.73	12.1	13.5	1.09	18.1	26.3	1.45
October.....	63.2	94.6	1.50	31.8	54.8	1.72	12.8	13.5	1.07	18.6	26.4	1.42
November <sup>6</sup> .....	64.5	95.0	1.47	32.2	55.0	1.71	13.1	13.3	1.02	19.2	26.8	1.40
December <sup>6</sup> .....										19.0		

<sup>1</sup> The series beginning in 1946 for wholesale trade and for retail trade are not comparable with previous years because of changes in definitions.

<sup>2</sup> Monthly average shown for year and total for month.

<sup>3</sup> Seasonally adjusted, end of period.

<sup>4</sup> Inventory/sales ratio. For annual periods, ratio of weighted average inventories to average monthly sales; for monthly data, ratio of inventories at end of month to sales for month.

<sup>5</sup> Where December data not available, data for year calculated on basis of no change from November.

<sup>6</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>7</sup> Beginning January 1960, retail sales and inventories include data for Alaska and Hawaii.

<sup>8</sup> Beginning January 1961, wholesale sales and inventories include data for Alaska and Hawaii.

NOTE.—For a description of the series and their comparability, see *Survey of Current Business*, September and November 1952, June 1957, and December 1961 for retail, and August 1957 for manufacturing and wholesale.

The inventory figures in this table do not agree with the estimates of change in business inventories included in the gross national product since these figures cover only manufacturing and trade rather than all business, and show inventories in terms of current book value without adjustment for revaluation.

Source: Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-39.—Manufacturers' sales, inventories, and orders, 1939-61

(Billions of dollars)

Year or month	Sales <sup>1</sup>		Inventories <sup>2</sup>						New orders <sup>1</sup>			Un-filled orders (unadjusted) <sup>3</sup>
	Durable goods industries	Non-durable goods industries	Durable goods industries			Nondurable goods industries			Total	Durable goods industries	Non-durable goods industries	
			Purchased materials	Goods in process	Finished goods	Purchased materials	Goods in process	Finished goods				
1939.....	1.9	3.2	1.8	1.5	2.1	2.4	0.8	2.9	5.4	2.2	3.2	7.0
1940.....	2.5	3.4	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.6	.9	3.0	6.8	3.4	3.4	18.4
1941.....	3.8	4.4	3.1	3.2	2.3	4.0	1.2	3.2	9.8	5.3	4.5	37.9
1942.....	5.2	5.3	3.7	4.6	2.2	4.3	1.2	3.3	13.3	8.0	5.3	72.9
1943.....	6.9	6.0	3.9	5.2	2.1	4.5	1.4	3.0	12.7	6.8	5.9	71.5
1944.....	7.3	6.4	3.3	5.0	2.1	4.7	1.4	3.0	11.9	5.5	6.4	49.0
1945.....	6.3	6.6	3.2	3.5	2.1	4.9	1.5	3.2	10.5	3.9	6.6	20.9
1946.....	5.0	7.6	4.5	4.6	2.9	6.5	1.8	4.2	13.7	5.9	7.8	33.8
1947.....	6.7	9.2	5.1	5.2	4.0	7.2	2.2	5.2	15.6	6.4	9.3	30.3
1948.....	7.6	10.0	5.6	5.4	4.7	7.3	2.2	6.5	17.4	7.5	9.9	26.9
1949.....	7.1	9.3	4.6	4.7	4.7	6.5	2.1	6.3	15.9	6.6	9.3	20.8
1950.....	8.8	10.5	6.1	6.0	4.7	8.4	2.5	6.6	21.0	10.3	10.7	41.1
1951.....	10.4	11.9	7.4	8.6	6.8	9.1	2.7	8.2	24.5	12.7	11.8	67.6
1952.....	10.9	11.9	7.3	10.2	6.9	8.6	2.7	8.1	23.6	11.7	11.9	76.3
1953.....	12.4	12.1	7.4	10.7	8.1	8.1	2.7	8.4	23.1	11.0	12.1	59.5
1954.....	11.2	12.3	6.5	9.8	7.7	7.9	2.6	8.4	22.5	10.2	12.3	46.9
1955.....	13.1	13.3	7.4	11.1	8.2	8.1	2.8	8.8	27.2	13.9	13.3	56.9
1956.....	13.8	13.9	8.7	12.8	9.2	8.5	3.0	10.1	28.3	14.4	13.9	64.2
1957.....	14.2	14.2	8.3	12.7	10.1	8.8	3.1	10.5	27.3	13.1	14.2	50.7
1958.....	12.4	13.8	7.5	11.3	9.0	8.6	3.0	9.8	25.9	12.0	13.9	46.8
1959.....	14.5	15.2	8.3	12.1	9.7	8.9	3.0	10.4	30.1	14.9	15.3	51.5
1960.....	14.7	15.7	8.0	12.1	10.8	8.7	3.1	11.1	29.9	14.2	15.7	45.4
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	14.6	16.3	8.2	12.8	10.6	8.9	3.3	11.2	31.1	14.8	16.3	47.7
Seasonally adjusted												
1960:												
January.....	15.4	15.7	8.6	12.3	9.9	9.0	3.0	10.5	29.8	14.2	15.6	50.9
February.....	15.7	15.9	8.7	12.5	10.1	9.1	3.0	10.5	30.6	14.8	15.8	50.2
March.....	15.2	15.7	8.8	12.7	10.4	9.1	3.0	10.5	30.3	14.6	15.7	49.5
April.....	15.0	16.0	8.8	12.6	10.5	9.1	3.1	10.5	30.4	14.5	15.9	48.4
May.....	15.1	15.9	8.8	12.7	10.6	9.1	3.1	10.6	30.5	14.7	15.8	47.8
June.....	14.9	15.9	8.7	12.8	10.7	9.1	3.1	10.6	30.1	14.3	15.8	47.7
July.....	14.7	15.7	8.6	12.6	10.8	9.1	3.2	10.6	29.2	13.8	15.4	47.7
August.....	14.4	15.7	8.6	12.6	10.9	9.0	3.2	10.7	30.0	14.4	15.6	47.5
September.....	14.4	15.7	8.4	12.4	11.0	8.9	3.1	10.9	30.4	14.6	15.8	47.5
October.....	14.1	15.5	8.3	12.2	10.9	8.9	3.1	11.0	29.2	13.7	15.5	46.4
November.....	13.8	15.4	8.1	12.1	10.9	8.8	3.1	11.0	29.0	13.6	15.4	45.8
December.....	13.6	15.5	8.0	12.1	10.8	8.7	3.1	11.1	28.7	13.2	15.5	45.4
1961:												
January.....	13.2	15.5	8.0	12.1	10.7	8.7	3.1	11.1	28.5	12.9	15.6	45.3
February.....	13.3	15.7	8.0	12.1	10.6	8.7	3.0	11.2	29.1	13.4	15.8	45.5
March.....	13.7	15.9	7.9	11.9	10.5	8.8	3.0	11.2	29.9	13.8	16.0	45.6
April.....	14.1	16.0	7.8	11.9	10.5	8.9	3.1	11.2	30.4	14.4	16.1	45.8
May.....	14.6	16.2	7.8	11.9	10.5	9.0	3.2	11.0	31.1	14.8	16.3	45.8
June.....	14.7	16.2	7.6	12.0	10.6	9.0	3.3	10.9	31.1	14.9	16.2	45.9
July.....	14.8	16.4	7.7	12.1	10.6	9.0	3.3	10.9	31.3	15.0	16.3	46.8
August.....	15.1	16.4	7.7	12.3	10.8	8.9	3.3	11.0	32.1	15.6	16.5	47.2
September.....	15.0	16.4	8.0	12.4	10.7	9.0	3.3	11.1	32.3	15.8	16.5	47.4
October.....	15.3	16.5	8.1	12.6	10.7	8.9	3.3	11.1	32.7	16.1	16.6	47.5
November <sup>5</sup> .....	15.7	16.6	8.2	12.8	10.6	8.9	3.3	11.2	32.7	16.2	16.5	47.7
December <sup>5</sup> .....	15.8	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	16.4	-----	-----

<sup>1</sup> Monthly average for year and total for month.

<sup>2</sup> Book value, seasonally adjusted, end of period.

<sup>3</sup> End of period.

<sup>4</sup> Based on data through November.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—See Table B-38 for total sales and inventories of manufacturers.

Source: Department of Commerce.

# PRICES

TABLE B-40.—Wholesale price indexes, 1929-61

[1947-49=100]<sup>1</sup>

Year or month	All commodities	Farm products	Processed foods	All commodities other than farm products and foods (industrials)				
				Total	Textile products and apparel	Chemicals and allied products	Rubber and rubber products	Lumber and wood products
1929.....	61.9	58.6	58.5	65.5	64.2	(*)	83.5	31.9
1930.....	56.1	49.3	53.3	60.9	57.1	(*)	73.0	29.4
1931.....	47.4	36.2	44.8	53.6	47.1	(*)	62.0	23.8
1932.....	42.1	26.9	36.5	50.2	39.0	(*)	53.8	20.3
1933.....	42.8	28.7	36.3	50.9	46.0	51.2	56.8	24.2
1934.....	48.7	36.5	42.6	56.0	51.8	53.7	65.8	28.5
1935.....	52.0	44.0	52.1	55.7	50.4	56.0	66.4	27.4
1936.....	52.5	45.2	50.1	56.9	50.8	56.4	71.7	28.7
1937.....	56.1	48.3	52.4	61.0	54.2	59.0	84.4	33.7
1938.....	51.1	38.3	45.6	58.4	47.4	55.9	82.7	30.8
1939.....	50.1	36.5	43.3	58.1	49.5	55.8	86.3	31.6
1940.....	51.1	37.8	43.6	59.4	52.4	56.6	80.2	35.2
1941.....	56.8	46.0	50.5	63.7	60.3	61.6	86.5	41.8
1942.....	64.2	59.2	59.1	68.3	68.9	69.3	100.6	45.4
1943.....	67.0	68.5	61.6	69.3	69.2	69.5	103.3	48.0
1944.....	67.6	68.9	60.4	70.4	69.9	70.2	102.0	51.9
1945.....	68.8	71.6	60.8	71.3	71.1	70.6	98.9	52.5
1946.....	78.7	83.2	77.6	78.3	82.6	76.3	99.4	60.3
1947.....	96.4	100.0	98.2	95.3	100.1	101.4	99.0	93.7
1948.....	104.4	107.3	106.1	103.4	104.4	103.8	102.1	107.2
1949.....	99.2	92.8	95.7	101.3	95.5	94.8	98.9	99.2
1950.....	103.1	97.5	99.8	105.0	99.2	96.3	120.5	113.9
1951.....	114.8	113.4	111.4	115.9	110.6	111.0	148.0	123.9
1952.....	111.6	107.0	108.8	113.2	99.8	104.5	134.0	120.3
1953.....	110.1	97.0	104.6	114.0	97.3	105.7	125.0	120.2
1954.....	110.3	95.6	105.3	114.5	95.2	107.0	126.9	118.0
1955.....	110.7	89.6	101.7	117.0	95.3	106.6	143.8	123.6
1956.....	114.3	88.4	101.7	122.2	95.3	107.2	145.8	125.4
1957.....	117.6	90.9	105.6	125.6	95.4	109.5	145.2	119.0
1958.....	119.2	94.9	110.9	126.0	93.5	110.4	145.0	117.7
1959.....	119.5	89.1	107.0	128.2	95.0	109.9	144.5	125.8
1960.....	119.6	88.8	107.7	128.3	96.1	110.2	144.7	121.3
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	119.1	88.0	108.5	127.7	94.4	109.0	139.3	116.0
1960: January.....	119.3	86.5	105.6	128.8	96.6	109.9	143.1	125.1
February.....	119.3	87.0	105.7	128.7	96.5	110.0	144.6	124.9
March.....	120.0	90.4	107.3	128.6	96.3	110.1	144.7	124.5
April.....	120.0	91.1	106.8	128.7	96.3	110.2	144.7	124.3
May.....	119.7	90.4	107.3	128.2	96.3	110.2	146.3	123.7
June.....	119.5	89.0	107.6	128.2	96.3	110.2	146.7	122.4
July.....	119.7	88.9	108.9	128.2	96.3	110.4	146.9	121.5
August.....	119.2	86.6	107.8	128.2	96.1	110.5	145.3	119.6
September.....	119.2	87.7	108.1	127.9	95.9	110.4	144.9	118.7
October.....	119.6	89.5	109.0	128.0	95.8	110.1	144.7	117.7
November.....	119.6	89.9	109.1	127.9	95.4	110.1	143.6	116.9
December.....	119.5	88.7	109.2	127.9	95.2	110.2	141.2	116.5
1961: January.....	119.9	89.7	109.9	128.1	94.8	109.7	139.7	115.7
February.....	120.0	90.0	110.5	128.1	94.7	110.0	139.6	114.7
March.....	119.9	89.9	109.6	128.2	94.4	110.1	139.9	115.4
April.....	119.4	88.5	108.7	128.0	94.1	110.2	140.1	118.0
May.....	118.7	86.8	107.5	127.6	94.0	109.9	140.2	117.6
June.....	118.2	85.1	106.7	127.4	93.7	109.3	139.6	117.8
July.....	118.6	87.1	107.5	127.4	93.9	108.9	139.0	117.2
August.....	118.9	88.6	108.1	127.4	94.2	108.4	139.4	115.9
September.....	118.8	87.2	108.1	127.5	94.4	108.1	139.6	115.7
October.....	118.7	87.1	108.3	127.3	94.7	108.0	139.4	114.7
November.....	118.8	87.6	107.9	127.5	94.8	107.9	138.4	114.7
December <sup>3</sup> .....	119.2	87.9	108.8	127.7	94.8	107.9	137.0	114.5

See footnotes at end of table, p. 255.

TABLE B-40.—Wholesale price indexes, 1929-67—Continued

[1947-49=100] <sup>1</sup>

Year or month	All commodities other than farm products and foods (industrials)—continued								
	Hides, skins, leather, and leather products	Fuel and related products, and power <sup>2</sup>	Pulp, paper, and allied products	Metals and metal products	Machinery and motive products	Furniture and other household durables	Nonmetallic mineral products <sup>3</sup>	Tobacco manufactures and bottled beverages	Miscellaneous products
1929.....	59.3	70.2	(4)	67.0	(4)	69.3	72.6	86.6	(4)
1930.....	54.4	66.5	(4)	60.3	(4)	68.2	72.4	87.1	(4)
1931.....	46.8	57.2	(4)	54.1	(4)	62.8	67.6	84.6	(4)
1932.....	39.7	59.5	(4)	49.9	(4)	55.4	63.4	81.4	(4)
1933.....	44.0	56.1	(4)	50.9	(4)	55.5	66.9	72.8	(4)
1934.....	47.1	62.0	(4)	56.2	(4)	60.2	71.6	76.0	(4)
1935.....	48.7	62.2	(4)	56.2	(4)	59.8	71.6	75.9	(4)
1936.....	51.9	64.5	(4)	57.3	(4)	60.6	71.7	75.8	(4)
1937.....	56.9	65.7	(4)	65.6	(4)	67.2	73.4	76.5	(4)
1938.....	50.5	64.7	(4)	63.1	(4)	65.6	71.1	76.4	(4)
1939.....	52.0	61.8	(4)	62.6	65.3	65.4	69.5	76.4	(4)
1940.....	54.8	60.7	(4)	62.8	66.2	66.8	69.7	77.3	(4)
1941.....	58.9	64.5	(4)	64.0	68.6	71.2	71.3	78.1	(4)
1942.....	64.0	66.4	(4)	64.9	71.2	76.8	74.1	79.1	(4)
1943.....	63.9	68.4	(4)	64.8	71.9	76.4	74.5	83.0	(4)
1944.....	63.4	70.3	(4)	64.8	71.0	78.4	75.9	83.4	(4)
1945.....	64.2	71.1	(4)	65.9	71.6	78.6	79.1	85.8	(4)
1946.....	74.6	76.2	(4)	73.9	80.3	83.0	84.2	89.7	(4)
1947.....	101.0	90.9	98.6	91.3	92.5	95.6	93.9	97.2	100.8
1948.....	102.1	107.1	102.9	103.9	100.9	101.4	101.7	100.5	103.1
1949.....	96.9	101.9	98.5	104.8	106.6	103.1	104.4	102.3	96.1
1950.....	104.6	103.0	100.9	110.3	108.6	105.3	106.9	103.5	96.6
1951.....	120.3	106.7	119.6	122.8	119.0	114.1	113.6	109.4	104.9
1952.....	97.2	106.6	116.5	123.0	121.5	112.0	113.6	111.8	108.3
1953.....	98.5	109.5	116.1	126.9	123.0	114.2	118.2	115.4	97.8
1954.....	94.2	108.1	116.3	128.0	124.6	115.4	120.9	120.6	102.5
1955.....	93.8	107.9	119.3	136.6	128.4	115.9	124.2	121.6	92.0
1956.....	99.3	111.2	127.2	148.4	137.8	119.1	129.6	122.3	91.0
1957.....	99.4	117.2	129.6	151.2	146.1	122.2	134.6	126.1	89.6
1958.....	100.6	112.7	131.0	150.4	149.8	123.2	136.0	128.2	94.2
1959.....	114.3	112.7	132.2	153.6	153.0	123.4	137.7	131.4	94.5
1960.....	110.3	113.8	133.2	153.8	153.2	123.1	138.0	131.8	92.1
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	111.3	115.0	129.4	152.9	153.1	122.3	138.5	132.6	96.4
1960: January.....	112.7	111.9	133.7	155.5	153.8	123.4	138.4	131.7	95.3
February.....	112.0	112.0	133.2	155.3	153.9	123.5	138.2	131.7	93.4
March.....	111.8	112.3	133.1	154.5	153.9	123.7	138.2	131.7	94.0
April.....	112.1	112.2	133.1	154.5	153.7	123.5	138.3	131.7	95.4
May.....	111.2	110.8	133.4	154.2	153.3	123.2	137.9	131.7	91.1
June.....	110.3	112.3	133.5	153.8	153.2	123.0	137.8	131.7	90.9
July.....	110.1	113.8	133.5	153.4	153.3	123.1	137.8	131.8	90.8
August.....	108.7	115.3	133.0	153.6	153.3	122.9	137.8	132.0	89.9
September.....	108.1	116.1	133.0	153.5	151.4	122.8	138.0	132.0	91.1
October.....	108.5	116.2	133.4	152.8	152.9	122.7	138.1	132.0	90.3
November.....	108.5	116.1	133.1	152.3	153.0	122.6	137.9	132.0	90.6
December.....	108.8	116.2	132.3	152.2	153.1	122.6	137.9	132.1	92.4
1961: January.....	108.3	117.2	132.2	152.2	153.5	122.3	139.5	132.1	95.6
February.....	108.0	117.7	132.2	152.3	153.4	122.2	138.4	132.1	95.2
March.....	109.5	117.5	131.5	152.4	153.4	122.2	138.6	132.1	96.8
April.....	109.9	115.2	131.0	152.7	153.1	122.5	138.6	132.0	97.7
May.....	110.7	113.6	126.1	153.0	153.1	122.4	138.5	132.1	99.5
June.....	110.1	114.3	126.5	153.1	153.2	122.4	138.3	132.1	95.9
July.....	111.1	114.6	126.4	153.2	153.0	122.3	138.4	132.6	95.6
August.....	113.1	114.4	126.3	153.6	152.7	122.1	138.5	132.8	95.6
September.....	113.5	113.7	129.5	153.7	152.7	122.2	138.5	133.4	95.6
October.....	114.1	113.0	130.4	153.2	152.8	122.2	138.9	133.4	93.4
November.....	113.8	114.0	129.9	152.4	152.9	122.3	138.6	133.5	97.5
December <sup>5</sup> .....	113.4	114.9	130.4	152.7	153.1	122.2	138.5	133.4	98.6

<sup>1</sup> This does not replace the former index (1926=100) as the official index prior to January 1952. Data beginning January 1947 represent the revised sample and weighting pattern. Prior to January 1947 they are based on the month-to-month movement of the former index.

<sup>2</sup> Formerly titled "Fuel, power, and lighting materials."

<sup>3</sup> Formerly titled "Nonmetallic minerals—structural."

<sup>4</sup> Not available.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-41.—Wholesale price indexes; by stage of processing, 1947-61

[1947-49=100]

Year or month	All commodities	Crude materials				Intermediate materials, supplies, and components <sup>1</sup>						
		Total	Foodstuffs and feedstuffs	Non-food materials, except fuel	Fuel	Total	Materials and components for manufacturing				Materials and components for construction	
							Total	Materials for food manufacturing	Materials for non-durable manufacturing	Materials for durable manufacturing		Components for manufacturing
1947.....	96.4	98.6	100.7	96.0	89.4	96.2	96.4	102.8	99.2	91.2	94.4	93.3
1948.....	104.4	108.0	108.8	106.8	105.6	104.0	104.0	106.0	105.0	103.0	101.9	103.2
1949.....	99.2	93.4	90.5	97.2	105.0	99.9	99.6	91.2	95.8	105.8	103.8	103.5
1950.....	103.1	101.8	97.0	111.0	104.6	104.3	104.5	94.9	100.5	111.9	107.6	108.9
1951.....	114.8	116.9	112.3	128.1	106.5	116.9	118.4	105.7	116.5	124.3	122.2	119.1
1952.....	111.6	107.4	105.7	110.9	107.2	113.5	113.4	101.5	104.8	124.6	122.5	118.3
1953.....	110.1	99.2	94.6	106.2	111.0	114.1	115.2	101.8	104.0	130.1	124.7	120.2
1954.....	110.3	98.3	94.7	104.2	106.0	114.8	115.4	100.9	102.3	133.1	125.3	120.9
1955.....	110.7	94.5	85.7	110.1	105.8	117.0	118.2	97.7	102.7	139.7	130.9	125.6
1956.....	114.3	95.0	84.0	114.2	113.3	122.1	123.7	98.0	104.3	148.5	142.9	132.0
1957.....	117.6	97.2	87.7	112.5	119.7	125.1	126.9	99.9	105.7	153.2	148.3	132.9
1958.....	119.2	99.4	92.8	108.4	121.2	125.3	127.2	102.2	104.7	154.3	149.5	132.9
1959.....	119.5	96.7	86.8	112.2	123.4	127.0	129.0	98.5	106.4	157.9	151.5	136.5
1960.....	119.6	94.5	85.7	107.5	124.4	127.0	128.9	99.3	106.5	158.1	150.7	135.5
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	119.1	93.9	84.6	108.7	124.2	126.1	127.4	102.3	104.1	155.9	149.1	133.6
1960:												
January....	119.8	94.6	83.7	111.7	126.0	127.5	129.5	97.4	106.9	159.0	152.1	137.2
February...	119.3	94.8	84.7	110.5	125.5	127.4	129.5	97.2	106.9	159.0	152.4	137.1
March.....	120.0	96.4	88.0	108.8	125.7	127.5	129.4	97.9	106.8	158.9	152.0	136.9
April.....	120.0	96.3	88.0	108.8	122.0	127.6	129.5	98.3	106.9	159.0	152.0	136.7
May.....	119.7	96.0	87.5	108.9	120.7	127.1	129.2	98.6	106.8	158.8	150.8	136.4
June.....	119.5	95.3	86.8	108.2	121.5	127.0	129.1	99.0	106.8	158.4	150.3	135.8
July.....	119.7	94.8	86.1	107.7	122.7	127.0	129.0	100.1	106.9	158.1	150.1	135.3
August.....	119.2	92.7	83.8	105.9	124.1	126.8	128.7	99.8	106.5	157.8	150.0	134.8
September..	119.2	92.9	83.9	106.1	126.1	126.8	128.5	100.0	106.2	157.7	149.8	134.6
October.....	119.6	93.3	85.1	104.8	126.0	126.6	128.4	100.7	105.9	157.2	149.8	134.2
November...	119.6	93.0	85.1	104.1	126.2	126.5	128.1	101.7	105.5	156.7	149.5	133.9
December...	119.5	93.3	85.5	104.1	126.3	126.4	127.9	101.3	105.2	156.6	149.3	133.7
1961:												
January....	119.9	94.7	87.3	104.4	126.9	126.7	127.8	102.4	104.9	155.5	150.0	133.7
February...	120.0	95.1	87.5	105.4	127.4	126.7	127.8	103.6	104.8	155.4	150.1	133.5
March.....	119.9	95.2	86.9	107.2	126.8	126.9	127.9	103.9	104.8	155.4	150.0	133.5
April.....	119.4	94.6	85.7	108.6	123.3	126.9	127.9	103.7	104.8	155.6	149.3	134.3
May.....	118.7	93.2	83.6	108.7	122.3	126.3	127.8	103.0	104.5	156.0	149.2	134.1
June.....	118.2	91.6	81.5	108.5	121.2	125.8	127.4	102.0	104.1	156.0	149.1	134.1
July.....	118.6	92.7	82.8	109.2	121.9	125.6	127.1	101.6	103.6	156.2	149.1	134.0
August.....	118.9	94.8	85.1	110.6	122.6	125.5	127.1	101.4	103.7	156.4	148.5	133.6
September..	118.8	93.8	83.4	111.3	123.2	125.7	127.0	101.3	103.5	156.4	148.4	133.5
October.....	118.7	93.7	83.1	111.5	124.7	125.4	127.0	101.7	103.6	156.0	148.5	133.2
November...	118.8	93.3	83.5	109.3	124.9	125.8	126.9	101.4	103.6	155.8	148.5	133.1
December <sup>4</sup> ..	119.2	94.3	84.7	109.7	124.7	126.1	127.0	101.8	103.6	155.9	148.8	133.1

See footnotes at end of table, p. 257.



TABLE B-41.—Wholesale price indexes, by stage of processing, 1947-61—Continued

[1947-49=100]

Year or month	Finished goods						Special groups of industrial products		
	Total	Consumer finished goods				Pro-ducer finished goods	Crude materials <sup>2</sup>	Inter-mediate materials, supplies, and components <sup>3</sup>	Con-sumer finished goods ex-cluding foods
		Total	Foods	Other non-durable goods	Du-rable goods				
1947.....	95.9	96.8	97.0	97.4	94.8	92.8	92.9	95.3	96.6
1948.....	103.5	104.1	105.8	103.5	101.3	101.1	108.5	103.7	102.8
1949.....	100.6	99.2	97.2	99.2	104.0	106.1	98.6	101.0	100.6
1950.....	102.4	100.9	99.2	100.8	105.0	108.7	109.9	105.7	102.1
1951.....	112.1	110.3	111.3	108.5	112.1	119.3	120.8	118.5	109.6
1952.....	111.5	109.0	110.4	105.9	113.0	121.3	109.3	114.7	108.0
1953.....	110.4	107.1	104.6	106.9	113.8	123.1	108.5	116.2	108.9
1954.....	110.7	107.1	103.8	107.2	114.7	124.7	103.3	116.7	109.4
1955.....	110.9	106.4	101.1	107.8	115.9	128.5	113.4	120.1	110.2
1956.....	114.0	108.0	101.0	109.9	119.7	138.1	120.0	126.0	112.8
1957.....	118.1	111.1	104.5	112.4	123.3	146.7	118.3	129.3	115.7
1958.....	120.8	113.5	110.5	111.7	125.0	150.3	113.7	129.1	115.8
1959.....	120.6	112.5	105.5	113.4	126.5	153.2	120.0	131.2	117.3
1960.....	121.5	113.6	107.7	114.1	126.0	153.5	115.3	131.7	117.8
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	121.5	113.4	107.2	114.2	125.5	153.9	114.1	130.0	117.6
1960: January.....	120.6	112.4	104.8	113.9	126.4	153.8	121.4	132.1	117.7
February.....	120.5	112.3	104.7	113.8	126.4	153.8	119.2	132.2	117.6
March.....	121.4	113.4	107.4	113.8	126.5	153.9	116.8	132.2	117.6
April.....	121.4	113.4	107.5	113.7	126.5	153.6	116.2	132.2	117.6
May.....	121.2	113.2	107.5	113.2	126.3	153.3	116.0	131.9	117.2
June.....	121.1	113.1	106.9	113.6	126.2	153.4	115.2	131.8	117.4
July.....	121.8	113.9	108.4	114.1	126.3	153.6	114.8	131.7	117.8
August.....	121.5	113.6	107.1	114.6	126.2	153.7	114.4	131.6	118.1
September.....	121.5	113.7	108.2	114.8	123.6	152.5	114.2	131.5	117.4
October.....	122.4	114.7	110.1	114.8	125.7	153.4	112.7	131.3	118.1
November.....	122.7	114.9	110.4	114.7	125.8	153.6	111.8	131.0	118.0
December.....	122.2	114.4	109.0	114.7	125.8	153.8	111.0	130.9	118.0
1961: January.....	122.4	114.5	109.1	114.9	125.8	154.0	111.3	130.8	118.2
February.....	122.6	114.8	109.5	115.2	125.6	153.9	112.1	130.7	118.3
March.....	122.2	114.3	108.6	115.0	125.5	153.8	113.3	130.7	118.1
April.....	121.3	113.3	106.8	114.2	125.5	153.7	113.3	130.6	117.6
May.....	120.7	112.5	105.7	113.5	125.5	153.7	113.3	129.9	117.1
June.....	120.6	112.4	105.0	113.8	125.6	153.9	113.6	129.8	117.3
July.....	121.2	113.1	106.8	113.9	125.6	153.8	114.4	129.6	117.4
August.....	121.4	113.3	107.2	114.0	125.5	153.8	115.8	129.5	117.4
September.....	121.3	113.2	106.9	113.9	125.5	153.8	116.4	129.8	117.4
October.....	121.3	113.2	107.1	113.8	125.3	154.0	117.0	129.6	117.3
November.....	121.4	113.2	106.8	114.1	125.4	154.1	114.1	129.7	117.5
December <sup>4</sup> .....	121.6	113.5	107.1	114.5	125.4	154.3	114.2	129.8	117.7

<sup>1</sup> Includes, in addition to subgroups shown, processed fuels and lubricants, containers, and supplies.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes crude foodstuffs and feedstuffs, plant and animal fibers, oilseeds, and leaf tobacco.

<sup>3</sup> Excludes intermediate materials for food manufacturing and manufactured animal feeds.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—For a listing of the commodities included in each sector and their relative importance, see *Monthly Labor Review*, December 1955 and *Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes*, 1958 (BLS Bulletin No. 1257).

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-42.—Consumer price indexes, by major groups, 1929-61

For city wage-earner and clerical-worker families

[1947-49=100]

Year or month	All items	Food	Housing		Apparel	Transportation	Medical care	Personal care	Reading and recreation	Other goods and services
			Total	Rent						
1929.....	73.3	65.6	(1)	117.4	60.3	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
1930.....	71.4	62.4	(1)	114.2	58.9	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
1931.....	65.0	51.4	(1)	108.2	53.6	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
1932.....	58.4	42.8	(1)	97.1	47.5	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
1933.....	55.3	41.6	(1)	83.6	45.9	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
1934.....	57.2	46.4	(1)	78.4	50.2	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
1935.....	58.7	49.7	71.8	78.2	50.6	69.6	71.4	54.6	58.1	67.2
1936.....	59.3	50.1	72.8	80.1	51.0	70.2	71.6	55.3	59.1	67.0
1937.....	61.4	52.1	75.4	83.8	53.7	71.3	72.3	58.5	60.8	68.8
1938.....	60.3	48.4	76.6	86.5	53.4	71.9	72.5	59.8	62.9	69.4
1939.....	59.4	47.1	76.1	86.6	52.5	70.2	72.6	59.6	63.0	70.6
1940.....	59.9	47.8	76.4	86.9	53.2	69.8	72.7	59.5	64.1	72.8
1941.....	62.9	52.2	78.3	88.4	55.6	72.2	73.1	61.0	66.4	74.2
1942.....	69.7	61.3	81.8	90.4	64.9	78.5	75.1	66.9	69.5	76.3
1943.....	74.0	68.3	82.8	90.3	67.8	78.2	78.7	73.8	75.3	80.2
1944.....	75.2	67.4	84.7	90.6	72.6	78.2	81.2	79.0	83.4	82.4
1945.....	76.9	68.9	86.1	90.9	76.3	78.1	83.1	81.5	86.8	85.7
1946.....	83.4	79.0	88.3	91.4	83.7	82.1	87.7	87.4	89.7	88.6
1947.....	95.5	95.9	95.0	94.4	97.1	90.6	94.9	97.6	95.5	96.1
1948.....	102.8	104.1	101.7	100.7	103.5	100.9	100.9	101.3	100.4	100.5
1949.....	101.8	100.0	103.3	105.0	99.4	108.5	104.1	101.1	104.1	103.4
1950.....	102.8	101.2	106.1	108.8	98.1	111.3	106.0	101.1	103.4	105.2
1951.....	111.0	112.6	112.4	113.1	106.9	118.4	111.1	110.5	106.5	109.7
1952.....	113.5	114.6	114.6	117.9	105.8	126.2	117.2	111.8	107.0	115.4
1953.....	114.4	112.8	117.7	124.1	104.8	129.7	121.3	112.8	108.0	118.2
1954.....	114.8	112.6	119.1	128.5	104.3	128.0	125.2	113.4	107.0	120.1
1955.....	114.5	110.9	120.0	130.3	103.7	126.4	128.0	115.3	106.6	120.2
1956.....	116.2	111.7	121.7	132.7	105.5	128.7	132.6	120.0	108.1	122.0
1957.....	120.2	115.4	125.6	135.2	106.9	136.0	138.0	124.4	112.2	125.5
1958.....	123.5	120.3	127.7	137.7	107.0	140.5	144.6	128.6	116.7	127.2
1959.....	124.6	118.3	129.2	139.7	107.9	146.3	150.8	131.2	118.6	129.7
1960.....	126.5	119.7	131.5	141.8	109.4	146.2	156.2	133.3	121.5	132.2
1961 <sup>2</sup> .....	127.8	121.1	132.5	143.5	110.1	147.8	160.7	134.0	124.0	133.2
1960: January.....	125.4	117.6	130.7	140.9	107.9	147.6	153.5	132.7	120.3	131.8
February.....	125.6	117.4	131.2	141.0	108.4	147.5	154.7	132.6	120.6	131.8
March.....	125.7	117.7	131.3	141.2	108.8	146.5	155.0	132.7	120.9	131.7
April.....	126.2	119.5	131.4	141.4	108.9	146.1	155.5	132.9	121.1	131.9
May.....	126.3	119.7	131.2	141.4	108.9	145.6	155.9	133.2	121.4	131.9
June.....	126.5	120.3	131.3	141.6	108.9	145.8	156.1	133.2	121.1	132.0
July.....	126.6	120.6	131.3	141.8	109.1	145.9	156.4	133.4	121.6	132.2
August.....	126.6	120.1	131.5	141.9	109.3	146.2	156.7	133.8	121.9	132.4
September.....	126.8	120.2	132.0	142.1	110.6	144.7	156.9	133.9	122.1	132.7
October.....	127.3	120.9	132.2	142.5	111.0	146.1	157.3	134.0	121.9	132.7
November.....	127.4	121.1	132.1	142.7	110.7	146.5	157.9	133.9	122.5	132.7
December.....	127.5	121.4	132.3	142.8	110.6	146.5	158.0	133.7	122.3	132.7
1961: January.....	127.4	121.3	132.3	142.9	109.4	146.2	158.5	133.7	122.2	132.6
February.....	127.5	121.4	132.4	143.1	109.6	146.2	159.4	133.8	122.7	132.6
March.....	127.5	121.2	132.5	143.1	109.8	145.7	159.6	133.6	123.4	132.6
April.....	127.5	121.2	132.3	143.3	109.5	145.8	159.9	133.8	124.1	132.6
May.....	127.4	120.7	132.2	143.4	109.6	146.6	160.4	133.8	123.9	133.1
June.....	127.6	120.9	132.4	143.5	109.6	147.7	160.9	133.9	123.5	133.1
July.....	128.1	122.0	132.4	143.6	109.9	148.3	161.2	134.3	124.1	133.6
August.....	128.0	121.2	132.3	143.6	109.9	149.3	161.4	134.2	124.4	133.6
September.....	128.3	121.1	132.6	143.9	111.1	149.4	161.7	134.3	125.0	133.8
October.....	128.4	120.9	132.7	144.1	111.4	150.2	162.3	134.0	125.4	133.8
November.....	128.3	120.3	132.9	144.2	111.2	150.5	162.4	134.3	125.2	133.8

<sup>1</sup> Not available.<sup>2</sup> January-November average.

Source: Department of Labor.

TABLE B-43.—Consumer price indexes, by special groups, 1935-61

For city wage-earner and clerical-worker families

[1947-49=100]

Year or month	All items	All items less food	All items less shelter	Commodities					Services		
				All commodities	Food	Commodities less food			All services	Rent	All services less rent
						All	Durables	Non-durables			
1935	58.7	65.8	55.5	52.0	49.7	57.3	53.3	57.1	75.6	78.2	72.6
1936	59.3	66.5	56.2	52.7	50.1	57.9	54.1	57.6	76.4	80.1	72.2
1937	61.4	68.9	58.0	54.7	52.1	60.4	57.5	59.9	78.7	83.8	72.9
1938	60.3	69.6	56.4	52.7	48.4	60.4	58.5	59.6	80.3	86.5	73.5
1939	59.4	69.1	55.4	51.6	47.1	59.4	57.3	58.7	80.4	86.6	73.5
1940	59.9	69.4	55.8	52.1	47.8	59.8	56.8	59.3	80.6	86.9	73.6
1941	62.9	71.4	59.1	55.7	52.2	62.7	60.7	61.8	81.6	88.4	74.5
1942	69.7	76.4	66.6	63.8	61.3	69.8	68.9	68.4	84.2	90.4	77.8
1943	69.0	78.5	71.6	69.4	68.3	72.7	71.2	71.3	85.8	90.3	81.3
1944	75.2	81.5	72.9	70.2	67.4	76.7	77.8	74.9	87.9	90.6	85.2
1945	78.9	83.4	74.8	72.3	68.9	79.7	83.7	77.6	89.0	90.9	87.0
1946	83.4	87.0	82.3	80.1	79.0	84.7	87.5	82.3	90.8	91.4	90.2
1947	95.5	95.1	95.6	96.3	95.9	95.7	94.9	95.7	94.5	94.4	94.7
1948	102.8	101.9	103.1	103.2	104.1	102.9	101.8	103.1	100.4	100.7	100.1
1949	101.8	103.0	101.3	100.6	100.0	101.5	103.3	101.1	105.1	105.0	105.2
1950	102.8	104.2	102.0	101.2	101.2	101.3	104.4	100.9	108.5	108.8	108.1
1951	111.0	110.8	110.5	110.3	112.6	108.9	112.4	108.5	114.1	113.1	114.6
1952	113.5	113.5	112.7	111.7	114.6	109.8	113.8	109.1	119.3	117.9	120.1
1953	114.4	115.7	113.1	111.3	112.8	110.0	112.6	110.1	124.2	124.1	124.6
1954	114.8	116.4	113.0	110.2	112.6	108.6	108.3	110.6	127.5	128.5	127.7
1955	114.5	116.7	112.4	109.0	110.9	107.5	105.1	110.6	129.8	130.3	130.1
1956	116.2	118.8	114.0	110.1	111.7	108.9	105.1	113.0	132.6	132.7	133.0
1957	120.2	122.8	117.8	113.6	115.4	112.3	108.8	116.1	137.7	135.2	138.6
1958	123.5	125.5	121.2	116.3	120.3	113.4	110.5	116.9	142.4	137.7	143.8
1959	124.6	127.9	122.2	116.6	118.3	115.1	113.0	118.3	145.8	139.7	147.5
1960	126.5	130.0	124.0	117.5	119.7	115.7	111.6	120.1	150.0	141.8	152.1
1961 <sup>1</sup>	127.8	131.4	125.3	118.3	121.1	115.9	111.2	120.7	152.7	143.5	155.0
1960: January	125.4	129.4	122.9	116.7	117.6	115.9	113.3	119.2	148.2	140.9	150.1
February	125.6	129.7	123.0	116.7	117.4	116.0	113.3	119.4	148.9	141.0	150.9
March	125.7	129.7	123.1	116.7	117.7	115.7	112.5	119.6	149.2	141.2	151.3
April	126.2	129.8	123.7	117.4	119.5	115.6	112.1	119.7	149.4	141.4	151.5
May	126.3	129.7	123.8	117.3	119.7	115.3	111.9	119.4	149.6	141.4	151.7
June	126.5	129.7	124.0	117.6	120.3	115.3	111.5	119.6	149.7	141.6	151.8
July	126.6	129.9	124.2	117.7	120.6	115.4	111.1	119.9	150.0	141.8	152.1
August	126.6	130.1	124.1	117.6	120.1	115.5	111.0	120.1	150.3	141.9	152.5
September	126.8	130.3	124.3	117.7	120.2	115.6	110.0	120.9	150.8	142.1	153.0
October	127.3	130.7	124.8	118.2	120.9	115.9	110.9	120.9	151.2	142.5	153.4
November	127.4	130.8	125.0	118.3	121.1	115.9	110.7	121.1	151.3	142.7	153.6
December	127.5	130.8	125.0	118.4	121.4	115.9	110.8	121.0	151.4	142.8	153.6
1961: January	127.4	130.6	124.8	118.0	121.3	115.4	110.2	120.5	151.7	142.9	154.0
February	127.5	130.8	125.0	118.1	121.4	115.5	110.3	120.6	151.9	143.1	154.2
March	127.5	130.9	125.0	118.0	121.2	115.4	109.9	120.7	152.2	143.1	154.6
April	127.5	130.8	125.0	117.9	121.2	115.2	110.7	120.0	152.3	143.3	154.7
May	127.4	131.0	124.9	117.7	120.7	115.3	110.8	120.0	152.5	143.4	154.9
June	127.6	131.2	125.2	118.0	120.9	115.6	111.2	120.3	152.7	143.5	155.0
July	128.1	131.4	125.7	118.7	122.0	116.0	111.5	120.6	152.8	143.6	155.2
August	128.0	131.6	125.6	118.4	121.2	116.1	111.9	120.7	153.0	143.6	155.4
September	128.3	132.0	125.8	118.7	121.1	116.6	111.9	121.5	153.2	143.9	155.6
October	128.4	132.3	126.0	118.8	120.9	117.0	112.7	121.5	153.4	144.1	155.8
November	128.3	132.4	125.8	118.5	120.3	116.9	112.6	121.5	153.7	144.2	156.1

<sup>1</sup> January-November average.

Source: Department of Labor.

# MONEY SUPPLY, CREDIT, AND FINANCE

TABLE B-44.—*Money supply, 1947-61*

[Averages of daily figures, billions of dollars]

Year and month	Money supply						Related deposits (unadjusted)	
	Seasonally adjusted			Unadjusted			Gross time	U.S. Government
	Total	Currency outside banks	Demand deposits <sup>1</sup>	Total	Currency outside banks	Demand deposits <sup>1</sup>		
1947: December .....	112.3	26.4	85.8	115.0	26.8	88.2	35.3	1.0
1948: December .....	110.7	25.8	84.9	113.3	26.1	87.2	35.9	1.8
1949: December .....	110.1	25.2	85.0	112.7	25.5	87.3	36.3	2.8
1950: December .....	115.3	25.0	90.3	118.1	25.4	92.7	36.6	2.4
1951: December .....	122.0	26.2	95.8	125.1	26.6	98.6	38.3	2.7
1952: December .....	126.5	27.4	99.1	129.8	27.8	102.0	41.3	4.0
1953: December .....	128.1	27.7	100.4	131.4	28.2	103.3	44.7	3.8
1954: December .....	131.8	27.4	104.4	135.0	27.9	107.1	48.5	5.0
1955: December .....	134.6	27.8	106.8	137.9	28.3	109.6	50.0	3.4
1956: December .....	136.5	28.2	108.3	139.7	28.7	111.0	51.8	3.4
1957: December .....	135.5	28.3	107.2	138.8	28.9	109.9	57.1	3.5
1958: December .....	140.8	28.6	112.2	144.3	29.2	115.1	65.1	3.9
1959: December .....	141.5	28.9	112.6	144.9	29.5	115.5	67.0	4.9
1960: December .....	140.4	29.0	111.4	143.8	29.5	114.3	72.5	4.7
1961: December <sup>2</sup> .....	144.9	29.5	115.4	148.5	30.1	118.4	82.3	4.9
1960: January .....	141.3	29.0	112.3	144.4	28.8	115.6	67.0	4.1
February .....	141.0	29.0	112.1	140.8	28.6	112.2	66.8	4.1
March .....	140.6	29.0	111.6	139.3	28.7	110.6	67.3	4.3
April .....	140.5	29.1	111.4	140.1	28.8	111.4	67.9	3.7
May .....	139.9	29.0	110.9	138.0	28.8	109.2	68.2	6.3
June .....	139.4	28.9	110.5	138.0	28.9	109.1	68.6	6.3
July .....	139.6	28.9	110.7	138.7	29.1	109.6	69.5	6.7
August .....	139.7	28.9	110.8	138.9	29.0	109.8	70.3	6.1
September .....	140.4	29.0	111.5	139.7	29.1	110.7	71.2	5.4
October .....	140.6	29.0	111.6	140.6	29.1	111.5	71.8	5.7
November .....	140.2	29.0	111.2	141.4	29.2	112.2	72.0	5.8
December .....	140.4	29.0	111.4	143.8	29.5	114.3	72.5	4.7
1961: January .....	140.6	28.9	111.7	143.7	28.8	114.9	73.7	4.1
February .....	141.2	28.9	112.3	140.9	28.6	112.3	75.1	4.8
March .....	141.5	29.0	112.6	140.1	28.6	111.4	75.9	4.7
April .....	142.0	29.0	113.0	141.7	28.7	113.0	76.9	2.9
May .....	142.0	29.0	113.0	140.0	28.7	111.3	78.1	4.6
June .....	142.1	28.9	113.2	140.7	28.9	111.8	79.0	4.5
July .....	142.0	29.0	113.0	141.1	29.2	111.9	79.9	4.3
August .....	141.8	29.0	112.8	141.1	29.2	111.9	80.7	5.5
September .....	143.0	29.2	113.8	142.4	29.3	113.1	81.3	5.2
October .....	143.7	29.3	114.4	143.6	29.4	114.2	82.0	6.5
November .....	144.1	29.4	114.6	145.3	29.7	115.6	82.0	5.8
December <sup>2</sup> .....	144.9	29.5	115.4	148.5	30.1	118.4	82.3	4.9

<sup>1</sup> Demand deposits at all commercial banks (member and nonmember).

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Between January and August 1959, the series were expanded to include data for all banks in Alaska and Hawaii.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-45.—Loans and investments of all commercial banks, 1929-61

[Billions of dollars, end of period]

Year or month <sup>1</sup>	Total loans and investments	Loans		Investments		
		Total <sup>2</sup>	Business loans <sup>3</sup>	Total	U.S. Government obligations <sup>4</sup>	Other securities
1929—June <sup>5</sup> .....	49.4	35.7	( <sup>6</sup> )	13.7	4.9	8.7
1930—June <sup>5</sup> .....	48.9	34.5	( <sup>6</sup> )	14.4	5.0	9.4
1931—June <sup>5</sup> .....	44.9	29.2	( <sup>6</sup> )	15.7	6.0	9.7
1932—June <sup>5</sup> .....	36.1	21.8	( <sup>6</sup> )	14.3	6.2	8.1
1933—June <sup>5</sup> .....	30.4	16.3	( <sup>6</sup> )	14.0	7.5	6.5
1934—June <sup>5</sup> .....	32.7	15.7	( <sup>6</sup> )	17.0	10.3	6.7
1935.....	36.1	15.2	( <sup>6</sup> )	20.9	13.8	7.1
1936.....	39.6	16.4	( <sup>6</sup> )	23.1	15.3	7.9
1937.....	38.4	17.2	( <sup>6</sup> )	21.2	14.2	7.0
1938.....	38.7	16.4	5.7	22.3	15.1	7.2
1939.....	40.7	17.2	6.4	23.4	16.3	7.1
1940.....	43.9	18.8	7.3	25.1	17.8	7.4
1941.....	50.7	21.7	9.3	29.0	21.8	7.2
1942.....	67.4	19.2	7.9	48.2	41.4	6.8
1943.....	85.1	19.1	7.9	66.0	59.8	6.1
1944.....	105.5	21.6	8.0	83.9	77.6	6.3
1945.....	124.0	26.1	9.6	97.9	90.6	7.3
1946.....	114.0	31.1	14.2	82.9	74.8	8.1
1947.....	116.3	38.1	18.2	78.2	69.2	9.0
1948.....	114.3	42.5	18.9	71.8	62.6	9.2
1949.....	120.2	43.0	17.1	77.2	67.0	10.2
1950.....	126.7	52.2	21.9	74.4	62.0	12.4
1951.....	132.6	57.7	25.9	74.9	61.5	13.3
1952.....	141.6	64.2	27.9	77.5	63.3	14.1
1953.....	145.7	67.6	27.2	78.1	63.4	14.7
1954.....	155.9	70.6	26.9	85.3	69.0	16.3
1955.....	160.9	82.6	33.2	78.3	61.6	16.7
1956.....	165.1	90.3	38.7	74.8	58.6	16.3
1957.....	170.1	93.9	40.5	76.2	58.2	17.9
1958.....	185.2	98.2	40.4	87.0	66.4	20.6
1959.....	190.3	110.8	40.2	79.4	58.9	20.5
1960.....	199.5	117.6	43.1	81.9	61.0	20.9
1961 <sup>8</sup> .....	215.6	125.2	44.4	90.4	66.5	23.9
1960: January.....	187.8	109.6	39.4	78.2	58.0	20.3
February.....	186.5	110.3	39.8	76.3	56.2	20.1
March.....	185.7	111.4	40.9	74.3	54.2	20.1
April.....	188.8	113.0	40.9	75.9	55.8	20.0
May.....	188.6	113.6	41.3	75.0	55.1	19.8
June.....	188.9	114.8	41.9	74.1	54.2	19.9
July.....	190.9	114.2	41.2	76.7	56.7	20.0
August.....	191.2	114.7	41.2	78.6	56.6	20.0
September.....	193.3	115.4	41.8	77.8	57.7	20.2
October.....	195.6	114.8	41.8	80.8	60.4	20.4
November.....	195.5	115.0	42.3	80.5	60.2	20.3
December.....	199.5	117.6	43.1	81.9	61.0	20.9
1961: January.....	197.0	114.2	41.5	82.8	61.9	20.9
February <sup>9</sup> .....	199.3	116.7	41.8	82.6	61.3	21.3
March.....	198.0	116.6	42.8	81.4	59.7	21.7
April.....	199.7	117.2	42.4	82.5	60.7	21.8
May.....	201.2	117.9	42.3	83.3	61.5	21.9
June.....	202.5	118.6	42.8	84.0	61.9	22.1
July.....	205.1	118.1	42.3	87.0	64.7	22.3
August.....	205.1	118.5	42.5	86.7	64.2	22.5
September.....	210.0	120.8	42.9	89.2	66.0	23.2
October <sup>8</sup> .....	210.3	120.5	43.1	89.8	66.6	23.2
November <sup>8</sup> .....	211.3	121.7	43.5	89.6	66.2	23.4
December <sup>8</sup> .....	215.6	125.2	44.4	90.4	66.5	23.9

<sup>1</sup> End-of-year figures (except 1961) are for call dates. Other data (including those for December 1961) are for the last Wednesday of the month.

<sup>2</sup> Data are shown net, i.e., after deduction of valuation reserves. Includes commercial and industrial, agricultural, security, real estate, bank, consumer, and other loans.

<sup>3</sup> Beginning with 1948, data are shown gross of valuation reserves, instead of net as for previous years. Prior to June 1947 and for months other than June and December, data are estimated on the basis of reported data for all insured commercial banks and for weekly reporting member banks.

<sup>4</sup> Figures in this table are based on book values and relate only to banks within the United States. Therefore, they do not agree with figures in Table B-53, which are on the basis of par values and include holdings of banks in United States Territories and possessions.

<sup>5</sup> June data are used because complete end-of-year data are not available prior to 1935 for U.S. Government obligations and other securities.

<sup>6</sup> Not available.

<sup>7</sup> Beginning June 1959, business loans exclude loans to financial institutions.

<sup>8</sup> Preliminary; December estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>9</sup> Data for March 1, 1961 used instead of last Wednesday of February.

NOTE.—Between January and August 1959, this series was expanded to include data for all banks in Alaska and Hawaii.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

TABLE B-46.—Federal Reserve Bank credit and member bank reserves, 1929-61

[Averages of daily figures, millions of dollars]

Year and month	Reserve Bank credit outstanding				Member bank reserves			Member bank free reserves (excess reserves less borrowings)
	Total	U.S. Government securities	Member bank borrowings	All other, mainly float	Total	Required	Excess	
1929: December	1,643	446	801	396	2,395	2,347	48	-753
1930: December	1,273	644	337	292	2,415	2,342	73	-264
1931: December	1,950	777	763	410	2,069	2,010	60	-703
1932: December	2,192	1,854	281	57	2,435	1,909	526	245
1933: December	2,669	2,432	95	142	2,588	1,822	1,766	671
1934: December	2,472	2,430	10	32	4,037	2,290	1,748	1,738
1935: December	2,494	2,430	6	58	5,716	2,733	2,983	2,977
1936: December	2,498	2,434	7	57	6,665	4,619	2,046	2,039
1937: December	2,628	2,565	16	47	6,879	5,808	1,071	1,055
1938: December	2,618	2,564	7	47	8,745	5,520	3,226	3,219
1939: December	2,612	2,510	3	99	11,473	6,462	5,011	5,008
1940: December	2,305	2,188	3	114	14,049	7,403	6,646	6,643
1941: December	2,404	2,219	5	180	12,812	9,422	3,390	3,385
1942: December	6,035	5,549	4	483	13,152	10,776	2,376	2,372
1943: December	11,914	11,166	90	659	12,749	11,701	1,048	958
1944: December	19,612	18,693	265	654	14,168	12,884	1,284	1,019
1945: December	24,744	23,708	334	702	16,027	14,536	1,491	1,157
1946: December	24,746	23,767	157	821	16,517	15,617	900	743
1947: December	22,858	21,905	224	729	17,261	16,275	986	762
1948: December	23,978	23,002	134	842	19,990	19,193	797	663
1949: December	19,012	18,287	118	607	16,291	15,488	803	685
1950: December	21,606	20,345	142	1,119	17,391	16,364	1,027	885
1951: December	25,446	23,409	657	1,380	20,310	19,484	826	169
1952: December	27,299	24,400	1,593	1,306	21,180	20,457	723	-870
1953: December	27,107	25,639	441	1,027	19,920	19,227	693	252
1954: December	26,317	24,917	246	1,154	19,279	18,576	703	457
1955: December	26,853	24,602	839	1,412	19,240	18,646	594	-245
1956: December	27,156	24,765	688	1,703	19,535	18,883	652	-36
1957: December	26,186	23,982	710	1,494	19,420	18,843	577	-133
1958: December	28,412	26,312	557	1,543	18,899	18,383	516	-41
1959: December	29,435	27,036	906	1,493	21,932	18,450	482	-424
1960: December	29,060	27,248	87	1,725	19,283	18,527	756	669
1961: December	31,217	29,098	149	1,970	20,118	19,545	572	423
1960: January	28,234	25,934	905	1,395	18,878	18,348	530	-375
February	27,210	25,322	816	1,072	18,213	17,762	451	-365
March	27,047	25,310	635	1,102	18,027	17,611	416	-219
April	27,181	25,488	602	1,091	18,104	17,696	408	-194
May	27,378	25,818	502	1,058	18,239	17,770	469	-33
June	27,737	26,124	425	1,188	18,294	17,832	462	37
July	28,176	26,619	388	1,169	18,518	18,010	508	120
August	28,206	26,983	293	930	18,501	17,961	540	247
September	28,088	26,653	225	1,210	18,570	17,931	639	414
October	28,490	27,056	149	1,285	18,733	18,104	629	480
November	29,241	27,871	142	1,228	19,004	18,248	756	614
December	29,060	27,248	87	1,725	19,283	18,527	756	669
1961: January	28,484	26,942	49	1,493	19,315	18,570	745	696
February	28,145	26,829	137	1,179	18,964	18,310	654	517
March	28,030	26,831	70	1,129	18,809	18,263	546	476
April	27,925	26,676	56	1,193	18,884	18,266	618	562
May	28,007	26,747	96	1,164	18,856	18,307	549	453
June	28,304	26,935	63	1,306	19,042	18,407	612	549
July	28,498	27,024	51	1,423	19,063	18,482	581	530
August	28,661	27,415	67	1,179	19,223	18,619	604	537
September	29,080	27,563	37	1,480	19,372	18,783	589	552
October	29,504	28,044	65	1,396	19,660	19,153	597	442
November	30,142	28,616	105	1,420	19,832	19,218	614	509
December	31,217	29,098	149	1,970	20,118	19,545	572	423

<sup>1</sup> Data from March 1933 through April 1934 are for licensed banks only.

<sup>2</sup> Beginning December 1959, total reserves held include vault cash allowed.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Data for member banks in Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1954 and 1959, respectively.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-47.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-61

[Percent per annum]

Year or month	U.S. Government securities			Corporate bonds (Moody's)		Common stock yields, 200 stocks (Moody's)	High-grade municipal bonds (Standard & Poor's)	Average rate on short-term bank loans to business—selected cities	Prime commercial paper, 4-6 months	Federal Reserve Bank discount rate
	3-month Treasury bills <sup>1</sup>	9-12 month issues <sup>2</sup>	Taxable bonds <sup>3</sup>	Aaa	Baa					
1929	( <sup>4</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	4.73	5.90	3.41	4.27	( <sup>6</sup> )	5.85	5.16
1930	( <sup>4</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	4.55	5.90	4.54	4.07	( <sup>6</sup> )	3.59	3.04
1931	1.402	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	4.58	7.62	6.17	4.01	( <sup>6</sup> )	2.64	2.11
1932	.879	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	5.01	9.30	7.36	4.65	( <sup>6</sup> )	2.73	2.82
1933	.515	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	4.49	7.76	4.42	4.71	( <sup>6</sup> )	1.73	2.56
1934	.256	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	4.00	6.32	4.11	4.03	( <sup>6</sup> )	1.02	1.54
1935	.137	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	3.60	5.75	4.06	3.40	( <sup>6</sup> )	.75	1.50
1936	.143	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	3.24	4.77	3.50	3.07	( <sup>6</sup> )	.75	1.50
1937	.447	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	3.26	5.03	4.77	3.10	( <sup>6</sup> )	.94	1.33
1938	.053	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	3.19	5.80	4.38	2.91	( <sup>6</sup> )	.81	1.00
1939	.023	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	3.01	4.96	4.15	2.76	2.1	.59	1.00
1940	.014	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	2.84	4.75	5.31	2.50	2.1	.56	1.00
1941	.103	( <sup>5</sup> )	-----	2.77	4.33	6.25	2.10	2.0	.53	1.00
1942	.326	( <sup>5</sup> )	2.46	2.83	4.28	6.67	2.36	2.2	.66	1.00
1943	.373	0.75	2.47	2.73	3.91	4.89	2.06	2.6	.69	1.00
1944	.375	.79	2.48	2.72	3.61	4.81	1.86	2.4	.73	1.00
1945	.375	.81	2.37	2.62	3.29	4.19	1.67	2.2	.75	1.00
1946	.375	.82	2.19	2.53	3.05	3.97	1.64	2.1	.81	1.00
1947	.594	.88	2.25	2.61	3.24	5.13	2.01	2.1	1.03	1.00
1948	1.040	1.14	2.44	2.82	3.47	5.78	2.40	2.5	1.44	1.34
1949	1.102	1.14	2.31	2.66	3.42	6.63	2.21	2.7	1.49	1.50
1950	1.218	1.26	2.32	2.62	3.24	6.27	1.98	2.7	1.45	1.59
1951	1.552	1.73	2.57	2.86	3.41	6.12	2.00	3.1	2.16	1.75
1952	1.766	1.81	2.68	2.96	3.52	5.50	2.19	3.5	2.33	1.75
1953	1.931	2.07	2.94	3.20	3.74	5.49	2.72	3.7	2.52	1.99
1954	.953	.92	2.55	2.90	3.51	4.78	2.37	3.6	1.58	1.60
1955	1.753	1.89	2.84	3.06	3.53	4.06	2.53	3.7	2.18	1.89
1956	2.658	2.83	3.08	3.36	3.88	4.07	2.93	4.2	3.31	2.77
1957	3.267	3.53	3.47	3.89	4.71	4.33	3.60	4.6	3.81	3.12
1958	1.839	2.09	3.43	3.79	4.73	4.05	3.56	4.3	2.46	2.16
1959	3.405	4.11	4.08	4.38	5.05	3.31	3.95	<sup>8</sup> 5.0	3.97	3.36
1960	2.928	3.55	4.02	4.41	5.19	3.60	3.73	5.2	3.85	3.53
1961	2.378	2.91	3.90	4.35	5.08	3.07	3.46	5.0	2.97	3.00
1959: January	2.837	3.26	3.91	4.12	4.87	3.36	3.87	-----	3.30	2.50
February	2.712	3.38	3.92	4.14	4.89	3.41	3.85	-----	3.26	2.50
March	2.852	3.56	3.92	4.13	4.85	3.43	3.76	4.51	3.35	2.92
April	2.960	3.66	4.01	4.23	4.86	3.29	3.84	-----	3.42	3.00
May	2.851	3.92	4.08	4.37	4.96	3.25	3.97	-----	3.56	3.05
June	3.247	3.97	4.09	4.46	5.04	3.28	4.04	4.87	3.83	3.50
July	3.243	4.30	4.11	4.47	5.08	3.18	4.04	-----	3.98	3.50
August	3.358	4.32	4.10	4.43	5.09	3.19	3.96	-----	3.97	3.50
September	3.998	4.80	4.26	4.52	5.18	3.34	4.13	<sup>8</sup> 5.27	4.63	3.83
October	4.117	4.65	4.11	4.57	5.28	3.36	3.99	-----	4.73	4.00
November	4.209	4.70	4.12	4.56	5.26	3.38	3.94	-----	4.67	4.00
December	4.572	4.98	4.27	4.58	5.28	3.28	4.05	5.36	4.88	4.00

See footnotes at end of table, p. 264.

TABLE B-47.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-61—Continued

[Percent per annum]

Year or month	U.S. Government securities			Corporate bonds (Moody's)		Common stock yields, 200 stocks (Moody's)	High-grade municipal bonds (Standard & Poor's)	Average rate on short-term bank loans to business—selected cities	Prime commercial paper 4-6 months	Federal Reserve Bank discount rate
	3-month Treasury bills <sup>1</sup>	9-12 month issues <sup>2</sup>	Taxable bonds <sup>3</sup>	Aaa	Baa					
1960: January.....	4.436	4.93	4.37	4.61	5.34	3.56	4.13	-----	4.91	4.00
February.....	3.954	4.58	4.22	4.56	5.34	3.53	3.97	-----	4.66	4.00
March.....	3.439	3.93	4.08	4.49	5.25	3.59	3.87	5.34	4.49	4.00
April.....	3.244	3.99	4.18	4.45	5.20	3.68	3.84	-----	4.16	4.00
May.....	3.392	4.19	4.16	4.46	5.28	3.60	3.85	-----	4.25	4.00
June.....	2.641	3.35	3.98	4.45	5.26	3.52	3.78	5.35	3.81	3.65
July.....	2.396	3.13	3.86	4.41	5.22	3.60	3.72	-----	3.39	3.50
August.....	2.286	2.89	3.79	4.28	5.08	3.50	3.53	-----	3.34	3.18
September.....	2.489	2.99	3.84	4.25	5.01	3.73	3.53	4.97	3.39	3.00
October.....	2.426	3.01	3.91	4.30	5.11	3.74	3.59	-----	3.30	3.00
November.....	2.384	2.99	3.93	4.31	5.08	3.60	3.46	-----	3.28	3.00
December.....	2.272	2.79	3.88	4.35	5.10	3.49	3.45	4.99	3.23	3.00
1961: January.....	2.302	2.70	3.89	4.32	5.10	3.28	3.44	-----	2.98	3.00
February.....	2.408	2.84	3.81	4.27	5.07	3.22	3.33	-----	3.03	3.00
March.....	2.420	2.86	3.78	4.22	5.02	3.15	3.38	4.97	3.03	3.00
April.....	2.327	2.83	3.80	4.25	5.01	3.15	3.44	-----	2.91	3.00
May.....	2.288	2.82	3.73	4.27	5.01	3.09	3.38	-----	2.76	3.00
June.....	2.359	3.02	3.88	4.33	5.03	3.16	3.53	4.97	2.91	3.00
July.....	2.268	2.87	3.90	4.41	5.09	3.05	3.53	-----	2.72	3.00
August.....	2.402	3.03	4.00	4.45	5.11	3.00	3.55	-----	2.92	3.00
September.....	2.304	3.03	4.02	4.45	5.12	3.03	3.54	4.99	3.05	3.00
October.....	2.350	2.97	3.98	4.42	5.13	2.95	3.46	-----	3.00	3.00
November.....	2.458	2.95	3.98	4.39	5.11	2.93	3.44	-----	2.98	3.00
December.....	2.617	3.03	4.06	4.42	5.10	2.90	3.49	4.96	3.19	3.00

<sup>1</sup> Rate on new issues within period. Issues were tax exempt prior to March 1, 1941, and fully taxable thereafter. For the period 1934-37, series includes issues with maturities of more than 3 months.

<sup>2</sup> Includes certificates of indebtedness and selected note and bond issues (fully taxable).

<sup>3</sup> First issued in 1941. Series includes bonds which are neither due nor callable before a given number of years as follows: April 1953 to date, 10 years; April 1952-March 1953, 12 years; October 1941-March 1952, 15 years.

<sup>4</sup> Treasury bills were first issued in December 1929 and were issued irregularly in 1930.

<sup>5</sup> Not available before August 1942.

<sup>6</sup> Not available on same basis as for 1939 and subsequent years.

<sup>7</sup> From October 30, 1942, to April 24, 1946, a preferential rate of 0.50 percent was in effect for advances secured by Government securities maturing or callable in 1 year or less.

<sup>8</sup> Series revised to exclude loans to nonbank financial institutions.

NOTE.—Yields and rates computed for New York City, except for short-term bank loans.

Sources: Treasury Department, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Moody's Investors Service, and Standard & Poor's Corporation.



TABLE B-48.—Short- and intermediate-term consumer credit outstanding, 1929-61

(Millions of dollars)

End of year or month	Instalment credit						Noninstalment credit		
	Total	Total	Auto- mobile paper <sup>1</sup>	Other con- sumer goods paper <sup>1</sup>	Repair and modern- ization loans <sup>2</sup>	Per- sonal loans	Total	Charge ac- counts	Other <sup>3</sup>
1929.....	6,444	3,151	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	3,293	1,602	1,691
1930.....	5,767	2,687	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	3,080	1,476	1,604
1931.....	4,760	2,207	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	2,553	1,265	1,288
1932.....	3,567	1,521	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	2,046	1,020	1,026
1933.....	3,482	1,588	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	1,894	990	904
1934.....	3,904	1,871	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	2,033	1,102	931
1935.....	4,911	2,694	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	2,217	1,183	1,034
1936.....	6,135	3,623	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	2,512	1,300	1,212
1937.....	6,689	4,015	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	2,674	1,336	1,338
1938.....	6,338	3,691	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	2,647	1,362	1,285
1939.....	7,222	4,503	1,497	1,620	298	1,088	2,719	1,414	1,305
1940.....	8,338	5,514	2,071	1,827	371	1,245	2,824	1,471	1,353
1941.....	9,172	6,085	2,458	1,929	376	1,322	3,087	1,645	1,442
1942.....	5,983	3,166	742	1,195	255	974	2,817	1,444	1,373
1943.....	4,901	2,136	355	819	130	832	2,765	1,440	1,325
1944.....	5,111	2,176	397	791	119	869	2,935	1,517	1,418
1945.....	5,665	2,462	455	816	182	1,009	3,203	1,612	1,591
1946.....	8,384	4,172	981	1,290	405	1,496	4,212	2,076	2,136
1947.....	11,598	6,695	1,924	2,143	718	1,910	4,903	2,381	2,522
1948.....	14,447	8,696	3,018	2,901	853	2,224	5,451	2,722	2,729
1949.....	17,364	11,590	4,555	3,706	898	2,431	5,774	2,854	2,920
1950.....	21,471	14,703	6,074	4,799	1,016	2,814	6,768	3,367	3,401
1951.....	22,712	15,294	5,972	4,880	1,085	3,357	7,418	3,700	3,718
1952.....	27,520	19,403	7,733	6,174	1,385	4,111	8,117	4,130	3,987
1953.....	31,393	23,005	9,835	6,779	1,610	4,781	8,388	4,274	4,114
1954.....	32,464	23,568	9,809	6,751	1,616	5,392	8,896	4,485	4,411
1955.....	38,807	28,883	13,437	7,641	1,693	6,112	9,924	4,795	5,129
1956.....	42,262	31,648	14,348	8,606	1,905	6,789	10,614	4,995	5,619
1957.....	44,848	33,745	15,218	8,844	2,101	7,582	11,103	5,146	5,957
1958.....	44,984	33,497	14,007	9,028	2,346	8,116	11,487	5,060	6,427
1959.....	51,331	39,034	16,209	10,630	2,809	9,386	12,297	5,104	7,193
1960.....	55,757	42,588	17,444	11,525	3,139	10,480	13,169	5,329	7,840
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	56,850	43,100	16,950	11,700	3,200	11,250	13,750	5,550	8,200
1960: January.....	50,728	38,921	16,176	10,547	2,800	9,398	11,807	4,625	7,182
February.....	50,494	38,962	16,273	10,423	2,812	9,454	11,532	4,180	7,352
March.....	50,634	39,189	16,462	10,365	2,831	9,531	11,445	4,016	7,429
April.....	51,672	39,783	16,794	10,437	2,871	9,681	11,889	4,328	7,561
May.....	52,332	40,246	17,039	10,501	2,935	9,771	12,086	4,435	7,651
June.....	53,026	40,859	17,348	10,634	2,984	9,893	12,167	4,529	7,638
July.....	53,231	41,201	17,476	10,668	3,020	10,037	12,030	4,413	7,617
August.....	53,594	41,580	17,598	10,731	3,074	10,177	12,014	4,390	7,624
September.....	53,852	41,774	17,595	10,820	3,109	10,250	12,078	4,411	7,667
October.....	53,979	41,859	17,553	10,909	3,129	10,268	12,120	4,504	7,616
November.....	54,298	41,996	17,544	11,003	3,144	10,305	12,302	4,605	7,697
December.....	55,757	42,588	17,444	11,525	3,139	10,480	13,169	5,329	7,840
1961: January.....	54,726	42,122	17,220	11,365	3,100	10,437	12,604	4,721	7,883
February.....	53,843	41,662	17,017	11,136	3,075	10,434	12,181	4,132	8,049
March.....	53,641	41,465	16,922	11,007	3,066	10,470	12,176	4,096	8,080
April.....	53,756	41,423	16,877	10,915	3,073	10,558	12,333	4,303	8,130
May.....	54,196	41,584	16,933	10,929	3,100	10,622	12,612	4,280	8,232
June.....	54,602	41,888	17,061	10,966	3,122	10,739	12,714	4,474	8,240
July.....	54,505	41,909	17,063	10,934	3,133	10,779	12,596	4,397	8,199
August.....	54,739	42,090	17,061	10,966	3,165	10,898	12,649	4,409	8,240
September.....	54,757	42,039	16,902	11,006	3,180	10,951	12,718	4,423	8,295
October.....	54,902	42,181	16,913	11,085	3,183	11,000	12,721	4,517	8,204
November.....	55,451	42,419	16,960	11,215	3,192	11,052	13,032	4,684	8,348
December <sup>6</sup> .....	56,850	43,100	16,950	11,700	3,200	11,250	13,750	5,550	8,200

<sup>1</sup> Includes all consumer credit extended for the purpose of purchasing automobiles and other consumer goods.

<sup>2</sup> Includes only such loans held by financial institutions; those held by retail outlets are included in "other consumer goods paper."

<sup>3</sup> Single-payment loans and service credit.

<sup>4</sup> Not available.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Series revised beginning 1955. For details, see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, December 1961. Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January and August 1959, respectively.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

TABLE B-49.—*Instalment credit extended and repaid, 1946-61*

(Millions of dollars)

Period	Total		Automobile paper		Other consumer goods paper		Repair and modernization loans		Personal loans	
	Ex-tended	Re-paid	Ex-tended	Re-paid	Ex-tended	Re-paid	Ex-tended	Re-paid	Ex-tended	Re-paid
1946.....	8,495	6,785	1,969	1,443	3,077	2,603	423	200	3,026	2,530
1947.....	12,713	10,190	3,692	2,749	4,498	3,645	704	391	3,819	3,405
1948.....	15,585	13,284	5,217	4,123	5,383	4,625	714	579	4,271	3,957
1949.....	18,108	15,514	6,967	5,430	5,865	5,060	734	689	4,542	4,335
1950.....	21,558	18,445	8,530	7,011	7,150	6,057	835	717	5,043	4,660
1951.....	23,576	22,985	8,956	9,058	7,485	7,404	841	772	6,294	5,751
1952.....	29,514	25,405	11,764	10,003	9,186	7,892	1,217	917	7,347	6,593
1953.....	31,558	27,956	12,981	10,879	9,227	8,622	1,344	1,119	8,006	7,336
1954.....	31,051	30,488	11,807	11,833	9,117	9,145	1,261	1,255	8,866	8,255
1955.....	38,844	33,629	16,706	13,077	10,642	9,752	1,393	1,316	10,203	9,484
1956.....	39,775	37,009	15,421	14,510	11,721	10,756	1,582	1,370	11,061	10,373
1957.....	41,871	39,775	16,321	15,451	11,807	11,569	1,674	1,477	12,069	11,278
1958.....	39,962	40,211	14,069	15,281	11,747	11,563	1,871	1,626	12,275	11,741
1959.....	47,818	42,435	17,544	15,411	13,982	12,402	2,222	1,765	14,070	12,887
1960.....	49,313	45,759	17,408	16,172	14,470	13,574	2,212	1,883	15,223	14,130
1961 <sup>1</sup> .....	48,025	47,525	15,800	16,300	14,450	14,275	2,050	2,000	15,725	14,950
Unadjusted										
1960: January.....	3,511	3,624	1,242	1,275	1,042	1,124	135	144	1,092	1,081
February.....	3,669	3,631	1,387	1,291	976	1,101	159	148	1,147	1,091
March.....	4,139	3,915	1,591	1,403	1,107	1,165	177	159	1,264	1,188
April.....	4,392	3,795	1,654	1,322	1,207	1,134	191	151	1,340	1,188
May.....	4,269	3,802	1,616	1,369	1,193	1,128	218	153	1,242	1,152
June.....	4,494	3,882	1,685	1,378	1,281	1,148	213	163	1,315	1,193
July.....	4,075	3,731	1,434	1,306	1,118	1,082	193	157	1,330	1,186
August.....	4,304	3,927	1,534	1,414	1,201	1,136	219	166	1,350	1,211
September.....	3,975	3,779	1,336	1,339	1,207	1,118	192	156	1,240	1,166
October.....	3,941	3,855	1,365	1,405	1,229	1,140	185	165	1,162	1,145
November.....	3,998	3,867	1,344	1,354	1,236	1,144	176	163	1,242	1,206
December.....	4,547	3,952	1,220	1,319	1,676	1,152	154	158	1,497	1,323
1961: January.....	3,426	3,895	1,130	1,354	1,031	1,193	127	167	1,138	1,181
February.....	3,183	3,643	1,049	1,252	888	1,116	127	152	1,119	1,123
March.....	3,907	4,104	1,323	1,306	1,111	1,242	161	169	1,312	1,275
April.....	3,721	3,764	1,243	1,290	1,073	1,184	166	159	1,239	1,151
May.....	4,203	4,043	1,449	1,394	1,221	1,207	200	173	1,333	1,289
June.....	4,347	4,042	1,515	1,387	1,236	1,199	196	174	1,400	1,282
July.....	3,905	3,885	1,365	1,362	1,113	1,145	175	165	1,252	1,213
August.....	4,234	4,053	1,395	1,396	1,229	1,198	206	174	1,404	1,285
September.....	3,789	3,839	1,168	1,327	1,200	1,159	184	169	1,237	1,184
October.....	4,244	4,102	1,452	1,441	1,300	1,221	186	183	1,306	1,257
November.....	4,275	4,037	1,402	1,355	1,327	1,197	177	168	1,369	1,317
December <sup>1</sup> .....	4,800	4,100	1,325	1,325	1,700	1,200	150	150	1,625	1,425
Seasonally adjusted										
1960: January.....	4,112	3,749	1,461	1,337	1,235	1,122	170	149	1,246	1,141
February.....	4,155	3,686	1,523	1,321	1,208	1,085	190	150	1,234	1,130
March.....	4,140	3,733	1,527	1,337	1,188	1,101	189	155	1,236	1,140
April.....	4,350	3,820	1,582	1,344	1,276	1,128	189	153	1,303	1,195
May.....	4,127	3,822	1,488	1,368	1,188	1,140	203	154	1,248	1,160
June.....	4,121	3,822	1,457	1,355	1,227	1,141	194	160	1,243	1,166
July.....	4,141	3,873	1,390	1,343	1,199	1,141	187	160	1,365	1,229
August.....	4,048	3,822	1,404	1,353	1,171	1,132	196	161	1,277	1,176
September.....	4,089	3,863	1,417	1,355	1,203	1,143	181	155	1,288	1,210
October.....	4,034	3,862	1,399	1,365	1,204	1,151	175	163	1,256	1,183
November.....	4,018	3,856	1,408	1,358	1,174	1,138	174	162	1,262	1,198
December.....	3,984	3,866	1,351	1,348	1,207	1,153	166	162	1,260	1,203
1961: January.....	3,866	3,875	1,286	1,356	1,179	1,163	155	167	1,246	1,189
February.....	3,812	3,889	1,216	1,353	1,165	1,151	157	160	1,274	1,225
March.....	3,894	3,907	1,255	1,348	1,188	1,176	172	164	1,279	1,219
April.....	3,800	3,907	1,225	1,356	1,162	1,189	167	165	1,246	1,197
May.....	3,907	3,895	1,270	1,336	1,173	1,166	181	169	1,283	1,224
June.....	3,962	3,962	1,296	1,354	1,175	1,188	177	171	1,314	1,249
July.....	3,909	3,937	1,300	1,364	1,184	1,183	167	165	1,258	1,225
August.....	4,038	3,994	1,302	1,362	1,212	1,197	186	170	1,338	1,265
September.....	3,942	3,956	1,271	1,350	1,199	1,190	175	170	1,297	1,246
October.....	4,209	4,028	1,405	1,372	1,254	1,210	173	178	1,377	1,268
November.....	4,317	4,017	1,511	1,359	1,249	1,188	174	166	1,383	1,304
December <sup>1</sup> .....	4,275	4,075	1,450	1,375	1,250	1,200	175	175	1,400	1,325

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary; December by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—See also Table B-48.

Series revised beginning 1955. For details, see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, December 1961.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning January and August 1959, respectively. Therefore, the difference between extensions and repayments for January and August 1959 and for the year 1959 does not equal the net change in credit outstanding.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

TABLE B-50.—Mortgage debt outstanding, by type of property and of financing, 1939-61

[Billions of dollars]

End of year or quarter	All properties	Nonfarm properties							Farm properties
		Total	1- to 4-family houses					Multi-family and commercial properties <sup>2</sup>	
			Total	Government underwritten			Conventional <sup>1</sup>		
				Total	FHA insured	VA guaranteed			
1939.....	35.5	28.9	16.3	1.8	1.8	-----	14.5	12.5	6.6
1940.....	36.5	30.0	17.4	2.3	2.3	-----	15.1	12.6	6.5
1941.....	37.6	31.2	18.4	3.0	3.0	-----	15.4	12.9	6.4
1942.....	36.7	30.8	18.2	3.7	3.7	-----	14.5	12.5	6.0
1943.....	35.3	29.9	17.8	4.1	4.1	-----	13.7	12.1	5.4
1944.....	34.7	29.7	17.9	4.2	4.2	-----	13.7	11.8	4.9
1945.....	35.5	30.8	18.6	4.3	4.1	0.2	14.3	12.2	4.8
1946.....	41.8	36.9	23.0	6.1	3.7	2.4	16.9	13.8	4.9
1947.....	48.9	43.9	28.2	9.3	3.8	5.5	18.9	15.7	5.1
1948.....	56.2	50.9	33.3	12.5	5.3	7.2	20.8	17.6	5.3
1949.....	62.7	57.1	37.6	15.0	6.9	8.1	22.6	19.5	5.6
1950.....	72.8	66.7	45.2	18.9	8.6	10.3	26.3	21.6	6.1
1951.....	82.3	75.6	51.7	22.9	9.7	13.2	28.8	23.9	6.7
1952.....	91.4	84.2	58.5	25.4	10.8	14.6	33.1	25.7	7.3
1953.....	101.3	93.6	66.1	28.1	12.0	16.1	38.0	27.5	7.8
1954.....	113.7	105.4	75.7	32.1	12.8	19.3	43.6	29.7	8.3
1955.....	129.9	120.9	88.2	38.9	14.3	24.6	49.3	32.6	9.1
1956.....	144.5	134.6	99.0	43.9	15.5	28.4	55.1	35.6	9.9
1957.....	156.6	146.1	107.6	47.2	16.5	30.7	60.4	38.5	10.5
1958.....	171.9	160.7	117.7	50.1	19.7	30.4	67.6	43.0	11.3
1959.....	190.9	178.8	130.9	53.8	23.8	30.0	77.0	47.9	12.2
1960.....	206.2	193.1	141.3	56.4	26.7	29.7	84.8	51.8	13.1
1961 <sup>3</sup> .....	223.1	208.9	152.9	59.6	29.6	30.0	93.3	56.0	14.3
1959: I.....	176.0	164.6	120.5	51.3	20.9	30.4	69.2	44.0	11.5
II.....	181.5	169.7	124.3	52.1	21.8	30.3	72.2	45.4	11.9
III.....	186.6	174.6	128.0	53.1	22.9	30.2	74.9	46.6	12.1
IV.....	190.9	178.8	130.9	53.8	23.8	30.0	77.0	47.9	12.2
1960: I.....	194.5	181.9	133.1	54.5	24.6	29.9	78.6	48.8	12.5
II.....	198.5	185.7	135.9	55.0	25.2	29.8	80.9	49.8	12.8
III.....	202.6	189.6	138.8	55.7	26.0	29.7	83.2	50.8	13.0
IV.....	206.2	193.1	141.3	56.4	26.7	29.7	84.8	51.8	13.1
1961: I <sup>2</sup> .....	209.3	196.0	143.2	57.1	27.4	29.7	86.1	52.8	13.3
II <sup>2</sup> .....	214.0	200.3	146.5	57.8	28.0	29.8	88.7	53.9	13.7
III <sup>2</sup> .....	219.0	205.0	149.9	58.7	28.8	29.9	91.2	55.1	14.0
IV <sup>2</sup> .....	223.1	208.9	152.9	59.6	29.6	30.0	93.3	56.0	14.3

<sup>1</sup> Derived figures.

<sup>2</sup> Includes negligible amount of farm loans held by savings and loan associations.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, estimated and compiled from data supplied by various Government and private organizations.

TABLE B-51.—*Net public and private debt, 1929-67*<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars]

End of year <sup>2</sup>	Total	Federal Government	State and local government <sup>3</sup>	Private									
				Total	Corporate			Individual and noncorporate					
					Total	Long-term	Short-term	Total	Farm <sup>4</sup>	Nonfarm			
										Total	Mortgage	Commercial and financial <sup>4</sup>	Consumer
1929.....	190.9	16.5	13.2	161.2	88.9	47.3	41.6	72.3	12.2	60.1	31.2	22.4	6.4
1930.....	191.0	16.5	14.1	160.4	89.3	51.1	38.2	71.1	11.8	59.4	32.0	21.6	5.8
1931.....	181.9	18.5	15.5	147.9	83.5	50.3	33.2	64.4	11.1	53.3	30.9	17.6	4.8
1932.....	174.6	21.3	16.6	136.7	80.0	49.2	30.8	56.7	10.1	46.6	29.0	14.0	3.6
1933.....	168.5	24.3	16.7	127.5	76.9	47.9	29.1	50.6	9.1	41.5	26.3	11.7	3.5
1934.....	171.4	30.4	15.9	125.1	75.5	44.6	30.9	49.6	8.9	40.7	25.5	11.2	3.9
1935.....	174.7	34.4	16.0	124.2	74.8	43.6	31.2	49.4	9.0	40.4	24.7	10.8	4.9
1936.....	180.3	37.7	16.2	126.4	76.1	42.5	33.5	50.3	8.6	41.7	24.4	11.2	6.1
1937.....	182.0	39.2	16.1	126.7	75.8	43.5	32.3	50.9	8.6	42.3	24.3	11.3	6.7
1938.....	179.6	40.5	16.0	123.1	73.3	44.8	28.4	49.8	9.0	40.9	24.5	10.1	6.3
1939.....	183.2	42.6	16.3	124.3	73.5	44.4	29.2	50.8	8.8	42.0	25.0	9.8	7.2
1940.....	189.9	44.8	16.5	128.6	75.6	43.7	31.9	53.0	9.1	43.9	26.0	9.5	8.3
1941.....	211.6	56.3	16.3	139.0	83.4	43.6	39.8	55.6	9.2	46.4	27.2	10.0	9.2
1942.....	259.0	101.7	15.8	141.5	91.6	42.7	49.0	49.9	8.9	41.0	26.8	8.1	6.0
1943.....	313.6	154.4	14.9	144.3	95.5	41.0	54.5	48.8	8.2	40.5	26.2	9.5	4.9
1944.....	370.8	211.9	14.1	144.8	94.1	39.8	54.3	50.7	7.7	43.0	26.1	11.8	5.1
1945.....	406.3	252.7	13.7	139.9	85.3	38.3	47.0	54.6	7.2	47.4	27.0	14.8	5.7
1946.....	397.4	229.7	13.6	154.1	93.5	41.3	52.2	60.6	7.6	53.0	32.5	12.1	8.4
1947.....	417.4	223.3	14.4	179.7	108.9	46.1	62.8	70.8	8.6	62.2	38.7	11.9	11.6
1948.....	433.6	216.5	16.2	200.9	117.8	52.5	65.3	83.1	10.8	72.3	45.1	12.9	14.4
1949.....	448.4	218.6	18.1	211.7	118.0	56.5	61.5	93.7	11.9	81.8	50.6	13.9	17.3
1950.....	490.3	218.7	20.7	250.9	142.1	60.1	81.9	108.8	12.2	96.6	59.4	15.8	21.4
1951.....	524.0	218.5	23.3	282.2	162.5	66.6	95.9	119.7	13.6	106.1	67.4	16.1	22.6
1952.....	555.2	222.9	25.8	306.5	171.0	73.3	97.7	135.5	15.1	120.3	75.2	17.8	27.4
1953.....	586.5	228.1	28.6	329.8	179.5	78.3	101.2	150.4	16.9	133.5	83.8	18.3	31.4
1954.....	612.0	230.2	33.4	348.4	182.8	82.9	100.0	165.5	17.6	147.9	94.6	20.8	32.5
1955.....	672.3	231.5	38.4	402.5	212.1	90.0	122.2	190.4	18.8	171.6	108.7	23.9	38.9
1956.....	707.5	225.4	42.7	439.4	231.7	100.1	131.7	207.7	19.5	188.1	121.2	24.4	42.5
1957.....	739.4	224.4	46.7	468.2	246.7	112.2	134.6	221.5	20.3	201.2	131.6	24.3	45.3
1958.....	783.5	232.7	50.9	499.9	259.5	121.2	138.4	240.4	23.3	217.0	144.6	26.9	45.5
1959.....	846.3	243.2	55.6	547.5	281.6	128.9	152.7	265.9	24.0	241.9	160.9	28.8	52.1
1960.....	882.9	241.0	60.0	581.9	295.0	137.5	157.6	286.9	25.4	261.5	173.9	31.5	56.0
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	932.6	248.1	65.0	619.5	312.5	146.5	166.0	307.0	27.2	279.8	188.0	35.0	56.8

<sup>1</sup> Net public and private debt outstanding is a comprehensive aggregate of the indebtedness of borrowers after elimination of certain types of duplicating governmental and corporate debt. For a further explanation of the concept, see *Survey of Current Business*, October 1950.

<sup>2</sup> Data for State and local government debt are for June 30.

<sup>3</sup> Farm mortgages and farm production loans. Farmers' financial and consumer debt is included in the nonfarm categories.

<sup>4</sup> Financial debt is debt owed to banks for purchasing or carrying securities, customers' debt to brokers, and debt owed to life insurance companies by policyholders.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—Revisions beginning 1955 in the consumer credit data of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System have not yet been incorporated into this series.

Sources: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Treasury Department, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and Interstate Commerce Commission (except as noted).

# GOVERNMENT FINANCE

TABLE B-52.—U.S. Government debt, by kind of obligation, 1929-61  
(Billions of dollars)

End of year or month	Gross public debt and guaranteed issues <sup>1</sup>	Interest-bearing public debt					Special issues <sup>4</sup>
		Marketable public issues		Nonmarketable public issues			
		Short-term issues <sup>2</sup>	Treasury bonds	United States savings bonds	Treasury tax and savings notes	Investment bonds <sup>3</sup>	
1929.....	16.3	3.3	11.3				0.6
1930.....	16.0	2.9	11.3				.8
1931.....	17.8	2.8	13.5				.4
1932.....	20.8	5.9	13.4				.4
1933.....	24.0	7.5	14.7				.4
1934.....	31.5	11.1	15.4				.6
1935.....	35.1	14.2	14.3	0.2			.7
1936.....	39.1	12.5	19.5	.5			.6
1937.....	41.9	12.5	20.5	1.0			2.2
1938.....	44.4	9.8	24.0	1.4			3.2
1939.....	47.6	7.7	26.9	2.2			4.2
1940.....	50.9	7.5	28.0	3.2			5.4
1941.....	64.3	8.0	33.4	6.1	2.5		7.0
1942.....	112.5	27.0	49.3	15.0	6.4		9.0
1943.....	170.1	47.1	67.9	27.4	8.6		12.7
1944.....	232.1	69.9	91.6	40.4	9.8		16.3
1945.....	278.7	78.2	120.4	48.2	8.2		20.0
1946.....	259.5	57.1	119.3	49.8	5.7		24.6
1947.....	257.0	47.7	117.9	52.1	5.4	1.0	29.0
1948.....	252.9	45.9	111.4	55.1	4.6	1.0	31.7
1949.....	257.2	50.2	104.8	56.7	7.6	1.0	33.9
1950.....	256.7	58.3	94.0	58.0	8.6	1.0	33.7
1951.....	259.5	65.6	76.9	57.6	7.5	13.0	35.9
1952.....	267.4	68.7	79.8	57.9	5.8	13.4	39.2
1953.....	275.2	77.3	77.2	57.7	6.0	12.9	41.2
1954.....	278.8	76.0	81.8	57.7	4.5	12.7	42.6
1955.....	280.8	81.3	81.9	57.9	( <sup>5</sup> )	12.3	43.9
1956.....	276.7	79.5	80.8	56.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	11.6	45.6
1957.....	275.0	82.1	82.1	52.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	10.3	45.8
1958.....	283.0	92.2	83.4	51.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	9.0	44.8
1959.....	290.9	103.5	84.8	48.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	7.6	43.5
1960.....	290.4	109.2	79.8	47.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.2	44.3
1961.....	296.5	120.5	75.5	47.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.1	43.5
1960: January.....	291.2	105.1	84.7	47.9	( <sup>5</sup> )	7.5	42.6
February.....	290.7	104.6	84.7	47.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	7.4	42.8
March.....	287.0	100.7	84.7	47.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	7.2	43.3
April.....	288.9	103.0	85.1	47.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	7.0	42.8
May.....	289.5	102.5	85.1	47.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.9	43.9
June.....	286.5	102.5	81.2	47.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.8	44.9
July.....	288.5	105.6	81.2	47.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.7	44.2
August.....	288.8	103.9	82.3	47.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.6	45.2
September.....	288.6	104.0	82.3	47.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.5	45.0
October.....	290.6	107.0	82.3	47.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.3	44.3
November.....	290.6	109.1	79.7	47.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.2	44.6
December.....	290.4	109.2	79.8	47.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.2	44.3
1961: January.....	290.2	109.5	79.8	47.2	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.1	43.8
February.....	290.7	110.1	79.8	47.3	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.1	43.7
March.....	287.7	105.8	80.6	47.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	6.0	44.0
April.....	288.2	107.2	80.9	47.4	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.9	43.0
May.....	290.4	108.0	80.8	47.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.8	44.5
June.....	289.2	106.3	80.8	47.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.8	45.0
July.....	292.6	110.5	80.8	47.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.8	44.2
August.....	294.0	111.5	79.7	47.6	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.7	45.6
September.....	294.0	112.6	79.3	47.7	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.6	45.0
October.....	296.0	116.0	79.3	47.7	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.2	43.9
November.....	297.3	120.4	75.2	47.8	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.1	44.2
December.....	296.5	120.5	75.5	47.5	( <sup>5</sup> )	5.1	43.5

<sup>1</sup> Total includes non-interest-bearing debt, fully guaranteed securities (except those held by the Treasury), Postal Savings bonds, prewar bonds, adjusted service bonds, depository bonds, and armed forces leave bonds, not shown separately. Not all of total shown is subject to statutory debt limitation.

<sup>2</sup> Bills, certificates of indebtedness, and notes.

<sup>3</sup> Series A bonds and, beginning April 1951, Series B convertible bonds.

<sup>4</sup> Issued to U. S. Government investment accounts. These accounts also held \$11.0 billion of public marketable and nonmarketable issues on December 31, 1961.

<sup>5</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>6</sup> The last series of Treasury savings notes matured in April 1956.

Source: Treasury Department.

TABLE B-53.—Estimated ownership of U.S. Government obligations, 1939-61

[Par values,<sup>1</sup> billions of dollars]

End of year or month	Gross public debt and guaranteed issues <sup>2</sup>									
	Total	Held by Gov- ernment invest- ment ac- counts	Held by others							
			Total	Federal Reserve banks	Com- mer- cial banks <sup>3</sup>	Mutual savings banks and in- sur- ance com- panies	Other corpora- tions <sup>4</sup>	State and local govern- ments <sup>5</sup>	Individ- uals <sup>6</sup>	Miscel- laneous inves- tors <sup>7</sup>
1939.....	47.6	6.5	41.1	2.5	15.9	9.4	2.2	0.4	10.1	0.7
1940.....	50.9	7.6	43.3	2.2	17.3	10.1	2.0	.5	10.6	.7
1941.....	64.3	9.5	54.7	2.3	21.4	11.9	4.0	.7	13.6	.9
1942.....	112.5	12.2	100.2	6.2	41.1	15.8	10.1	1.0	23.7	2.3
1943.....	170.1	16.9	153.2	11.5	59.9	21.2	16.4	2.1	37.6	4.4
1944.....	232.1	21.7	210.5	18.8	77.7	28.0	21.4	4.3	53.3	7.0
1945.....	278.7	27.0	251.6	24.3	90.8	34.7	22.2	6.5	64.1	9.1
1946.....	259.5	30.9	228.6	23.3	74.5	36.7	15.3	6.3	64.2	8.1
1947.....	257.0	34.4	222.6	22.6	68.7	35.9	14.1	7.3	65.7	8.4
1948.....	252.9	37.3	215.5	23.3	62.5	32.7	14.8	7.9	65.5	8.9
1949.....	257.2	39.4	217.8	18.9	66.8	31.5	16.8	8.1	66.3	9.4
1950.....	256.7	39.2	217.5	20.8	61.8	29.6	19.7	8.8	66.3	10.5
1951.....	259.5	42.3	217.2	23.8	61.6	26.3	20.7	9.6	64.6	10.6
1952.....	267.4	45.9	221.6	24.7	63.4	25.5	19.9	11.1	65.2	11.7
1953.....	275.2	48.3	226.9	25.9	63.7	25.1	21.5	12.7	64.8	13.2
1954.....	278.8	49.6	229.2	24.9	69.2	24.1	19.2	14.4	63.4	13.9
1955.....	280.8	51.7	229.1	24.8	62.0	23.1	23.5	15.4	64.7	15.6
1956.....	276.7	54.0	222.7	24.9	59.5	21.3	19.1	16.3	65.5	16.1
1957.....	275.0	55.2	219.8	24.2	59.5	20.2	18.6	16.6	64.0	16.6
1958.....	283.0	54.4	228.6	26.3	67.5	19.9	18.8	16.5	63.0	16.6
1959.....	290.9	53.7	237.3	26.6	60.3	19.5	22.6	18.0	68.2	22.1
1960.....	290.4	55.1	235.3	27.4	62.1	18.1	19.7	18.2	65.6	24.2
1961 <sup>8</sup> .....	296.5	54.5	242.0	28.9	67.3	17.6	19.4	18.5	65.5	24.8
1960: January.....	291.2	53.2	238.0	25.5	59.0	19.6	24.4	18.2	69.0	22.3
February.....	290.7	53.2	237.5	25.2	57.0	19.5	25.2	18.4	69.3	22.9
March.....	287.0	53.7	233.3	25.3	54.7	19.3	22.4	18.6	70.1	22.9
April.....	288.9	53.2	235.7	25.6	56.8	19.1	23.1	18.5	69.4	23.3
May.....	289.5	54.4	235.1	26.0	56.0	18.9	23.7	18.6	69.0	22.9
June.....	286.5	55.3	231.1	26.5	55.3	18.6	20.7	18.8	68.4	22.7
July.....	288.5	54.8	233.6	26.9	57.4	18.6	21.1	18.7	68.1	23.0
August.....	288.8	55.9	232.9	26.8	57.5	18.6	20.4	18.5	67.7	23.4
September.....	288.6	55.5	233.0	27.0	58.6	18.5	19.3	18.3	67.8	23.5
October.....	290.6	55.0	235.6	27.4	61.4	18.3	20.1	18.3	66.6	23.6
November.....	290.6	55.4	235.2	27.5	61.2	18.2	20.6	18.3	66.5	22.8
December.....	290.4	55.1	235.3	27.4	62.1	18.1	19.7	18.2	65.6	24.2
1961: January.....	290.2	54.6	235.6	26.6	62.7	18.3	20.1	18.3	65.7	24.0
February.....	290.7	54.5	236.3	26.7	61.9	18.2	21.2	18.5	65.8	23.9
March.....	287.7	54.9	232.8	26.7	59.7	18.3	19.5	18.7	65.9	24.1
April.....	288.2	54.0	234.2	26.8	61.7	17.9	20.5	18.5	64.9	23.9
May.....	290.4	55.5	234.9	26.9	62.1	17.9	21.2	18.5	64.7	23.5
June.....	289.2	56.1	233.1	27.3	62.5	17.7	19.4	18.7	64.3	23.2
July.....	292.6	55.2	237.4	27.4	65.5	17.8	19.5	18.7	64.8	23.7
August.....	294.0	56.5	237.5	27.7	65.1	17.8	19.8	18.6	65.2	23.2
September.....	294.0	55.9	238.1	27.8	66.6	17.8	18.4	18.5	65.3	23.7
October.....	296.0	55.0	241.0	28.3	67.3	17.8	19.4	18.4	65.3	24.5
November.....	297.3	55.4	241.9	29.2	66.9	17.7	20.3	18.4	65.3	24.1
December <sup>8</sup> .....	296.5	54.5	242.0	28.9	67.3	17.6	19.4	18.5	65.5	24.8

<sup>1</sup> United States savings bonds, series A-F and J, are included at current redemption value.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes guaranteed securities held by the Treasury. Not all of total shown is subject to statutory debt limitation.

<sup>3</sup> Includes commercial banks, trust companies, and stock savings banks in the United States and Territories and possessions; figures exclude securities held in trust departments. Since the estimates in this table are on the basis of par values and include holdings of banks in United States Territories and possessions, they do not agree with the estimates in Table B-45, which are based on book values and relate only to banks within the United States.

<sup>4</sup> Exclusive of banks and insurance companies.

<sup>5</sup> Includes trust, sinking, and investment funds of State and local governments and their agencies, and of Territories and possessions.

<sup>6</sup> Includes partnerships and personal trust accounts.

<sup>7</sup> Includes savings and loan associations, nonprofit institutions, corporate pension trust funds, dealers and brokers, and investments of foreign balances and international accounts in this country. Beginning with December 1946, the international accounts include investments by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Development Association in special non-interest-bearing notes issued by the U.S. Government. Beginning with June 30, 1947, includes holdings of Federal land banks.

<sup>8</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

Source: Treasury Department (except as noted).

TABLE B-54.—Average length and maturity distribution of marketable interest-bearing public debt, 1946-61

End of year or month	Amount outstanding	Maturity class					Average length	
		Within 1 year	1 to 5 years	5 to 10 years	10 to 20 years	20 years and over	Years	Months
<b>Fiscal year:</b>								
1946.....	189,606	61,974	24,763	41,807	17,461	43,599	9	1
1947.....	168,702	51,211	21,851	35,562	18,597	41,481	9	5
1948.....	160,346	48,742	21,630	32,264	16,229	41,481	9	2
1949.....	155,147	48,130	32,562	16,746	22,821	34,888	8	9
1950.....	155,310	42,338	51,292	7,792	28,035	25,853	8	2
1951.....	137,917	43,908	46,526	8,707	29,979	8,797	6	7
1952.....	140,407	46,367	47,814	13,933	25,700	6,594	5	8
1953.....	147,335	65,270	36,161	15,651	28,662	1,592	5	4
1954.....	150,354	62,734	29,866	27,515	28,634	1,606	5	6
1955.....	155,206	49,703	39,107	34,253	28,613	3,530	5	10
1956.....	154,953	58,714	34,401	28,908	28,578	4,351	5	4
1957.....	155,705	71,952	40,669	12,328	26,407	4,349	4	9
1958.....	166,675	67,782	42,557	21,476	27,652	7,208	4	3
1959.....	178,027	72,958	58,304	17,052	21,625	8,088	4	7
1960.....	183,845	70,467	72,844	20,246	12,630	7,658	4	4
1961.....	187,148	81,120	58,400	26,435	10,233	10,960	4	6
1960: January.....	189,856	81,455	61,691	22,138	16,489	8,084	4	2
February.....	189,384	76,735	72,849	15,240	17,365	7,194	4	3
March.....	185,437	72,721	72,934	19,931	12,659	7,193	4	4
April.....	188,147	72,807	75,133	19,930	12,649	7,629	4	3
May.....	187,735	74,335	73,184	19,928	12,641	7,648	4	3
June.....	183,845	70,467	72,844	20,246	12,630	7,658	4	4
July.....	186,915	73,479	72,911	20,245	12,625	7,655	4	3
August.....	186,294	73,892	70,819	21,314	12,617	7,653	4	3
September.....	186,366	76,148	68,646	21,312	12,610	7,660	4	2
October.....	189,358	79,203	68,595	17,332	12,601	11,627	4	7
November.....	188,840	75,324	70,755	18,544	13,235	10,982	4	8
December.....	189,015	75,315	70,812	18,684	13,224	10,979	4	7
1961: January.....	189,320	75,613	70,836	18,684	13,211	10,976	4	6
February.....	189,919	80,054	67,007	18,683	13,203	10,973	4	6
March.....	186,520	76,622	61,007	27,658	10,262	10,970	4	7
April.....	188,147	78,731	60,541	27,654	10,254	10,968	4	6
May.....	188,893	78,896	62,349	26,438	10,245	10,965	4	6
June.....	187,148	81,120	58,400	26,435	10,233	10,960	4	6
July.....	191,275	85,224	58,437	26,433	10,225	10,956	4	4
August.....	191,138	80,675	63,607	25,693	10,212	10,952	4	5
September.....	191,925	81,334	63,747	21,934	11,479	13,431	4	8
October.....	195,234	82,578	65,828	21,930	11,469	13,428	4	7
November.....	195,643	83,641	67,105	19,487	11,982	13,428	4	8
December.....	195,965	85,913	64,874	19,782	11,976	13,419	4	7

NOTE.—All issues classified to final maturity except partially tax-exempt bonds, which are classified to earliest call date.

Source: Treasury Department.

TABLE B-55.—Federal budget receipts and expenditures and the public debt, 1929-63

[Millions of dollars]

Fiscal or calendar year	Net budget receipts <sup>1</sup>	Budget expenditures	Surplus or deficit (—)	Public debt at end of year <sup>2</sup>
<b>Fiscal year:</b>				
1929.....	3,861	3,127	734	16,931
1930.....	4,058	3,320	738	16,185
1931.....	3,116	3,577	-462	16,801
1932.....	1,924	4,659	-2,735	19,487
1933.....	1,097	4,598	-2,602	22,539
1934.....	3,015	6,645	-3,630	27,053
1935.....	3,706	6,497	-2,791	28,701
1936.....	3,997	8,422	-4,425	33,779
1937.....	4,956	7,733	-2,777	36,425
1938.....	5,588	6,765	-1,177	37,165
1939.....	4,979	8,841	-3,862	40,440
1940.....	5,137	9,055	-3,918	42,968
1941.....	7,096	13,255	-6,159	48,961
1942.....	12,547	34,037	-21,490	72,422
1943.....	21,947	79,368	-57,420	136,696
1944.....	43,563	94,986	-51,423	201,003
1945.....	44,362	98,303	-53,941	258,682
1946.....	39,650	60,326	-20,676	269,422
1947.....	39,677	38,923	754	258,286
1948.....	41,375	32,955	8,419	252,292
1949.....	37,663	39,474	-1,811	252,770
1950.....	36,422	39,544	-3,122	257,357
1951.....	47,480	43,970	3,510	255,222
1952.....	61,287	65,303	-4,017	259,105
1953.....	64,671	74,120	-9,449	266,071
1954.....	64,420	67,537	-3,117	271,260
1955.....	60,209	64,389	-4,180	274,374
1956.....	67,850	66,224	1,626	272,751
1957.....	70,562	68,966	1,596	270,527
1958.....	68,550	71,369	-2,819	276,343
1959.....	67,915	80,342	-12,427	284,706
1960.....	77,763	76,539	1,224	286,331
1961.....	77,659	81,515	-3,856	288,971
1962 <sup>3</sup> .....	82,100	89,075	-6,975	295,370
1963 <sup>3</sup> .....	93,000	92,537	463	294,920
<b>Calendar year:</b>				
1948.....	40,800	35,559	5,241	252,800
1949.....	37,464	41,056	-3,592	257,130
1950.....	37,235	37,657	-422	256,708
1951.....	52,877	56,236	-3,358	259,419
1952.....	64,705	70,547	-5,842	267,391
1953.....	63,654	72,811	-9,157	275,168
1954.....	60,938	64,622	-3,683	278,750
1955.....	63,119	65,891	-2,771	280,769
1956.....	70,616	66,838	3,779	276,628
1957.....	71,749	71,157	592	274,898
1958.....	68,262	75,349	-7,088	282,922
1959.....	72,738	79,778	-7,040	290,798
1960.....	79,518	77,565	1,953	290,217
1961 <sup>4</sup> .....	78,200	84,500	-6,300	296,169

<sup>1</sup> Gross receipts less refunds of receipts and transfers of tax receipts to the old-age and survivors insurance trust fund, the disability insurance trust fund, the railroad retirement account, the unemployment trust fund, and the highway trust fund.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes guaranteed obligations; therefore, differs from total shown in Tables B-52 and B-53. The change in the public debt from year to year reflects not only the budget surplus or deficit but also changes in the Government's cash on hand, and the use of corporate debt and investment transactions by certain Government enterprises.

<sup>3</sup> Estimate.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Certain interfund transactions are excluded from budget receipts and expenditures beginning fiscal year 1932. For years prior to 1932, the amounts of such transactions are not significant.

Sources: Treasury Department and Bureau of the Budget.



TABLE B-56.—Federal budget receipts by source and expenditures by function, fiscal years 1946-63

[Millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Budget receipts by source					Budget expenditures by function					Budget surplus or deficit (-)	
	Total	Individual income taxes	Corporation income taxes	Excise taxes	All other receipts <sup>1</sup>	Total	National defense	Veterans' services and benefits	Agriculture and agricultural resources	Interest		All other expenditures <sup>2</sup>
1946..	39,650	16,157	11,833	6,999	4,661	60,326	43,176	4,415	747	4,816	7,173	-20,676
1947..	39,677	17,835	8,569	7,207	6,066	38,923	14,368	7,381	1,243	5,012	10,917	754
1948..	41,375	19,305	9,678	7,356	5,037	32,955	11,771	6,653	575	5,248	8,708	8,419
1949..	37,663	15,548	11,195	7,502	3,418	39,474	12,908	6,725	2,512	5,445	11,884	-1,811
1950..	36,422	15,745	10,448	7,549	2,679	39,544	13,009	6,646	2,783	5,817	11,288	-3,122
1951..	47,480	21,643	14,106	8,648	3,083	43,970	22,444	5,342	650	5,714	9,819	3,510
1952..	61,287	27,913	21,225	8,851	3,298	65,303	43,976	4,863	1,045	5,934	9,486	-4,017
1953..	64,671	30,108	21,238	9,868	3,456	74,120	50,442	4,368	2,955	6,578	9,777	-9,449
1954..	64,420	29,542	21,101	9,945	3,833	67,537	46,986	4,341	2,573	6,470	7,167	-3,117
1955..	60,209	28,747	17,861	9,131	4,469	64,389	40,695	4,522	4,388	6,438	8,346	-4,180
1956..	67,850	32,188	20,880	9,929	4,854	66,224	40,723	4,810	4,868	6,846	8,977	1,626
1957..	70,562	35,620	21,167	9,055	4,721	68,966	43,360	4,870	4,546	7,307	8,883	1,596
1958..	68,560	34,724	20,074	8,612	5,141	71,369	44,234	5,184	4,419	7,689	9,843	-2,819
1959..	67,915	36,719	17,309	8,504	5,384	80,342	46,491	5,287	6,590	7,671	14,303	-12,427
1960..	77,763	40,715	21,494	9,137	6,418	76,539	45,691	5,266	4,882	9,266	11,434	1,224
1961..	77,659	41,338	20,954	9,063	6,304	81,515	47,494	5,414	5,173	9,050	14,354	-3,856
1962 <sup>3</sup> ..	82,100	45,000	21,300	9,627	6,173	89,075	51,212	5,575	6,343	8,998	16,947	-6,975
1963 <sup>3</sup> ..	93,000	49,300	26,600	9,956	7,144	92,537	52,690	5,298	5,836	9,398	19,315	463

<sup>1</sup> Includes employment taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs revenues, and miscellaneous receipts. See also Note below.

<sup>2</sup> Includes expenditures for international affairs and finance; space research and technology; natural resources; commerce and transportation; housing and community development; health, labor, and welfare; education; and general government. Also includes adjustment to daily Treasury statement (for actuals) and allowance for contingencies (for estimates). See also Note below.

<sup>3</sup> Estimate.

NOTE.—Total budget receipts and total budget expenditures and the "all other" categories exclude certain interfund transactions.

Sources: Treasury Department and Bureau of the Budget.

TABLE B-57.—Government cash receipts from and payments to the public, 1946-63

[Billions of dollars]

Fiscal or calendar year	Total			Federal <sup>1</sup>			State and local <sup>2</sup>		
	Cash receipts	Cash payments	Excess of receipts or of payments (-)	Cash receipts	Cash payments	Excess of receipts or of payments (-)	Cash receipts	Cash payments	Excess of receipts or of payments (-)
<b>Fiscal year:</b>									
1946.....	54.2	70.2	-16.0	43.5	61.7	-18.2	10.7	8.5	2.2
1947.....	55.6	47.5	8.1	43.5	36.9	6.6	12.1	10.6	1.5
1948.....	59.6	50.2	9.4	45.4	36.5	8.9	14.2	13.7	.5
1949.....	57.6	56.3	1.3	41.6	40.6	1.0	16.0	15.7	.3
1950.....	58.2	61.5	-3.3	40.9	43.1	-2.2	17.3	18.4	-1.1
1951.....	72.5	65.2	7.3	53.4	45.8	7.6	19.1	19.4	-.3
1952.....	88.7	88.9	-.2	68.0	68.0	(3)	20.7	20.9	-.2
1953.....	93.9	99.1	-5.2	71.5	76.8	-5.3	22.4	22.3	.1
1954.....	95.6	96.1	-.4	71.6	71.9	-.2	24.0	24.2	-.2
1955.....	93.5	97.5	-4.0	67.8	70.5	-2.7	25.7	27.0	-1.3
1956.....	105.8	101.6	4.2	77.1	72.6	4.5	28.7	29.0	-.3
1957.....	113.5	111.8	1.7	82.1	80.0	2.1	31.4	31.8	-.4
1958.....	115.0	118.2	-3.2	81.9	83.4	-1.5	33.1	34.8	-1.7
1959.....	117.2	132.2	-15.0	81.7	94.8	-13.1	35.5	37.4	-1.9
1960.....	134.1	133.2	.9	95.1	94.3	.8	39.0	38.9	.1
1961.....	138.2	142.4	-4.1	97.2	99.5	-2.3	41.1	43.1	-2.0
1962 <sup>4</sup> .....	-----	-----	-----	102.6	111.1	-8.5	-----	-----	-----
1963 <sup>4</sup> .....	-----	-----	-----	116.6	114.8	1.8	-----	-----	-----
<b>Calendar year:</b>									
1946.....	52.9	50.9	2.0	41.4	41.4	(3)	11.4	9.5	1.9
1947.....	57.4	50.7	6.7	44.3	38.6	5.7	13.1	12.1	1.0
1948.....	60.0	51.8	8.2	44.9	36.9	8.0	15.1	14.9	.2
1949.....	57.9	59.8	-1.8	41.3	42.6	-1.3	16.6	17.1	-.5
1950.....	60.4	61.1	-.6	42.4	42.0	.5	18.0	19.1	-1.1
1951.....	79.1	78.3	.9	59.3	58.0	1.2	19.9	20.2	-.4
1952.....	93.0	93.6	-.6	71.3	72.0	-.6	21.7	21.6	.1
1953.....	93.5	100.4	-6.9	70.2	77.4	-7.2	23.2	23.0	.3
1954.....	93.3	95.3	-2.0	68.6	69.7	-1.1	24.7	25.6	-.9
1955.....	98.4	100.2	-1.8	71.4	72.2	-.7	26.9	28.0	-1.1
1956.....	110.2	105.2	5.0	80.3	74.8	5.5	29.9	30.4	-.5
1957.....	116.8	116.6	.2	84.5	83.3	1.2	32.3	33.3	-1.0
1958.....	115.9	125.2	-9.3	81.7	89.0	-7.3	34.1	36.2	-2.1
1959.....	124.7	133.2	-8.5	87.6	95.6	-8.0	37.1	37.6	-.5
1960.....	138.3	136.1	2.3	98.3	94.7	3.6	40.1	41.4	-1.3
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	-----	-----	-----	97.2	103.8	-6.6	-----	-----	-----

<sup>1</sup> For derivation of Federal cash receipts and payments, see *Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1963*, and Table B-60.

<sup>2</sup> Estimated by Council of Economic Advisers from receipts and expenditures in the national income accounts. Cash receipts consist of personal tax and nontax receipts, indirect business tax and nontax accruals, and corporate tax accruals adjusted to a collection basis. Cash payments are total expenditures less Federal grants-in-aid and less contributions for social insurance. (Federal grants-in-aid are therefore excluded from State and local receipts and payments and included only in Federal payments.) See also Table B-58.

<sup>3</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>4</sup> Estimate.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

Sources: Treasury Department, Bureau of the Budget, Department of Commerce, and Council of Economic Advisers.

TABLE B-58.—Government receipts and expenditures in the national income accounts, 1929-61

[Billions of dollars]

Calendar year or quarter	Total government			Federal Government <sup>1</sup>			State and local government		
	Re-ceipts	Ex-pen-ditures	Sur-plus or deficit (-) on income and product account	Re-ceipts	Ex-pen-ditures	Sur-plus or deficit (-) on income and product account	Re-ceipts	Ex-pen-ditures	Sur-plus or deficit (-) on income and product account
1929.....	11.3	10.2	1.0	3.8	2.6	1.2	7.6	7.7	-0.1
1930.....	10.8	11.0	- .3	3.0	2.8	.3	7.8	8.4	- .5
1931.....	9.5	12.3	-2.8	2.0	4.2	-2.1	7.7	8.4	- .7
1932.....	8.9	10.6	-1.7	1.7	3.2	-1.5	7.3	7.6	- .2
1933.....	9.3	10.7	-1.4	2.7	4.0	-1.3	7.2	7.2	( <sup>2</sup> )
1934.....	10.5	12.8	-2.4	3.5	6.4	-2.9	8.6	8.1	.5
1935.....	11.4	13.3	-2.0	4.0	6.5	-2.6	9.1	8.5	.6
1936.....	12.9	15.9	-3.0	5.0	8.5	-3.5	8.6	8.1	.5
1937.....	15.4	14.8	.6	7.0	7.2	.2	9.1	8.4	.7
1938.....	15.0	16.6	-1.6	6.5	8.5	-2.0	9.3	8.9	.4
1939.....	15.4	17.5	-2.1	6.7	9.0	-2.2	9.6	9.6	.1
1940.....	17.7	18.5	- .8	8.6	10.1	-1.4	10.0	9.2	.7
1941.....	25.0	28.8	-3.8	15.4	20.5	-5.1	10.4	9.0	1.3
1942.....	32.6	64.0	-31.4	22.9	56.1	-33.2	10.6	8.8	1.8
1943.....	49.2	93.4	-44.2	39.3	86.0	-46.7	10.9	8.4	2.5
1944.....	51.2	103.1	-51.9	41.0	95.6	-54.6	11.1	8.4	2.7
1945.....	53.2	92.9	-39.7	42.5	84.8	-42.3	11.6	9.0	2.6
1946.....	51.1	47.0	4.1	39.2	37.0	2.2	13.0	11.1	1.9
1947.....	57.1	43.8	13.3	43.3	31.1	12.2	15.5	14.4	1.1
1948.....	59.2	51.0	8.2	43.4	35.4	8.0	17.8	17.6	.3
1949.....	56.4	59.5	-3.1	39.1	41.6	-2.5	19.6	20.2	- .6
1950.....	69.3	61.1	8.2	50.2	41.0	9.2	21.4	22.4	-1.0
1951.....	85.5	79.4	6.1	64.5	58.0	6.4	23.5	23.8	- .3
1952.....	90.6	94.4	-3.9	67.7	71.6	-3.9	25.5	25.4	.1
1953.....	94.9	102.0	-7.1	70.3	77.7	-7.4	27.4	27.1	.3
1954.....	90.0	96.7	-6.7	63.8	69.6	-5.8	29.1	30.1	- .9
1955.....	101.4	98.6	2.9	72.8	68.9	3.8	31.7	32.7	-1.0
1956.....	109.5	104.3	5.2	77.5	71.8	5.7	35.2	35.7	- .5
1957.....	116.3	115.3	1.0	81.7	79.7	2.0	38.6	39.6	-1.0
1958.....	115.1	126.6	-11.4	78.5	87.9	-9.4	42.0	44.1	-2.1
1959.....	129.3	131.6	-2.2	89.4	91.2	-1.8	46.5	46.9	- .4
1960.....	139.1	137.2	1.9	96.0	92.8	3.3	49.2	50.6	-1.4
1961 <sup>3</sup> .....	143.6	149.8	-6.2	97.9	101.4	-3.6	52.3	55.0	-2.7
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1959: I.....	126.3	130.4	-4.1	87.4	90.1	-2.7	45.5	46.9	-1.4
II.....	131.3	131.4	- .1	91.6	91.1	.5	46.3	46.9	- .6
III.....	129.3	132.1	-2.8	89.1	91.6	-2.5	46.9	47.2	- .4
IV.....	130.4	132.5	-2.0	89.6	92.0	-2.4	47.3	47.0	.4
1960: I.....	139.4	132.9	6.5	97.0	90.5	6.5	48.6	48.6	( <sup>2</sup> )
II.....	140.0	136.5	3.5	96.9	92.5	4.5	49.2	50.1	-1.0
III.....	138.8	139.3	- .5	95.6	94.2	1.4	49.4	51.3	-1.9
IV.....	138.3	140.2	-1.9	94.6	94.2	.4	49.7	52.0	-2.3
1961: I.....	136.9	144.8	-7.9	92.5	98.0	-5.5	51.4	53.8	-2.4
II.....	141.9	148.5	-6.6	96.8	101.1	-4.3	51.9	54.2	-2.3
III.....	145.4	151.3	-6.0	99.3	102.4	-3.1	52.4	55.3	-2.9
IV <sup>4</sup> .....	( <sup>4</sup> )	154.8	( <sup>4</sup> )	( <sup>4</sup> )	104.3	( <sup>4</sup> )	( <sup>4</sup> )	56.8	( <sup>4</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> See Note, Table B-59.

<sup>2</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>4</sup> Not available.

NOTE.—Federal grants-in-aid to State and local governments are reflected in Federal expenditures and State and local receipts and expenditures. Total government receipts and expenditures have been adjusted to eliminate this duplication.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-59.—Federal Government receipts and expenditures in the national income accounts, 1946-61

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Receipts					Expenditures							Surplus or deficit (-) on income and product account	
	Total	Personal tax and non-tax receipts	Corporate profits tax accruals	Indirect business tax and non-tax accruals	Contributions for social insurance	Total	Purchases of goods and services	Transfer payments		Grants-in-aid to State and local governments	Net interest paid	Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises		
								To persons	Foreign (net)					
<b>Fiscal year:</b>								(1)	(1)					
1946	38.3	17.8	7.3	7.5	5.8	56.3	41.3	8.3	0.2	0.9	3.9	2.1	-18.0	
1947	42.9	18.8	10.7	7.9	5.5	31.7	16.9	8.7	0.6	1.5	4.2	.7	11.2	
1948	43.7	20.0	11.2	8.0	4.6	32.3	16.6	8.1	.6	1.8	4.2	.4	11.4	
1949	40.1	16.3	10.9	8.1	4.8	40.0	21.8	8.1	2.9	2.1	4.3	.8	.2	
1950	42.0	16.5	11.7	8.3	5.5	42.2	20.0	11.3	3.1	2.4	4.4	1.0	-.2	
1951	61.7	23.5	21.8	9.6	6.6	45.3	26.5	8.2	2.3	2.4	4.6	1.3	16.3	
1952	65.5	29.0	19.3	9.9	7.3	66.6	47.7	8.7	1.8	2.5	4.8	1.1	-1.1	
1953	69.9	31.5	19.8	11.0	7.6	76.2	56.8	9.4	1.7	2.8	4.8	.9	-6.3	
1954	65.9	30.4	17.1	10.7	7.7	74.5	53.9	10.6	1.3	2.8	4.9	1.0	-8.6	
1955	67.0	29.9	18.4	10.4	8.3	68.1	45.0	12.2	1.6	2.9	4.9	1.4	-1.1	
1956	76.3	33.5	21.0	11.2	10.5	69.5	45.2	12.9	1.3	3.1	5.0	1.9	6.8	
1957	80.9	36.7	20.4	12.1	11.7	76.5	48.3	14.6	1.5	3.6	5.5	3.1	4.4	
1958	77.8	36.3	17.3	12.0	12.3	82.8	50.5	18.1	1.3	4.5	5.6	2.7	-4.9	
1959	85.4	38.1	21.2	12.3	13.8	90.2	53.8	20.3	1.4	6.0	5.9	2.8	-4.8	
1960	94.1	42.0	21.6	13.8	16.7	91.9	52.9	21.2	1.6	6.6	6.8	2.8	2.2	
1961	94.8	42.9	20.1	13.6	18.1	97.0	54.6	24.2	1.5	6.4	6.9	3.3	-2.2	
1962 <sup>2</sup>	105.6	46.7	24.6	14.5	19.8	106.1	60.2	27.8		7.0	6.6	4.5	-.5	
1963 <sup>2</sup>	116.3	51.7	27.5	15.3	21.8	111.9	64.2	29.4		7.7	6.9	3.7	4.4	
<b>Calendar year:</b>														
1946	39.2	17.2	8.6	7.9	5.5	37.0	20.6	9.2	.3	1.1	4.2	1.6	2.2	
1947	43.3	19.6	10.7	7.9	5.1	31.1	15.6	8.9	.1	1.7	4.2	.6	12.2	
1948	43.4	19.0	11.8	8.1	4.5	35.4	19.3	7.7	1.6	2.0	4.3	.6	8.0	
1949	39.1	16.2	9.8	8.2	4.9	41.6	22.2	8.8	3.2	2.2	4.4	.7	-2.5	
1950	50.2	18.2	17.1	9.0	5.9	41.0	19.3	10.9	2.8	2.3	4.5	1.2	9.2	
1951	64.5	26.3	21.6	9.5	7.1	58.0	38.8	8.7	2.1	2.5	4.7	1.3	6.4	
1952	67.7	31.2	18.6	10.5	7.4	71.6	52.9	8.9	1.5	2.6	4.7	1.0	-3.9	
1953	70.3	32.4	19.4	11.2	7.4	77.7	58.0	9.7	1.6	2.8	4.8	.8	-7.4	
1954	63.8	29.2	16.5	10.1	8.1	69.6	47.5	11.6	1.4	2.9	5.0	1.2	-5.8	
1955	72.8	31.5	20.9	11.0	9.3	68.9	45.3	12.5	1.5	3.0	4.9	1.6	3.8	
1956	77.5	35.2	20.2	11.6	10.6	71.8	45.7	13.5	1.5	3.3	5.2	2.7	5.7	
1957	81.7	37.3	19.9	12.2	12.2	79.7	49.7	16.0	1.5	4.1	5.7	2.8	2.0	
1958	78.5	36.6	17.7	11.9	12.4	87.9	52.6	20.0	1.3	5.4	5.6	3.0	-9.4	
1959	89.4	39.6	21.9	13.0	14.9	91.2	53.5	20.6	1.5	6.6	6.4	2.6	-1.8	
1960	96.0	43.2	21.2	14.0	17.7	92.8	52.9	22.2	1.6	6.1	7.0	2.9	3.3	
1961 <sup>3</sup>	97.9	43.9	21.6	13.8	18.6	101.4	57.2	25.6	1.6	6.6	6.5	3.9	-3.6	
	Seasonally adjusted annual rates													
<b>Calendar quarter:</b>														
1959: I	87.4	38.7	21.6	12.6	14.5	90.1	53.2	20.2	1.5	6.6	6.0	2.7	-2.7	
II	91.6	39.8	24.1	12.7	15.0	91.1	53.9	20.4	1.4	6.6	6.2	2.6	.5	
III	89.1	39.9	21.0	13.3	15.0	91.6	54.1	20.5	1.3	6.7	6.5	2.5	-2.5	
IV	89.6	40.0	21.0	13.6	15.0	92.0	52.9	21.4	1.9	6.5	6.8	2.5	-2.4	
1960: I	97.0	42.7	22.6	14.1	17.5	90.5	51.8	21.2	1.5	6.1	7.0	2.8	6.5	
II	96.9	43.3	21.8	14.2	17.7	92.5	52.9	21.8	1.6	6.1	7.1	2.9	4.5	
III	95.6	43.5	20.3	13.8	18.0	94.2	54.0	22.4	1.5	6.2	7.1	2.9	1.4	
IV	94.6	43.1	20.0	13.8	17.6	94.2	53.0	23.7	1.6	6.0	7.0	2.9	.4	
1961: I	92.5	42.6	18.6	13.3	18.0	98.0	54.7	24.8	1.6	7.1	6.8	3.0	-5.5	
II	96.8	43.6	21.2	13.6	18.4	101.1	56.6	25.7	1.5	6.8	6.6	4.0	-4.3	
III	99.3	44.5	22.1	14.0	18.7	102.4	57.4	26.1	1.7	6.4	6.4	4.5	-3.1	
IV <sup>3</sup>	(1)	44.8	(1)	14.5	19.3	104.3	59.9	25.9	1.5	6.3	6.5	4.2	(1)	

<sup>1</sup> Not available.

<sup>2</sup> Estimate

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

NOTE.—These accounts, like the cash budget, include the transactions of the trust accounts. Unlike both the conventional budget and the cash statement, they exclude certain capital and lending transactions. In general, they do not use the cash basis for transactions with business. Instead, corporate profits taxes are included in receipts on an accrual instead of a cash basis; expenditures are timed with the delivery instead of the payment for goods and services; and CCC guaranteed price-support crop loans financed by banks are counted as expenditures when the loans are made, not when CCC redeems them.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included beginning 1960.

Sources: Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Budget (except as noted).

TABLE B-60.—*Reconciliation of Federal Government receipts and expenditures in the conventional budget and the consolidated cash statement with receipts and expenditures in the national income accounts, fiscal years 1959-63*

[Billions of dollars]

Receipts or expenditures	Fiscal years				
	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
<b>RECEIPTS</b>					
<b>Budget receipts</b> .....	67.9	77.8	77.7	82.1	93.0
Less: Intragovernmental transactions.....	3.3	4.4	4.2	4.0	3.9
Receipts from exercise of monetary authority.....	(1) .1	.1	.1	.1	(1) .1
Plus: Trust fund receipts.....	17.1	21.8	23.8	24.5	27.5
<b>Equals: Federal receipts from the public (consolidated cash receipts)</b> .....	81.7	95.1	97.2	102.6	116.6
Adjustments for agency coverage:					
Less: District of Columbia revenues.....	.2	.2	.3	.4	.4
Adjustments for netting and consolidation:					
Less: Interest, dividends, and other earnings.....	.8	1.4	1.1	1.0	1.1
Plus: Contributions to Federal employees' retirement funds, etc.....	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7
Adjustments for timing:					
Plus: Excess of corporate tax accruals over collections; personal taxes, social insurance contributions, etc.....	4.3	.1	-1.3	3.5	.8
Adjustments for capital transactions: <sup>2</sup>					
Less: Realization upon loans and investments, sale of Government property, etc.....	1.2	.9	1.5	.9	1.3
<b>Equals: Receipts—National income accounts</b> .....	85.4	94.1	94.8	105.6	116.3
<b>EXPENDITURES</b>					
<b>Budget expenditures</b> .....	80.3	76.5	81.5	89.1	92.5
Less: Intragovernmental transactions.....	3.3	4.4	4.2	4.0	3.9
Accrued interest and other non-cash expenditures (net).....	2.1	.4	.8	.1	.8
Plus: Trust fund expenditures.....	18.6	22.2	23.2	25.6	26.7
Government-sponsored enterprise expenditures (net).....	1.3	.5	-.2	.5	.3
<b>Equals: Federal payments to the public (consolidated cash expenditures)</b> .....	94.8	94.3	99.5	111.1	114.8
Adjustments for agency coverage:					
Less: District of Columbia expenditures.....	.3	.3	.3	.4	.4
Adjustments for netting and consolidation:					
Less: Interest received and proceeds of Government sales.....	.6	1.0	.6	1.0	1.0
Plus: Contributions to Federal employees' retirement funds, etc.....	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7
Adjustments for timing:					
Plus: Excess of interest accruals over payments on savings bonds and Treasury bills.....	.9	.6	.2	.5	.6
Excess of deliveries over expenditures and miscellaneous items <sup>3</sup> .....	.1	-.6	.5	.1	.8
Less: Commodity Credit Corporation foreign currency exchanges.....	.8	.9	1.0	1.1	1.0
Adjustments for capital transactions: <sup>2</sup>					
Less: Loans—Federal National Mortgage Association secondary market mortgage purchases, redemption of International Monetary Fund notes, etc.....	3.8	1.0	1.3	3.7	2.5
Trust and deposit fund items.....	1.5	.7	.4	1.0	1.0
Purchase of land and existing assets.....	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
Other <sup>4</sup> .....			1.3		
<b>Equals: Expenditures—National income accounts</b> .....	90.2	91.9	97.0	106.1	111.9

<sup>1</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>2</sup> Consist of transactions in financial assets and liabilities, land and secondhand assets. Acquisition of newly produced tangible assets are included in expenditures for goods and services as defined in the national income and product accounts.

<sup>3</sup> Includes net change in Commodity Credit Corporation guaranteed non-recourse loans and increase in clearing account.

<sup>4</sup> Commodity Credit Corporation inventory valuation adjustment.

Sources: Bureau of the Budget and Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-61.—State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fiscal years, 1927-60

[Millions of dollars]

Fiscal year <sup>1</sup>	Revenues by source <sup>2</sup>						Expenditures by function <sup>3</sup>					
	Total	Property taxes	Sales and gross receipts taxes	Individual income taxes	Corporation net income taxes	Revenue from Federal Government	All other revenue <sup>4</sup>	Total	Edu- cation	High- ways	Public welfare	All other <sup>4</sup>
1927.....	7,271	4,730	470	70	92	116	1,793	7,210	2,235	1,809	151	3,015
1932.....	7,267	4,487	752	74	79	232	1,643	7,765	2,311	1,741	444	3,269
1934.....	7,678	4,076	1,008	80	49	1,016	1,449	7,181	1,831	1,509	889	2,952
1936.....	8,395	4,093	1,484	153	113	948	1,604	7,644	2,177	1,425	827	3,215
1938.....	9,228	4,440	1,794	218	165	800	1,811	8,757	2,491	1,650	1,069	3,547
1940.....	9,609	4,430	1,982	224	156	945	1,872	9,229	2,638	1,573	1,156	3,862
1942.....	10,418	4,537	2,351	276	272	858	2,123	9,190	2,586	1,490	1,225	3,889
1944.....	10,908	4,604	2,289	342	451	954	2,269	8,863	2,793	1,200	1,133	3,737
1946.....	12,356	4,986	2,986	422	447	855	2,661	11,028	3,356	1,672	1,409	4,591
1948.....	17,250	6,126	4,442	543	592	1,861	3,685	17,684	5,379	3,036	2,099	7,170
1950.....	20,911	7,349	5,154	788	593	2,486	4,541	22,787	7,177	3,803	2,940	8,867
1952.....	25,181	8,652	6,357	998	846	2,566	5,763	26,098	8,318	4,650	2,788	10,342
1953.....	27,307	9,375	6,927	1,065	817	2,870	6,252	27,910	9,390	4,987	2,914	10,619
1954.....	29,012	9,967	7,276	1,127	778	2,966	6,897	30,701	10,557	5,527	3,060	11,557
1955.....	31,073	10,735	7,643	1,237	744	3,131	7,584	33,724	11,907	6,452	3,168	12,197
1956.....	34,667	11,749	8,691	1,538	890	3,335	8,465	36,711	13,220	6,953	3,139	13,399
1957.....	38,310	13,097	9,461	1,767	984	3,838	9,163	40,438	14,501	7,762	3,411	14,764
1958.....	41,219	14,047	9,829	1,759	1,018	4,865	9,699	44,851	15,919	8,567	3,729	16,635
1959 <sup>5</sup> .....	45,306	14,983	10,437	1,994	1,001	6,377	10,516	48,887	17,283	9,592	4,19	17,994
1960 <sup>6</sup> .....	50,505	16,405	11,849	2,463	1,180	6,974	11,634	51,876	18,719	9,428	4,404	19,325

<sup>1</sup> Fiscal years not the same for all governments.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes revenues or expenditures of publicly owned utilities and liquor stores, and of insurance-trust activities. Intergovernmental receipts and payments between governments in these categories are also excluded.

<sup>3</sup> Includes licenses and other taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues.

<sup>4</sup> Includes expenditures for health, hospitals, police, local fire protection, natural resources, sanitation, housing and community redevelopment, local recreation, general control, interest on general debt, and other and unallocable expenditures.

<sup>5</sup> Includes data for Alaska.

<sup>6</sup> Includes data for Alaska and Hawaii

NOTE.—Data are not available for intervening years.  
See Table B-51 for net debt of State and local governments.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

# CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE

TABLE B-62.—Profits before and after taxes, all private corporations, 1929-61

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Corporate profits (before taxes) and inventory valuation adjustment						Corporate profits before taxes	Corporate tax liability <sup>1</sup>	Corporate profits after taxes		
	All industries	Manufacturing			Transportation, communication, and public utilities	All other industries			Total	Dividend payments	Undistributed profits
		Total	Durable goods industries	Non-durable goods industries							
1929.....	10.1	5.1	2.6	2.5	2.0	3.0	9.6	1.4	8.3	5.8	2.4
1930.....	6.6	3.9	1.5	2.4	1.2	1.5	3.3	.8	2.5	5.5	-3.0
1931.....	1.6	1.3	( <sup>2</sup> )	1.3	.6	-2	-8	.5	-1.3	4.1	-5.4
1932.....	-2.0	-6	-1.1	.4	.2	-1.5	-3.0	.4	-3.4	2.6	-6.0
1933.....	-2.0	-5	-5	( <sup>2</sup> )	.1	-1.5	.2	.5	-4	2.1	-2.4
1934.....	1.1	.9	.2	.7	.4	-2	1.7	.7	1.0	2.6	-1.6
1935.....	2.9	2.0	.9	1.1	.5	.5	3.1	1.0	2.2	2.9	-.7
1936.....	5.0	3.1	1.7	1.4	.7	1.2	5.7	1.4	4.3	4.5	-.2
1937.....	6.2	3.6	1.7	2.0	.8	1.8	6.2	1.5	4.7	4.7	( <sup>2</sup> )
1938.....	4.3	2.2	.7	1.4	.6	1.5	3.3	1.0	2.3	3.2	-.9
1939.....	5.7	3.2	1.6	1.5	1.0	1.5	6.4	1.4	5.0	3.8	1.2
1940.....	9.1	5.4	3.0	2.3	1.3	2.4	9.3	2.8	6.5	4.0	2.4
1941.....	14.5	9.3	6.3	3.0	2.0	3.2	17.0	7.6	9.4	4.5	4.9
1942.....	19.7	11.7	7.1	4.5	3.5	4.5	20.9	11.4	9.5	4.3	5.2
1943.....	23.8	13.7	8.0	5.6	4.4	5.7	24.6	14.1	10.5	4.5	6.0
1944.....	23.0	13.0	7.3	5.7	3.9	6.1	23.3	12.9	10.4	4.7	5.7
1945.....	18.4	9.5	4.5	5.0	2.8	6.1	19.0	10.7	8.3	4.7	3.6
1946.....	17.3	8.4	2.1	6.3	1.8	7.1	22.6	9.1	13.4	5.8	7.7
1947.....	23.6	12.8	5.3	7.4	2.1	8.7	29.5	11.3	18.2	6.5	11.7
1948.....	30.8	16.8	7.4	9.4	2.9	11.2	33.0	12.5	20.5	7.2	13.3
1949.....	28.2	15.3	7.9	7.4	2.9	10.1	26.4	10.4	16.0	7.5	8.5
1950.....	35.7	20.4	12.0	8.4	4.0	11.3	40.6	17.9	22.8	9.2	13.6
1951.....	41.0	24.4	13.5	10.9	4.5	12.0	42.2	22.4	19.7	9.0	10.7
1952.....	37.7	21.1	11.8	9.3	4.8	11.8	36.7	19.5	17.2	9.0	8.3
1953.....	37.3	21.4	12.1	9.3	4.9	11.0	38.3	20.2	18.1	9.2	8.9
1954.....	33.7	18.4	10.1	8.3	4.4	11.0	34.1	17.2	16.8	9.8	7.0
1955.....	43.1	25.0	14.2	10.8	5.4	12.8	44.9	21.8	23.0	11.2	11.8
1956.....	42.0	23.5	12.6	10.9	5.6	12.9	44.7	21.2	23.5	12.1	11.3
1957.....	41.7	22.9	13.1	9.8	5.5	13.3	43.2	20.9	22.3	12.6	9.7
1958.....	37.2	18.3	9.0	9.3	5.6	13.3	37.4	18.6	18.8	12.4	6.4
1959.....	46.4	24.8	13.2	11.6	6.4	15.2	46.8	23.1	23.7	13.4	10.3
1960.....	45.1	23.3	12.0	11.3	6.8	15.0	45.0	22.3	22.7	14.1	8.6
1961 <sup>3,4</sup> .....	46.2	23.0	11.6	11.4	7.1	16.0	46.1	22.8	23.3	14.4	8.8
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1959: I.....	45.3	23.9	12.8	11.1	6.3	15.1	46.1	22.8	23.4	13.0	10.4
II.....	50.2	27.7	15.8	12.0	6.8	15.7	51.5	25.4	26.1	13.3	12.8
III.....	44.4	24.1	12.2	11.9	6.0	14.3	44.8	22.1	22.7	13.7	9.0
IV.....	45.5	23.4	11.9	11.5	6.4	15.8	44.9	22.1	22.7	13.8	8.9
1960: I.....	47.4	25.5	13.9	11.5	6.7	15.2	48.1	23.9	24.2	14.0	10.2
II.....	45.9	23.4	12.0	11.4	6.9	15.5	46.3	23.0	23.3	14.0	9.3
III.....	44.1	22.6	11.4	11.3	6.6	14.9	43.2	21.4	21.7	14.1	7.6
IV.....	42.9	21.6	10.7	10.9	6.8	14.6	42.6	21.1	21.4	14.3	7.2
1961: I.....	40.0	18.8	8.5	10.4	6.5	14.6	39.6	19.6	20.0	14.2	5.8
II.....	45.5	22.3	11.2	11.2	7.1	16.1	45.2	22.4	22.8	14.2	8.6
III.....	47.0	23.6	12.1	11.5	7.3	16.1	47.2	23.3	23.8	14.3	9.5
IV <sup>5</sup> .....	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	( <sup>5</sup> )	15.0	( <sup>5</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> Federal and State corporate income and excess profits taxes.

<sup>2</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>4</sup> Data for corporate profits are approximations for the year as a whole; data for fourth quarter are not available. All other data incorporating or derived from these figures are correspondingly approximate.

<sup>5</sup> Not available.

Source: Department of Commerce (except as noted).

TABLE B-63.—Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, private manufacturing corporations, by industry group, 1958-61

Year or quarter	All private manufacturing corporations	Durable goods industries											
		Lumber and wood products (except furniture)	Furniture and fixtures	Stone, clay, and glass products	Primary iron and steel industries	Primary non-ferrous metal industries	Fabricated metal products	Machinery (except electrical)	Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies	Motor vehicles and equipment	Other transportation equipment	Instruments and related products	Miscellaneous manufacturing (including ordnance)
<i>Ratio of profits after Federal taxes (annual rate) to stockholders' equity—percent</i>													
<b>BASED ON 1957 SIC<sup>1</sup></b>													
1958: I.....	6.8	0.2	2.	3.4	5.3	5.7	5.0	5.6	8.3	8.3	11.6	7.0	3.6
II.....	7.8	3.1	3.	1.0	6.5	4.6	7.3	7.7	9.1	5.9	10.3	9.6	5.7
III.....	9.0	11.0	8.	4.7	6.5	5.6	8.8	7.1	9.9	1.5	10.3	12.2	13.7
IV.....	10.7	8.4	11.	1.4	10.4	7.9	7.9	7.0	13.4	16.9	10.6	13.6	9.2
1959: I.....	10.0	6.1	6.	8.0	11.7	8.2	5.9	7.1	10.7	19.1	7.8	10.8	7.2
II.....	12.4	11.3	9.	17.4	16.7	10.3	9.7	12.5	12.7	20.5	9.6	12.0	7.1
III.....	9.6	12.9	11.	15.7	-2.7	6.7	10.9	10.7	12.1	8.0	6.6	14.5	12.4
IV.....	9.6	7.0	8.3	9.8	6.3	6.7	5.6	8.5	14.3	10.8	6.7	14.8	10.2
1960: I.....	9.8	3.3	5.5	6.7	12.1	8.0	5.3	8.1	10.4	18.5	6.7	11.6	5.7
II.....	9.9	6.2	5.8	13.1	8.0	8.2	6.9	9.7	10.0	16.1	7.8	12.1	7.9
III.....	8.7	4.6	8.2	11.9	4.0	6.8	7.2	6.9	9.1	6.1	5.3	11.9	11.5
IV.....	8.4	.3	6.5	7.8	4.6	5.5	3.0	5.6	8.6	13.2	3.6	10.8	11.6
1961: I.....	6.8	-.6	-1.1	2.9	3.2	6.1	2.5	5.7	7.3	8.0	6.4	7.1	5.9
II.....	9.2	6.2	4.0	10.9	7.0	8.0	7.3	9.1	8.2	13.2	8.3	9.9	7.2
III.....	8.8	6.8	7.0	11.7	6.4	6.1	7.7	7.8	8.1	6.3	8.2	11.6	12.6
<i>Profits after taxes per dollar of sales—cents</i>													
<b>BASED ON 1957 SIC<sup>1</sup></b>													
1958: I.....	3.4	0.1	0.7	2.7	4.2	4.7	2.5	3.0	3.2	3.7	2.7	3.8	1.5
II.....	3.8	1.6	1.2	7.2	4.9	3.8	3.2	3.9	3.5	2.9	2.3	5.0	2.2
III.....	4.4	5.0	2.8	8.8	5.0	4.4	3.6	3.9	3.9	1.0	2.4	6.3	4.8
IV.....	4.9	3.8	3.2	7.3	7.1	5.8	3.2	3.7	4.7	6.8	2.5	6.3	3.3
1959: I.....	4.7	3.0	2.0	5.7	7.1	6.0	2.6	3.8	4.0	7.4	2.0	5.7	2.9
II.....	5.5	4.7	2.8	9.8	8.1	7.0	3.8	5.8	4.5	7.8	2.2	6.0	2.6
III.....	4.6	5.4	3.4	9.1	-3.1	5.1	4.1	5.3	4.4	4.2	1.5	7.3	4.6
IV.....	4.5	3.2	2.4	6.4	4.8	5.0	2.3	4.3	4.8	5.0	1.5	6.8	3.7
1960: I.....	4.7	1.7	1.9	5.0	7.0	5.9	2.4	4.1	3.9	6.9	1.6	6.0	2.4
II.....	4.6	2.7	1.9	8.2	5.3	6.0	2.9	4.5	3.6	6.6	1.8	6.2	3.1
III.....	4.3	2.1	2.6	7.4	3.2	5.2	3.0	3.6	3.5	3.5	1.3	6.2	4.1
IV.....	4.0	.1	2.1	5.4	3.9	4.3	1.3	3.0	3.2	5.8	.8	5.3	4.1
1961: I.....	3.5	-.3	-.4	2.4	2.7	4.8	1.2	3.2	2.9	4.1	1.5	4.0	2.5
II.....	4.4	2.9	1.3	6.8	5.0	5.9	3.0	4.6	3.2	5.8	1.8	5.3	2.8
III.....	4.3	3.0	2.1	7.0	4.6	4.8	3.1	4.2	3.3	3.8	1.9	6.0	4.2

See footnotes at end of table, p. 281.



TABLE B-63.—Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, private manufacturing corporations, by industry group, 1958-61—Continued

Year or quarter	Nondurable goods industries										
	Food and kindred products	Tobacco manufactures	Textile mill products	Apparel and related products	Paper and allied products	Printing and publishing (except newspapers)	Chemicals and allied products	Petroleum refining	Products of petroleum and coal (except petroleum refining)	Rubber products	Leather and leather products
<i>Ratio of profits after Federal taxes (annual rate) to stockholders' equity—percent</i>											
<b>BASED ON 1957 SIC <sup>1</sup></b>											
1958: I.....	6.8	11.8	0.6	3.3	7.0	8.4	9.8	8.9	-2.4	5.3	4.1
II.....	8.5	13.3	2.5	1.5	7.9	9.4	11.0	8.2	8.3	8.7	3.2
III.....	9.8	14.5	5.1	9.4	7.9	11.5	11.8	10.4	12.4	11.5	8.3
IV.....	9.7	14.3	5.8	5.5	9.3	6.6	12.8	12.3	6.2	10.8	6.9
1959: I.....	7.8	12.0	5.9	8.6	8.5	9.8	13.0	10.1	4.0	10.0	6.9
II.....	9.5	14.2	8.1	7.5	10.2	12.0	15.6	9.4	13.6	13.1	8.9
III.....	10.4	14.4	7.6	10.1	9.6	14.9	14.1	9.7	19.3	11.1	8.7
IV.....	9.4	12.8	8.6	8.1	9.6	8.8	11.9	10.1	7.2	9.9	9.2
1960: I.....	7.6	12.0	6.6	5.2	8.5	11.3	12.5	9.8	.9	9.8	10.4
II.....	8.8	13.6	6.1	6.9	9.3	10.2	13.6	8.8	8.3	10.5	6.2
III.....	9.8	13.7	5.7	11.9	8.2	11.8	12.1	10.3	22.1	8.2	3.6
IV.....	8.7	14.2	5.0	6.8	8.1	9.0	10.6	11.5	8.8	7.9	5.0
1961: I.....	7.2	12.0	2.6	2.1	6.6	7.5	9.8	10.6	-6.6	6.7	3.3
II.....	9.2	14.1	4.3	2.6	8.3	6.8	13.2	9.6	14.4	10.6	2.6
III.....	10.0	14.3	6.0	11.2	7.3	11.2	11.8	9.6	20.6	9.2	4.7
<i>Profits after taxes per dollar of sales—cents</i>											
<b>BASED ON 1957 SIC <sup>1</sup></b>											
1958: I.....	1.8	5.1	0.3	0.7	4.3	2.9	6.4	8.2	-1.5	2.2	1.3
II.....	2.2	5.2	1.2	.3	4.8	3.4	6.7	8.2	3.5	3.3	1.0
III.....	2.5	5.5	2.3	1.7	4.6	4.1	7.1	9.9	4.2	4.4	2.4
IV.....	2.4	5.6	2.4	1.0	5.3	2.3	7.6	11.3	2.9	3.9	1.9
1959: I.....	2.1	5.2	2.5	1.6	5.0	3.6	7.7	9.3	1.9	3.9	1.9
II.....	2.5	5.5	3.2	1.4	5.5	4.2	8.5	9.4	5.7	4.4	2.4
III.....	2.7	5.6	3.0	1.8	5.2	5.1	8.1	9.5	7.1	4.1	2.2
IV.....	2.5	5.2	3.3	1.4	5.2	2.9	7.2	9.9	3.3	3.7	2.4
1960: I.....	2.1	5.2	2.8	1.0	4.9	4.0	7.6	9.4	.5	3.8	2.7
II.....	2.4	5.4	2.5	1.3	5.4	3.6	7.8	8.9	3.2	3.9	1.6
III.....	2.6	5.5	2.5	2.0	4.8	3.9	7.4	10.2	6.4	3.3	.9
IV.....	2.2	5.8	2.1	1.1	4.8	2.9	6.9	11.0	3.1	3.2	1.4
1961: I.....	1.9	5.3	1.2	.4	4.1	2.6	6.5	10.4	-3.0	2.9	.9
II.....	2.4	5.7	1.8	.5	4.8	2.3	7.8	9.9	4.9	4.2	.7
III.....	2.6	5.9	2.5	1.8	4.3	3.7	7.4	9.8	6.0	3.8	1.2

<sup>1</sup> Standard Industrial Classification.

NOTE.—Data on a comparable basis are not available for earlier periods. For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see *Quarterly Financial Reports for U.S. Manufacturing Corporations*, Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included for all periods.

Sources: Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.

TABLE B-64.—Relation of profits before and after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, private manufacturing corporations, by asset size class, 1958-61

Year or quarter	Asset size class (millions of dollars)											
	All asset sizes		Under 1		1 to 10		10 to 100		100 to 1,000		1,000 and over	
	<i>Ratio of profits (annual rate) to stockholders' equity—percent</i>											
	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes
<b>BASED ON 1957 SIC <sup>1</sup></b>												
1958: I.....	12.9	6.8	5.5	0.4	9.8	3.5	13.0	6.3	14.2	7.4	14.3	9.5
II.....	13.9	7.8	11.4	5.4	13.3	6.0	14.4	7.2	15.7	8.3	12.3	8.8
III.....	15.9	9.0	16.5	9.3	17.1	8.3	16.9	8.5	17.8	9.4	12.3	9.1
IV.....	18.8	10.7	7.8	2.5	14.9	7.3	18.5	9.7	20.2	11.2	21.4	14.2
1959: I.....	18.7	10.0	12.5	5.7	15.1	6.9	17.5	8.7	19.2	10.1	21.7	12.9
II.....	23.1	12.4	20.4	11.7	20.2	10.1	22.4	11.4	23.8	12.5	24.5	14.3
III.....	17.1	9.6	21.1	12.4	19.8	9.9	20.7	10.5	17.6	9.4	12.1	8.6
IV.....	16.8	9.6	8.8	3.3	14.6	7.0	19.0	10.0	18.4	10.4	15.9	10.7
1960: I.....	18.4	9.8	11.7	5.0	14.1	6.3	17.1	8.4	18.5	9.8	21.9	13.0
II.....	18.0	9.9	15.2	8.0	16.4	7.6	17.9	9.0	18.3	10.1	19.0	11.5
III.....	15.4	8.7	16.7	9.0	14.6	6.9	16.3	8.2	16.9	9.1	13.3	9.1
IV.....	14.8	8.4	5.0	.5	9.2	3.6	14.5	7.4	16.2	9.2	17.4	11.4
1961: I.....	12.6	6.8	6.3	.9	8.3	2.6	11.8	5.6	13.9	7.5	14.4	9.5
II.....	16.8	9.2	13.7	6.8	14.7	6.9	16.3	8.3	17.1	9.1	18.0	11.2
III.....	15.8	8.8	15.8	8.4	16.8	8.2	16.3	8.1	17.1	9.2	13.6	9.2
	<i>Profits per dollar of sales—cents</i>											
	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes	Before taxes	After taxes
<b>BASED ON 1957 SIC <sup>1</sup></b>												
1958: I.....	6.4	3.4	1.3	0.1	3.8	1.4	6.5	3.1	7.5	3.9	10.6	7.0
II.....	6.8	3.8	2.5	1.2	5.0	2.3	7.0	3.5	8.0	4.2	9.7	6.9
III.....	7.7	4.4	3.6	2.1	6.1	2.9	8.1	4.0	8.9	4.7	10.4	7.7
IV.....	8.6	4.9	1.6	.5	5.3	2.6	8.5	4.5	9.7	5.4	14.9	9.9
1959: I.....	8.9	4.7	2.8	1.3	5.4	2.5	8.4	4.2	9.6	5.0	15.2	9.0
II.....	10.2	5.5	4.2	2.4	6.6	3.3	9.9	5.0	10.9	5.7	16.4	9.6
III.....	8.2	4.6	4.3	2.5	6.7	3.4	9.5	4.8	8.8	4.7	10.2	7.3
IV.....	7.9	4.5	1.8	.7	4.9	2.4	8.7	4.5	9.1	5.1	12.2	8.2
1960: I.....	8.7	4.7	2.6	1.1	5.0	2.2	8.1	4.0	9.3	4.9	14.5	8.6
II.....	8.4	4.6	3.2	1.6	5.6	2.6	8.2	4.1	9.0	5.0	13.2	8.0
III.....	7.6	4.3	3.5	1.9	5.1	2.4	7.7	3.9	8.7	4.7	10.6	7.3
IV.....	7.1	4.0	1.1	.1	3.2	1.3	6.9	3.5	8.3	4.7	12.7	8.3
1961: I.....	6.5	3.5	1.4	.2	3.0	.9	6.0	2.8	7.4	4.0	11.6	7.7
II.....	8.0	4.4	2.9	1.5	4.8	2.3	7.6	3.9	8.4	4.5	13.6	8.5
III.....	7.7	4.3	3.4	1.8	5.5	2.7	7.7	3.8	8.5	4.6	11.4	7.7

<sup>1</sup> Standard Industrial Classification.

NOTE.—Data on a comparable basis are not available for earlier periods. For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see *Quarterly Financial Reports for U.S. Manufacturing Corporations*, Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.

Data for Alaska and Hawaii included for all periods.

Sources: Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.

TABLE B-65.—Sources and uses of corporate funds, 1950-61<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars]

Source or use of funds	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Total uses</b> .....	36.5	36.8	27.3	28.2	24.0	45.1	39.5	37.8	31.5	45.2	39.1	42.1
Plant and equipment outlays.....	16.9	21.6	22.4	23.9	22.4	24.2	29.9	32.7	26.4	27.7	30.8	30.4
Inventories (book value).....	9.8	9.8	1.3	1.8	-1.6	6.7	7.6	2.1	-2.4	5.7	3.0	2.2
Customer net receivables <sup>3</sup> .....	5.0	2.0	3.1	.7	2.4	6.4	3.3	2.1	2.9	5.5	6.5	4.8
Cash and U.S. Government securities.....	4.5	2.8	.1	1.8	( <sup>4</sup> )	5.0	-4.3	-.3	2.6	3.6	-3.1	1.5
Other assets.....	.3	.6	.4	( <sup>4</sup> )	.8	2.8	3.0	1.3	1.9	2.7	2.9	3.2
<b>Total sources</b> .....	35.4	36.9	28.1	30.0	22.4	44.8	42.4	40.1	35.7	48.0	41.4	44.4
<b>Internal sources</b> .....	20.8	19.0	17.8	19.7	19.8	26.6	27.8	28.0	26.0	30.6	30.3	32.1
Retained profits and depletion allowances.....	13.0	10.0	7.4	7.9	6.3	10.9	10.5	8.9	5.7	9.1	7.4	7.7
Depreciation and amortization allowances.....	7.8	9.0	10.4	11.8	13.5	15.7	17.3	19.1	20.3	21.5	22.9	24.4
<b>External sources</b> .....	14.6	17.9	10.3	10.3	2.6	18.2	14.6	12.2	9.8	17.4	11.1	12.3
Federal income tax liability.....	7.3	4.3	-3.1	.6	-3.1	3.8	-1.7	-2.2	-2.5	2.4	-1.5	( <sup>4</sup> )
Other liabilities.....	1.0	1.9	2.4	2.2	.4	2.1	3.0	2.1	1.8	2.0	1.5	1.2
Bank loans and mortgage loans.....	2.6	5.4	3.1	.4	-.6	5.4	5.4	1.7	1.1	5.2	3.1	1.7
Net new issues.....	3.7	6.3	7.9	7.1	5.9	6.9	7.9	10.6	9.4	7.8	8.0	9.4
<b>Discrepancy (uses less sources)</b> .....	1.1	-.1	-.8	-1.8	1.6	.3	-2.9	-2.3	-4.2	-2.8	-2.3	-2.2

<sup>1</sup> Excludes banks and insurance companies.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary estimates.

<sup>3</sup> Receivables are net of payables, which are therefore not shown separately.

<sup>4</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary estimate by Council of Economic Advisers.

Source: Department of Commerce based on Securities and Exchange Commission and other financial data (except as noted).

TABLE B-66.—Current assets and liabilities of United States corporations, 1939-61<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Current assets						Current liabilities					Net working capital	
	Total	Cash on hand and in banks	U.S. Government securities	Receivables from U.S. Government <sup>2</sup>	Other notes and accounts receivable	Inventories	Other current assets <sup>3</sup>	Total	Advances and prepayments, U.S. Government <sup>3</sup>	Other notes and accounts payable	Federal income tax liabilities		Other current liabilities
1939.....	54.5	10.8	2.2	-----	22.1	18.0	1.4	30.0	-----	21.9	1.2	6.9	24.5
1940.....	60.3	13.1	2.0	0.1	23.9	19.8	1.5	32.8	0.6	22.6	2.5	7.1	27.5
1941.....	72.9	13.9	4.0	.6	27.4	25.6	1.4	40.7	.8	25.6	7.1	7.2	32.3
1942.....	83.6	17.6	10.1	4.0	23.3	27.3	1.3	47.3	2.0	24.0	12.6	8.7	36.3
1943.....	93.8	21.6	16.4	5.0	21.9	27.6	1.3	51.6	2.2	24.1	16.6	8.7	42.1
1944.....	97.2	21.6	20.9	4.7	21.8	26.8	1.4	51.7	1.8	25.0	15.5	9.4	45.6
1945.....	97.4	21.7	21.1	2.7	23.2	26.3	2.4	45.8	.9	24.8	10.4	9.7	51.6
1946.....	108.1	22.8	15.3	.7	30.0	37.6	1.7	51.9	.1	31.5	8.5	11.8	56.2
1947.....	123.6	25.0	14.1	-----	38.3	44.6	1.6	61.5	-----	37.6	10.7	13.2	62.1
1948.....	133.0	25.3	14.8	-----	42.4	49.9	1.6	64.4	-----	39.3	11.5	13.5	68.6
1949.....	133.1	26.5	16.8	-----	43.0	45.3	1.4	60.7	-----	37.5	9.3	14.0	72.4
1950.....	161.5	28.1	19.7	1.1	55.7	55.1	1.7	79.8	.4	47.9	16.7	14.9	81.6
1951.....	179.1	30.0	20.7	2.7	58.8	64.9	2.1	92.6	1.3	53.6	21.3	16.5	86.5
1952.....	186.2	30.8	19.9	2.8	64.6	65.8	2.4	96.1	2.3	57.0	18.1	18.7	90.1
1953.....	190.6	31.1	21.5	2.6	65.9	67.2	2.4	98.9	2.2	57.3	18.7	20.7	91.8
1954.....	194.6	33.4	19.2	2.4	71.2	65.3	3.1	99.7	2.4	59.3	15.5	22.5	94.9
1955.....	224.0	34.6	23.5	2.3	86.6	72.8	4.2	121.0	2.3	73.8	19.3	25.7	103.0
1956.....	237.9	34.8	19.1	2.6	95.1	80.4	5.9	130.5	2.4	81.5	17.6	29.0	107.4
1957.....	244.7	34.9	18.6	2.8	99.4	82.2	6.7	133.1	2.3	84.3	15.4	31.1	111.6
1958.....	255.3	37.4	18.8	2.8	106.9	81.9	7.5	136.6	1.7	86.7	12.9	33.3	118.7
1959.....	278.7	37.2	22.6	2.9	119.0	88.2	8.8	151.2	1.7	99.0	15.3	35.2	127.5
1960.....	287.4	37.0	19.7	3.1	126.5	91.3	9.8	154.9	1.8	102.6	13.8	36.8	132.5
1960: I.....	259.3	34.6	20.2	2.8	109.0	84.5	8.3	137.8	1.7	89.5	12.5	34.2	121.5
1960: II.....	267.5	35.9	20.7	2.7	113.3	86.3	8.7	143.1	1.7	92.8	13.4	35.2	124.4
1960: III.....	272.3	35.6	21.9	2.7	116.3	86.7	8.9	146.4	1.7	94.9	14.3	35.6	125.9
1960: IV.....	278.7	37.2	22.6	2.9	119.0	88.2	8.8	151.2	1.7	99.0	15.3	35.2	127.5
1960: I.....	281.3	33.8	22.4	2.9	120.3	91.9	9.9	151.6	1.8	99.6	13.9	36.2	129.7
1960: II.....	283.0	34.6	20.7	2.9	122.8	92.1	10.0	152.9	1.8	101.3	12.9	36.9	130.2
1960: III.....	285.8	35.0	19.3	2.9	125.8	92.6	10.1	154.2	1.8	101.9	13.4	37.2	131.6
1960: IV.....	287.4	37.0	19.7	3.1	126.5	91.3	9.8	154.9	1.8	102.6	13.8	36.8	132.5
1961: I.....	286.6	34.8	19.5	3.2	125.5	92.9	10.7	152.3	1.8	100.9	12.1	37.5	134.3
1961: II.....	291.4	36.1	19.4	3.1	129.2	92.3	11.3	153.5	1.7	102.4	11.7	37.7	137.9
1961: III.....	296.2	36.8	18.4	3.2	132.9	93.2	11.7	156.9	1.8	104.0	12.7	38.4	139.3

<sup>1</sup> All United States corporations, excluding banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance companies. Year-end data through 1958 are based on *Statistics of Income* (Treasury Department), covering virtually all corporations in the United States. *Statistics of Income* data may not be strictly comparable from year to year because of changes in the tax laws, basis for filing returns, and processing of data for compilation purposes. All other figures shown are estimates based on data compiled from many different sources, including data on corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. As more complete information becomes available, estimates are revised.

<sup>2</sup> Receivables from and payables to U.S. Government do not include amounts offset against each other on the corporation's books or amounts arising from subcontracting which are not directly due from or to the U.S. Government. Wherever possible, adjustments have been made to include U.S. Government advances offset against inventories on the corporation's books.

<sup>3</sup> Includes marketable securities other than U.S. Government.

Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.

TABLE B-67.—State and municipal and corporate securities offered, 1934-67<sup>1</sup>

[Millions of dollars]

Year or quarter	State and municipal securities offered for cash (principal amounts)	Corporate securities offered for cash <sup>2</sup>									
		Gross proceeds <sup>3</sup>				Proposed uses of net proceeds <sup>4</sup>					
		Total	Common stock	Preferred stock	Bonds and notes	Total	New money			Retirement of securities	Other purposes
							Total	Plant and equipment	Working capital		
1934.....	939	397	19	6	371	384	57	32	26	231	95
1935.....	1,232	2,332	22	86	2,225	2,266	208	111	96	1,865	193
1936.....	1,121	4,572	272	271	4,029	4,431	858	380	478	3,368	204
1937.....	908	2,310	285	406	1,618	2,239	991	574	417	1,100	148
1938.....	1,108	2,155	25	86	2,044	2,110	681	504	177	1,206	222
1939.....	1,128	2,164	87	98	1,980	2,115	325	170	155	1,695	95
1940.....	1,238	2,677	108	183	2,386	2,615	569	424	145	1,854	192
1941.....	956	2,667	110	167	2,390	2,623	868	661	207	1,583	172
1942.....	524	1,062	34	112	917	1,043	474	287	187	396	173
1943.....	435	1,170	56	124	990	1,147	308	141	167	739	100
1944.....	661	3,202	163	369	2,669	3,142	657	252	405	2,389	96
1945.....	795	6,011	397	758	4,855	5,902	1,080	638	442	4,555	267
1946.....	1,157	6,900	891	1,127	4,882	6,757	3,279	2,115	1,164	2,868	610
1947.....	2,324	6,577	779	762	5,036	6,466	4,591	3,409	1,182	1,352	524
1948.....	2,690	7,078	614	492	5,973	6,959	5,929	4,221	1,708	307	722
1949.....	2,907	6,052	736	425	4,890	5,959	4,606	3,724	882	401	952
1950.....	3,532	6,361	811	631	4,920	6,261	4,006	2,966	1,041	1,271	984
1951.....	3,189	7,741	1,212	838	5,691	7,607	6,531	5,110	1,421	480	589
1952.....	4,401	9,534	1,369	564	7,601	9,380	8,180	6,312	1,868	664	537
1953.....	5,558	8,898	1,326	489	7,083	8,755	7,960	5,647	2,313	260	535
1954.....	6,969	9,516	1,213	816	7,488	9,365	6,780	5,110	1,670	1,875	709
1955.....	5,977	10,240	2,185	635	7,420	10,049	7,957	5,333	2,624	1,227	864
1956.....	5,446	10,939	2,301	636	8,002	10,749	9,663	6,709	2,954	364	721
1957.....	6,958	12,884	2,516	411	9,957	12,661	11,784	9,040	2,744	214	663
1958.....	7,449	11,558	1,334	571	9,653	11,372	9,907	7,792	2,115	549	915
1959.....	7,681	9,748	2,027	531	7,190	9,527	8,578	6,084	2,494	135	814
1960.....	7,230	10,154	1,664	409	8,081	9,924	8,758	5,662	3,097	271	895
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	8,330	12,894	3,281	447	9,167	12,619	10,635	7,354	3,281	885	1,099
1959: I.....	2,157	2,282	518	142	1,622	2,232	1,899	1,367	531	28	306
II.....	2,504	2,665	639	173	1,854	2,603	2,414	1,712	702	36	153
III.....	1,500	2,062	333	63	1,066	2,016	1,817	1,096	721	37	162
IV.....	1,520	2,739	537	154	2,048	2,675	2,448	1,909	539	33	195
1960: I.....	1,885	2,265	435	100	1,729	2,214	1,972	1,180	791	69	174
II.....	2,252	2,537	582	112	1,845	2,465	2,181	1,412	768	83	201
III.....	1,764	2,520	337	82	2,091	2,467	2,222	1,480	742	39	205
IV.....	1,329	2,832	310	106	2,417	2,778	2,384	1,589	795	80	315
1961: I.....	2,122	1,992	354	96	1,543	1,951	1,648	952	695	142	161
II.....	2,370	5,352	1,582	192	3,578	5,261	4,272	3,373	899	586	423
III.....	1,766	2,566	571	82	1,913	2,501	2,120	1,396	723	63	318
IV <sup>5</sup> .....	2,072	2,084	774	77	2,133	2,906	2,596	1,633	963	113	198

<sup>1</sup> These data cover substantially all new issues of State, municipal, and corporate securities offered for cash sale in the United States in amounts over \$100,000 and with terms to maturity of more than 1 year.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes notes issued exclusively to commercial banks, intercorporate transactions, sales of investment company issues, and issues to be sold over an extended period, such as offerings under employee-purchase plans.

<sup>3</sup> Number of units multiplied by offering price.

<sup>4</sup> Net proceeds represents the amount received by the issuer after payment of compensation to distributors and other costs of flotation.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Data for Alaska and Hawaii included for all periods.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission, *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, and *The Bond Buyer*.

TABLE B-68.—Common stock prices and earnings and stock market credit, 1939-61

Year or month	Common stock price index, 1957-59=100 (SEC) <sup>1</sup>	Common stock price/earnings ratio—industrials (Standard & Poor's) <sup>2</sup>	Stock market credit			
			Customer credit (excluding U.S. Government securities)			Bank loans to brokers and dealers <sup>5</sup>
			Total	Net debit balances <sup>3</sup>	Bank loans to "others" <sup>4</sup>	
Millions of dollars						
1939.....	26.8	12.17	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	715
1940.....	25.3	11.03	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	584
1941.....	23.0	9.65	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	535
1942.....	20.1	10.14	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	850
1943.....	26.6	17.58	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	1,328
1944.....	29.0	16.95	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	353	2,137
1945.....	35.2	22.99	1,374	942	432	2,782
1946.....	40.1	11.01	976	473	503	1,471
1947.....	35.1	9.14	1,032	517	515	1,784
1948.....	35.6	5.86	968	499	469	1,331
1949.....	34.3	6.76	1,249	821	428	1,608
1950.....	41.4	7.51	1,798	1,237	561	1,742
1951.....	49.6	9.62	1,826	1,253	573	1,419
1952.....	52.3	10.22	1,980	1,332	648	2,002
1953.....	51.9	9.68	2,445	1,665	780	2,248
1954.....	61.7	12.17	3,436	2,388	1,048	2,688
1955.....	81.8	12.65	4,030	2,791	1,239	2,852
1956.....	92.6	13.54	3,984	2,823	1,161	2,214
1957.....	89.8	12.91	3,576	2,482	1,094	2,190
1958.....	93.2	17.71	4,537	3,285	1,252	2,569
1959.....	116.7	19.79	4,461	3,280	1,181	2,584
1960.....	113.9	18.92	4,415	3,222	1,193	2,614
1961.....	134.2	.....	5,602	4,259	1,343	3,418
1960: January.....	117.6	.....	4,372	3,198	1,174	1,921
February.....	114.1	.....	4,281	3,129	1,152	1,816
March.....	112.1	15.87	4,165	3,028	1,137	1,487
April.....	113.5	.....	4,161	3,037	1,124	1,817
May.....	113.2	.....	4,142	3,021	1,121	1,591
June.....	117.0	17.80	4,221	3,082	1,139	1,670
July.....	114.5	.....	4,143	3,004	1,139	1,665
August.....	115.6	.....	4,252	3,109	1,143	1,871
September.....	112.1	17.29	4,292	3,137	1,155	2,071
October.....	109.1	.....	4,303	3,133	1,170	1,961
November.....	112.6	.....	4,303	3,141	1,162	1,855
December.....	115.2	18.92	4,415	3,222	1,193	2,614
1961: January.....	120.9	.....	4,424	3,253	1,171	1,969
February.....	125.4	.....	4,532	3,358	1,174	2,001
March.....	129.8	23.88	4,787	3,601	1,186	1,805
April.....	133.0	.....	5,190	3,936	1,254	2,397
May.....	134.9	.....	5,386	4,080	1,326	2,439
June.....	132.8	21.65	5,367	4,024	1,343	2,441
July.....	132.7	.....	5,355	3,991	1,364	2,732
August.....	137.4	.....	5,349	3,972	1,377	2,136
September.....	136.2	18.58	5,311	3,991	1,320	2,637
October.....	138.0	.....	5,333	4,029	1,304	2,743
November.....	144.0	.....	5,460	4,141	1,319	2,583
December.....	145.8	.....	5,602	4,259	1,343	3,418

<sup>1</sup> Based on 300 stocks.

<sup>2</sup> Based on 50 stocks for 1939-56 and 425 stocks beginning 1957. Ratio is obtained by dividing the stock price index as of the end of the period by the seasonally adjusted annual rate of earnings for the quarter then ending.

<sup>3</sup> As reported by member firms of the New York Stock Exchange carrying margin accounts. Includes net debit balances of all customers (other than general partners in the reporting firm and member firms of national exchanges) whose combined accounts net to a debit. Balances secured by U.S. Government obligations are excluded. Data are for end of period.

<sup>4</sup> Loans by weekly reporting member banks to others than brokers and dealers for purchasing or carrying securities except U.S. Government obligations. From 1953 through June 1959, loans for purchasing or carrying U.S. Government securities were reported separately only by New York and Chicago banks. Accordingly, for that period any loans for purchasing or carrying such securities at other reporting banks are included. Series also revised beginning July 1946, March 1953, and July 1958. Data are for last Wednesday of period. For details, see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, August 1959.

<sup>5</sup> Loans by weekly reporting member banks for purchasing or carrying securities, including U.S. Government obligations. Series revised beginning July 1946, January 1952, July 1958, and July 1959. Data are for last Wednesday of period. For details, see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, August 1959.

<sup>6</sup> Not available.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Standard & Poor's Corporation, and New York Stock Exchange.

TABLE B-69.—Business population and business failures, 1929-61

Year or month	Operating businesses and business turnover (thousands of firms) <sup>1</sup>			New business incorporations (number) <sup>2</sup>	Business failures <sup>3,4</sup>						
	Operating businesses <sup>2</sup>	New businesses <sup>3</sup>	Discontinued businesses <sup>3</sup>		Business failure rate <sup>5</sup>	Number of failures			Amount of current liabilities (millions of dollars)		
						Total	Liability size class		Total	Liability size class	
							Under \$100,000	\$100,000 and over		Under \$100,000	\$100,000 and over
1929	3,029	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	103.9	22,909	22,165	744	483.3	261.5	221.8
1930	2,994	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	121.6	26,355	25,408	947	668.3	303.5	364.8
1931	2,916	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	133.4	28,285	27,230	1,055	736.3	354.2	382.2
1932	2,828	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	154.1	31,822	30,197	1,625	928.3	432.6	495.7
1933	2,782	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	100.3	19,859	18,880	979	457.5	215.5	242.0
1934	2,884	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	61.1	12,091	11,421	670	334.0	138.5	195.4
1935	2,992	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	61.7	12,244	11,691	553	310.6	135.5	175.1
1936	3,070	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	47.8	9,607	9,285	322	203.2	102.8	100.4
1937	3,136	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	45.9	9,490	9,203	287	183.3	101.9	81.4
1938	3,074	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	61.1	12,836	12,553	283	246.5	140.1	106.4
1939	3,222	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	69.6	14,768	14,541	227	182.5	132.9	49.7
1940	3,319	275	318	( <sup>6</sup> )	63.0	13,619	13,400	219	166.7	119.9	46.8
1941	3,276	290	271	( <sup>6</sup> )	54.4	11,848	11,685	163	136.1	100.7	35.4
1942	3,295	121	386	( <sup>6</sup> )	44.6	9,405	9,282	123	100.8	80.3	20.5
1943	3,030	146	337	( <sup>6</sup> )	16.4	3,221	3,155	66	45.3	30.2	15.1
1944	2,839	331	175	( <sup>6</sup> )	6.5	1,222	1,176	46	31.7	14.5	17.1
1945	2,995	423	176	( <sup>6</sup> )	4.2	809	759	50	30.2	11.4	18.8
1946	3,242	617	209	132,916	5.2	1,129	1,002	127	67.3	15.7	51.6
1947	3,651	461	239	112,638	14.3	3,474	3,103	371	204.6	63.7	140.9
1948	3,873	393	282	96,101	20.4	5,250	4,853	397	234.6	98.9	140.7
1949	3,984	331	306	85,491	34.4	9,246	8,708	538	308.1	161.4	146.7
1950	4,009	348	290	92,925	34.3	9,162	8,746	416	248.3	151.2	97.1
1951	4,067	327	276	83,649	30.7	8,058	7,626	432	259.5	131.6	128.0
1952	4,118	346	276	92,819	28.7	7,611	7,081	530	283.3	131.9	151.4
1953	4,188	352	299	102,545	33.2	8,862	8,075	787	394.2	167.5	226.6
1954	4,240	366	319	117,164	42.0	11,086	10,226	860	462.6	211.4	251.2
1955	4,287	408	314	139,651	41.6	10,969	10,113	856	449.4	206.4	243.0
1956	4,381	431	342	140,775	48.0	12,686	11,615	1,071	562.7	239.8	322.9
1957	4,471	398	335	136,697	51.7	13,739	12,547	1,192	615.3	267.1	348.2
1958	4,533	397	347	150,280	55.9	14,964	13,499	1,465	728.3	297.6	430.7
1959	4,583	423	347	193,067	51.8	14,053	12,707	1,346	692.8	278.9	413.9
1960	4,660	443	386	182,713	57.0	15,445	13,650	1,795	938.6	327.2	611.4
1961	4,717	-----	-----	181,538	64.4	17,075	15,006	2,069	1,090.1	370.1	720.0
1960: January	4,670	-----	-----	18,202	51.0	1,181	1,055	126	53.7	24.6	29.0
February	-----	-----	-----	14,681	50.7	1,214	1,091	123	60.9	24.4	36.6
March	-----	-----	-----	17,473	51.1	1,335	1,172	163	70.2	27.0	43.2
April	4,690	-----	-----	15,494	54.9	1,370	1,235	135	69.2	28.9	40.3
May	-----	-----	-----	15,571	54.1	1,273	1,153	120	73.3	27.8	45.5
June	-----	-----	-----	16,710	57.2	1,334	1,157	177	126.4	26.5	100.0
July	4,710	-----	-----	14,709	54.8	1,146	1,008	138	61.7	23.1	38.6
August	-----	-----	-----	15,028	59.6	1,315	1,137	178	97.6	27.4	70.2
September	-----	-----	-----	14,043	65.2	1,269	1,118	151	80.6	28.6	52.0
October	4,725	-----	-----	13,783	63.3	1,344	1,192	152	81.5	28.6	52.9
November	-----	-----	-----	12,435	62.0	1,311	1,126	185	84.5	28.9	55.6
December	-----	-----	-----	14,594	63.4	1,353	1,206	147	79.0	31.6	47.5
1961: January	4,730	-----	-----	16,350	61.1	1,404	1,241	163	81.5	33.0	48.6
February	-----	-----	-----	13,281	64.2	1,449	1,274	175	88.1	31.7	56.4
March	-----	-----	-----	16,783	62.9	1,610	1,369	241	126.6	33.3	93.3
April	4,740	-----	-----	14,815	60.8	1,441	1,271	170	86.1	32.1	54.0
May	-----	-----	-----	16,371	64.3	1,545	1,370	175	80.5	34.8	45.7
June	-----	-----	-----	16,418	60.7	1,403	1,206	197	83.8	28.9	55.0
July	4,755	-----	-----	14,483	62.5	1,275	1,133	142	69.2	28.9	40.2
August	-----	-----	-----	15,079	74.4	1,604	1,412	192	102.7	34.1	68.6
September	-----	-----	-----	13,616	67.5	1,285	1,143	142	116.7	27.5	89.1
October	4,770	-----	-----	15,492	69.5	1,446	1,301	145	70.3	31.2	39.0
November	-----	-----	-----	14,045	63.8	1,335	1,145	190	119.2	27.3	92.0
December	-----	-----	-----	14,805	63.6	1,278	1,141	137	65.5	27.3	38.2

<sup>1</sup> Excludes firms in the fields of agriculture and professional services. Includes self-employed person only if he has either an established place of business or at least one paid employee. Series revised beginning 1951.

<sup>2</sup> Data through 1939 are averages of end-of-quarter estimates centered at June 30. Beginning 1940, data are for beginning of period. Quarterly data shown here are seasonally adjusted.

<sup>3</sup> Total for period.

<sup>4</sup> Commercial and industrial failures only. Excludes failures of banks and railroads and, beginning 1933, of real estate, insurance, holding, and financial companies, steamship lines, travel agencies, etc.

<sup>5</sup> Failure rate per 10,000 listed enterprises. Monthly data are seasonally adjusted.

<sup>6</sup> Not available.

<sup>7</sup> Series revised; not strictly comparable with earlier data.

<sup>8</sup> Includes data for Hawaii beginning 1959 and Alaska beginning 1960. (Data for 1958 comparable to 1959 are 150,781; data for 1960 comparable to 1959 are 182,374.)

Sources: Department of Commerce and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

# AGRICULTURE

TABLE B-70.—Income from agriculture, 1929-61

Year or quarter	Income received by total farm population from agricultural sources		Income received by farm operators from farming					Net income per farm including net inventory change <sup>1</sup>	
			Realized gross		Production expenses	Net			
	Total <sup>1</sup>	Farm wages <sup>2</sup>	Total <sup>3</sup>	Cash receipts from marketings		Excluding net inventory change	Including net inventory change <sup>4</sup>	Current prices	1961 prices <sup>5</sup>
					Billions of dollars				
1929.....	7.0	0.9	13.9	11.3	7.6	6.3	6.1	943	1,779
1930.....	5.1	.8	11.4	9.1	6.9	4.5	4.3	650	1,327
1931.....	4.0	.6	8.4	6.4	5.5	2.9	3.3	506	1,177
1932.....	2.5	.5	6.4	4.7	4.4	1.9	2.0	305	847
1933.....	3.0	.4	7.1	5.3	4.3	2.8	2.6	382	1,032
1934.....	3.4	.5	8.5	6.4	4.7	3.9	2.9	434	1,033
1935.....	5.9	.6	9.7	7.1	5.1	4.6	5.3	778	1,809
1936.....	5.0	.6	10.7	8.4	5.6	5.1	4.3	643	1,495
1937.....	6.8	.7	11.3	8.9	6.1	5.2	6.0	911	2,070
1938.....	5.1	.7	10.1	7.7	5.8	4.3	4.4	675	1,607
1939.....	5.2	.7	10.6	7.9	6.2	4.4	4.5	697	1,700
1940.....	5.3	.7	11.0	8.4	6.7	4.3	4.6	720	1,714
1941.....	7.5	.9	13.8	11.1	7.7	6.2	6.6	1,044	2,327
1942.....	11.1	1.2	18.8	15.6	9.9	8.8	9.9	1,600	3,130
1943.....	13.2	1.4	23.4	19.6	11.5	11.9	11.8	1,942	3,407
1944.....	13.4	1.5	24.4	20.5	12.2	12.2	11.8	1,967	3,278
1945.....	14.0	1.6	25.8	21.7	12.9	12.8	12.4	2,080	3,302
1946.....	17.0	1.8	29.7	24.8	14.5	15.2	15.3	2,574	3,730
1947.....	17.5	1.9	34.4	29.6	17.0	17.3	15.5	2,648	3,289
1948.....	19.8	2.0	34.9	30.2	18.9	16.1	17.8	3,065	3,564
1949.....	14.7	1.8	31.8	27.8	18.0	13.8	12.9	2,259	2,689
1950.....	15.7	1.7	32.5	28.5	19.3	13.2	14.0	2,479	2,916
1951.....	18.1	1.8	37.3	33.0	22.2	15.2	16.3	2,951	3,208
1952.....	17.3	1.9	37.0	32.6	22.6	14.4	15.3	2,829	3,042
1953.....	15.1	1.8	35.3	31.1	21.4	13.9	13.3	2,502	2,720
1954.....	14.4	1.8	33.9	30.0	21.7	12.2	12.7	2,700	2,903
1955.....	13.5	1.7	33.3	29.6	21.9	11.5	11.8	2,572	2,766
1956.....	13.4	1.7	34.6	30.6	22.6	12.0	11.6	2,611	2,778
1957.....	13.6	1.8	34.4	29.8	23.4	11.0	11.8	2,724	2,808
1958.....	15.4	1.8	37.9	33.4	25.3	12.6	13.5	3,226	3,259
1959.....	13.1	1.8	37.5	33.5	26.3	11.2	11.3	2,760	2,788
1960.....	13.7	1.8	38.1	34.0	26.4	11.7	12.0	2,990	2,990
1961 <sup>6</sup> .....	14.8	1.8	39.6	34.8	26.9	12.7	13.0	3,333	3,333
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1960: I.....	(9)	(9)	36.8	32.7	26.4	10.4	10.5	2,620	2,650
II.....	(9)	(9)	38.5	34.4	26.5	12.0	12.3	3,080	3,080
III.....	(9)	(9)	38.3	34.2	26.3	12.0	12.4	3,100	3,100
IV.....	(9)	(9)	38.7	34.7	26.3	12.4	12.7	3,180	3,180
1961: I <sup>7</sup> .....	(9)	(9)	39.3	35.3	26.7	12.6	12.9	3,310	3,310
II <sup>8</sup> .....	(9)	(9)	39.2	34.0	26.7	12.5	12.9	3,310	3,310
III <sup>8</sup> .....	(9)	(9)	39.3	34.4	26.9	12.4	12.8	3,280	3,280
IV <sup>8</sup> .....	(9)	(9)	40.6	35.5	27.2	13.4	13.6	3,490	3,490

<sup>1</sup> Net income of farm operators from farming (including net inventory change) and farm wages as shown.  
<sup>2</sup> Farm wages received by farm resident workers.

<sup>3</sup> Cash receipts from marketings, Government payments, and nonmoney income furnished by farms.

<sup>4</sup> Includes net change in inventory of crops and livestock valued at the average price for the year. Data prior to 1946 differ from farm proprietors' income shown in Tables B-11 and B-14 because of revisions by the Department of Agriculture not yet incorporated into the national income accounts of the Department of Commerce.

<sup>5</sup> Based on estimated number of farms as reported by the Department of Agriculture according to 1954 Census of Agriculture definition, except as noted in footnote 7.

<sup>6</sup> Income in current prices divided by the index of prices paid by farmers for family living items on a 1961 base.

<sup>7</sup> Per farm figures for 1954-61 based on interim approximations of number of farms consistent with the 1959 Census of Agriculture definition of a farm.

<sup>8</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>9</sup> Not available.

Source: Department of Agriculture.



TABLE B-71.—Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers, and parity ratio, 1929-67

[1910-14=100]

Year or month	Prices received by farmers											
	All farm products <sup>1</sup>	Crops							Livestock and products			
		All crops <sup>1</sup>	Food grains	Feed grains and hay		Cotton	Tobacco	Oil-bearing crops	All livestock and products <sup>1</sup>	Meat animals	Dairy products	Poultry and eggs
				Total	Feed grains							
1929.....	148	135	116	118	124	150	171	143	150	155	166	161
1930.....	125	115	93	106	109	104	140	111	134	133	142	128
1931.....	87	75	56	74	71	64	98	73	98	91	111	98
1932.....	65	57	44	48	44	49	84	44	72	63	86	81
1933.....	70	71	66	57	57	68	107	57	70	59	87	74
1934.....	90	98	90	95	97	101	156	103	81	68	101	89
1935.....	109	103	97	107	112	98	171	127	114	115	114	116
1936.....	114	108	108	103	110	99	163	120	119	118	125	115
1937.....	122	118	120	125	135	94	200	129	126	130	131	111
1938.....	97	80	75	71	73	70	173	95	112	113	115	110
1939.....	95	82	72	72	72	74	162	96	107	110	110	96
1940.....	100	90	84	85	86	83	134	103	109	106	120	98
1941.....	124	108	97	92	94	111	157	138	138	143	140	122
1942.....	159	145	120	115	117	156	247	183	171	186	163	152
1943.....	* 193	187	148	162	156	167	319	202	198	203	* 198	191
1944.....	* 197	199	166	172	175	172	348	222	196	190	* 222	177
1945.....	* 207	202	172	167	168	179	360	228	211	* 207	* 229	198
1946.....	* 236	228	201	202	212	238	376	260	242	* 248	* 268	201
1947.....	276	263	271	256	275	274	374	363	288	329	273	223
1948.....	267	255	250	258	273	272	380	351	315	361	301	242
1949.....	250	224	218	177	176	246	398	242	272	311	252	221
1950.....	258	233	224	193	198	282	402	276	280	340	249	186
1951.....	302	265	243	226	237	336	436	339	336	409	286	228
1952.....	288	267	244	234	242	310	432	295	306	353	303	206
1953.....	255	240	234	206	212	268	433	279	268	288	267	221
1954.....	246	242	232	203	209	274	443	304	249	283	246	178
1955.....	232	231	228	183	187	272	437	249	234	246	247	191
1956.....	230	235	224	182	186	268	452	255	226	235	255	176
1957.....	235	225	225	166	169	263	466	244	244	275	259	162
1958.....	250	223	208	154	156	253	482	225	273	335	254	170
1959.....	240	221	202	156	157	267	506	219	256	313	257	143
1960.....	238	221	203	151	150	254	500	214	253	296	250	160
1961.....	240	226	209	151	151	259	524	257	251	299	259	146
1960:												
January.....	233	220	206	151	148	253	485	216	243	280	266	146
February.....	234	218	208	153	150	240	495	216	247	289	261	145
March.....	241	221	210	153	150	240	495	213	257	309	256	155
April.....	242	224	209	158	155	244	494	216	257	311	244	163
May.....	240	225	209	158	158	247	495	218	252	309	237	154
June.....	235	221	199	158	159	260	494	216	248	303	235	149
July.....	236	222	194	156	158	265	491	213	249	300	244	149
August.....	234	219	196	152	153	273	488	211	247	290	254	154
September.....	238	222	197	152	153	272	510	208	251	285	269	163
October.....	241	222	200	147	146	267	513	209	257	286	277	176
November.....	241	219	204	136	132	254	517	213	260	288	282	182
December.....	242	217	204	141	137	243	517	217	263	298	278	178
1961:												
January.....	241	218	207	146	143	233	508	231	261	304	271	165
February.....	244	221	209	150	148	227	517	250	263	309	263	169
March.....	243	224	208	150	149	240	516	264	259	309	256	160
April.....	239	226	202	145	143	249	516	286	251	305	247	145
May.....	236	230	203	151	151	250	517	285	241	292	241	139
June.....	234	231	200	152	153	261	516	261	236	286	240	131
July.....	237	232	201	156	158	265	516	261	241	288	248	138
August.....	241	229	209	154	155	276	523	259	251	302	257	142
September.....	242	229	214	156	157	277	542	242	252	303	266	138
October.....	240	226	217	154	154	286	537	242	252	297	274	141
November.....	238	223	218	149	147	280	530	248	250	291	275	140
December.....	240	224	219	150	149	269	544	250	255	299	273	146

See footnotes at end of table, p. 290.

TABLE B-71.—Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers, and parity ratio, 1929-67—  
Continued

[1910-14=100]

Year or month	Prices paid by farmers										Parity ratio <sup>6</sup>	
	All items, interest, taxes, and wage rates (parity index)	Commodities and services							Interest <sup>2</sup>	Taxes <sup>3</sup>		Wage rates <sup>4</sup>
		All items	Family living items	Production items								
				All production items <sup>1</sup>	Feed	Motor vehicles	Farm machinery	Fertilizer				
1929.....	160	150	154	146	136	148	153	130	213	279	186	92
1930.....	151	140	144	135	122	144	152	126	206	281	177	83
1931.....	130	119	124	113	86	143	150	114	197	277	139	67
1932.....	112	102	106	99	64	141	142	100	185	254	104	58
1933.....	109	104	108	99	73	140	138	93	164	220	88	64
1934.....	120	118	122	114	103	148	144	105	147	188	99	75
1935.....	124	123	124	122	106	150	148	104	135	178	107	88
1936.....	124	123	124	122	109	157	150	98	125	180	114	92
1937.....	131	130	128	132	124	162	153	103	117	181	129	93
1938.....	124	122	122	122	93	172	158	102	110	187	130	78
1939.....	123	121	120	121	93	165	155	101	106	185	127	77
1940.....	124	122	121	123	100	163	153	98	102	189	129	81
1941.....	133	130	130	130	108	172	155	98	98	187	151	93
1942.....	152	149	149	148	132	186	164	109	94	189	197	105
1943.....	171	165	165	164	156	195	170	116	84	185	202	113
1944.....	182	174	175	173	173	211	174	118	79	185	318	108
1945.....	190	179	182	176	172	218	176	120	75	192	359	109
1946.....	208	197	202	191	200	224	182	121	74	213	387	113
1947.....	240	230	237	224	236	260	206	134	76	237	419	115
1948.....	260	250	251	250	250	291	240	146	78	276	442	110
1949.....	251	240	243	238	206	320	270	150	82	298	430	100
1950.....	256	246	246	246	210	320	277	144	89	320	425	101
1951.....	282	271	268	273	236	342	298	152	98	335	470	107
1952.....	287	273	271	274	251	358	308	156	108	350	503	100
1953.....	277	261	269	256	227	355	311	157	117	365	513	92
1954.....	277	262	270	255	226	355	312	158	126	381	510	89
1955.....	276	259	270	251	211	358	312	155	136	394	516	84
1956.....	278	260	274	250	206	367	326	152	150	421	536	83
1957.....	286	267	282	257	201	395	342	153	163	440	558	82
1958.....	293	273	287	264	198	412	357	153	176	470	574	85
1959.....	297	275	288	266	199	425	372	152	194	496	612	81
1960.....	299	275	290	265	194	420	382	152	213	534	631	80
1961 <sup>7</sup> .....	301	276	291	266	196	416	390	154	228	578	641	86
1960:												
January.....	299	275	289	265	197	432	-----	-----	213	536	632	78
February.....	299	275	289	266	197	-----	-----	-----	213	536	632	78
March.....	300	276	289	267	197	427	379	-----	213	534	633	80
April.....	302	277	291	268	199	-----	-----	152	213	534	649	80
May.....	301	277	291	267	198	-----	-----	-----	213	534	649	80
June.....	299	275	290	265	196	420	381	-----	213	534	649	79
July.....	298	274	290	263	195	420	-----	-----	213	534	651	79
August.....	298	274	290	262	193	-----	-----	-----	213	534	651	79
September.....	298	274	289	263	193	414	385	153	213	534	651	80
October.....	296	273	290	262	191	403	-----	-----	213	534	613	81
November.....	297	274	291	262	188	-----	-----	-----	213	534	613	81
December.....	298	275	291	265	189	417	385	-----	213	534	613	81
1961:												
January.....	301	276	291	267	194	417	-----	-----	228	578	655	80
February.....	302	277	291	267	196	-----	-----	-----	228	578	655	81
March.....	302	277	290	268	197	417	388	-----	228	578	655	80
April.....	302	277	290	267	195	-----	-----	153	228	578	647	79
May.....	302	277	291	266	199	-----	-----	-----	228	578	647	78
June.....	300	275	290	265	198	416	389	-----	228	578	647	78
July.....	300	275	290	264	198	416	-----	-----	228	578	648	79
August.....	301	276	290	265	197	-----	-----	-----	228	578	648	80
September.....	301	276	291	266	197	415	393	154	228	578	648	80
October.....	301	276	291	265	194	414	-----	-----	228	578	635	80
November.....	301	276	291	265	194	-----	-----	-----	228	578	635	79
December.....	302	277	292	267	197	-----	-----	-----	228	578	635	79

<sup>1</sup> Includes items not shown separately.

<sup>2</sup> Interest payable per acre on farm real estate debt.

<sup>3</sup> Farm real estate taxes payable per acre (levied in preceding year).

<sup>4</sup> Monthly data are seasonally adjusted.

<sup>5</sup> Percentage ratio of prices received for all farm products to parity index.

<sup>6</sup> Includes wartime subsidy payments.

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE B-72.—Farm production indexes, 1929-61

[1947-49=100]

Year	Farm output <sup>1</sup>	Crops									Livestock and products			
		Total <sup>2</sup>	Feed grains	Hay and forage	Food grains	Vegetables	Fruits and nuts	Cotton	Tobacco	Oil bearing crops	Total <sup>3</sup>	Meat animals	Dairy products	Poultry and eggs
1929	74	79	83	88	66	78	76	104	75	21	77	77	82	63
1930	72	76	73	75	72	79	75	98	81	23	78	78	84	65
1931	79	84	84	79	76	80	94	119	76	23	80	82	86	63
1932	76	80	95	86	62	80	76	91	49	21	81	83	86	63
1933	70	71	73	79	45	77	77	91	68	18	82	86	87	62
1934	60	58	48	67	44	84	72	68	54	21	75	73	85	59
1935	72	76	80	96	53	85	91	75	65	34	72	66	86	59
1936	65	64	53	74	52	80	72	87	58	27	77	74	87	63
1937	82	88	87	87	72	86	95	133	78	30	76	71	86	63
1938	79	83	84	98	75	86	85	84	69	36	79	77	89	65
1939	79	82	83	93	61	85	101	83	93	47	85	88	90	70
1940	82	85	85	105	67	88	96	88	72	56	87	89	92	70
1941	85	87	91	106	76	89	102	75	63	61	92	94	96	77
1942	96	97	104	115	80	95	101	90	70	92	102	108	100	89
1943	94	91	96	109	69	103	87	80	69	98	110	120	99	102
1944	97	96	100	108	85	98	101	86	96	82	105	108	101	102
1945	95	93	97	112	89	100	92	63	98	88	104	103	103	106
1946	98	98	106	104	92	111	110	61	114	84	101	101	102	99
1947	95	93	81	102	108	97	104	83	104	91	100	100	101	98
1948	104	106	116	99	103	103	95	105	98	109	97	97	98	96
1949	101	101	103	99	89	100	101	112	98	100	103	103	101	106
1950	101	97	104	106	83	102	101	70	101	115	107	109	101	111
1951	104	99	97	110	82	95	103	106	116	108	112	117	100	116
1952	108	104	103	106	105	96	100	106	112	104	112	117	100	117
1953	109	103	101	109	96	101	101	115	102	103	114	116	105	120
1954	109	101	106	108	85	98	102	96	111	116	117	121	107	125
1955	113	105	112	115	80	102	102	103	109	128	120	127	108	123
1956	114	106	112	109	84	109	107	93	108	152	122	123	110	136
1957	114	106	122	122	79	104	103	77	82	147	121	119	111	137
1958	124	118	135	122	117	108	109	80	86	180	124	124	111	145
1959	125	117	140	115	93	106	111	102	89	158	128	130	109	152
1960	128	121	143	119	111	108	108	100	96	170	126	125	110	151
1961 <sup>4</sup>	128	119	130	117	102	114	119	101	100	200	132	130	112	164

<sup>1</sup> Farm output measures the annual volume of farm production available for eventual human use through sales from farms or consumption in farm households. Total excludes production of feed for horses and mules.

<sup>2</sup> Includes production of feed for horses and mules and certain items not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Includes certain items not shown separately.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE B-73.—Selected measures of farm resources and inputs, 1929-61

Year	Cropland harvested (millions of acres) <sup>1</sup>		Live-stock breeding units (1947-49=100) <sup>2</sup>	Man-hours of farm work (billions)	Index numbers of inputs (1947-49=100)						
	Total	Exclusive of use for feed for horses and mules			Total	Farm labor	Farm real estate <sup>3</sup>	Mechanical power and machinery	Fertilizer and lime	Feed, seed, and live-stock purchases <sup>4</sup>	Miscellaneous
1929.....	365	298	92	23.2	98	138	98	53	36	38	96
1930.....	360	304	92	22.9	97	137	96	55	36	37	96
1931.....	365	303	93	23.4	96	140	94	52	28	32	99
1932.....	371	311	95	22.6	93	135	91	48	19	34	100
1933.....	340	281	98	22.6	91	135	92	44	21	34	97
1934.....	304	247	98	20.2	86	121	91	44	25	33	88
1935.....	345	289	86	21.1	88	126	93	45	29	32	84
1936.....	323	259	90	20.4	89	122	94	48	35	43	87
1937.....	347	295	87	22.1	94	132	95	52	41	40	86
1938.....	349	301	87	20.6	91	123	96	55	39	42	89
1939.....	330	285	93	20.7	94	123	97	55	41	52	92
1940.....	339	298	95	20.5	97	122	98	58	48	63	93
1941.....	342	302	94	20.0	97	120	98	61	52	65	94
1942.....	346	307	104	20.6	101	123	96	66	58	80	95
1943.....	356	319	117	20.3	101	121	94	69	66	88	97
1944.....	361	325	114	20.2	101	120	93	70	75	90	97
1945.....	354	322	108	18.8	99	113	93	74	78	101	97
1946.....	351	322	107	18.1	99	108	96	80	92	97	98
1947.....	354	323	103	17.2	99	103	98	89	97	102	99
1948.....	356	332	98	16.8	100	100	101	100	98	101	97
1949.....	360	338	99	16.2	101	97	101	111	105	97	104
1950.....	345	326	102	15.1	101	90	103	118	118	101	108
1951.....	344	326	103	15.2	104	91	104	127	128	112	112
1952.....	349	334	102	14.4	104	86	105	133	139	113	112
1953.....	348	335	100	13.9	103	83	105	134	143	112	116
1954.....	346	335	104	13.1	102	78	106	135	152	115	115
1955.....	340	330	106	12.8	102	76	106	136	156	120	120
1956.....	326	317	104	12.1	102	72	105	137	158	128	124
1957.....	326	318	102	11.4	100	68	105	138	163	130	122
1958.....	328	321	100	11.1	101	66	106	137	167	141	127
1959.....	330	324	100	10.8	102	64	106	139	189	149	133
1960.....	323	317	97	10.3	102	62	106	140	189	152	135
1961 <sup>5</sup> .....	303	297	98	10.1	101	61	106	139	193	155	136

<sup>1</sup> Acreage harvested (excluding duplication) plus acreages in fruits, tree nuts, and farm gardens.

<sup>2</sup> Animal units of breeding livestock, excluding horses and mules.

<sup>3</sup> Includes buildings and improvements on land.

<sup>4</sup> Nonfarm inputs associated with farmers' purchases.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE B-74.—Farm population, employment, and productivity, 1929-61

Year	Farm population (April 1) <sup>1</sup>		Net migration to and from farms (thousands) <sup>2</sup>	Farm employment (thousands) <sup>4</sup>			Farm output			Crop production per acre <sup>5</sup>	Livestock production per breeding unit	
	Number (thousands)	As percent of total population <sup>3</sup>		Total	Family workers	Hired workers	Per unit of total input	Per man-hour				
								Total	Crops			Livestock
Index, 1947-49=100												
1929	30,580	25.1	-477	12,763	9,360	3,403	76	54	51	76	79	84
1930	30,529	24.8	-61	12,497	9,307	3,190	74	53	50	76	75	85
1931	30,845	24.9	156	12,745	9,642	3,103	82	56	54	75	83	86
1932	31,388	25.1	607	12,816	9,922	2,894	82	56	55	75	79	85
1933	32,393	25.8	-463	12,739	9,874	2,865	77	52	50	73	71	84
1934	32,305	25.6	-527	12,627	9,765	2,862	70	50	48	69	59	77
1935	32,161	25.3	-799	12,733	9,855	2,878	82	57	57	70	76	84
1936	31,737	24.8	-834	12,331	9,350	2,981	73	53	50	73	65	86
1937	31,266	24.3	-661	11,978	9,054	2,924	87	62	60	73	88	87
1938	30,980	23.9	-545	11,622	8,815	2,807	87	64	63	76	85	91
1939	30,840	23.6	-703	11,338	8,611	2,727	84	64	63	79	85	91
1940	30,547	23.1	-633	10,979	8,300	2,679	85	67	67	80	88	92
1941	30,273	22.7	-1,424	10,669	8,017	2,652	88	71	71	82	90	98
1942	29,234	21.7	-2,975	10,504	7,949	2,555	95	78	78	88	99	98
1943	26,681	19.5	-1,563	10,446	8,010	2,436	93	78	76	92	92	94
1944	25,495	18.4	-564	10,219	7,988	2,231	96	81	79	90	96	92
1945	25,295	18.1	864	10,000	7,881	2,119	96	84	85	91	95	96
1946	26,483	18.7	151	10,295	8,106	2,189	99	91	92	94	101	94
1947	27,124	18.8	-1,696	10,382	8,115	2,267	96	92	91	97	95	97
1948	25,903	17.7	-371	10,363	8,026	2,337	104	104	104	99	106	99
1949	25,954	17.4	-1,314	9,964	7,712	2,252	100	104	105	104	99	104
1950	25,058	16.5	-1,302	9,926	7,597	2,329	100	112	114	107	97	105
1951	24,160	15.7	-271	9,546	7,310	2,236	100	114	112	114	98	109
1952	24,283	15.5	-1,996	9,149	7,005	2,144	104	126	125	117	104	110
1953	22,679	14.2	-962	8,864	6,775	2,089	106	131	129	120	103	114
1954	22,099	13.6	-25	8,639	6,579	2,060	107	140	138	124	101	112
1955	22,438	13.6	-435	8,364	6,347	2,017	111	149	148	130	106	113
1956	22,362	13.3	-1,134	7,820	5,899	1,921	112	158	161	136	109	117
1957	21,606	12.6	-576	7,577	5,682	1,895	114	168	160	138	112	119
1958	21,388	12.3	-548	7,525	5,570	1,955	123	188	203	144	126	124
1959	21,172	12.0	( <sup>6</sup> )	7,384	5,459	1,925	123	196	202	156	123	128
1960	20,541	11.4	( <sup>6</sup> )	7,118	5,249	1,869	125	206	220	159	130	130
1961 <sup>7</sup>	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	( <sup>6</sup> )	6,990	5,104	1,886	127	210	225	167	134	135

<sup>1</sup> Farm population as defined by Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce, i.e., civilian population living on farms, both urban and rural, regardless of occupation, according to concept in use prior to 1960.

<sup>2</sup> Total population of United States as of July 1, excluding Alaska and Hawaii; includes armed forces abroad.

<sup>3</sup> Net change for year beginning in April, estimated by Department of Agriculture. For 1940 and subsequent years, includes inductions and enlistments into the armed forces, and persons returning from the armed forces. For all years, includes persons who have not moved but who are in and out of the farm population because agricultural operations have begun or have ceased on the place where they are living.

<sup>4</sup> Includes persons doing farm work on all farms. These data, published by the Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, differ from those on agricultural employment by the Department of Labor (see Table B-19) because of differences in the method of approach, in concepts of employment, and in time of month for which the data are collected. For further explanation, see monthly report on *Farm Labor*, September 10, 1953.

<sup>5</sup> Computed from variable weights for individual crops produced each year.

<sup>6</sup> Not available.

<sup>7</sup> On the basis of 1960 Census definitions, farm population for 1960 is 15,635,000, or 8.7 percent of total population. Comparable figures for earlier years are not yet available.

<sup>8</sup> Preliminary.

Sources: Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-75.—Comparative balance sheet of agriculture, 1929-62

[Billions of dollars]

Beginning of year	Assets									Claims			
	Total	Real estate	Other physical assets				Financial assets			Total	Real estate debt	Other debt	Proprietors' equities
			Live-stock	Machinery and motor vehicles	Crops <sup>1</sup>	Household furnishings and equipment <sup>2</sup>	Deposits and currency	U.S. savings bonds	Investment in co-operatives				
1929.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	48.0	6.6	3.2	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	9.8	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1930.....	68.4	47.9	6.5	3.3	2.5	4.0	3.6	( <sup>3</sup> )	0.6	68.4	9.6	5.0	53.8
1931.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	43.7	4.9	3.2	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	9.4	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1932.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	37.2	3.6	2.9	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	9.1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1933.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	30.8	3.0	2.5	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	8.5	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1934.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	32.2	3.2	2.2	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	7.7	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1935.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	33.3	3.5	2.2	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	7.6	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1936.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	34.3	5.2	2.4	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	7.4	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1937.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	35.2	5.1	2.6	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	7.2	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1938.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	35.2	5.0	3.0	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	7.0	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1939.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	34.1	5.1	3.0	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	6.8	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
1940.....	53.0	33.6	5.1	3.1	2.7	4.3	3.2	0.2	.8	53.0	6.6	3.4	43.0
1941.....	55.1	34.4	5.3	3.3	3.0	4.3	3.5	.4	.9	55.1	6.5	3.9	44.7
1942.....	62.5	37.5	7.1	4.0	3.8	4.5	4.2	.6	.9	62.5	6.4	4.1	52.0
1943.....	73.3	41.6	9.6	4.9	5.1	4.6	5.4	1.1	1.0	73.3	6.0	4.0	63.3
1944.....	83.8	48.2	9.7	5.3	6.1	4.6	6.6	2.2	1.1	83.8	5.4	3.5	74.9
1945.....	93.1	53.9	9.0	6.3	6.7	4.7	7.9	3.4	1.2	93.1	4.9	3.4	84.8
1946.....	102.2	61.0	9.7	5.2	6.3	4.8	9.4	4.2	1.4	102.0	4.8	3.2	94.0
1947.....	113.9	68.5	11.9	5.1	7.1	5.4	10.2	4.2	1.5	113.9	4.9	3.6	106.4
1948.....	125.2	73.7	13.3	7.0	9.0	6.2	9.9	4.4	1.7	125.2	5.1	4.2	115.9
1949.....	132.1	76.6	14.4	9.4	8.6	7.0	9.6	4.6	1.9	132.1	5.3	6.1	120.7
1950.....	130.8	75.3	12.9	11.3	7.6	7.8	9.1	4.7	2.1	130.8	5.6	6.9	118.3
1951.....	149.6	86.8	17.1	13.0	7.9	8.7	9.1	4.7	2.3	149.6	6.1	7.0	136.5
1952.....	165.6	96.0	19.5	15.2	8.8	9.5	9.4	4.7	2.5	165.6	6.7	7.9	151.0
1953.....	162.9	96.6	14.8	15.6	9.0	10.2	9.4	4.6	2.7	162.9	7.3	8.8	146.8
1954.....	159.7	94.7	11.7	16.3	9.2	10.8	9.4	4.7	2.9	159.7	7.8	9.3	142.6
1955.....	164.7	98.8	11.2	16.2	9.6	11.4	9.4	5.0	3.1	164.7	8.3	9.5	146.9
1956.....	168.0	102.7	10.6	16.5	8.3	11.9	9.5	5.2	3.3	168.0	9.1	9.8	149.1
1957.....	176.2	109.5	11.0	17.1	8.3	12.4	9.4	5.1	3.4	176.2	9.9	9.6	156.7
1958.....	185.8	116.3	13.9	17.0	7.6	12.8	9.5	5.1	3.6	185.8	10.5	9.7	165.6
1959.....	201.9	125.1	17.7	17.7	9.3	13.1	10.0	5.2	3.8	201.9	11.3	12.0	178.6
1960.....	202.9	129.1	15.5	18.6	7.9	13.5	9.1	5.1	4.1	202.9	12.3	11.8	178.8
1961.....	204.1	130.6	15.5	18.1	8.1	13.7	8.7	5.1	4.3	204.1	13.1	12.3	178.7
New basis <sup>4</sup>													
1960.....	204.8	134.8	15.5	18.6	7.9	10.1	9.1	4.7	4.1	204.8	12.3	11.8	180.7
1961.....	206.1	136.5	15.5	18.1	8.1	10.3	8.7	4.6	4.3	206.1	13.1	12.3	180.7
1962 <sup>5</sup> .....	211.3	140.6	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	211.3	14.0	13.2	184.1

<sup>1</sup> Includes all crops held on farms for whatever purpose and crops held off farms as security for Commodity Credit Corporation loans. The latter on January 1, 1961, totaled \$648 million.

<sup>2</sup> Estimated valuation for 1940, plus purchases minus depreciation since then.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

<sup>4</sup> Tentative estimates based on revisions in process as a result of the 1959 Census of Agriculture.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

# INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS

TABLE B-76.—United States balance of payments, 1956-61<sup>1</sup>

[Millions of dollars]

Type of transaction	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	January-September	
						1960	1961
<b>Recorded transactions other than changes in monetary gold stock and in liquid liabilities:</b>							
United States payments: Total.....	25,846	27,374	27,206	28,689	30,781	22,788	22,121
Imports of goods and services: Total..	19,829	20,923	21,053	23,537	23,327	17,900	17,102
Merchandise, adjusted.....	12,804	13,291	12,951	15,294	14,722	11,237	10,550
Transportation.....	1,408	1,569	1,636	1,759	1,942	1,516	1,455
Travel.....	1,275	1,372	1,460	1,610	1,744	1,416	1,441
Miscellaneous services.....	807	873	918	935	942	708	776
Military expenditures.....	2,955	3,165	3,412	3,109	3,048	2,321	2,245
Income on investments:							
Private.....	426	452	537	549	597	438	436
Government.....	154	201	139	281	332	264	199
Unilateral transfers, net: Total.....	2,398	2,318	2,338	2,424	2,489	1,828	2,087
Government grants.....	1,733	1,616	1,616	1,633	1,641	1,210	1,445
Remittances and pensions.....	665	702	722	791	848	618	642
United States capital, net: Total....	3,619	4,133	3,815	* 2,728	4,965	3,060	2,932
Private, net: Total.....	2,990	3,175	2,844	2,375	3,856	2,299	2,494
Direct investments, net.....	1,859	2,058	1,094	1,372	1,694	961	1,194
New issues.....	453	597	955	624	573	472	388
Redemptions.....	-174	-179	-85	-95	-100	-69	-61
Other long-term, net.....	324	441	574	397	377	233	141
Short-term, net.....	528	258	306	77	1,312	702	832
Government, net: Total.....	629	958	971	* 353	1,109	761	438
Long-term capital, outflow..	545	993	1,176	* 1,051	1,213	825	1,231
Repayments.....	-479	-659	-544	-1,054	-631	-450	-1,006
Short-term, net.....	563	624	339	356	527	386	213
United States receipts: Total.....	24,281	27,161	23,298	24,418	27,500	20,265	21,134
Exports of goods and services: Total..	23,705	26,733	23,325	23,709	27,300	19,974	20,662
Merchandise, adjusted.....	17,379	19,390	16,263	16,282	19,409	14,277	14,591
Transportation.....	1,642	1,999	1,672	1,646	1,816	1,374	1,321
Travel.....	705	785	825	902	968	752	737
Miscellaneous services.....	1,210	1,306	1,347	1,534	1,567	1,139	1,197
Military transactions.....	158	372	296	302	335	250	340
Income on investments:							
Direct investments.....	2,120	2,313	2,198	2,228	2,338	1,602	1,801
Other private.....	297	363	417	466	518	376	460
Government.....	194	205	307	349	349	204	215
Foreign investments in the United States, other than liquid funds, net..	576	428	-27	709	200	291	472
Balance on recorded transactions [net receipts or net payments (-)].....	-1,565	-213	-3,908	-4,271	-3,281	-2,523	-987
<b>Unrecorded transactions—errors and omissions [net receipts or net payments (-)]...</b>	643	748	380	528	-648	-196	-184
<b>Increase in liquid liabilities to foreign countries and international institutions.....</b>	1,228	263	1,253	* 3,012	2,227	1,938	886
<b>United States gold sales or purchases (-)....</b>	-306	-798	2,275	* 731	1,702	781	285

<sup>1</sup> Excludes transfers of goods and services under military grant programs.

\* Excludes \$1,375 million for increase in United States subscription to the International Monetary Fund, of which \$344 million was paid in gold and \$1,031 million in non-interest-bearing notes.

Source: Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-77.—Major U.S. Government foreign assistance, by type and by area, total postwar period and fiscal years 1958-61

[Fiscal years, billions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Total	Western Europe (excluding Greece and Turkey)	Near East (including Greece and Turkey) and South Asia	Other Africa	Far East and Pacific	American Republics	International organizations and unspecified areas
<b>Total, net</b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	84.7	39.5	12.6	0.8	20.0	3.4	8.4
1958	4.8	1.1	1.3	.1	1.7	.4	.2
1959	6.0	.7	1.5	.1	1.5	.6	1.6
1960	4.2	.4	1.5	.2	1.5	.3	.3
1961	4.0	-.1	1.6	.2	1.5	.4	.4
<b>Investment in five international financial institutions<sup>2</sup></b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	4.9						4.9
1958							
1959	1.4						1.4
1960	.1						.1
1961	.1						.1
<b>Under assistance programs, net</b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	79.8	39.5	12.6	.8	20.0	3.4	3.4
1958	4.8	1.1	1.3	.1	1.7	.4	.2
1959	4.7	.7	1.5	.1	1.5	.6	.2
1960	4.1	.4	1.5	.2	1.5	.3	.2
1961	3.9	-.1	1.6	.2	1.5	.4	.3
<b>Net grants of military supplies and services</b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	28.8	14.7	4.5	.1	8.6	.6	.3
1958	2.3	.8	.6	(9)	.8	.1	(9)
1959	2.2	.7	.5	(9)	.8	.1	(9)
1960	2.0	.8	.4	(9)	.7	.1	(9)
1961	1.7	.6	.3	(9)	.7	.1	(9)
<b>Other aid, net</b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	51.0	24.8	8.1	.7	11.4	2.8	3.1
1958	2.5	.4	.7	.1	.9	.3	.2
1959	2.4	(9)	.9	.1	.7	.6	.2
1960	2.1	-.3	1.1	.2	.7	.2	.2
1961	2.2	-.6	1.3	.2	.8	.3	.3
<b>Net grants (less conversions)</b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	35.9	17.0	4.8	.4	10.3	.9	2.4
1958	1.5	.2	.3	(9)	.8	.1	.1
1959	1.6	.1	.5	.1	.7	.1	.1
1960	1.6	.2	.4	.1	.7	.1	.1
1961	1.8	.1	.6	.2	.7	.1	.2
<b>Net credits (including conversions)</b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	12.2	7.1	1.8	.3	.9	1.8	.4
1958	.6	.2	.1	(9)	.1	.2	(9)
1959	.7	-.1	.2	(9)	.1	.5	(9)
1960	.1	-.4	.3	(9)	(9)	.1	(9)
1961	(9)	-.7	.4	(9)	.1	.2	(9)
<b>Other assistance (through net accumulation of foreign currency claims)<sup>4</sup></b>							
Total postwar <sup>1</sup>	3.0	.6	1.5	(9)	.3	.2	.4
1958	.3	(9)	.2	(9)	(9)	(9)	.1
1959	.2	(9)	.2	(9)	(9)	(9)	.1
1960	.4	-.1	.3	(9)	(9)	.1	.1
1961	.4	(9)	.3	(9)	(9)	(9)	.1

<sup>1</sup> Fiscal years 1946-61.

<sup>2</sup> Inter-American Development Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, and International Monetary Fund.

<sup>3</sup> Less than \$50 million.

<sup>4</sup> Other assistance (net) represents the transfer of United States farm products in exchange for foreign currencies, less the U.S. Government's disbursements of the currencies as grants, credit, or for purchases.

Source: Department of Commerce.



TABLE B-78.—United States merchandise export and imports, by economic category, 1949 and 1956-61

[Millions of dollars]

Category	1949	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	January-September	
							1960	1961
<b>Domestic exports: Total</b> <sup>1</sup> .....	11,789	17,183	19,316	16,202	16,211	19,351	14,241	14,526
Agricultural.....	3,578	4,170	4,506	3,854	3,955	4,824	3,392	3,569
Nonagricultural.....	8,211	13,013	14,810	12,348	12,256	14,527	10,849	10,957
<b>Food and beverages.....</b>	2,302	2,744	2,738	2,549	2,796	3,096	2,224	2,341
Agricultural foodstuffs.....	2,254	2,702	2,696	2,511	2,751	3,053	2,196	2,315
Nonagricultural foodstuffs.....	48	42	42	38	45	43	28	26
<b>Industrial supplies and materials.....</b>	4,870	7,281	8,583	6,404	6,110	7,797	5,753	5,654
Cotton, tobacco, and other agricultural.....	1,273	1,360	1,720	1,262	1,088	1,653	1,115	1,170
Nonagricultural industrial materials.....	3,597	5,921	6,863	5,142	5,022	6,144	4,638	4,484
<b>Materials used in farming.....</b>	167	297	303	263	300	331	241	251
<b>Capital equipment.....</b>	3,378	5,271	5,931	5,328	5,363	6,356	4,737	4,935
Machinery and related items.....	2,296	3,568	4,028	3,667	3,706	4,109	3,026	3,323
Commercial transportation equipment.....	918	1,454	1,626	1,423	1,369	1,789	1,371	1,148
Special category equipment <sup>2</sup> .....	164	249	277	238	288	458	340	464
<b>Consumer goods, nonfood.....</b>	913	1,314	1,333	1,271	1,274	1,323	950	1,006
<b>Government military sales and unclassified.....</b>	159	276	428	387	368	448	336	339
<b>General imports: Total.....</b>	6,622	12,615	12,982	12,834	15,207	14,654	11,179	10,535
<b>Industrial supplies and materials.....</b>	3,727	7,299	7,201	6,585	8,021	7,593	5,843	5,417
Petroleum and products.....	485	1,282	1,534	1,610	1,536	1,547	1,141	1,254
Newsprint and paper base stocks.....	670	1,093	1,032	988	1,089	1,099	813	808
Materials associated with non-durable goods output.....	991	1,321	1,301	1,161	1,556	1,489	1,158	1,067
Selected building materials (excluding metals).....	143	487	407	435	603	540	424	400
All other industrial supplies and materials (associated mainly with durable goods output).....	1,438	3,116	2,927	2,391	3,237	2,918	2,307	1,888
<b>Food and beverages.....</b>	2,004	3,086	3,175	3,354	3,364	3,211	2,416	2,405
<b>Materials used in farming.....</b>	286	365	380	366	366	353	271	294
<b>Consumer goods, nonfood.....</b>	410	1,260	1,524	1,710	2,424	2,453	1,860	1,555
<b>Capital equipment (including agricultural machinery).....</b>	107	368	412	481	618	605	466	527
<b>All other and unclassified.....</b>	88	237	290	371	414	439	323	337

<sup>1</sup> Excludes military aid shipments of supplies and equipment under the Mutual Security Program, 1956-61; in 1949, excludes military shipments under the Greek-Turkey and the China military aid programs.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes Government military cash sales.

<sup>3</sup> Total adjusted to exclude \$33 million of the value reported by economic category.

Source: Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-79.—United States merchandise exports and imports, by area, 1949 and 1956-61

[Millions of dollars]

Area	1949	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	January-October	
							1960	1961
<b>Exports (including reexports):</b>								
<b>Total</b> <sup>1</sup> .....	11,560	17,015	18,990	15,919	15,915	18,834	15,485	15,772
Canada.....	1,928	4,035	3,935	3,438	3,743	3,707	3,123	3,033
Other Western Hemisphere..	2,820	4,008	4,848	4,334	3,777	3,755	3,141	3,042
Western Europe.....	3,980	5,216	5,748	4,509	4,530	6,299	5,128	5,173
Other Europe.....	65	18	91	118	96	207	153	133
Asia.....	1,997	2,801	3,391	2,658	2,755	3,627	2,922	3,387
Oceania.....	175	249	282	245	323	475	386	338
Africa.....	594	688	695	618	691	765	632	667
<b>General imports: Total</b> .....	6,622	12,615	12,982	<sup>2</sup> 12,834	15,207	14,654	12,336	11,874
Canada.....	1,512	2,894	2,907	2,684	3,042	2,902	2,430	2,543
Other Western Hemisphere..	2,483	3,982	4,141	4,049	4,029	3,964	3,326	3,086
Western Europe.....	909	2,890	3,077	3,297	4,523	4,184	3,514	3,288
Other Europe.....	72	73	69	68	85	83	71	69
Asia.....	1,184	1,996	1,985	1,997	2,603	2,721	2,302	2,112
Oceania.....	125	203	216	209	338	266	237	268
Africa.....	338	597	587	561	589	535	456	506

<sup>1</sup> Excludes special category items.

<sup>2</sup> Total adjusted to exclude \$33 million of the value reported by area.

Source: Department of Commerce.

TABLE B-80.—Estimated gold reserves and dollar holdings of foreign countries and international organizations, 1949 and 1956-61

[Millions of dollars; end of period]

Area and country	1949	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
							Sep- tember <sup>1</sup>
Total.....	18, 677	32, 489	32, 565	36, 543	42, 237	46, 371	48, 267
Continental Western Europe.....	6, 101	14, 008	14, 683	17, 244	19, 254	21, 058	23, 071
Austria.....	92	377	460	612	630	539	527
Belgium.....	820	1, 054	1, 053	1, 391	1, 279	1, 314	1, 479
France.....	713	1, 557	944	1, 294	1, 980	2, 165	3, 019
Germany.....	149	3, 343	4, 113	4, 407	4, 640	6, 450	6, 403
Italy.....	564	1, 270	1, 533	2, 209	3, 119	3, 080	3, 376
Netherlands.....	370	983	957	1, 399	1, 634	1, 783	1, 807
Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland)...	394	882	960	1, 121	1, 113	941	1, 145
Switzerland.....	2, 067	2, 643	2, 813	2, 853	2, 991	2, 957	3, 263
Other.....	932	1, 899	1, 830	1, 958	1, 868	1, 829	2, 052
United Kingdom.....	2, 027	3, 015	3, 080	3, 917	3, 813	4, 887	5, 302
Canada.....	1, 516	2, 986	3, 180	3, 438	3, 610	3, 770	4, 040
Latin America.....	3, 078	4, 314	4, 544	4, 123	4, 014	3, 645	3, 698
Argentina.....	418	370	263	210	393	420	446
Brazil.....	510	550	457	464	479	483	552
Chile.....	101	138	116	140	228	180	178
Colombia.....	138	210	215	241	288	237	223
Cuba.....	463	514	525	452	296	79	46
Mexico.....	270	604	569	565	587	541	536
Peru.....	82	119	88	96	111	114	124
Uruguay.....	236	260	236	262	242	232	230
Venezuela.....	517	1, 061	1, 556	1, 215	932	797	847
Other.....	343	488	519	478	458	562	516
Asia.....	2, 008	3, 400	2, 937	3, 251	4, 008	4, 444	4, 247
Japan.....	356	1, 149	716	1, 095	1, 566	2, 169	1, 956
Other.....	1, 652	2, 251	2, 221	2, 156	2, 442	2, 275	2, 291
All other countries.....	679	1, 231	1, 222	1, 199	1, 313	1, 273	1, 302
International.....	3, 268	3, 535	2, 919	3, 371	6, 225	7, 294	6, 607

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

NOTE.—Includes gold reserves and dollar holdings of all foreign countries (with the exception of gold reserves of U.S.S.R., other Eastern European countries, and Communist China), and of international organizations (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, United Nations and others). Holdings of the Bank for International Settlements and the European Payments Union/European Fund and the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold are included under "other" Continental Western Europe.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-81.—Price changes in international trade, 1954-61

[1953=100]

Area or commodity class	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
								Third quarter
<b>Area:</b>								
Developed areas:								
Exports .....	98	98	101	104	101	99	100	101
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	98	98	99	98	102	104	105	107
Underdeveloped areas:								
Exports .....	102	102	101	101	97	93	94	92
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	106	105	102	98	98	96	96	95
Latin America:								
Exports .....	106	99	98	96	89	83	85	85
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	111	102	99	94	89	84	85	87
Latin America excluding petroleum:								
Exports .....	105	97	96	93	84	78	80	80
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	110	100	96	91	84	78	81	82
<b>Commodity class: <sup>2</sup></b>								
Manufactured goods .....	98	99	103	106	106	106	109	110
Nonferrous base metals .....	99	119	123	100	90	99	102	102
Primary commodities: Total .....	103	100	101	102	96	94	93	91
Excluding crude petroleum .....	103	99	100	101	94	93	93	90
Foodstuffs .....	107	96	97	98	94	89	88	85
Coffee, tea, cocoa .....	136	103	100	97	94	80	76	69
Cereals .....	89	87	86	83	82	80	79	81
Other agricultural commodities .....	100	102	101	101	90	94	96	92
Fats, oils, oilseeds .....	98	92	99	95	94	98	92	88
Textiles .....	101	95	92	97	78	75	80	82
Wool .....	95	86	87	98	69	73	74	75
Minerals .....	99	102	109	114	108	103	101	100
Metal ores .....	96	103	110	107	100	99	101	102

<sup>1</sup> Terms of trade indexes are unit value indexes of exports divided by unit value indexes of imports.

<sup>2</sup> Data are for second quarter.

<sup>3</sup> Manufactured goods indexes are for exports. Primary commodities indexes are for exports and imports combined.

NOTE.—Data shown for area groups and for manufactured goods are unit value indexes. All others are price indexes.

Data exclude trade of Soviet area and Communist China.

Source: United Nations.







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